
New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax 3

Constituent Syntax: Quantification, Numerals, Possession, Anaphora

Philip Baldi
Pierluigi Cuzzolin
Editors

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Volume 3

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Volume 3: Constituent Syntax: Quantification, Numerals, Possession, Anaphora

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List of abbreviations

[anim]	animate (as semantic feature)
[def]	definite (as semantic feature
[hum]	human (as semantic feature)
1st	first person
2nd	second person
3rd	third person
abl.	ablative
abs.	absolute
acc.	accusative
AcI	*Accusativus cum Infinitivo*
adj.	adjective
adv.	adverb
AG	adjective-genitive (order)
ALat.	Archaic Latin
AN	adjective-noun (order)
AS	Anglo-Saxon
BCE	before the common era
Catal.	Catalan
CE	in the common era
Celtiber.	Celtiberian
CLat.	Classical Latin
coord.	coordinating
cop.	copula
dat.	dative
decl.	declension
deict.	deictic
det.	determiner
DG	determiner-genitive (order)
ELat.	Early Latin
erg.	ergative
Eng.	English
Fr.	French
fut.	future

Gaul.	Gaulish
gen.	genitive
Ger.	German
Gk.	Greek
GN	genitive-noun (order)
Goth.	Gothic
Heb.	Hebrew
Hitt.	Hittite
IE	Indo-European
imperat.	imperative
impf.	imperfect
Ind.	Indic
indic.	indicative
infin.	infinitive
instr.	instrumental
interrog.	interrogative
Ir.	Irish
It.	Italian
Lat.	Latin
Lep.	Lepontic
LLat.	Late Latin
loc.	locative
Med.	Medieval
ME	Middle English
MFr.	Middle French
MHG	Middle High German
ModRum.	Modern Rumanian
N	noun
NA	noun-adjective (order)
NcI	*Nominativus cum Infinitivo*
NG	noun-genitive (order)
nom.	nominative
NP	noun phrase
num.	numeral
OE	Old English
OFr.	Old French

OHG	Old High German
OIr.	Old Irish
OIt.	Old Italian
ord.	ordinal
OSard.	Old Sardinian
Osc.	Oscan
OSp.	Old Spanish
OSV	object-subject-verb (order)
OV	object-verb (order)
OVS	object-verb-subject (order)
pass.	passive
Paelign.	Paelignian
perf.	perfect
pers.	person
PIE	Proto-Indo-European
pl.	plural
Port.	Portuguese
PP	prepositional phrase
pred.	predication
pres.	present
pron.	pronoun
Prov.	Provencal
ptc.	particle
ptcp.	participle
Rom.	Romance
Rum.	Rumanian
Russ.	Russian
Sard.	Sardinian
sg.	singular
Skt.	Sanskrit
SLat.	Silver Latin
SOV	subject-object-verb (order)
Sp.	Spanish
spec	specifier
subj.	subject
SVO	subject-verb-object (order)

Sw.	Swedish
Umbr.	Umbrian
V	verb
VO	verb-object (order)
voc.	vocative
VOS	verb-object-subject (order)
VSO	verb-subject-object (order)
W.	Welsh

Other abbreviations

cod./codd.	codex
BTL	*Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina*
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*
ed. princ.	*editio princeps*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
ILCV	*Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*
Lex XII tab.	*Lex XII Tabularum*
ms/mss	manuscript/manuscripts
OLD	*Oxford Latin Dictionary*
sc.	*scilicet* (that is to say)
S. C. de Bacch.	*Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*
s.v./s.vv.	under the word/s
ThLL	*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (textual citations follow *ThLL* conventions)
v.l./vv.ll.	*varia lectio* (alternate reading)

Special signs

::	indicates speaker switch in dialogue
←	is replaced by
→	onward

<	develops from
>	develops into
*	indicates a reconstructed form (acc. to context)
*	indicates an ungrammatical sentence (acc. to context)

Philip Baldi and Pierluigi Cuzzolin

Prolegomena

1. Background and methodology

With this volume (the third of four) we continue the publication of *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax*[1]. This work has been underway for longer than either of us cares to remember, though looking back from the vantage point of the present, it is hard to imagine that it could have taken any less time than it has, or will, by the time the last volume is published.

Given the number of years involved in its formation, the project's history bears recounting. *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax* was conceived on an excursion bus in Spain while the two editors were attending the IX International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics in Madrid in 1997. Baldi was telling Cuzzolin about his book on the history of Latin (Baldi 2002), which was underway at the time, and was lamenting the fact that, despite his efforts to do so, Baldi had failed to provide anything but a few scattered observa-

1. The work was originally announced as *The New Historical Syntax of Latin*, and was projected to contain chapters on "Non-finite subordination", "Negation", "Apposition", "Requests and commands", and "Voice". Unfortunately, the authors of these chapters failed to produce the work they had promised, and by the time their inaction became fully apparent to the editors, it was too late for us to recruit new contributors. We deeply regret the absence of these chapters, whose subject matter is so central to the history and structure of Latin. So a less inclusive title was developed which reflected the actual contents, and which also conveyed the novelty of our approach; hence, *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax*. Another departure from the original plan concerns the number of volumes. In the "Prolegomena" of Volume One we described the work as comprising three volumes. But the sheer size of many of the contributions, which in some cases are equal to small monographs, compelled the publisher, with our agreement, to subdivide the contents of the projected Volume Two into Volumes Two and Three. By the time this decision was taken, it was too late for us to change the text of the Prolegomena of Volume One.

tions on Latin historical syntax. The reason, he explained, was that the book was situated squarely in the Neogrammarian/structuralist tradition as it laid out the facts of phonological and morphological change from Proto-Indo-European (PIE) to Latin, and that syntax simply didn't lend itself to the same sort of account. There existed no complete account of PIE syntax from which Latin could be revealingly derived, as was the case for phonology and morphology. So short of reconstructing PIE syntax first, then handling the Latin facts accordingly, the prospects for providing an account of historical Latin syntax seemed well beyond the scope of Baldi's book, and outside the parameters of traditional approaches to linguistic change.

Cuzzolin agreed with Baldi's methodological assessment, but rather than concede the hopelessness of the situation, he suggested a three-pronged strategy, proposing a new historical syntax of Latin that would fill the need which Baldi's book (and others before it) failed to provide. The first part of the strategy involved a cooperative effort between the two of us, as joint coordinators of the proposed enterprise. Thus began a collaboration that has stretched far beyond this project, and promises to continue into the future. The second part involved the recognition that a subject as vast as the evolution of Latin syntax, from its PIE beginnings up to the Early Middle Ages, was a task beyond the capacity, and the capability, which we together brought to the table. A team of specialists would be required to do the job. Finally, there was the crucial matter of framework. We both recognized the inadequacies of structure-based approaches to syntactic change, especially for an account on the scale which we imagined would be required to write an explanatory historical syntax. We saw traditional grammar as insightful, but not sophisticated enough to reveal the sorts of generalizations that linguists are bound to provide. Various instantiations of generative grammar were discussed, but the general inadequacy of this model in dealing with the syntax of extinct languages, and in providing a general framework for diachronic explanation, loomed large. So we abandoned this approach as a possibility, acknowledging further that neither of us was fluent enough in the theory, and also that the pool of potential contributors from this tradition was vanishingly small. A different approach would be required, one that incorporated structural and functional information into the explanatory formula, one that handled diachronic phenomena, and one in which we felt comfortable. This holistic framework is called the "functional-typological" approach, about which we will have more to say below.

The project percolated until 1999, when we introduced it to our peers at the X International Congress of Latin Linguistics in Paris (published as Baldi and Cuzzolin 1999). By this time we had prepared a provisional Table of Contents and had secured some funding from the US National Science Foundation to explore the framework as it applied to our own subjects, namely Possession (Baldi) and Comparison (Cuzzolin). The team was also beginning to take shape, which was no small accomplishment given the number of scholars worldwide who met all the criteria, namely to be: a Latinist; a linguist; sympathetic to and versed in the functional-typological approach; interested in diachrony; willing to work on the project. Settling the roster of collaborators was the most difficult part, not only because the pool is so restricted, but also because the parameters of the assignment and the normal ebb and flow of academic commitment eliminated many fine scholars. A representative set of team members assembled at the University of Bergamo in June of 2000, when the basic intellectual and structural guidelines of the project were discussed and agreed upon by the group. It was around this time that members started working on their chapters. The group met again for a three-day conference at the Rockefeller Foundation Villa in Bellagio in September, 2001, where an intense vetting of each contribution was performed by the group on every presentation. This was followed by a mini-conference at the University of Bologna in June of 2003, when semi-final drafts were presented and critiqued. Deadlines were set, and reset, several times, and by June of 2005 we had many of the chapters, much expanded and hugely improved, available for the editing process. By this time we realized, with the agreement of the editorial staff of Mouton de Gruyter, that more volumes would be required, largely because of the considerable excess over the original page limit on the part of nearly every contributor. In the end, four volumes proved necessary, a sizable increase over initial predictions.

2. Historical syntax and Latin

The term "history of Latin" (or of any other ancient IE language) in its most widespread usage means "history of phonology and morphology" as they have developed from PIE. Comparative grammars of Latin (e.g., Leumann 1977, Sommer & Pfister 1977, Meillet & Vendryes 1979, Sihler 1995, Baldi 2002) have concentrated primarily on the development of the phonological

and morphological systems of the language, with comparatively little attention paid to historical syntax. This emphasis is reflective of the Indo-European tradition in which the aforementioned works were executed. The few existing historical syntaxes of Latin are also methodologically located well within the mainstream of the Indo-European linguistics, with an emphasis of structure over function. In this category are the volumes of Draeger (1878–1881) and Scherer (1975), as well as the more synchronically-oriented grammars of Kühner & Stegmann (1912–1914), Hofmann & Szantyr (1965), Woodcock (1959), and Ernout & Thomas (1964).

The most dramatic scientific accomplishments of the past two hundred years have been in the areas of historical phonology, morphology, and lexicon, resulting in numerous handbooks, encyclopedias and etymological dictionaries of Indo-European and its descendants. However, comparatively less progress has been made in the reconstruction of an agreed-upon set of syntactic structures which characterize the protolanguage, and the corresponding principles which govern the syntactic evolution of the daughter languages. The most recent outlines of PIE, by Beekes (1995), Szemerényi (1996), and Meier-Brügger (2003) contain no treatment of syntax, though Fortson (2004) is a qualified exception. And despite the ongoing progress and promise of the approach to PIE syntax based primarily on word order typology in the massive research program initiated by W. P. Lehmann (e.g., 1974, 1993), a complete explanatory syntax of PIE is yet to be developed. Furthermore, historical syntax as a field continues to lag behind phonology and morphology methodologically, so that explanatory diachronic principles which are not bound to particular synchronic formalist theories have yet to be developed. The result: historical linguistics has failed to provide a comprehensive method with the power to explain large-scale syntactic developments in the long-term history of a language. This is not to suggest that diachronic syntactic analyses do not exist (cf. for example the work of Harris and Campbell 1995, Lightfoot, e.g., 1999, Miller 2002, Kiparsky, e.g., Condoravi and Kiparsky 2001, Hopper and Traugott 2003). These approaches provide accounts of particular syntactic developments in specific languages, or of specific diachronic phenomena resulting from grammaticalization. What we are attempting to do in this historical syntax is to develop a methodology, which includes grammaticalization phenomena, around which the *entire* syntactic history of a language can be written.

The general omission of syntax from the study of the history of Latin is a consequence of many factors. Chief among these are the aforementioned lack of a detailed explanatory syntax of PIE, and the dominantly structuralist/formalist approach which typifies Neogrammarian and post-Neogrammarian thinking, with its primary focus on the rules governing the regular development of the phonological and morphological systems of the IE languages from PIE. Such rules and processes are less obvious in the development of the syntactic system, and there is no verified methodological principle to guide the way in the study of syntactic change. For example, the regularity principle of exceptionless sound change provides a strict methodological guideline in the description of phonological, and to a lesser extent morphological change. For syntax, no such principle exists so that there is no methodologically consistent means to map syntactic structures from reconstructed PIE to the actually occurring daughter languages. Typological and grammatical reorganizations are often so extreme between PIE and its descendant systems that structural mappings of the type familiar from phonology and morphology, namely "X > Y/Z", are often difficult to identify.

The traditional strategy according to which the historical description of the syntax of Latin and other early IE languages has been executed is one of evaluating data structurally, just as in phonology and morphology. An unspoken principle of explanation is the chronological order in which structures are attested, or their marginality in the system. Thus, the older or more marginal a structure is, the more it is privileged in historical analysis. Deeper and more integrated linguistic explanations, when they are attempted, are provided in piecemeal fashion without full consideration of the overall picture of the syntactic development of Latin from PIE, or of syntactic changes which have taken place within the historical period of Latin itself. Such isolated explanations are particularly prominent in generative and post-generative analyses of syntactic change, which attend to a relatively small number of structural types and deal with their development in terms of pre-established (synchronic) formal considerations. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the discourse levels represented in ancient texts, and to the different types of syntactic phenomena which different textual genres can reveal within a language. This is a particularly serious problem in formalist approaches to syntactic change, which generally have underdeveloped mechanisms for dealing with syntactic variation by text type, since such variation frequently involves discourse-level and pragmatic considerations.

3. The Functional-typological Approach

Because of the failure of traditional structuralist and current formalist approaches to provide a coherent method for the study of large-scale, system-wide syntactic change, and with it the failure to provide the means to study the syntactic evolution of ancient languages like Latin in their historical entirety, it seems clear that a new approach is necessary. The approach we have tried to develop in this work is a holistic one, in which structural considerations of the traditional type are combined in a complementary and balanced way with functional and typological principles. The functional/typological perspective provides a powerful alternative to the strict structural models of the nineteenth century and their later formalist descendants. Of course, the perspective adopted in this historical syntax is that the functional/typological approach and the formal one are not incompatible (see Newmeyer 2003, with ensuing debate). In addition, even though typological descriptions of single languages are becoming more common in the literature, typology by definition is ideally based on a rich sample of genetically unrelated languages. How then are we to profit from a typology based on a single language? One claim underlying our approach is that the vertical or diachronic dimension of a language provides a typological equivalent to the horizontal or synchronic comparison of genetically unrelated languages. For example, in its history from Proto-Indo-European, Latin shifts from a "be" language to a "have" language as regards its basic expression of predicative possession. That is, it shifts from the *mihi est liber* type of expression ("A book is to me") to the *habeo librum* type ("I have a book"). This diachronic shift is in complete compatibility with the typology of possession developed through the study of unrelated languages synchronically, namely a distinction between "be" and "have" expressions, conforming right down to the type of "be" language that it was originally (the locative type) to the etymological source of the "have" verb (from "seize, grasp"). See Baldi and Nuti, this volume.

Another basic concept underlying a functional/typological grammar are that cognitive principles are involved in grammatical organization, and that these principles are relevant to the description and history of a language. In this methodology, the relevant facts include typological variation for a particular construction and the semantic and pragmatic function of that construction in each language. In a formalist methodology, on the other hand, the

facts consist of a variety of constructions, within a single language or across languages, that display the same, or almost the same domains, of application (Croft 1991: 17). Given the often considerable changes that have taken place between the ancestral PIE stage and the actually occurring daughter languages, or between Archaic Latin and Late Latin, it is clear that such constructions as may be present in one stage may be wholly absent in another, or vice-versa, with the result that some potentially important fact of grammatical history may be missed.

For example, PIE quite clearly had a mood (the optative) whose primary independent function was to express some wished-for or desired outcome on the part of the speaker. Latin gave up the optative mood in the pre-literary period, and collapsed it functionally with the subjunctive, the common thread between the two moods being that both express some *irrealis* condition (a few morphological traces of the optative survive). In traditional structure-based approaches to historical syntax, this is the extent of the explanation. However, a functional/typological perspective is concerned not with "*What* happened to the optative as it developed from PIE into Latin", but rather "*How* did PIE express the notion of 'desired outcome', and *how* does Latin express the same notion"? Latin, having given up the optative mood, innovates in exploiting a dominantly lexical expression of "desired outcome", namely *utinam* 'would that' and through the use of verbs like *sperare* and *velle*, both meaning 'wish', but originally meaning 'thrive, prosper' and 'want, choose' respectively.

Such structural asymmetries can be seen from the perspective of the descendant as well as that of the parent. As an example of a syntactic construction for which there is no apparent Latin antecedent, we note that in French there is an aspectual construction which expresses recency, marked by the verb *venir* 'to come' accompanied by an infinitive and the preposition *de* (*Il vient de voir Marie* 'He just saw Marie'). This construction has no direct structural ancestor in Latin (**venit de videre Mariam*). Its origins involve functional and semantic changes in the verb; changes in the function of prepositions; and changes in the grammatical function of infinitives, all to create a novel means of expressing verbal aspect. No simple structural conversion can tell the story.

In the functional/typological approach, historical syntactic phenomena are analyzed according to a continuum, along which are located parameters

relevant to syntactic description. This continuum of possible expressions of a given feature or category is deduced from the typological study of the world's languages. Such a study is designed to reveal patterns of expression of particular concepts, and to allow the formation of universal generalizations according to which data in individual languages can be evaluated. It is presupposed that all linguistic phenomena, including syntactic ones, can be arranged on a scale from the maximal form of expression (e.g., lexical) through intermediate stages (e.g., syntactic or morphological) to the minimal form of expression (e.g., phonological). Relevant to the conception of grammatical scale is the notion of the implicational universal: when changes take place they are assumed to have occurred along the continuum in a non-arbitrary order. For example, in our survey of possession, we found no examples of "have" languages becoming "be" languages, only the other way around (e.g., Yucatec Maya, various Indo-European languages). The change is based on a complex network of lexical ("seize" > "hold" > "have, possess"), pragmatic ("location in" is roughly equivalent to "have") and typological parameters (such as increasing subjectivity as in *John has a book* vs. *A book is at John*).

One of the basic assumptions of this approach is that some semantic notions are pervasively encoded in syntax. This implies that several apparently unrelated phenomena may be well accounted for by the presence or absence of a particular feature. In other words, if a given feature begins to be encoded in a syntactic construction, or, conversely, stops being encoded syntactically, this change provides the trigger for a series of other changes. We can think of this systematic triggering of related changes affecting different grammatical categories as a network. In the example of the optative mood cited above, there seem to be two factors which contributed to the loss of this mood. On the formal side, it seems that the use of the optative in subordinate clauses introduced by conjunctions brought about a syntactic rather than a semantic regulation of the category in late PIE and derivatively in preliterary Latin. In such a syntactic regulation, rules of sequencing are dictated by purely grammatical conditions (W.P. Lehmann 1993: 182-183), partially depriving the optative mood of its independent function of marking wished-for outcome. On the functional side, it may be that the same change which is acknowledged to have brought about the loss of the productive middle voice in Latin and some other early IE languages, namely a rise in transitivity as late PIE changed from an active language to a nominative-accusative one, also played

a part in bringing about the loss of the optative mood in Latin. This is because the notion of wished-for or desired outcome which characterizes the basic meaning of the optative necessarily involves some beneficiary or experiencer role for the subject, as does the middle voice. As Latin moved away from middle expressions and more in the direction of expressions encoding strong transitivity and agency (with active verbs plus reflexive pronouns in place of the middle voice), the expression of the notion "wished-for outcome" shifted from the morphologically expressed optative mood to independent lexical forms such as *sperare* and *velle*. Furthermore, we see that the same network of changes involving a rise in agent-oriented expressions can also explain the loss of impersonal constructions such as *pudet* 'it shames', *paenitet* 'it repents' and *miseret* 'it moves to pity' from Latin to the Romance languages (cf. Bauer 2000).

4. The diachronic dimension

When we speak of Latin, we are properly speaking about a system that includes a number of dialects which can be classified as comprising a single linguistic category (see Figure 1). Of these dialects, "Classical Latin" is surely the best attested because it is the vehicle of classical literature. Far less represented in the record are those spoken dialects of the Latin diasystem which underlie the Romance languages. It is not out of the question, though it is impossible to prove, that all of the dialects of Latin can be traced back to a single homogenous variant, perhaps going back to the beginnings of the first millennium BCE.

Written standardized Latin, the classical language, was accessible to a fairly small segment of the population of ancient Rome. Only a few, most of them men, were sufficiently trained and educated to master the classical variant, which over time diverged more and more from the spoken dialects. And of course there were many regional and social varieties of spoken Latin, not only around Rome itself, but also in the reaches of the Romania, from Dacia to Sicily to the Iberian Peninsula. The real history of Latin then is one which is represented in the continuously evolving spoken dialects. Written, Classical Latin is not the direct ancestor of any particular Romance language or dialect. Our challenge is to discern the essential features which link all the




Figure 1. The diachrony of Latin (after Pulgram 1978)

varieties of Latin together, including the classical dialect, into a uniform and explanatory historical account.

The diachrony of Latin can be approached in two complementary ways. These are the retrospective and prospective dimensions of this or any language. Because of its place in the Indo-European family of languages, Latin has long enjoyed a special place in historical linguistic circles. With its rich inscriptional corpus and deep chronology stemming from the 6th century BCE, Latin is among the crown jewels of Indo-European linguistics. It has a well-deserved reputation for archaism in many areas of the system, and rarely fails to make an appearance in the effort to reconstruct PIE at any level, phonology, morphology, syntax or lexicon.

The early inscriptional monuments of Latin, from the 6th century BCE, offer a trove of materials which are also useful in our consideration of Latin as a language in its own right, not just as a cog in the Indo-European wheel. Inscriptions are full of archaisms of course, not only of the conventional phonological, lexical and morphological type, but in syntax as well, such as the use of nê in negative imperatives, rare in Classical Latin, but common in inscriptions, such as Duenos and Garigliano (Baldi 2002: 197–202).

Latin thus allows us an opportunity to study a linguistic system which, if we combine what we know about PIE, covers a continuous span of perhaps 5000 years of linguistic evolution. If we consider Latin only from the perspective of Proto-Italic, we are dealing with perhaps as much as 3000 years. If we consider Latin from its earliest verified monuments, we have 2400 years of continuous linguistic evolution up to the Romance present. But if we consider Latin as Latin alone, which is our primary task in these pages, we are in a position to assess the evolution of a linguistic system for about 1200 years, for it is this time span which is covered by the period from the earliest inscriptions right up until the breakup of the system into what we might call proto-Romance, that is, the 1200 years from the first inscription to Gregory of Tours.

In addition to its novel methodology and its emphasis on diachrony, *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax* has several other distinguishing characteristics. One is its attempt at *uniformity*: unlike many other multiply-authored works of this type, this one is characterized by a methodology and conceptual framework which has been developed in consultation with all contributors. Of course not all authors have followed the methodological desider-

ata as strictly as one might hope, owing not only to individual differences and emphases among scholars, but also because of the varying nature of the subject matter. Some topics, for example Numerals, lend themselves better to a structurally-oriented account, while others, such as Modality or Deixis, lean in the other direction. This is why we insist that the approach be *holistic*, incorporating both structure and function in revealing ways. Still another distinctive feature of the *Syntax* is the extremely long time span which it covers, from PIE to Late Latin. While this time span is more easily accommodated for some topics (e.g., Possession) than others, it is a perspective which informs every chapter. For example, the syntax (and pragmatics) of possession can be traced from its PIE beginnings as a locative-possessive with the verb 'to be', through the addition of a verb 'to have' and the eventual elimination of the 'to be' construction by the time of Late Latin, and on into the Romance period. For other topics (e.g., Adverbs), it is somewhat more difficult to speculate on the PIE situation, so the emphasis is on the history of the category and its syntax within Latin itself. The essential point, however, is that there is an implicit diachrony in every chapter; what varies are the beginning and end-points of the investigation.

Finally, and in some ways most importantly, *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax* is distinctive because it is text-based. Team members all agreed that it would not be sufficient to mine the standard grammars like Bennett (1910–1914), Hofmann & Szantyr (1965), Kühner & Stegmann (1912–1914) for examples, because to do so would lead to a simple rehash of the *status quo*, and would deter contributors from asking new questions. Guided by the requirements of the functional-typological approach and the necessity for textually-based analyses, authors of individual chapters have entered much new territory. As a way of assuring maximal access to textual material, contributors have all worked with electronic databases such as the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina* (*BTL*) and the Packard Humanities Institute CD Rom, and have generally relied on the best paper editions available for Latin authors, usually either the Teubner or Oxford texts.

5. Audience

New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax is intended for several audiences. The first of these is the community of linguists, specifically historical linguists, who may be interested in the strategies we have applied in assessing the historical syntax in a corpus language with such a rich and deep textual and intellectual tradition as Latin. For this audience we have attempted to make the material as accessible as possible, especially by including English translations for every numbered example which occurs in each chapter. Our second target is Classicists, especially Latinists, who are interested in the syntax and semantics of Latin poetic and prose texts. This group will find the linguistic terminology used in the volume, and the mode of argumentation, generally "user-friendly", and should be pleased to discover that they can follow the arguments, despite not being professional linguists. The third group is the community of Indo-Europeanists, who have an abiding interest in the syntactic history of a principal Indo-European language, and whose concerns for the syntax of the protolanguage will be directly addressed by the contents and approach of this project.

6. Volume 3

The third volume of *New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax: Constituent Syntax: Quantification, Numerals, Possession, Anaphora* contains four chapters, and continues the focus of Volume Two on phrasal or sub-sentential phenomena. This volume highlights some of the more difficult topics in the history of Latin, and some of the most under-researched. This is especially true of the chapters on quantifiers and anaphora, which present special analytical challenges owing to their inherently abstract nature.

As in the first two volumes of this work, we provide a brief summary of the contents of this volume. These summaries are designed only to inform the reader of the content and main claims of the chapters. For the details, we encourage you to read on; we assure you that you will find it worth the effort.

In their chapter "Quantifiers", Alessandra Bertocchi, Mirka Maraldi and Anna Orlandini provide an analysis of the indefinite items *quis*, *aliquis*, *quispiam*, *quidam*, *quisquam*, *nemo*, *quiuis*/*quilibet* based on a typological-func-

tional approach to indefinites which is supplemented by quantificational aspects. The main functional distinctions regarding indefiniteness are in accordance with those suggested by Haspelmath (1997): specificity and nonspecificity, knowledge of the speaker, negation, negative polarity, and free-choice. The authors show how the distinction between specific and nonspecific NPs underlies the difference in Latin between *aliquis* and *quis*. They demonstrate further that when the speaker is able to identify the referent of an indefinite pronoun, 'knowledge of the speaker' is the parameter that accounts the use of the indefinite *quidam*. Analyses are also provided for the negative indefinite *nemo*, which expresses sentential negation, for *quisquam* as a negative polarity item, and for the free-choice indefinites *quiuis/quilibet*, which are generally semantically similar to universal quantifiers like *omnes* and *quisque*, but which also express the meaning of 'irrelevance'.

In his contribution "Numerals", Jesús de la Villa outlines the evolution of the different series of numerals, such as cardinal, ordinal, multiplicative, frequency adverbs, etc. Mainly on the basis of morphology, he shows that these series developed, both in prehistorical and historical times, following certain patterns of derivation which are in accordance with general typological tedencies. As elsewhere in the grammar, the peak of complexity for the numerical system seems to have been reached in the classical period. The historical evolution of that system shows, first, that there was a significant degree of overlap in the use of the series, and a noticeable simplification of the system in Late Latin. Both the overlap and the simplification follow, inversely, the patterns of creation of the different series. The author also presents the results of statistical research on the syntax of Latin numerals, especially in relationship to word order. Some lines of evolution appear, following the known patterns that produced the numerical systems of the Romance languages.

In their chapter "Possession", Philip Baldi and Andrea Nuti trace the evolution and use of predicative possessive constructions (*I have a book*) from Archaic to Late Latin. They take it as historically established that PIE was a *be* language without a lexical verb *have*, and they show how the Latin verb *habeo* (*habeo librum*) develops out of a verb meaning 'grasp, seize' and eventually displaces the inherited PIE construction (Lat. *mihi est liber*). Baldi and Nuti demonstrate how the two predicative expressions co-existed in Latin from the earliest texts, with a discoverable distribution: *mihi est* is used for *possessum*-oriented and existential sentences, while *habeo* was used

in sentences that were *possessor*-oriented and with a semantic orientation towards more specific profiles, such as prototypical possession. The diachronic comparison of these two constructions includes analyses according to parameters such as +/−definiteness of the constituents, distinct textual functions and the expression of semantic cores such as (judirical) ownership. Within this contrastive scope, a more fine-grained observation of dative vs. genitive construction is also offered. Eventually, the *habeo* construction displaced the *mihi est* construction as the unmarked possessive expression, following the general trend in Latin to reduce impersonal expressions. By the time of the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, *mihi est* has been reduced to infrequent use, mainly in fixed expressions.

In her chapter “Deixis and anaphora”, Silvia Pieroni takes up both the deictic and endophoric domains. She shows how deixis focalizes the feature of person (mainly in its pronominal manifestations), both when it appears overtly (as in personal pronouns) and when it is a covert feature (as in demonstrative pronouns). The tripartition of the Latin demonstrative system is described according to a hierarchical analysis of the opposition between person and non-person. As for endophora, in addition to the endophoric uses of demonstrative pronouns (among which are the so-called ‘discourse-deictic’ uses), Pieroni deals with the ‘pure’ determinative *is, ea, id* and with the reflexive pronoun, describing the nature of its antecedent and long-distance structures (i.e., reflexive structures where the antecedent occurs outside the reflexive proposition itself). She also treats the specific features of *idem* and *ipse*. Pieroni demonstrates conclusively that from a functional point of view the pronominal category, despite its formal consistency, is in fact quite heterogeneous. Throughout the chapter diachronic developments are brought into the discussion and some final notes are devoted to the paths which lead to the genesis of articles and clitics, categories with apparently explicit functions which could remain implicit in Latin syntax.

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Quantification

The term "quantification" is borrowed from logic, which distinguishes between existential and universal quantifiers, and has been extended to formal semantics and to linguistics.[1] Related to universal quantification are pronouns and adjectives such as *omnis*, *totus*, distributive quantifiers such as *quisque*, and free choice indefinites such as *quiuis*, *quilibet*, *quisquis*, and *quicumque.* The negative quantifiers such as *nemo* and *nihil* can be considered in relation to either universal or existential quantification. Existential quantifying properties are shared by indefinite pronouns such as *quidam* and *aliquis* and by *quispiam*, *quis*, and *quisquam* in modalized contexts.

Our analysis of Latin quantifiers is not based on logical analyses of quantification, but on the functions that quantifiers play in their linguistic use. To avoid some unresolved problems we adopt the more traditional terms usually found in Latin grammars. For example, since the function of existential quantification in Latin is predominantly performed by indefinite pronouns, we use the latter term to refer to the elements peforming this function.

1. Indefinite pronouns

Latin indefinites occur in series constituted by (i) a pronominal element indicating the ontological category (person, thing, place, direction, manner, time, etc.) and (ii) a formal element shared by all members of each series, which is semantically specialized. This formal element can be a postfixal marker, a suffix that follows inflectional suffixes, such as *-quam* in *quisquam*, or a prefix, such as *ali-* in *aliquis* (Table 1). Latin indefinite pronouns are marked

1. Another classic distinction is that between quantifiers and determiners; that is, between a quantificational and a cardinal reading. On this subject, see Lyons (1977, 2: 454–460), Diesing (1992), Milsark (1977), Reuland and ter Meulen (1987).

Table 1. Indefinite formation by prefix or suffix

	Prefix	Suffix
person	*aliquis*	*quisquam*
thing	*aliquid*	*quidquam, quicquam*
place	*aliquo, alicubi*	*quoquam, usquam*
time	*aliquando*	*umquam*

by different kinds of indefiniteness markers and are thus derived forms, as in most languages.

1.1 *The derivation of indefinites*

In the world's languages there are two main types of derivational bases: (i) generic ontological category nouns such as *person*, *thing*, *place*, etc., and (ii) interrogative pronouns. As Haspelmath (1997) suggests, usually all the members of an indefinite series are derived from the same kind of base. English is somewhat peculiar in that it has both interrogative-based and generic-noun-based indefinite pronouns, even within the same series: *somebody*, *something*, and *someplace* (based on generic nouns) exist alongside *somewhere, somehow*, and *somewhat* (based on interrogative pronouns). The majority of the world's languages have interrogative-based indefinite pronouns. In several western Indo-European languages, which normally use interrogative-derived indefinites, bare interrogatives used as indefinites are also found. This is the case for Vedic Sanskrit, German, Gothic, Lithuanian, and most of the Slavic languages. The type of derivation based on pronominal origin, at least for these languages, has been the object of different proposals concerning the direction of the derivation, whether from interrogative to indefinite pronouns or the other way round. Latin is a language where indefinites have a pronominal origin; on the original value there is no general agreement. According to Hahn (1933), for example, Latin is similar to Hittite in that the various indefinite pronouns are modifications of the simple indefinite *kuiš* or *quis*, at first scarcely to be differentiated from it but gradually specialized. In Latin this specialization was at its height in the classical period. In Early and Late Latin, the lines are much less rigidly drawn, and there is much confusion of

the compound indefinites with the simple indefinite and with one another. In other words, the rigid lines drawn between the different Latin indefinites during the classical period are not natural to Latin. The opposite opinion is maintained by Ferrarino (1942), who argues in favor of a derivation from the interrogative pronoun.[2]

On the basis of typological and functional considerations, Haspelmath (1997) has proposed that, since in languages where indefinites derive from a pronominal form the direction of the derivation can be said to be from interrogative to indefinite pronouns, the same derivational basis can be assigned to Latin. Haspelmath's proposal is based on the observation that the majority of the world's languages have interrogative-based indefinite pronouns. Since indefinite pronouns are usually expressed by a sequence of morphemes, unlike interrogative pronouns, typologically, indefinites are a marked category relative to interrogatives. As Ultan (1978) and Moravcsik (1969) observe, indefinite pronouns are sometimes not overtly derived from interrogative pronouns but are identical to them: in such cases we can say that indefinite pronouns are zero-derived (derived by conversion) from interrogative pronouns. One might object that the direction of derivation could just as well be the opposite: interrogative pronouns could be zero-derived from indefinite pronouns. However, according to Haspelmath, this is unlikely because of the universal asymmetric markedness relation such that indefinite pronouns are usually more marked than and derived from interrogative pronouns.[3] In languages which use bare interrogatives[4] as indefinite pronouns (as opposed to interrogatives plus an indefiniteness marker, the most widespread type of indefinite in Haspelmath's 40-language sample), disambiguation is usually achieved by syntactic differences and/or suprasegmental means. For instance, in Modern German the

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2. There are also cases where the derivation is clear: for example, some indefiniteness markers that combine with interrogative pronouns have arisen from a clause with the meaning 'I don't know'. This type is especially well attested in European languages. Haspelmath (1997: 130–131) calls them the 'dunno' indefinites. For example, in dialectal Romanian the form *neştine* 'some' derives from Latin *nescio quis* 'I don't know wh-'.
3. A further proof cited by Haspelmath is the fact that an interrogative pronoun may lose its indefinite function (e.g., Latin *quis/quem*, which survived into modern Romance but can no longer be used as an indefinite; similarly, Classical Greek τίς can no longer be used as an indefinite in Modern Greek).
4. Including Classical Greek, Chinese, Khmer, and Modern German.

interrogative pronoun is usually clause-initial, whereas the indefinite pronoun must cliticize to the preceding word and hence cannot be clause-initial (1).

(1) a. *Wer kommt da?*
    b. *Da kommt wer* (= *Jemand* (**wer*) *kommt da*)

An analogous situation is found in Latin, where the form of the interrogative pronoun *quis* is identical to that of the indefinite *quis*, but they differ in that only the interrogative is clause-initial. Furthermore, the interrogative *quis* is tonic while the indefinite *quis* is atonic and enclitic.

As Haspelmath suggests, bare interrogatives as indefinites may occur in all non-emphatic nonspecific functions; they are therefore excluded from past or current present affirmative declarative clauses, where indefinites must be specific. This restriction is a generalized property and can also be found outside Indo-European. Li (1992) reports that Chinese bare interrogatives may be used as indefinites in questions, conditionals, negative sentences, and other contexts where they can be interpreted nonspecifically, but not in ordinary declarative sentences. The similarity between the Chinese and Indo-European situations is too striking to be due to accident. In Haspelmath's 100-language sample, there are 64 languages whose indefinites are based on interrogatives. Of these 64 languages, 31, or almost one third of the whole sample, have bare interrogatives. The typological facts show conclusively that it is a question of systematic polysemy rather than accidental homonymy. Since it cannot be shown that bare interrogatives as indefinites are diachronically derived from interrogatives, we have to look for synchronic functional similarities that justify the systematic polysemy.[5]

Haspelmath notes that the contexts of occurrence of the pronouns which he defines as "bare interrogatives as indefinites" are the same in all the lan-

5. A way of formulating the similarity between *Someone stole my bike* and *Who stole my bike?* is to say that the former is presupposed by the latter (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 758). In this way the indefinite meaning would be contained in the interrogative meaning. In this line of reasoning, interrogatives are derived from indefinites. It is therefore natural to ask whether the formal similarities between interrogatives and indefinites can be explained (even if only partially) by a diachronic change from an indefinite to an interrogative pronoun. Cf. Traina and Pasqualini (1985: 165), who consider it plausible that the indefinite value is older: from *uenit quis?* 'did somebody come?' the passage to *quis uenit?* 'who came?' is easy.

guages that admit such an option, languages which are unrelated to one another. As a tentative explanation he suggests that such contexts are precisely those where interrogatives and indefinites cannot be confused. But on the basis of the formal distinction in Latin between the two types, we think rather that the occurrence of the indefinite *quis* is limited to specific contexts, such as polar questions and conditionals, because those contexts are nonfactual and as such are the most compatible with a form of indefinite pronoun which is neutral with respect to existence: that is, it is not semantically specialized either for existence or for non-existence.

1.2 *Indefinites and quantification*

Even though our analysis of Latin quantifiers is based not on logic but on the functions that quantifiers play in linguistic use, we nonetheless give a very brief survey of some points which are of major concern in logico-linguistic studies in order to clarify certain uses of the terminology adopted here.

1.2.1 The relation between "existential quantifier" and "presupposition of existence"

First, we borrow from logic the terms "existential" and "universal" quantifier to refer to pronouns such as *some* and *everyone*, respectively. We do not, however, enter into the difficult problems of interpretation that have occupied linguists in recent years concerning the assignment of certain quantifiers to one class or another. A typical case is constituted by *any*, which eludes definite characterization due to its double value of existential or universal quantifier, depending on its value as a negative polarity item or as a free-choice indefinite. For Latin, it is relevant to clarify our use of the term "existential quantifier". Traditionally, at least two different readings have been given to the existential quantifier (∃x), an existential reading or a substitutional reading. The existential reading can be paraphrased by *there exists an x such that S*. The substitutional reading avoids mention of existence and is paraphrased by *for at least one substitution value of x, S is true* (cf. Ioup 1977: 236). We choose to follow the second reading, which allows the inclusion, under the single term existential quantifier, of indefinite pronouns which do not carry a

presupposition of existence. In this respect we move away from Lyons (1977, 1: 150), who analyses the existential quantifier as carrying the implication of existence,[6] and follow instead Longobardi (1988), who considers cases of generic reference to be existential quantifiers: that is, cases in which the speaker uses an existential even if he is not able to specify the individual reference, as in the Italian example (2).

(2) *Se incontri qualche avvocato alla festa, fatti aiutare*
'If you meet a lawyer at the party, let him help you'

As (2) shows, in a language like Italian it is the context that is relevant for the generic interpretation, not a particular form of the pronoun. *Qualche* may in fact have either a definite or a generic interpretation, according to the context. Usually, conditional or modal contexts are compatible with a generic interpretation. In Latin, instead, there is a particular form of the indefinite pronoun (*quis*) which always has a generic interpretation: it does not presuppose existence and is found only in modal or conditional contexts. On the basis of the "substitutional" reading, we also consider *quis* an existential quantifier, even if it does not carry a presupposition of existence.

1.2.2 The distinction "specific/nonspecific" and the presupposition of existence

Another point to be clarified is the distinction made by many linguists between a specific and a nonspecific reading of a quantifier. Lyons, for example, applies the distinction in particular to different uses of the English indefinite article *a*. Compare, for example, the two possible interpretations of (3). Under one interpretation, *a heron* is understood to refer to a specific, though unidentified, individual and can be paraphrased by the expression *a particular heron*. Under the other interpretation, it does not refer to some specific individual and it can be paraphrased by the expression *some heron or other*.

6. The term "implication" in Lyons is analogous to the term "presupposition". Cf. on this matter Horn (1976: 5), who explains that to say *the present king of France is bald* is to *imply* that "There is an entity x such that x is (a) King of France" in "some sense of imply", a sense which constitutes a new logical relation that has become known as *presupposition*.

(3) *Every evening at six o'clock a heron flies over the chalet*

The distinction is relevant for Latin, where, in the absence of indefinite articles, it is through the choice of different indefinite pronouns that the distinction between a specific and a nonspecific reference is captured.

According to Ioup (1977), the semantic properties that contribute to the interpretation of indefinites are characterized as naming a unique referent (specific reference) or as defining a class of objects (nonspecific reference). The ambiguity between a specific and a generic reading is illustrated by Ioup (1977: 233) as (4), where the indefinite noun phrase *a motorcycle* may be intended as referring to a particular motorcycle or to a certain type of object. A similar example is used by Haspelmath (1997: 37) in (5). In the specific reading, the existence of a uniquely identified Ainu speaker is presupposed, whereas in the nonspecific reading the identity of the Ainu speaker has not been established.

(4) *Melinda wants to buy a motorcycle*

(5) *Nabuko wants to marry a native speaker of Ainu*

The examples in (3), (4), and (5) share the property of presenting a type of context where the two readings specific and nonspecific are both possible. In Lyons's example (3), it is a context of multiple quantification (*every evening*), while in (4) and (5), it is a *want* context. Following Croft (1983), Haspelmath calls most of the contexts allowing two readings "irrealis". The criterion distinguishing specific from nonspecific expressions is that only with specific expressions does the speaker presuppose the existence and unique identifiability of the referent (see Haspelmath 1997: 38). But in certain cases of special (most "irrealis") contexts, a nonspecific reading may also carry the presupposition of existence. This is the case of distributive contexts as in Lyons's example, where the referent *a heron* can be uniquely identifiable (specific reading) or not (a different heron every evening), but it is presupposed as existing in any case. The similar example (6) is also given by Haspelmath.

(6) *Everybody is reading something*

In the specific reading, everybody reads the same thing, while in the nonspecific reading, different people may be reading different things. In the latter

case, since the event is taking place at the moment of speech, the speaker must presuppose the existence of the reading material, but since it is distributed over the referents of the subject noun phrase (*everybody*), it is not a unique object and therefore also qualifies as nonspecific (see Haspelmath (1997: 41).[7] In the relation between the specific/nonspecific distinction and the presupposition of existence, the context of occurrence of an indefinite pronoun is highly relevant. We distinguish realis from irrealis contexts and show that this distinction is useful in giving an account of the distribution of Latin indefinites such as *quis, aliquis, quispiam*. Realis contexts are affirmative sentences in the perfective past or in the ongoing present (tenses with a definite temporal anchorage). As shown by languages like Russian, which is provided with two distinct series for specific and nonspecific reference, only specific indefinites are allowed in realis contexts. Irrealis contexts include two subtypes: the first comprises imperatives, questions, and conditional protases. They admit only nonspecific indefinite pronouns (not presupposed as existing, not uniquely identifiable).[8] The second subtype includes contexts with propositional attitude verbs (like *want, believe*), among them verbs or adverbs of epistemic modality as well as contexts of distributivity, which are characterized by the occurrence of a distributive quantifier or by a habitual event. In distributive contexts, nonspecific indefinites may occur, which are in relation to referents that are presupposed as existing. In our analysis of Latin indefinites, we show that the two criteria of "presupposition of existence" and "unique identifiability" do not always hold together. Certain Latin indefinites require that between the cases of specific reference, characterized by the properties [+presupposition of existence, +unique identifiability], and the cases of nonspecific reference, [–presupposition of existence, –unique identifiability], there are also cases where the referent of the indefinite is given as existing, but it is not uniquely identifiable. The main motivation for such a distinction in Latin is to account for the meaning and use of particular indef-

7. Ioup (1977) discusses a similar example: *Harvey courts a girl at every convention. She always comes to the banquet with him.* According to Ioup, the speaker cannot intend no girl in particular if Harvey courts a different one each year. Rather, there are more of them, a particular girl for each year. That the referent is given as existing, though different for each occasion, is a reason for giving it a specific reading.
8. It is for pragmatic reasons that the indefinites in these contexts can only be nonspecific.

inite Latin expressions and not to explain specific/nonspecific ambiguities of the same expression. This last is the case in languages with an indefinite pronoun system less rich than Latin's, and where the same form covers different kinds of reference. In Latin both the context (as in English) and the variety of forms (as in Russian) must be evaluated.

1.3 Main functional types of indefinites

Our analysis of the indefinite items *quis*, *aliquis*, *quispiam*, *quidam*, *quisquam*, *nemo*, and *quiuis/quilibet* is based mainly on the typological-functional approach to indefinites. The functional description is supplemented with quantificational aspects. The main functional distinctions regarding indefiniteness are specificity and nonspecificity, knowledge of the speaker, negation, negative polarity, and free choice.[9]

1.3.1 Specificity and nonspecificity

The concept of specificity is a key concept in the semantics of reference. There are some texts that positively identify only specific noun phrases, in particular (i) only a specific noun phrase can have a "discourse referent"; (ii) paraphrasability by an existential sentence is possible only with a specific noun phrase; (iii) in some languages there are determiner-like expressions which seem to force a specific reading (cf. Eng. *a certain*). As for indefinite pronouns, it is not uncommon for languages to have two different indefinite series for specific and nonspecific noun phrases. The difference in Latin between *aliquis* and *quis* is strictly connected with this distinction.

1.3.2 Knowledge of the speaker

The speaker may or may not be able to identify the referent of the indefinite pronoun. This classification applies only to specific phrases, in which the identifiability of their referents is presupposed. In Russian the *-to*-series can only be used if the referent cannot be identified by the speaker. If the referent

9. These are the distinctions suggested by Haspelmath (1997).

can be identified by the speaker, but the speaker chooses to withhold the information about this identity from the hearer, the *koe*-series or the determiner *odin* 'one' is used. In Latin this parameter is relevant to account for the use of *quidam* in contrast with *aliquis.*

1.3.3 Negation

Many languages have special indefinite pronouns that are only used in negative sentences where the scope of negation extends over the indefinite. In some of these languages the indefinite pronoun by itself is sufficient to express sentential negation. Latin *nemo* falls within this function.

1.3.4 Negative polarity

Negative polarity includes contexts of implicitly negative expressions like *without*, verbs such as *deny* and *refuse*, and situations of negative raising (i.e., when the negation in the superordinate clause logically belongs to the subordinate clause). In such situations some languages use the same indefinite series as in direct negation, but other languages require a different series (cf. Ital. *nessuno* vs. Lat. *quisquam*).

1.3.5 Free choice

Free-choice indefinites are semantically similar to universal quantifiers like *everyone* and *everything*, and in many environments they can be replaced by universal quantifiers without a noticeable change in the truth conditions. However, in many contexts a significant difference in the truth conditions exists; for example, a sentence like *You can take any apple* is quite different from *You can take every apple*. According to Haspelmath (1997), there seems to be very little cross-linguistic variation in the conditions under which free-choice indefinites are possible. Free-choice indefinites are semantically nonspecific, so they cannot occur in perfective past and ongoing present contexts. The most typical environments for them are sentences which express possibility, imperatives (if the imperative is a permission rather than a command), and generic sentences. Free-choice indefinites are also licensed in hypothetical and counterfactual sentences (e.g., *I would give anything to see that* and *At that point, I think I would have accepted anything*). Finally, as observed

by König (1991: 104), free-choice indefinites are also licensed in contexts expressing sufficient conditions, independently of the tense or modality of the clause (compare *any amount is sufficient* with **any amount is necessary*). In Latin, the free-choice indefinites are the *-uis* and *-libet* series.

2. Nonspecific/specific: *quis/aliquis*

In defining the contexts of occurrence of nonspecific indefinite pronouns, Haspelmath indicates the contexts allowing a double reading of the indefinite pronoun (a specific alongside a nonspecific reading). Such contexts include propositional attitude verbs (like *want*, *believe*), verbs or adverbs of epistemic modality, and contexts of distributivity. Haspelmath also indicates the contexts that allow only a nonspecific reading – imperatives, interrogatives, and conditionals – and identifies in pragmatics the reasons why in such contexts a specific indefinite cannot occur. In our opinion, Latin requires a more differentiated analysis.

Latin uses three different indefinite pronouns to cover the cases represented by the tripartition proposed by Haspelmath (specific/nonspecific/known to the speaker): *aliquis* is generally, though not always, specific; *quidam* is specific and known to the speaker; and *quis* is nonspecific. On the basis of their different semantic and pragmatic values, these indefinites occur in different syntactic environments. We analyze *aliquis* and *quis* starting from the consideration that the specific indefinite *aliquis* is allowed in factual contexts, while the nonspecific *quis* is excluded. In nonfactual contexts, either specific or nonspecific indefinites, either *aliquis* or *quis*, may occur according to pragmatic properties, but there is a steady prevalence of nonspecific occurrences.

2.1 *Quis*

In Latin there is a nonspecific indefinite pronoun whose range of occurrence is limited only to contexts which present a situation as hypothetical or virtual. This pronoun is *quis*. It has some features in common with *any* in English, but also some discordant points, which are an indication of the richness of the

Latin indefinite pronoun system as compared with English. *Any* is considered both an existential quantifier and a universal quantifier.[10] It is an existential quantifier when it has the property of a negative polarity item, occurring in negative (e.g., *John didn't do anything*) or hypothetical contexts. In these last contexts, it may alternate with *some*.

(7) a. *if you eat any candy, I'll whip you*
b. *if you eat some candy, I'll whip you*

According to R. Lakoff (1969), sentences with *any* involve a neutral or negative feeling on the part of the speaker, while those with *some* involve a positive feeling. As we will see, hypothetical clauses are among the preferred contexts of occurrence of *quis*. But its value is always neutral, not involving either a negative or a positive feeling, since Latin has distinct items for such expressions, *quisquam* and *aliquis/quidam* respectively, which are not so frequent as *quis* in conditional clauses, but which can be found to express a positive or negative presupposition of existence.

(8) a. [neutral]
Cic. *Phil.* 14,18: *quod si quis de contentione principatus laborat . . . stultissime facit*
'but if anyone is anxious to compete for leadership he acts most foolishly'
b. [positive]
Cic. *inv.* 2,171: *si aliquid effugere aut adipisci uelimus*
'if there is something that we wish to avoid or gain'
c. [negative]
Cic. *Att.* 16,5,3: *iocari me putas? moriar si quisquam me tenet praeter te*
'do you think I am joking? I will die if anyone other than you keeps me here'

Any is a universal quantifier when it has a free-choice interpretation (e.g., *anyone can leave at any time*, *take anything*). As a free-choice pronoun, *any* has a generic reading. The generic reading is also the most usual interpretation of

10. On this point, see Michael (1977), Linebarger (1980), and Davison (1980), among others.

quis, but this does not mean that *quis* also has a free-choice value, since Latin has various pronouns which specifically express a free-choice interpretation and which are formed by adjunction to the pronoun *quis* of a verb meaning 'preference', as shown by *quiuis, quilibet*.

2.1.1 The contexts of occurrence of quis

Grammars describe *quis* as an indefinite pronoun that cannot be found in the first position of a clause, but only as an enclitic of particles which all have a value of possibility, such as *si* and its compounds, *ne, cum, ubi, num, an*. But, as noted by Hahn (1933: 31), in the pre-Classical period *quis* is also found without these words. In Plautus there are five examples where *quis* occurs with no particle at all.[11]

In general, it can be said that the most frequent use is with *si* and *ne*, on which we comment in detail later on. The cases in which *quis* is an enclitic of *cum* number about forty; there is no example in Early Latin, only one is found in Cicero, while it is more frequent in post-Classical and Late Latin. The mood may be indicative, as in (9a), or subjunctive, as in (9b).

(9) a. Colum. 8,15: *sed antiquissimum est, cum quis nessotrophium constituere uolet*
'but it is most important, when anyone wishes to establish a place for rearing ducks'

b. Plin. *nat.* 28,33: *cum quis tectum in quo sit grauida transmiserit lapide uel missili*
'if anyone should throw a stone or a missile over the house where the pregnant woman is'

As the examples in (9) show, *quis* is often found in relation to a *cum iterativum*, which presents an action not as unique and determined, but as generic

11. The examples are: *Amph.* 563, *Capt.* 45, *Most.* 655, *Most.* 749, and *Pseud.* 1130. (e.g., *Capt.* 45: *plus insciens quis fecit quam prudens boni*). Even if sporadic, there are also examples in Classical and later Latin. The hypothetical value, however, is maintained: Cic. *parad.* 6,44: *filiam quis habet, pecunia est opus*. This example is considered by H. B. Rosén (1998: 706–707) to be not a conditional, but a relative clause, where *quis* would be an archaic relative pronoun.

and repeated. Accordingly, along with the indicative mood, the subjunctive with a value of possibility can also be found. But the value of the *cum*-clause can also be different. The only example of *cum quis* found in Cicero is a good illustration.

(10) Cic. *div*. 2,107: *potest autem, cum quis diuinationem habeat, errare aliquando*
'though one with the power of divination may sometimes be mistaken'

This is an instance of *cum* with a concessive conditional value: the nonspecific value of *quis* makes it compatible in fact with all the environments that have a virtual or hypothetical character. So it is found in conditional concessive sentences like those introduced by *quamuis*, *etiamsi*, or a free-choice pronoun like *quicumque*; while it is excluded in factual concessives, such as those introduced by *quamquam*, where *aliquis* is found. Compare (11a–c) with (11d).

(11) a. Cic. *Phil*. 2,44: *quamuis quis fortunae uitio, non suo decoxisset*
'however much a man had gone bankrupt by fault of fortune, not by his own'
b. Cic. *Sull.* 68: *de quo etiamsi quis dubitasset antea*
'even if anyone had been in doubt before this'
c. Colum. 4,29: *sed quocumque quis tempore destinauerit inserere*
'but at whatever time one intends to sow'
d. Cic. *fin.* 2,119: *et quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen inuenire malo paratiores*
'though I might be able to do something myself, yet I prefer to find some who are better equipped'

Cicero's (10) is also interesting when compared to a similar occurrence of *quis* in the same work:

(12) Cic. *div.* 1,71: *potest autem quis, cum diuinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec uera cernere*
'though endowed with the power of divination, one may sometimes be mistaken and not see the truth'

In (12), *quis* is not inside the *cum* clause and does not follow a particle with a value of possibility, but it is the subject of the modal verb *potest.* As shown by Bertocchi and Orlandini (2001: 60), the epistemic modality expressed by *potest* and *fieri potest* signals a pure possibility without any commitment by the speaker as to the actualization (or non-actualization) of the predicate. This accords with the neutral value of *quis*, involving neither a positive nor a negative presupposition of existence. See for example (13).[12] The cases in which *aliquis* rather than *quis* is found with *cum* (in its narrative value), like (14), are much more frequent (see Kühner & Stegmann 1962: 634).

(13) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,6: *fieri autem potest, ut recte quis sentiat et id quod sentit polite eloqui non possit*
'now it is possible for someone to hold correct views and yet be unable to express them in a polished style'

(14) Cic. *inv.* 1,87: *si, cum aliquis dicat se profectum esse ad exercitum, contra eum quis uelit hac uti argumentatione*
'if, when one might say he had set out for the army, an opponent might wish to use this form of argument against him'

The same holds for *ubi*. In the corpus of the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina* there are about 30 cases of *ubi quid* but only 7 of *ubi quis*, while the number of occurrences of *ubi* with *aliquis/aliquid* is higher in both cases. Mood can be indicative or subjunctive and the percentage of uses is not significant, since they are equally distributed. In most cases, with *quis* both subjunctive (15a) and indicative (15b–c) have the value of a generic, eventual action. In (15a) the generic value is evidenced by the use of the second person of the verb; in (15b) there is a description of the usual habits of *Graeci palliati* made by Curculius; and (15c) contains a description of customary actions of the Gauls: habituality then explains the co-occurrence of *ubi quis* with an indicative perfect tense.

(15) a. Plaut. *Cas.* 370: *ita fit, ubi quid tanto opere expetas*
'that's quite usual, when you're awfully eager for something'

12. It is significant that with *fortasse*, which expresses an epistemic modality with a positive subjective orientation on the part of the speaker, only *aliquis* is found and not *quis.*

b. Plaut. *Curc.* 293: *ubi quid subripuere, operto capitulo calidum bibunt*
'when they have stolen something, they take hot drinks with their wretched heads muffled'

c. Caes. *Gall.* 6,23,7: *atque ubi quis ex principibus in concilio dixit se ducem fore*
'and when any of the chiefs has said in public assembly that he will be leader'

The contexts of occurrence of *quis* coincide only partially with the contexts (interrogative, conditional, imperative clauses) that Haspelmath indicates as exclusive of nonspecific pronouns. *Quis* is in fact found in interrogative and conditional clauses, but not in imperative clauses. This is to be related to the fact that the referents of indefinites in interrogative and conditional clauses are only to be considered virtual or possible, while in imperative clauses they are given as existing, at least from the point of view of the speaker, even if they are not identified. The necessity of marking a distinction between the two features constituting "specificity" – presupposition of existence and unique identifiability – seems to be in order. The indefinite involved in such a distinction is *aliquis*.

2.2 *Aliquis*

Aliquis carries both features in some contexts, while in other cases it carries the presupposition of existence; but it is not uniquely identifiable. It has both features when it occurs in affirmative declarative sentences, in which the speaker is committed to the existence and identifiability of the referent, as in (16). That *aliquis* has a specific value is revealed in particular by its occurrence in existential sentences, which, as a rule, are compatible only with a specific reading, as in (17).[13] But *aliquis* can also occur as an indefinite pronoun that carries a presupposition of existence but is not uniquely identifiable. Such is the case for example of *aliquis* in certain conditional clauses, as

13. In existential clauses, however, *quidam* is much more frequent than *aliquis*.

in (18), where the referent of *aliquis* is explicitly given as existing by the partitive specification *ex istis*, *ex is*. *Aliquis* can also be found in negative clauses, but outside the scope of negation,[14] as in (19). Here too the referent of *aliquid* carries a presupposition of existence,[15] without being uniquely identifiable. In this case it is similar to *someone* in clauses such as *John didn't see someone*, which Lyons (1977, 2: 457) analyzes as different from *John didn't see anyone*, the difference residing precisely in the fact that *someone* has specific reference, while *anyone* does not have a presupposition of existence. While *quis* is mainly found in interrogative and hypothetical clauses, but not in imperative clauses, in this last context *aliquis* can be found. This is in accordance with the idea that the indefinite object of an imperative verb should be existing for the speaker, although not uniquely identifiable, and that it is *aliquis* that may correspond to such properties, as in (20).[16]

(16) Cic. *Att.* 13,15: *expectabam aliquem meorum*
'I was expecting one of my messengers'

(17) a. Cic. *fin.* 5,89: *ita quemadmodum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet . . .*
'just as in the senate there is always someone who demands an interpreter'

b. Liv. 1,16,4: *fuisse credo tum quoque aliquos qui discerptum regem patrum manibus taciti arguerent*
'there were some, I believe, even then who secretly asserted that the king had been rent in pieces by the hands of the senators'

14. This is also the idea expressed in different terms by Methner (1913: 282–283) with regard to the same example. Methner gives also another example of the same kind: Cic. *Verr.* II 3,17 *non miror te aliquid excogitasse*.

15. Orlandini (2000: 152) gives a different analysis of this example and considers this occurrence of *aliquis* as "non existencielle, mais virtuelle", where the virtuality is expressed by the use of *cum,* which Orlandini considers a case of *cum iterativum.*

16. A rare and colloquial expression is constituted by the use of the indefinite *aliquis* together with the second person plural of the imperative: Plaut. *Epid.* 399: *heus foras exite huc aliquis*; Ter. *Ad.* 634: *aperite aliquis actutum ostium* (cf. Kühner & Stegmann 1962, 1: 60: 'du oder wer sonst da ist, öffnet'). These uses express the speaker's uncertainty about the possibility that there exists someone who will follow his order. For this reason, the indefinite *quis* can also be found: Plaut. *Pseud.* 1284: *aperite, aperite heus, Simoni adesse me quis nuntiate.*

(18) a. Sen. *contr.* 10,4,3: *quid, si aliquis ex istis futurus est uir fortis?*
'what if one of these is destined to be a hero?'
b. Petron. 93,3: *nam si aliquis ex is, qui in eodem synoecio potant, nomen poetae olfecerit*
'if a single one of the people who are drinking in the same tenement with us scents the name of a poet'

(19) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,88: *cum aliquid non habeas*
'when there is something that you don't have'

(20) a. Hor. *sat.* 2,3,5: *dic aliquid dignum promissis: incipe*
'say something worthy of the promises: go ahead'
b. Sen. *dial.* 5,8,6: *dic aliquid contra, ut duo simus*
'say something opposed, that there may be two of us!'

2.3 Interrogative clauses: *ecquis*, *numquis*

Interrogative clauses show that in Latin, interrogative *quis* and indefinite *quis* are two distinct forms. As proof of the distinction between the tonic interrogative form and the atonic indefinite, consider that in polar (yes–no) questions *num quis* (*numquis*) and *ecquis* are never interrogatives, but only indefinites. These polar questions are either "dubitative" or rhetorical questions, since they prompt a positive or negative answer. Consider, for example, the case of *ecquis* in (21). This is a "dubitative" question with a polar value, where the meaning of *ecquis* is indefinite ('anybody') and not interrogative ('who').

(21) Plaut. *Most.* 899–901: *heus, ecquis hic est, maximam his qui iniuriam / foribus defendat? Ecquis has aperit foris?/ Homo nemo hinc quidem foras exit*
'hey! Is there anybody here who will defend this door from assault? Anyone going to open up? No one's coming out from here, that's for sure!'

While in Plautus the prevailing use of *ecquis* is in "dubitative" questions, in Cicero it is in rhetorical questions negatively oriented, as in (22). Similar to *ecquis* is the more common *numquis*, which also has the value of an indefinite pronoun, not an interrogative, in polar questions. That it is not a *wh-* pronoun

is clearly shown by the answer *etiam* in (23). Another, direct or indirect, interrogative context for *quis* is that introduced by *an*, as in (24). But the number of occurrences of *quis/quid* enclitic to *an* is extremely low.[17]

(22) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,87: *ecquis id dixerit?*
'can anyone make such a statement?'

(23) Plaut. *Most.* 999: *numquid processit ad forum hic hodie noui?* :: *Etiam*
'anything new come up at the forum today? :: Yes'

(24) a. Liv. 23,45,9: *an quid prodigii est aliud?*
'or is there some other portent?'
b. Fronto 4,3,6: *haud sciam an quis roget*
'I don't know if someone is asking you'

2.4 Conditional clauses: most cases of *quis*, some cases of *aliquis*

The most likely context of *quis* is the hypothetical clause.[18] The semantic properties of *quis* make it able to occur in conditional clauses, which rarely involve factuality[19] and more often have a nonfactual value. Consider some examples. In (25a), the counterfactual value expressed by the pluperfect subjunctive *dixisset* conveys the negative expectation that the thing referred to is not possible: the *si* clause, however, is advanced as a true hypothesis used to confirm Cicero's opinion that the only possible answer to the question *concessisses?* would be negative: Lucius Lucullus would never have surrendered his inheritance. In (25b), a hypothesis is advanced which Cicero hopes may

17. We have counted 14 examples of *quis* (among them, 1 in Plautus, 1 in Terence, 1 in Cicero, 6 in Aulus Gellius) and 14 examples of *quid* (among them, 1 in Cicero and 8 in *Digesta*).
18. On the frequency of *quis* in *si*-clauses, see Delbrück ([1893] 1967, 3: 515), who underlines the diffusion of the relation: "Die Verbindung mit *si* ist als uritalisch anzusehen, vgl. umbr. *svepis*, osk. *svaepis, svaí píd,* volsk. *sepis.*" Delbrück also notes the scarce use of *quis* in positive main clauses and quote, as an example, Cic. *parad.* 6,44: *filiam quis habet, pecunia est opus.* But this example too must be considered a case of hypotheticality, albeit in paratactic form.
19. See Comrie (1986: 80), among others.

be realized, even if he is well aware of its improbability, since the senators are not even inclined to call Antonius *hostis*, let alone a harsher name.

(25) a. Cic. *Flacc.* 85: *si quis eas suas esse dixisset, concessisses?*
'if anyone had said that they were his, would you have surrendered them?'
b. Cic. *Phil.* 14,10: *grauius si quis attulerit nomen, libenter adsentiar*
'if anyone suggest a harsher name, I will gladly assent to it'

Conditional clauses exhibit a property relevant to interpreting the quantifying force of the indefinites. Usually, indefinites are interpreted as existential quantifiers. But, as noted by Chierchia (1997: 429–430), indefinites in conditional clauses have a universal interpretation.[20] The universal value of *quis* in conditional clauses is confirmed by the cases where the indefinite pronoun is co-referential with an anaphoric element in the main clause, as in (26), where the anaphor is represented by the intended pronominal subject of the main clause (*uehementer errat*) and the universal interpretation of the indefinite *quis* corresponds to 'all those' or 'everyone who'.

20. The typical case of universal interpretation of indefinites in conditional clauses is constituted by the structures known as "donkey sentences". According to Heim (1982: 44), "donkey sentences" are sentences that contain an indefinite noun phrase inside an *if*-clause (or relative clause) and a pronoun outside that *if*-clause but related anaphorically to the indefinite noun phrase, as in *if a man owns a donkey, he beats it*. The reference problems posed by structures of this kind are well known from ancient logic, and the relationship between universal and particular reference was also studied by the Stoic school. "Donkey sentences" are in fact also known as Chrisippus's sentences, since a clause such as *if a man is in Athens, he cannot be in Megara*, assigned to Chrisippus, has the same reference problems as "donkey sentences". It is through the discussion of Chrisippus's position that Cicero quotes a typical case of universal reference as Cic. *fat.*12: *si quis oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur*, which Cicero considers to be convertible in a particular case such as Cic. *fat.* 12: *si Fabius oriente Canicula natus est, Fabius in mari non morietur*.

(26) Cic. *Arch.* 23: *nam si quis minorem gloriae fructum putat ex Graecis uersibus percipi quam ex Latinis uehementer errat*
'for if anyone thinks that the glory won by the writing of Greek verse is naturally less than that accorded to the poet who writes in Latin, he is entirely in the wrong'

The particular interpretation of indefinites in conditional clauses as universal quantifiers is sometimes explained as a case of genericity.[21] But not every conditional clause has a generic value. Barwise (1986: 23), for example, distinguishes between specific conditional statements and general conditional statements. A specific conditional statement describes some specific situation. A general conditional statement makes some more general claim. Compare, for example, (27a), about some particular time and place, with (27b), which has an implicit universal quantification over times and places. Sometimes only the context can determine whether a conditional statement is specific or general.

(27) a. *if it is snowing, then the sidewalks are slippery*
b. *if it snows, then the sidewalks are slippery*

Broadly speaking, *quis* is found in general conditional clauses with the value of a universal quantifier, while *aliquis*, with the value of an existential quantifier, is more likely in specific conditional clauses. Consider, for example, the use of *aliquis* in (28). The co-occurrence of *quis* with adverbs that explicitly underline the fortuitous and not presupposed character of the event (such as *forte* 'by chance')[22] or with adverbs that express a mere supposition (such as *umquam* 'ever') explicitly shows its hypothetical value (29). The mood most

21. Dahl (1995: 422) for example, observes that there are languages provided with grammaticalized tense-aspect markers, which can be considered "habituals" and which are potential sources of genericity markers. It is interesting that, for example, in a language like Isekiri (Niger-Kordofanian), the preverbal particle *kà* marks generic contexts (e.g., *he (usually) writes letters*) and it is also used in conditional constructions of the type *if you tease a cat, it cries*. On generics see Carlson and Pellettier (1995).

22. However, *forte* can also occur with *aliquis*. There are 12 examples of *si quis forte* and 12 of *si forte aliquis*, in the same meaning: Cic. *Att.* 3,9,1: *si quis forte fuisset qui contentus nostris malis non esset*; Lucr. 2,931: *quod si forte aliquis dicet*. A difference is that *si quis forte* prevails in prose, *si forte aliquis* in poetry.

frequently found in conditional clauses containing *quis* is the subjunctive. In Livy, for example, there is a consistent predominance of subjunctive over indicative (30). In conditional clauses, however, mood must be considered in relation to the type of condition expressed, which can be either objective or subjective and, when subjective, either possible or unreal. Consider the difference between the clauses in (31a), where the indicative is motivated by the objective value of the conditional clause, and (31b), where the imperfect subjunctive signals a purely hypothetical value. Many examples in the indicative mood are speech act conditions, which do not express a condition on the apodosis but on the illocutionary act or on the beliefs of the speaker and the legitimacy of expressing such beliefs. See, for example, (32), where *si quis est* has the sense that Horn (1976) assigns to *if any*: it acts as a suspender of the presupposition of existence.

(28) a. Sen. *epist.* 104,9: *tantus erit ambitionis furor, ut nemo tibi post te uideatur, si aliquis ante te fuerit*
'your ambition will be so frenzied that you will regard yourself last in the race if there is someone in front of you'

b. Cic. *inv.* 1,80: *aut erit omnino incredibile, ut si aliquis, quem constet esse auarum*
'or the statement may be wholly incredible, as in the case of a man known by everyone to be avaricious'

(29) a. Cic. *Mur.* 60: *nam si quis hoc forte dicet, Catonem descensurum ad accusandum non fuisse*
'for if anyone will perhaps declare that Cato would not have stooped to bring an accusation'

b. Cic. *Flacc.* 9: *nam si quis umquam de nostris hominibus a genere isto studio ac uoluntate non abhorrens fuit*[23]
'for if anyone of our people was ever not unsympathetic to that race in interest and disposition'

(30) Liv. 6,11,3: *si quis uere aestimare uelit*
'if one wished to consider the situation fairly'

23. As expected, there is no example of *si quis numquam* ('never'), since there would be a contrast between the factual character of *numquam* and the virtual one of *quis*.

(31) a. Sall. *Catil.* 14,4: *quod si quis etiam a culpa uacuos in amicitiam eius inciderat . . . par similisque ceteris efficiebatur*
'and if any guiltless man did chance to become his friend, he soon was made as bad as the rest'

b. Liv. 6,40,13: *illud si quis patricius, si quis – quod illi uolunt inuidiosius esse – Claudius diceret*[24]
'suppose that some patrician, or – what those fellows would make out to be still more hateful – some Claudius should say'

(32) Cic. *Rab. Post.* 2: *sed tamen, si quis est, iudices, qui illam Postumi . . . temeritatem uituperandam putet*
'however, gentlemen, if there is anyone who thinks that Postumus's conduct is deserving of rebuke'

2.5 Indefinites in negative conditionals

Of particular interest is the use of indefinites in negative conditionals introduced by *nisi*. The number of occurrences of *quis* in *nisi* clauses is low compared to *si* clauses. While *nisi* occurs 24.11 % as often as *si*, *nisi quis* occurs only 1.29 % as often as *si quis*. As a confirmation, *si quis* occurs 3.54 % as often as *si,* while *nisi quis* occurs 0.19 % as often as *nisi*. These data are unexpected, especially considering that most traditional grammars give *si* and its compounds (including *nisi*) as the most frequent elements to which *quis* is enclitic. In our opinion, there is a strict relation between the possibility of finding *quis* in a *nisi* clause and the degree of hypotheticality of the *nisi* clause itself.

Truly hypothetical contexts are those where one does not know whether they are actualized or not.[25] On this basis, we can distinguish between different occurrences of *nisi* and between *nisi* and *si non*. It is in relation to the hypothetical content of the clause that the probability of finding *quis* is determined. Our proposal is that *si non* generally represents a true hypothes-

24. On the use of indefinites with proper nouns (as in *quis Claudius*), see Bertocchi and Maraldi (2006).
25. Cf. Montolio (2000) and Bertocchi and Maraldi (2005).

is, presenting *q* as well as the possibility of *not q*.[26] On the contrary, *nisi* is nonhypothetical when it is a counterfactual and hypothetical when it has an exceptive value (similar to *unless* in English).

As for indefinites in *nisi* clauses, we suggest that there is a relation between the semantic properties of *quis* and the hypothetical value of the clause: in the corpus of the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina* there are 36 examples of *si quis non* but only 15 example of *nisi quis*, most of them instances of the exceptive use of *nisi*. Consider some examples, where the value we assign to the term "hypothetical" (contexts where one does not know whether they are actualized or not) is confirmed:

(33) a. Cic. *Phil.* 3,19: *si quis non adfuerit, hunc existimare omnes poterunt et interitus mei et perditissimorum consiliorum auctorem fuisse*
'if anyone is not present, all men will be able to regard him as one who has advocated both my destruction and that of the most ruined counsels'

b. Cic. *inv.* 1,56: *extra quam si quis rei publicae causa exercitum non tradiderit, patiemini?*
'except in the case that a commander shall for the common good refuse to hand over his army, will you permit it?'

(34) a. Plaut. *Capt.* 791: *nisi quis satis diu uixisse sese homo arbitrabitur*
'unless a man thinks he has lived long enough'

b. Plin. *epist.* 7,20,6: *nisi quis forte alterutri nostrum amicissimus*
'unless in the case of someone's particular friendship to either of us'

2.6 Clauses introduced by *ne*

Another favorite context for the occurrence of *quis* is clauses introduced by *ne* (see (35)). In this case too, the semantic properties of *quis* appear to be

26. An exception is constituted by *si non* clauses in the pluperfect, which can have a counterfactual value.

in agreement with the properties of the clause. The referent of *quis* is given as virtual and is not presupposed as existing: *ne* excludes that someone with the properties indicated can exist. In this use *quis* corresponds to a negative universal quantifier ('nobody'), thus assuming the same characteristics of universality it has in conditional clauses. As a confirmation of the compatibility of the semantic properties of *quis* with those of *ne,* consider, by contrast, the extremely low number of occurrences of *quis* in clauses introduced by a positive complementizer of volition like *ut*.[27] Only in Tacitus are they rather frequent, but in this author *ut quis* is used with a distributive value, in the same way as *ut quisque* (see (36)).

(35) a. Cic. *Q. Rosc.* 24: *ne quis aut in genere iniuriae aut ratione actionis errare possit*
'so that no one can possibly be mistaken as to the nature of the injury or the method of the legal procedure'

b. Cic. *Planc.* 64: *sed tamen non uereor ne quis audeat dicere ullius in Sicilia quaesturam aut clariorem aut gratiorem fuisse*
'still, I am not afraid that anyone should venture to assert that any Sicilian quaestor has won greater renown or popularity'

(36) Tac. *ann.* 11,7,1: *omitti curas familiares, ut quis se alienis negotiis intendat*
'private business was neglected in proportion as a man applied himself to the affairs of others'

2.7 Some special uses of *aliquis*

In Late Latin *aliquis* is generalized and is found in contexts where Classical Latin would use different indefinites. It is frequently found in place of *quis* in

27. When the referent of the indefinite pronoun is specific, then *aliquis* can be found in *ut* clauses: Cic. *Sull.* 41: *uidi ego hoc … fore ut … aliquis patrimonii naufragus, inimicus otii, bonorum hostis, aliter indicata haec esse diceret* 'I foresaw that it would happen that someone who had made a shipwreck of his fortunes, some enemy of peace and quiet, some enemy of decent men, would say it was a false record'. The use of *aliquis* seems to be motivated by Cicero's certainty (*uidi ego hoc*) about the future existence of someone with the relevant properties.

conditional clauses or clauses introduced by *ne* (37). In conditional clauses the non-classical *quis aliquis* can also be found. As stressed by Foschi (2006: 278), the *iunctura* is attested in the *Regula Canonicorum* by Chrodegang (*RC* 1112,19: *si quis aliquis ex ipso clero infirmatur*) and five times in the *Paenitentiale Oxoniense* (*Paen. Ox.* 1,37: *si quis aliquis infans*).

(37) a. Pallad. 1,8,1: *si aliquis casus incurrerit*
'if anything were to happen'
b. Iord. *Get.* 213: *ne aliquis eius uulnere laetaretur*
'lest someone rejoice over his wound'

There are also many examples where *aliquis* is used without any special value in negative contexts instead of *quisquam* (38). In some cases *aliquis* has the value of *alius quis* (39).[28] In Classical Latin, *aliquis* is restricted to affirmative declarative sentences, in which the speaker is committed to the existence and unique identifiability of the referent.

(38) a. Veg. *mil.* 2,23: *nec inter doctos aliquis error exsistit*
'nor among trained men does any mistake come forth'
b. *Itin. Eger*. 6,2: *diligentius et securius … faranitae ambulant nocte quam aliqui hominum ambulare potest*
'the Paranites can travel by night even faster and more safely than anyone else can'
c. *Itin. Eger*. 19,17: *sed nec corpus alicuius mortui liciatur per ipsam portam*
'nor has any dead body been taken out through this gate'
d. Chiron 43,33: *sed emissiones sanguinis non sunt facienda, ne aliqua re uires animalis minuantur*
'bleedings must not be done, in order not to diminish the vigor of the animal in any way'
e. Chiron 24,26: *non uidet et tensis oculis erit et colore integro sine nullo humore aliquo interius obstante*
'it doesn't see and will have swollen eyes of unchanged color without obstruction by any internal fluid'

28. Cf. E. Löfstedt ([1911] 1962: 174), who mentions Late examples of the type *omnes* = *ceteri omnes*; *aliquis* = *alius quis*; *ullus* = *ullus alius.*

(39) *CIL* V 8738: *nullus de genere nostro uel aliquis*
'no one of our family or someone else'

There are also some special cases of *aliquis* which show that it may occur in particular syntactic environments and that it may assume a particular semantic nuance. In some way, such cases can all be put into relation with a notion of scalarity. The main types are:
(a) when *aliquis* expresses a quantity, either in positive or in negative clauses.
(b) when *aliquis* expresses a value next to a free-choice pronoun.

2.7.1 Aliquis *expresses a quantity*

Aliquis may express a quantity or a value corresponding to a certain degree on a scale. This value may be a minimal quantity, as in (40), which is a case of mock modesty: Cicero appears to minimize his personal contribution to the defense of good moral qualities, but his intent is to emphasize it. On the contrary, the degree to which reference is made in (41) is not minimal, not even apparently, since here Cicero refers to the pain of Octavianus over the death of Caesar. As underlined by Kühner & Stegmann (1962: 635), *aliquis* may then refer to something "bedeutend oder unbedeutend, wichtig oder gering" according whether it is used in opposition to 'nothing' or to 'all'.

(40) Cic. *Verr.* II 4,81: *est aliqua mea pars uirilis*[29]
'(in this right) I myself have a share, even if small'
(41) Cic. *Phil.* 14,4: *uicitque dolorem aliquem domesticum patriae caritate*
'and has overcome some private pain by his love of his country'

The same type of reference to different degrees on a scale is made by *aliquis* in negative contexts. For example, *aliquis* in place of the expected *quisquam/ullus* in a phrase introduced by *sine* makes reference to a high degree (42).[30] In other negative contexts, the use of *aliquis* instead makes reference to a very low degree on a scale. In such cases it is a negative polarity

29. Cf. Gaffiot (1934), s.v.: 'j'ai là pour une part (si petite qu'elle soit, elle existe) mon lot personnel'. See also Orlandini (2000), who analyzes the argumentative value of such cases.
30. Cf. Kühner & Stegmann (1962: 641): "ohne einen nicht geringen Zusatz".

item, which serves to give more emphasis to the negation (43). In a conditional clause the expression of a minimal quantity through *aliquid* indicates a sufficient condition, which is assured also by the focus of a scalar adverb like *modo* (44).

(42) Cic. *fin.* 3,30: *qui mancam fore putauerunt sine aliqua accessione uirtutem*
'who held that virtue would be incomplete without some enhancement'

(43) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,88: *illud excutiendum est, ut sciatur quid sit carere, ne relinquatur aliquid erroris in uerbo*
'we must thoroughly sift, so as to be sure that there may be no possibility of mistake in using the phrase with the meaning "to feel the need of"'

(44) Cic. *de orat.* 1,129: *si aliquid modo esset uiti*[31]
'if there was any blemish whatever in them'

2.7.2 Aliquis *is next to a free-choice pronoun*

The generic value expressed by *aliquis* in (45) can be characterized as non-identification and indifference or lack of concern.[32] These are the same properties assigned by Jayez and Tovena (2002) to the French free-choice indefinite pronoun *un N quelconque*. The scalarity, the relation we posit between *aliquis* with the value of a free choice and a scale (cf. Section 2.7.1), resides in the qualitative low value of *quadripedem aliquam* in (45): 'you humiliate yourself so much that you don't think there is a difference between

31. Cf. Leemann and Pinkster (1981: 227): "*aliquid* statt *quid* wegen des starken *si ... modo*". But *quid* is absent from *si modo* clauses, which only have *aliquid*. This is in agreement with the property of *si modo* of expressing an attitude of the speaker: while in this respect *quid* is neutral, *aliquid* is positively oriented. Cf. Bertocchi (2001).

32. This is also the value of *unus aliquis*. Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 211): 'Soll die Zahlangabe nur als eine ungefähre gekennzeichnet werden, dann wird *aliquis* hinzugesetzt.' The value of approximation that *aliquis* confers to a cardinal number is a value of indifference with *unus*. Compare for example: *Rhet. Her.* 4,8: *quare unius alicuius esse similem satis habebit,* which Calboli (1969: 73) translates: 'quindi riterrà sufficiente somigliare a uno solo qualsiasi' or Plaut. *Truc.* 102: *oenus eorum aliquis* ('uno qualsivoglia di loro' in the translation by Paratore 1976).

you and any beast (any beast whatsoever)' means that any beast can be compared with you, the most humble included. The scalar value of superlatives, as recognized by Fauconnier (1975), has led Haspelmath (1997: 116–118) to observe that in contexts where superlatives give rise to a quantifying reading, free-choice indefinites are licensed (e.g., *the smallest amount is enough* = 'any amount is enough'). This complete parallel behavior of quantifying superlatives and free choice indefinites suggests that free-choice indefinites, too, express a low point on a scale.

(45) Cic. *parad.* 1,14: *sic te ipse abicies atque prosternes, ut nihil inter te atque inter quadripedem aliquam putes interesse?*
'will you make yourself so abject and so low an outcast as to deem that there is no difference between you and any four-footed beast?'

The scalarity of *aliquis* when it expresses a small quantity or a free-choice value is thus related to a low point on a scale. As a negative polarity item, *quisquam/ullus* also expresses a low point, but on a negative scale. Beginning with Ducrot (1973), many linguists have shown the relationship between positive and negative scales. According to Haspelmath, for example, free-choice indefinites express the low point on a nonreversed scale (e.g., *the weakest cow can cross the river* = 'any cow can cross the river'), whereas negative polarity items express the low point on a reversed scale (e.g., *she didn't give a red cent* (*she didn't give the* ***smallest*** *sum*) = 'she gave nothing at all').

The opposite orientation of the scale explains the use of *aliquis* and *quisquam* when both refer to a small quantity. Even if both refer to the same low point, the scale of *aliquis* is positively oriented while the scale of *quisquam* is negatively oriented, toward a null quantity. Traina and Bertotti (1985: 190) explain the difference between (46a) and (46b) similarly: when *quisquam* and *aliquis* express the value 'even just one', 'even just a little', they overlap, but the former limits reality to a minimum, while the latter asserts a minimum of reality: the speaker uses one form or the other according to whether his thought is oriented toward limitation or assertion. In the same way, we will say that with *aliquis* the perspective is positive, oriented toward duration of the action and its continuation. The scale is reversed when *quisquam* is found and is negatively oriented toward *nihil*. In this way the action is seen in its movement toward an end.

(46) a. Liv. 4,39,5: *consul … dum quicquam superfuit lucis, hostem tenuit*
'the consul kept the enemy engaged as long as there was any light'

b. Liv. 7,34,14: *ite mecum, ut, dum lucis aliquid superest … qua pateat hinc exitus, exploremus*
'follow me, so that while there is yet some light we may find out where the way out of here lies open'

3. *Quispiam*

Quispiam is used much less than the other indefinite pronouns. It was probably already an archaism in Early Latin, as shown by its frequent use at the end of a verse. In popular speech it was perhaps already dead by the time of Cicero (cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 1972: 196). It is absent in Trogus and Petronius and, in Late Latin, in Filastrion and others. Its use has been variously interpreted, but the most common tendency does not assign a particular value to *quispiam.* For example, Ernout & Meillet (1951: 161) consider *quispiam* equivalent to *quis* in the expression *dixerit quispiam* and a synonym of *aliquis* and *quisquam.* Seyffert and Müller ([1876] 1965: 279) also consider *quispiam* close to *quis* and *quisquam.*[33]

A different position is held by Ferrarino (1942), who considers *quispiam* the indefinite expressing probability: as regards the various indefinites and existence, with *quis* existence is given as a pure hypothesis, with *aliquis* existence is presupposed, while with *quispiam* it is given as probable. Analysis of the occurrences of *quispiam* shows that it is scarce and that its value is subject to diachronic variation.

33. Specifically, they say that *quispiam* can be found when *quisquam* already occurs in the same sentence: Cic. *Verr.* II 3,74: *numquam post populi Romani nomen ab Siculis auditum et cognitum Agyrinenses contra quemquam infimum ciuem Romanum dixisse aut fecisse quippiam.*

3.1 *Quispiam* in Early and Classical Latin

In Early Latin, *quispiam*[34] is found in conditional and in interrogative clauses (47), but there are also a few occurrences in negative contexts: *quispiam* may be used in contexts which are syntactically negative, as in (48a), where in Classical Latin *quis* would be found. It is also used in the same way as *quisquam* in contexts which are only semantically negative, as in (48b).[35]

(47) a. Plaut. *Pseud.* 784: *si quispiam det qui manus grauior siet*
'if someone put something in my hand that made it heavier'
b. Plaut. *Truc.* 724: *amator nouus quispiam?*
'some new lover?'

(48) a. Plaut. *Pseud.* 170: *ne quispiam pertundat cruminam cautiost*
'we must watch that no one cuts through a purse'
b. Plaut. *Most.* 846: *errabo potius, quam perductet quispiam*
'I had rather go wrong than have anyone take me in'

In Classical Latin, the prevailing use is in conditional clauses and formulaic expressions, usually in the perfect subjunctive or the future indicative, expressing a potential value (49). In constructions of the type *dixerit quispiam*, the indefinite alternates with *aliquis* and *quis*. That the highest frequency of *quispiam* in Classical Latin is in structures with potential value, where the attitude of the speaker seems to have a positive orientation, confirms the hypothesis of Ferrarino (1942), that *quispiam* is between *aliquis* and *quis* and expresses probability. The other major contexts where *quispiam* can be found in Classical or post-Classical Latin are those introduced by *si* and its compounds (50). There are also some occurrences in negative clauses, but their frequency is extremely low, especially compared with *quispiam* in negative clauses in Early Latin. Most of the examples given by Dräger (1878) as negative and equivalent to *quisquam* cannot be considered such. In (51) the clause

34. In Terence there is only one case of *quispiam* (Ter. *Eun.* 875: *quid si hoc quispiam uoluit deus?*), while in Plautus there are 12. But Terence has one case of *quapiam* and two of *quidpiam* while Plautus has none.
35. Perhaps this is why Haspelmath (1997) considers *quispiam* a negative polarity item. But this hypothesis does not seem to be correct, since *quispiam* in negative contexts is very rare, especially in Classical Latin.

is not negative: *non* and *neque* are emphatic negations which have scope only over the noun phrases *Torquatus* and *Torquati quispiam similis*, respectively, not over the whole clause. Furthermore, most of the negative cases mentioned by Dräger as instances where *quispiam* is the same as *quisquam* are introduced by *ne* or *nisi*, as in (52). The most common indefinite in such contexts is *quis*, not *quisquam*: this is a further confirmation of Ferrarino's hypothesis, that *quispiam* lies between *quis* and *aliquis*. Its positive value is also explicitly shown by those examples where *quispiam* is used in opposition to a negative indefinite (53). Even in Classical Latin, however, there are some negative cases where no semantic distinction seems to exist between *quisquam* and *quispiam* (54). But there are also cases which show that *quispiam* can be used with the same meaning as *aliquis* (55).

(49) a. Cic. *Arch.* 15: *quaeret quispiam*
'someone may ask'
b. Cic. *Phil.* 14,13: *tu igitur ipse de te? dixerit quispiam*
'are you then speaking of your own self? someone may say'

(50) a. Cic. *Caecin.* 56: *siue me tu deieceris siue tuorum quispiam siue seruorum siue amicorum*
'whether it be you who drives me out or one of your associates or slaves or friends'
b. Cic. *off.* 1,106: *sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat uoluptati*
'but if someone should be found who sets some value on sensual gratification'
c. Plin. *nat.* 20,119: *si eo die feriatur quispiam a scorpione …*
'if a man is stung by a scorpion on the same day …'

(51) Cic. *Sull.* 41: *fore ut aliquando non Torquatus neque Torquati quispiam similis… sed ut aliquis patrimonii naufragus … diceret*
'one day it would happen that, not Torquatus nor anyone like Torquatus, but that someone who had made shipwreck of his fortunes would say'

(52) a. Cic. *Verr.* II 1,56: *uereor ne haec forte cuipiam nimis antiqua et iam obsoleta uideantur*
'but there are some, I fear, to whom these instances may seem old-fashioned and already out of date'

b. Cic. *Catil.* 4,13: *nisi uero cuipiam L. Caesar... crudelior nudius tertius uisus est*
'unless perhaps it seemed to anyone that L. Caesar was too cruel the day before yesterday'

(53) Cic. *div.* 2,128: *si nulla est, quid istos interpretes audiamus? Sin quaepiam est, aueo audire quae sit*
'if there is none, why should we listen to your interpreters? But if there is one, I am eager to hear what it is'

(54) Cic. *Lael.* 39: *ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse*
'it is impossible for us even to suspect any one of these men of importuning a friend for anything'

(55) Cic. *Verr.* II 2,78: *forsitan aliquis aliquando eiusmodi quippiam fecerit*
'there may now and then have been someone who did something of this kind'

3.2 *Quispiam* in Late Latin

In Late Latin, *quispiam* becomes rarer but also less restricted in context than in Classical Latin. For example, in the *Historia Augusta*, one of the few works where *quispiam* occurs, usage is free, as in (56). Formulas of potential value, which are the favored context in Classical Latin, occur in only a few cases, as in (57). In the *Historia Augusta*, *quispiam* is also found in negative clauses, precisely in contexts which are typical of *quisquam* (58).[36] Another type of occurrence in the *Historia Augusta* is the combination of *quispiam* with *alius*, a structure already used in Classical Latin and found also in other late authors. Compare (59). That the use of *quispiam* in Late Latin is not restricted to precise contexts is also evidenced by the free use of the (very few) examples in late authors, where in (60a) *quispiam* is in a conditional clause while in (60b) it is contained in a consecutive clause.

36. Cf. Dräger (1878: 96) on such examples: "In manchen Stellen mag die Lesart falsch und ein Casus von *quisquam* zu schreiben sein".

(56) Alex. 55,3: *quia indigne ferunt Persarum reges quempiam suorum alicubi seruire*
'because the kings of the Persians deem it a disgrace that any of their subjects should serve anywhere as slaves'

(57) a. Heliog. 34,1: *mirum fortasse cuipiam uideatur*
'it may perhaps seem strange to some'
b. Aurelian. 10,1: *friuola haec fortassis cuipiam et nimis leuia esse uideantur*
'these details may perhaps seem to some to be frivolous and rather trivial'

(58) a. Maximin. 8,3: *numquam ille annonam cuiuspiam tulit*
'he never took away any man's rations'
b. Vopisc. *Tac*. 17,5: *imago Apollinis... sine hominis cuiuspiam manu deprehensa est*
'the statue of Apollo was worshipped without the agency of any human hand'
c. Geta 5,2: *si quid accepit a parentibus ad suum contulit cultum neque quicquam cuipiam dedit*
'whatever he received from his parents he used for his own adornment, and he never gave anything to anybody'

(59) a. Cic. *Tusc*. 3,19: *aut num aliud quodpiam membrum timidum ac turgidum non uitiose se habet*?
'or can any other limb fail to be defective when in a swollen and inflamed state?'
b. Prob. 11,3: *uel illum uel alium quempiam maiestas uestra fecisset*
'that your majesty had made either him or some other man your prince'
c. Mart. Cap. 4,344: *item puerum si uelis diuidere in Catamitum aut alium quempiam certae personae puerum*
'and again, if you want to divide "the boy" into Catamitus or some other boy of a certain person'

(60) a. Amm. 26,1,1: *quas si scitari uoluerit quispiam*
'if someone wishes to know these things'

b. Veg. *mil.* 2,21: *ita ut ex prima cohorte ad gradum quempiam promotus uadat ad decimam cohortem*
'so that having been promoted from the first cohort to some other rank (a soldier) goes to the tenth cohort'

3.3 *Quispiam* in Gellius and Apuleius

A case apart is constituted by Aulus Gellius and Apuleius. The frequency of *quispiam* in these authors is comparatively much higher than in other authors, and it is used, especially in Gellius, almost exactly the same as *quidam*. *Quispiam* appears 52 times in Gellius; there are about as many occurrences in the nominative case as there are of *quidam*. Like *quidam*, *quispiam* relates to a specific referent known to the speaker (61). It often relates to a common noun indicating a category such as *homo, adulescens, grammaticus* (62) or to a proper noun, where *quispiam* has a de-definitizing function (typical of *quidam*) (63). In the cases other than nominative, the great majority, if not all, examples of *quispiam* are equivalent to *quidam* (64).

(61) Gell. 2,21,6: *tum quispiam ex his, qui se ad litteras memoriasque ueteres dediderat*
'then one of them, who had devoted himself to ancient literature and antiquities'

(62) a. Gell. 3,1,7: *erat tum nobiscum in eodem ambulacro homo quispiam sane doctus*
'there was with us at the time in the same promenade a man of considerable learning'

b. Gell. 9,2,1: *adiit nobis praesentibus palliatus quispiam*
'there once came, when I was present, a man in a cloak'

(63) Gell. 3,8,1: *tum Ambraciensis quispiam Timochares... ad C. Fabricium consulem furtim uenit*
'a certain Timochares, an Ambracian ... came stealthily to the consul G. Fabricius'

(64) a. Gell. 3,3,10: *in eodem libro Varronis id quoque scriptum et Plautium fuisse quempiam poetam comoediarum*
'in that same book of Varro's we are told also that there was another writer of comedies called Plautius'
b. Gell. 6,17,1: *percontabar Romae quempiam grammaticum*
'I inquired at Rome of a certain grammarian'
c. Gell. 10,1,1: *familiari meo cuipiam litteras Athenis Romam misi*
'I sent a letter from Athens to a friend of mine in Rome'

In Aulus Gellius there is no example of *quispiam* used as in Classical Latin, that is, in a conditional clause or a clause with potential value. Not even in Apuleius are such contexts favored for *quispiam*. Of 41 examples, more than half have the same sense as *quidam* (65). In other examples, *quispiam* is rather similar to *aliquis* (66). The use of *quispiam* in place of *quidam* prevails in Gellius and Apuleius but it appears not to be limited exclusively to them. For instance, if the sense of *quempiam* in example (67) by Ammianus were confirmed to be the same as *quidam*, this use could have been generalized in some way. In (67), *quempiam*, if it is connected with the adjective *non ignobilem*, could function as a "hedge" by analogy with one of the major functions of *quidam*. Otherwise, *quempiam* could be interpreted like *aliquis* as a free-choice pronoun, expressing indifference or lack of concern.[37]

(65) a. Apul. *met.* 3,15: *nec umquam magis artis huius uiolentia nititur, quam cum scitulae formulae iuuenem quempiam libenter aspexit*
'and never does she depend more on the force of this art than when she has looked lustfully at some young man with an attractive figure'
b. Apul. *met.* 4,3: *sed ilico mulier quaepiam, uxor eius scilicet, simul eum prostratum et semianimem ex edito despexit*
'just then, however, some woman, evidently his wife, looked down from the hill and saw him stretched out half-dead'

37. Compare the Italian translation by Selem (1973): 'non un re qualsiasi di stirpe non nobile'.

(66) Apul. *apol.* 40: *quid enim tandem, si medicinae neque instudiosus neque imperitus quaepiam remedia ex piscibus quaero*?
'what about if, being neither misinformed nor incapable in medicine, I look for some remedies from fishes?'

(67) Amm. 17,13,24: *isdemque ad gratiae cumulum non ignobilem quempiam regem, sed quem ipsi antea sibi praefecere, regalem imposuit bonis animi corporisque praestantem*
'and as a crowning favor, he set over them, not some low-born king, but one whom they themselves had previously chosen as their ruler, a man eminent for his mental and physical gifts'

4. Knowledge of the speaker

In various languages "knowledge of the speaker" is a semantic factor relevant to determine the choice between different indefinites.[38] The Latin indefinite sensitive to "knowledge of the speaker" is *quidam*.[39] Like *aliquis,* it is a specific phrase presupposing the existence of its referent.[40] But only by *quidam* it is made clear that the speaker is able to identify the referent of the indefinite pronoun (68). Normally the indefinite *quidam* is used when the referent is known to the speaker but unknown to the hearer. It may also happen that the referent is known to both: in this case, the use of *quidam* permits a hint as to the entity whose identifiability is presupposed, without naming it, as in (69a), where the referent is a known rival party; see also (69b),

38. Cf. Haspelmath (1997: 45–48). In Russian, the indefinite formed with *-to* can only be used if the referent cannot be identified by the speaker. If the referent can be identified but the speaker chooses to withhold information about its identity from the hearer, the indefinite formed with *koe-* is used. As underlined by Jayez and Tovena (2006), conditions of non-identification are required by Fr. *un* N *quelconque*, while *un certain*, on the contrary, requires that the referent be identified.
39. The formation of *quidam* is uncertain. Ferrarino (1942: 108–110) maintains that it is derived from *quis-de-am,* but this is rejected by Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 196) in favor of the derivation from *quis-dam.*
40. Normally *quidam* is possible with episodic nonmodal sentences; it is not found in sentences which are neutral with respect to presupposition of existence, such as generic statements and conditional sentences.

where *quosdam* refers to people well known to the addressee. The property of referring to entities identifiable by the speaker applies also to *quidam* as a modifier of animate nouns (70). The fact that *quidam* requires the referent to be already known agrees with its being compatible with proper nouns, which intrinsically make identification possible, as suggested by some analyses;[41] examples where *quidam* accompanies a proper noun, as in (71), are very frequent.[42] With a proper noun, *quidam* often signals that the identity of the person referred to is known but not divulged and the addressee is expected not to know who this person is. Sometimes the addition of *quidam* to a proper noun seems to imply semantic enrichment, as in (71b).

(68) a. Ter. *Eun.* 843: *interim dum ante ostium sto, notus mihi quidam obuiam uenit*
'while I was standing at the door, up came an acquaintance of mine'

b. Hor. *sat.* 1,9,3: *accurrit quidam notus mihi nomine tantum*
'a fellow runs up, who is known to me only by name'

c. Cic. *Verr.* II 2,173: *dat amico suo cuidam negotium*
'he instructed one of his friends'

(69) a. Ter. *Eun.* 483: *neque pugnas narrat neque cicatrices suas ostentat neque tibi obstat, quod quidam facit*
'he doesn't tell stories of battles or display his scars or hamper your choice, as a certain personage does'

b. Cic. *Catil.* 1,8: *uideo enim esse hic in senatu quosdam, qui tecum una fuerunt*
'I see here in the senate some who were there with you'

41. Cf. Geurts (1997).

42. Compatibility with proper nouns is also shown by Fr. *un certain*, Eng. *a certain.* For a recent analysis of these epistemic determiners, see Jayez and Tovena (2002; 2006), who propose that the epistemic value of *un certain* is to signal that there are two independent identifications of the referent, one by the speaker and the other by another epistemic agent. The latter identification may be provided in the sentence (cf. *j'ai rencontré un certain diplomate dont on m'avait parlé*) or be covert (cf. *un certain collègue a accepté de relire mon article*). In the latter case, it is up to the reader to reconstruct the reasons why the speaker signals the second identification. On *a certain*, see Hintikka (1986) and Hornstein (1988).

(70) a. Plaut. *Merc*. 426–428: *senex est quidam, qui illam mandauit mihi / ut emerem ad instanc faciem.* :: *At mihi quidam adulescens, pater, / mandauit, ut ad illam faciem, ita ut illast, emerem sibi*
‘there’s a certain old man who commissioned me to buy her – or a girl of her appearance. :: But, father, a certain young man commissioned me to buy him a girl of precisely her appearance’

b. Ter. *Andr*. 221–222: *fuit olim quidam senex/mercator; nauim is fregit apud Andrum insulam*[43]
‘once upon a time there was an old gentleman, an Athenian, a merchant; he was wrecked on the Isle of Andros’

(71) a. Plaut. *Men*. 650: *quis is homost?* :: *Menaechmus quidam*
‘who is this man? :: A certain Menaechmus’

b. Cic. *Verr*. II 5,81: *erat Pipa quaedam, uxor Aeschrionis Syracusani; . . . erat Nice, . . . uxor Cleomeni Syracusani*
‘among the ladies there was a certain Pipa, the wife of Aeschrio of Syracuse; there was also Nice, the wife of Cleomenes of Syracuse’

c. Cic. *nat. deor*. 1,107: *et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cuiusdam fuisse Cercopis*
‘and the Pythagoreans say that the Orphic poem which we possess was the work of a certain Cercops’

d. Cic. *Verr*. II 2,128: *erat eius honoris cupidus Artemo quidam, Climachia cognomine, homo sane locuples et domi nobilis. Sed is fieri nullo modo poterat si Herodotus quidam adesset*
‘this position was coveted by one Artemo, surnamed Climachias, who was admittedly a man of wealth and of high rank in his own town; however, his appointment was out of the question if a certain Herodotus appeared as candidate’

43. As demonstrated by H. Rosén (1998), *quidam* is especially appropriate for inceptive statements, including presentational sentences such as (70b). According to her, in Plautus and Terence about 30 % of adjectival *quidam* are found in initial statements, where, on the contrary, no form of *aliqui(s)* is found; in Phaedrus there is no *aliqui(s)*, and about 70 % of the occurrences of *quidam* are in story beginnings.

e. Liv. 24,5,6: *tres ex iis, quibus solis aditus in domum familiarior erat, Adranodorus et Zoippus, generi Hieronis, et Thraso quidam*
'three of them, who alone had more intimate access to the palace, Adranodorus and Zoippus, the sons-in-law of Hiero, and a certain Thraso'

4.1 Semantic enrichment by implicature

Although the usage exemplified in (71) is not at all marginal, it generally goes unmentioned in traditional grammars, perhaps because it contrasts with the usual explanation that *quidam* is used when the speaker cannot or does not want to name the referent.[44] On the basis of (71b–c), Serbat (1984: 346) has suggested an analysis of *quidam* + proper noun as a sort of quantifier with a double meaning: (a) it denotes a specific entity, (b) this entity is chosen within a set of similar entities: 'Pipa est une parmi les amies de Verrès', 'Cercops est un parmi les Pythagoriciens'. Even if Serbat's suggestion could be right for the examples in question, it does not seem to cover the other occurrences in (71), where there is no (explicit or implicit) reference set (cf. (71a)). It seems more plausible that the addition of *quidam* to a proper noun serves to "de-definitize" the proper noun, as suggested by H. Rosén (1998: 729), and to enable pragmatic enrichment based on conversational implicatures.[45] The reasons for de-definitization can be various: the speaker can simply stress that the referent of the proper noun is unknown to the addressee[46] (this is the more frequent usage: see (71a, c–e), or he can express a "depreciative" (in

44. Cf. Ernout & Thomas (1951), Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 196): "ein gewisser, den man nicht näher bestimmen kann oder will".
45. Cf. Haspelmath (1997: 187). Semantic enrichment of indefinite pronouns is based on Grice's first maxim of Quantity, "Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange". From this maxim it follows that when speakers use indefinite pronouns in situations where they do not contribute any additional information, hearers are entitled to make additional inferences.
46. Hintikka (1986: 335) states that the force of *a certain* in connection with a proper noun is not to assert that the referent of the proper noun exists, but to point that the addressee is expected not to know who he is.

the sense of Haspelmath 1997: 186) or ironical nuance. In (71b), for example, the addition of *quaedam* drives *Pipa* back into anonymity, creating a strong contrast with the fame surrounding this woman (cf. Cic. *Verr.* II 5,81: *de qua muliere plurimi uersus qui in istius cupiditatem facti sunt tota Sicilia percelebrantur*). The impression is that the noun phrase *Pipa quaedam* carries a depreciative nuance as its secondary meaning. An ironic nuance seems to characterize (72), where *quidam* accompanies a proper noun identifying a universally known referent. The ironic coloring comes from the contradiction between *quidam* and *Iuppiter*, the greatest of the gods, treated on par with other minor gods.[47]

(72) Tert. *apol.* 9,5: *sed et in illa religiosissima urbe Aeneadarum piorum est Iuppiter quidam quem ludis suis humano sanguine proluunt*
'in that most religious of all cities, the city of the pious race of Aeneas, is a certain Jupiter, whom they drench with human blood at his own games'

The depreciative or ironic sense shown by the specific indefinite *quidam* in (71b) and (72) contrasts with the cross-linguistic tendency observed by Haspelmath (1997: 188), that specific indefinites are used appreciatively while nonspecific indefinites have depreciative meaning (73); but the appreciative interpretation of *quodam* in (73) is determined by the contrast with the free-choice indefinite *quolibet*, to which a depreciative meaning is often assigned.[48] The same holds for the contrast in (74). When there is no contrast, it is more difficult to exclude the chance that *quidam* may have a depreciative interpretation. A depreciative sense is admitted by Donatus (*et 'fallaciam' et 'quandam', ut nec uerisimilis sit ipsa fallacia: in toto uis contemptionis et*

47. Serbat (1984: 347–348) suggests that the ironic effect is the result of the "jeu qui s'institue entre l'être déterminé et l'ensemble des analogues": *Juppiter* is identified, but at the same time he is included within a set of analogous entities that are inferior to him.
48. Since free-choice indefinites are nonspecific and refer to an arbitrary element of their class, it is normal that they can have depreciative interpretations: if their referents are selected randomly, one can expect that even the worst element of the class be selected. In (73), the appreciative reading is also favored by the presence of the adjective *certus* that here carries the meaning 'fixed', 'particular'. Cf. also Cic. *Tusc.* 2,65: *certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis* 'to certain definite fixed opinions'; Aug. *epist.* 95,8: *deinde certa quaedam in apocalypsi angeli statura definitur*.

uilitatis), when he comments on (75), where the expression *quandam fallaciam* neither identifies “a certain (special) wild story” nor is it simply equivalent to “a wild story” with the indefinite article in a specific interpretation.[49]

(73) Cic. *fin.* 3,24: *uita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet*
‘life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like’[50]

(74) Cic. *fin.* 3,23: *appetitio animi … non ad quoduis genus uitae, sed ad quandam formam uiuendi uidetur data*
‘our faculty of appetite was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living’[51]

(75) Ter. *Andr.* 220: *et fingunt quandam inter se nunc fallaciam*
‘and now between them they’ve hatched a wild story’

The depreciative meaning that *quidam* shows, in contrast to equivalent specific indefinites of other languages,[52] might be related to its strong indefinite characterization that also permits the expression of such notions as approximation or detraction of properties.[53] In other words, *quidam* may function as a “hedge”.

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49. Its interpretation is rather something like ‘non so che imbroglio’, ‘je ne sais quelle invention’, as translated into Italian by Bianco (1993) and into French by Marouzeau (1967).
50. Compare Haspelmath’s translation: ‘life must be led in a certain (special) way, not (just) anyhow’.
51. Contrary to the expression *ad quoduis genus*, where no *genus* can be identified, the choice being completely free, *ad quandam formam* suggests a reading where reference is made to a determinate and appreciated type of life (a type that an epistemic agent might identify).
52. Italian expressions such as *uomo di una certa età*, *persona di una certa cultura* normally imply a noticeable amount/degree of the property involved. As noted by Jayez and Tovena (2002), with quantity-denoting nouns Fr. *un certain* also suggests that the quantity is noticeable (cf. *ça prend du temps, et même un certain temps*). If, instead, *un certain* accompanies a quality-denoting noun, it suggests that the type of the quality is determined. In a sentence like j*’ai éprouvé de la surprise, en tout cas une certaine surprise*, *une certaine* relativizes the truth of the sentence to a type of surprise and implies that other types do not satisfy the property expressed by the sentence.
53. H. Rosén (1998: 729) thinks that “*quidam* functions as a qualifying, partializing and diminishing – approaching *nil* – the identification of the entity in question. As such, it can modify adjectives, detracting from the quality they denote (*rufus quidam:* Plaut. *Pseud.* 1218)”. According to Ferrarino (1942: 112) an argument in favor of the approximation

4.2 The value of "hedge"

While grammars generally ignore the use of *quidam* exemplified in (71), they do assign great prominence to its use as a modifier of adjectives or of abstract nouns, often occurring in comparative or comparative conditional clauses, as exemplified in (76). As suggested by Kühner & Stegmann (1962: 643), in these examples *quidam* shows two different and opposing functions: a strengthening function (= 'gerade', 'wirklich') in (76a–b) and a weakening function (= 'so zu sagen') in (76c–d), and the two opposing values are registered as two different meanings. This approach has been strongly criticized by Ferrarino (1942: 110–113), who maintains that *quidam* has the unique and true meaning of indefiniteness and that the two different values shown in (76) are the result of the combination of *quidam* with different items. Its weakening function is close to the basic meaning of *quidam* and therefore it is more common and expected, while the strengthening function can occur when *quidam* modifies adjectives denoting a quality at a very high degree. In *mirifica quaedam* (in (76a)), the contribution of *quaedam* is to signal that the quality denoted by the adjective cannot be easily specified: *meravigliosa da non potersi dire, quanto non è possibile dire* 'marvelous, so to say (in a way that can't be said)'; as such it can then be considered as extraordinary: *indicibilmente meravigliosa* 'ineffably marvelous'. The behavior of *quidam* in (76) is thus similar to that of a "hedge", i.e. of an expression "whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy".[54] With adjectives, *quidam* as a hedge signals that the quality is not easy to determine and is therefore uncommon and exceptional, while with abstract nouns it signals the metaphorical character of the expression (see (76c–d)).[55] An interesting case is given in (77),

value comes from Cicero himself, who alternates *quidam* with *paene* or *prope* with the same adjective without relevant differences: Cic. *har. resp.* 1,2: *cuius* (*P. Seruili*) *si iam uim et grauitatem illam singularem ac paene diuinam adsequi possem.*

54. The term "hedge" was introduced by G. Lakoff (1972). On the origins of and recent approaches to the concept of hedging, see Gudrun (1997). On the use of hedges as mitigating devices, see Caffi (1999).

55. A more explicit instance of the hedge value of *quidam* appears in the expression *quodam modo*, which is often used to nuance a metaphor: Quint. *inst.* 10,1,31: *est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutus;* Tac. *Agr.* 32,4: (*Romanos*) *clausos quodam modo uinctos di nobis tradiderunt*.

whose special aspect is that the comparative phrase contains a metaphorical proper noun in a predicative structure.[56] In this case the proper noun does not have the normal function of identifying a particular person but rather descriptive content, since it denotes a type or category of person: *Roscius* is intended here as the prototype of the very great actor.[57] In this metaphorical construction, *quendam* plays the role of a "hedge",[58] expressing approximation of the comparison: *Roscius* is the ideal, unique, and inimitable model, so the resemblance wanted by Crassus can only be approximate ('a kind of *Roscius*'). The hedge *quendam*, applied to the proper noun *Roscius*, has the effect of attenuating a metaphor that is considered too audacious.

(76) a. Cic. *off.* 2,38: *et maxime iustitia, ex qua una uirtute uiri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam multitudini uidetur*
'so justice, above all, on the sole basis of which men are called "good men", seems to people generally a quite marvelous virtue'

b. Cic. *Tusc.* 1,66: *nec uero deus ipse… alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera*
'and indeed God Himself can be comprehended in no other way than as a mind unfettered and free'

c. Cic. *Brut.* 45: *et iam bene constitutae ciuitatis quasi alumna quaedam eloquentia*
'eloquence is, one may say, the offspring of well-established civic order'

d. Sen. *dial.* 9,17,5: *nascitur ex adsiduitate laborum animorum hebetatio quaedam et languor*
'continuous mental toil breeds in the mind a certain dullness and languor'

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56. For a detailed description of the construction and interpretation of metaphorical proper nouns, see Jonasson (1991) and Flaux (1991). On the metaphorical usage of proper nouns in Latin, see Vallat (2002).

57. It is evident that the descriptive content on which the metaphorical interpretation of *Roscius* is based presupposes the existence of a referent of the proper noun that is known both to the speaker and to the addressee.

58. In Kleiber (1981: 408–410), the term "hedge" is translated by the French term "enclosure". Among the various "enclosures" listed by Kleiber there are the expressions *une sorte de*, *une espèce de*, which, in our opinion, are paralleled by *quidam.*

(77) Cic. *de orat.* 1,258: *uoluisti enim in suo genere unum quemque quasi quendam esse Roscium*
'for you would have every one of us be a kind of Roscius in his own line'

In modern languages, metaphorical proper nouns are syntactically distinct from referential proper nouns for they are generally accompanied by a determinant and/or by different types of expansions. A similar situation is obtained through the use of an indefinite, as in (78).[59] The proper nouns also denote some well-known prototypes: *Phormio* and *Gnatho* denote the typical features of the parasite, and *Ballio* is the prototype of the ruffian. So these proper nouns have depreciative connotations which make them similar to common nouns. Differently from the proper noun *Roscius* in (77), which refers to the highest degree in a scale of cleverness and thus to a unique and inimitable model, the proper nouns in (78) connote properties that are easily repeatable: while there is only one *Roscius*, there can be more than one *Phormio*, *Gnatho*, or *Ballio*.[60] The distribution of *quidam* and *aliquis* in these examples agrees well with the properties we have suggested for them: *quidam* has a referent presupposed as existing and uniquely identifiable (only one), *aliquis* has a referent presupposed as existing but not uniquely identifiable (more than one).[61]

59. In Latin, where the article is lacking, it is also possible to find bare metaphoric proper nouns. See, for example Vell. 2,18,1: *Mithridates, Ponticus rex, bello acerrimus, uirtute eximius, odio in Romanos Hannibal* '... in hatred towards the Romans a Hannibal'.
60. The reproducibility of the prototype is confirmed by examples where the proper noun is used in the plural: Cic. *de orat.* 2,77: *erras, Catule, inquit Antonius, nam egomet in multos iam Phormiones incidi*. The plural in fact suggests that the class of individuals denoted by the metaphorical proper noun is far from empty. Cf. Jonasson (1991: 69).
61. The difference between *quidam* and *aliquis* as regards the identification of the referent is related to the possibility, which only *aliquis* has, of assuming a generic value and of expressing indifference or lack of concern. In this way, *aliquis* has the same properties that Jayez and Tovena (2002) assign to *un* N *quelconque* in French. An analysis of metaphorical proper nouns accompanied by the indefinites *aliquis* or *quidam* is suggested in Bertocchi and Maraldi (2006).

(78) Cic. *Phil.* 2,15: *cui? Neminem nominabo; putate tum Phormioni alicui, tum Gnathoni, tum etiam Ballioni*
'to whom? I will give no name; imagine it to be given, at one time to some Phormio, at another to a Gnatho, at another even to a Ballio'

The occurrence of *quidam* with metaphorical proper nouns is fairly rare. For this reason, a late example from *Historia Augusta*, where *quidam* plays the same role of "hedge" as in (77), is worth noting. In (79), the presence of the adjective *nouus*[62] changes the reference of the proper noun: *nouus Sylla* does not refer to the real original referent designated by this proper noun, but it is applied to a second referent, the emperor Commodus. Commodus was named *Felix* in imitation of the well-known dictator *Sylla* and for this reason he could be metaphorically defined as a new *Sylla*. The metaphor is mitigated by the presence of *quidam* with the function of a hedge.

(79) Comm. 8,1: *appellatus Felix, inter plurimas caedes multorum ciuium quasi quidam nouus Sylla*
'he was given the name Felix, as though, amid the multitudinous executions of many citizens, he were a kind of second Sulla'

4.3 Plural uses

The plural use of *quidam*, already found in Caesar, becomes very frequent in Livy.[63] In this usage, the de-definitizing function tends to pass from a qualitative value, as in (69b), to a quantitative one, where reference is made to a certain, not precisely determined, number of objects in the discourse domain. Example (80b) shows how the two meanings, the qualitative and the quantitative, may co-occur. It is the context that gives the correct interpretation. Sometimes it is difficult to determine the interpretation, as seen in

62. The use of *nouus* in this example parallels the use of the French adjective *nouveau*, which Jonasson (1991: 66) interprets as an "enclosure": *Il est le nouveau Don Juan et ses conquêtes sont innombrables*.

63. In Plautus there is no occurrence of *quidam* used in the plural, in Terence only one: Ter. *Ad.* 647: *habitant hic quaedam mulieres pauperculae*, where *quaedam* signals the feature 'known to the speaker'.

(81), where *quaedam* can be read with both a qualitative and a quantitative value.[64] In some cases, instead, the quantitative reading is the only possible one, as in (82), where *quaedam* occurs within the second member of a concessive correlative structure and is correlative to the quantity item *multa*.[65] In Livy there are many occurrences of this type, where the quantitative meaning is made evident by the correlation with other items expressing number or amount (*multi… quidam*; *pars… quidam*) (83). The plural use in correlation with other indefinites making reference to quantity is also well attested in Tacitus (84). Frequently, *quidam* alternates with *alii* in subdivisions: *quidam … quidam* or *alii … quidam* is equivalent to *alii … alii*, as in (85). The existence of numerous cases where *quidam* alternates with *alii* and has a quantitative meaning equivalent to *aliquot*[66] shows that in its diachronic development *quidam* tends to lose its typical feature ('knowledge of the speaker') and to occupy the field of *aliquis*.[67] This tendency is not surprising. According to the implicational map suggested by Haspelmath (1997) for the uses/functions of indefinite pronoun series, the two pronouns share the same function of specificity and consequently form a contiguous area on the map. More surprising is the situation of *quidam* in Late Latin, since it is also found in contexts that do not allow specific indefinites.

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64. The qualitative choice can be motivated by the intention of leaving the suspicion of strangulation vague and uncertain. The quantitative choice is related to the intention of leaving the number indefinite, as if it were equivalent to 'a certain number of marks of strangulation'.
65. According to Horn (1976: 61), *multa* may be defined as a mid-scalar quantifier. It occupies the middle of a scale from maximal to minimal quantity ('all-most-many-several-few-none'). The correlation *multa … quaedam* supports the interpretation of *quaedam* as a mid-scalar quantifier, too. They are different quantitatively but have the same positive orientation, toward the great quantity.
66. For an analogous use in Lucretius, see Serbat (1984), according to whom the alternation of *quidam* and *aliquis* is possible in the singular too, as suggested by the parallelism of examples such as: Lucr. 3,878: *facit esse sui quiddam super* and Lucr. 1,672: *proinde aliquid superesse necesse est incolume ollis.*
67. From Codoñer's (1968) percentages concerning the use of indefinites in Plautus, Terence, Lucretius, Cicero, and Tacitus, it turns out that Tacitus shows a considerable increase of *quidam* corresponding to the decrease of *aliquis*. This situation, the opposite of Cicero's, would have favored the process of assimilating *quidam* to *aliquis*.

(80) a. Caes. *civ.* 3,101,3: *et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris uictoria … essent adlati*
'and at that time had not some news of Caesar's victory been brought'
b. Varro *rust.* 2,1,24: *in alimoniis, si sunt plures nati, ut quidam faciunt, sequendum ut quosdam subducas*
'on the matter of feeding, if too many young are born you should follow the practice of some breeders, and wean some of them'

(81) Vell. 2,4,5: *repertus est mortuus, ita ut quaedam elisarum faucium in ceruice reperirentur notae*
'he was found dead with certain marks suggesting strangulation on his throat'

(82) Cic. *Att.* 13,21a,1: *in quo non sane multa mutaui, sed tamen quaedam*
'in which I have made a few alterations, though not many'

(83) Liv. 1,54,9: *multi palam, quidam, in quibus minus speciosa criminatio erat futura, clam interfecti*
'many were openly executed; some, whom it would not have looked well to accuse, were put to death in secret'

(84) Tac. *ann.* 1,56: *cum quidam ad Germanicum perfugissent, reliqui omissis pagis uicisque in siluas disperguntur*
'a few then had come over to Germanicus, while the rest abandoned their townships and villages and scattered through the woods'

(85) a. Liv. 41,20,4: *itaque nescire, quid sibi uellet, quibusdam uideri; quidam ludere eum simpliciter, quidam haud dubie insanire aiebant*
'and so he seemed to some not to know what he wanted; some said that he was playing childish tricks, some that he was unquestionably insane'
b. Tac. *hist.* 4,50: *militesque et centuriones quosdam puniit, alios praemiis adfecit*
'and he also punished some soldiers and centurions, others he rewarded'

4.4 Later developments

In Late Latin, *quidam* tends to occur where indefinites with the feature "non-specific" would be expected. In Gregory of Tours, for example, there are instances of *quidam* in place of *quisquam* (86).[68] There are also instances where *quis* is used instead of *quidam* and vice versa, as in (87). In (87a), *quidam* would be expected both because the subject of the sentence is the speaker himself, who cannot not identify the referent of the indefinite pronoun, and because the event talked about is in a perfective past tense (*quae audiui*). In (87b–c), *quidam* is found instead of the usual enclitic *quis*. While *ne quidam* is rare,[69] *si quidam* is relatively more frequent and is also attested in less late authors.[70] Here too the occurrence of the specific indefinite *quidam* finds some motivation, as shown in (88), where the indefinite pronoun has a known referent in both cases: in (88a) *quidam homines* refers to the Optimates who hope to have Cicero as an ally in the struggle against the democratic party; in (88b) *quosdam* refers to people well identified by both the speaker and the addressee. As for later examples, in (89a) the *si*-clause has not a conditional, but a relative interpretation, with *si quidam* equivalent to *si qui*. In (89b) the choice of *quidam* is congruent with the meaning the author assigns to the notion *particulare*:[71] *conuersio* implies that *quidam* refers to a uniquely identified individual and that the *si*-clause is a specific conditional statement.

68. Cf. Bonnet (1968: 303). On cases of *quidam* instead of an expected *quisquam* in Ammianus see Petschenig (1889: 268). One case is Amm. 25,1,1: *hanc noctem ... exegimus, nec sedere quodam auso, nec flectere in quietem lumina prae timore.*
69. The only occurrences we have found are *ne quaedam* in Lucr. 2,499; Cassiod. *var.* 7,16 and *ne quibusdam* in Symm. *epist.* 6,66.
70. Among late authors, there are two examples in Lactantius and ten in Augustine. Other occurrences are found in *Digesta*.
71. Martianus Capella distinguishes two types of sentences with respect to quantity (*in quantitate*): *uniuersalia,* such as *omnis homo animal est*, and *particularia*, such as *quidam homo ambulat*. So *quidam* is used to express the quantificational value 'one' in contrast with the universal quantification represented by *omnis.* With the quantificational value 'one', *quidam* becomes equivalent to *unus*. But while for *unus* this value is the first step toward the subsequent development as an indefinite article, for *quidam* a similar development did not take place (cf. n. 73 below).

(86) Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 10,3: *ita ut prius regionem propriam … adficerent quam quiddam uictoriae de inimica gente patrarent*
'so that they considered the region their own before obtaining a victory over the enemies'

(87) a. Greg. Tur. *glor. mart.* 7: *quae a quibus audiui silere nequeo*
'I cannot keep silent on the things I heard from them'

b. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 5,19: *proderit tibi si quiddam nobis profuturum narraueris*[72]
'it will be an advantage for you if you tell us something (which will be) advantageous for us'

c. Greg. Tur. *Mart.* 4,5: *dum … excubaret ne quiddam ex eo bestia raperet*
'while he was keeping watch so that a beast couldn't steal anything from there'

(88) a. Cic. *epist.* 1,8,4: *otium nobis exoptandum est, quod ii qui potiuntur rerum praestaturi uidentur, si quidam homines patientius eorum potentiam ferre potuerint*
'tranquility is what I must pray for, and that those who are at the head of affairs seem likely to answer for me, if certain persons prove themselves less intolerant of their supremacy'

b. Cic. *epist.* 4,10,2: *quod si nullum haberes sensum nisi oculorum, prorsus tibi ignoscerem si quosdam nolles uidere*
'well, if you possessed no single sense but that of vision, I should quite forgive you for objecting to the sight of certain folk'

(89) a. Prob. 13,2: *statim deinde, si quidam ex interfectoribus Aureliani superfuerant, uario genere uindicauit*
'immediately thereafter he punished in various ways all the slayers of Aurelian who eventually survived'

72. Bonnet translates the *si*-clause as 'si tu nous livres un secret avantageux', on the basis of a *lectio* which does not add *esse* to *profuturum.* In this way, (87b) would be a real (perhaps unique) exception to the expected use of *si quid* in hypothetical conditionals.

b. Mart. Cap. 4,397: *particulare autem dedicatiuum habet necessario conuersionem, nam si quidam homo animal est, quoddam animal homo est*
'an affirmation concerning a part necessarily has an inversion: for if a certain man is an animal, a certain animal is a man'

Another aspect of the late use of *quidam* is its presumed equivalence to the modern indefinite article. The overwhelming frequency of *quidam* in Apuleius's *Metamorphoses* led Graur (1969) to argue for the existence of a Latin indefinite article as early as Apuleius. This hypothesis is rejected by H. Rosén (1998: 730) on the basis of the fact that in Apuleius (and certainly not earlier) there is no regularity in the use of *quidam* similar to that of any modern indefinite article. Nor does the use of *quidam* in late texts (e.g., *Itinerarium Egeriae*, Filastrius Brixiensis's *Diuersarum hereseon liber*, or Gregorius Magnus's works) support the idea that in Late Latin *quidam* becomes a marker for singular-indefinite nouns.[73] In spite of rare examples such as (90), where *quidam* might function as an indefinite article, in general the Late examples do not differ from the Classical ones. In *Itinerarium Egeriae*, *quidam* is used 9 times and in none does it seem to be simply equivalent to an indefinite article (91). In Filastrius, many occurrences of *quidam* are with a proper noun.[74]

73. As maintained by Givón (1981), in many languages of the world it is the numeral 'one' that gradually develops as a marker for singular-indefinite nouns. This development is also attested in Romance, where there is no trace of an indefinite article *quidam* and the word itself did not survive (cf. Graur 1969: 382). It is from the Latin quantifier *unus* that the development of the indefinite article started. Some Latin passages are generally considered the first steps toward the Romance future development: (i) Plaut. *Truc.* 250: *est huic unus seruus uiolentissimus*; (ii) Ter. *Andr.* 118: *unam adspicio adulescentulam*; (iii) Cic. *de orat.* 1,132: *non mihi modo, qui sicut unus pater familias, his de rebus loquor.* It is worth noting that here *unus* marks both referential ((i) and (ii)) and non-referential nouns ((iii), where *pater familias* has an attributive reading). On the development of *unus* as an indefinite article, see Pinkster (1988). Typological arguments might also be taken into consideration that analyze indefinite articles in relation to definite articles. As noted by Plank and Moravcsik (1996: 204): "Among languages with an article it is most common to have only a definite article. What is second most common is to have both a definite and an indefinite article, and it is by far least common to have only an indefinite article."

74. Such occurrences contrast with what is stated by Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 197), who enlist Filastrius among the authors of the "späteren Volkssprache" who do not use *quidam.*

Consider, for example, (92), where *quidam* cannot be considered equivalent to the modern indefinite article. *Valentinus quidam* has the same interpretation as in (71); it can be translated as 'a certain Valentine' and not as 'a Valentine', which would be very odd.[75] Moreover, both Filastrius and Gregorius Magnus use *quidam* with the Classical value of "hedge", as shown by (93) and (94). While cases of *quidam* instead of *aliquis* are fairly usual[76] (cf. (95)), occurrences of *quidam* with the value of a nonspecific indefinite continue to be very rare (cf. (96)). *Quidam* is not listed in Meyer-Lübke (1911), and, as emphasized by Bourciez (1946: 244), it is from *certus* that Romance indefinites functioning like *quidam* developed (Sp. *cierto*; It. *certo*; Fr. *certes*; Rum. *cert*). That *quidam*, having disappeared in Romance,[77] was replaced by *certus* is not surprising, since *certus* was already used with the same sense as *quidam*, even if only sporadically (see Cic. *Marcell.* 16: *insolentia certorum hominum*; Cic. *Catil.* 3,16: *iam ad certas res conficiendas certos homines delectos ac descriptos habebat*). The tendency to use *certus* instead of *quidam* is already clear in Benedict of Nursia, where no occurrence of the latter is found while the former, however rare, is used as in (97).

(90) Greg. M. *in evang.* 23,2: *quidam paterfamilias cum tota domo sua magno hospitalitatis studio seruiebat; cumque quotidie ad mensam suam peregrinos susciperet, quodam die peregrinus quidam inter alios uenit, ad mensam ductus est*
'a head of a family with all his house was greatly devoted to hospitality; every day receiving pilgrims at his table, one day a pilgrim came among others and was led to the table'

(91) a. *Itin. Eger.* 23,1: *nam proficiscens de Tharso perueni ad quandam ciuitatem supra mare adhuc Ciliciae, que appellatur Pompeiopolim*
'Leaving Tarsus, but still in Cilicia, I reached a certain city by the sea, named Pompeiopolis'

75. The oddity of 'a Valentine' derives from the fact that the indefinite article with a proper noun can be accepted only if the proper noun has a metaphorical use and is more or less lexicalized, becoming a common noun.
76. But as we have already seen, this non-classical use becomes frequent from Livy onward.
77. See Graur (1969: 382). According to Serbat (1984: 353 n.7) the form 'quidam' of modern French is "emprunté sans doute au jargon de la procédure au XIVe siècle".

b. *Itin. Eger.* 20,5: *et martyrium ibi positum est, id est sancti cuiusdam monachi nomine Helpidi*
'This is the tomb of a certain holy monk called Helpidius'

(92) Filastr. 38,1: *post istum Valentinus quidam surrexit, pythagoricus magis quam christianus, uanam quandam ac perniciosam doctrinam eructans*
'after this one a certain Valentine stood up, who was more a Pythagorean than a Christian, uttering a vain and pernicious doctrine'

(93) Filastr. 98,4: *cum non adtendant quod inspiratio diuini spiritus est quaedam gratia*[78]
'since they do not take care that the inspiration of the divine spirit is a kind of grace'

(94) Greg. M. *in Ezech.* 1,8,252: *uox ergo est in mente quasi quidam sonus intellegentiae*
'the voice in the mind is like a kind of sound of the intelligence'

(95) Filastr. 89,5: *et quia addiderunt in ea quaedam non bene sentientes, inde non legitur in ecclesia, et si legitur a quibusdam …*
'and since some women joined who did not hear well, for this reason they do not read in the church and if someone reads … '

(96) a. Filastr. 156,15: *itidem sine quadam intermissione nuntiantes*
'in the same way they announced without any interruption'

b. Greg. M. *in Ezech.* 2,2,1: *ne quidam me fortasse tacita cogitatione reprehendant quod… qua mente id faciam agnoscant*
'in order that anyone can perhaps blame me with a silent thought'

(97) Bened. *reg.* 48,1: *otiositas inimica est animae, et ideo certis temporibus occupari debent fratres in labore manuum, certis iterum horis in lectione diuina*
'idleness is the enemy of soul, therefore at certain times the brothers must be engaged in manual labor, and at certain hours in divine lesson again'

78. About this example, Juret (1906: 164) states that *quidam* has the classical meaning "une sorte de".

5. Negation

According to the typology suggested by Werle (2002), negative indefinites can be divided into two main types, those that inherently express negation (negative quantifiers), and those that do not (negative polarity items). Negative quantifiers are just one strategy that some languages use to express the general meaning 'There is no x such that Q(x) and P(x)'.[79] Other strategies can be used, some of which involve indefinite expressions under the scope of negation. Latin can use the first strategy (inherently negative quantifiers), but in specific cases it can also adopt the use of negative polarity items under the scope of negation.

5.1 Negative indefinite pronouns

Like many other languages, Latin has special indefinite pronouns (_nemo, nihil_) and a special adjective (_nullus_) that are only used in negative sentences. According to Werle (2002), these negative indefinites can be treated as negative quantifiers because they have the special property of inherently expressing negative universal quantification – that is, they do not need the support of verbal negation to express nonexistence.[80] They contain a diachronically negative formative (_nemo_ < _*ne-hemo_ < _*ne-homo_; _nihil_ < _*ne-hil_ < _*ne-hilum_; _nullus_ < _*ne-ullus_ < _*ne-oinelos_; _numquam_ < _*ne-umquam_; _nusquam_ < _*ne-usquam_) and are sufficient by themselves to express senten-

79. Unlike sentence negation, intrinsically negative indefinites are not a universal feature of language. They are concentrated in languages of Africa and Eurasia. Cf. Bernini (1998).

80. On the contrary, negative polarity items do not express inherent negation; they need the support of verbal negation in order to express nonexistence. As we will see, _quisquam_ has just this function in Latin.

tial negation (98).[81] The sentences in (98)[82] can be translated into Italian as 'Non venne nessuno', 'Non vide niente', or also more emphatically, as 'Nessuno venne', 'Niente vide'. Unlike Latin, the double possibility in Italian can be accounted for by assigning these languages to two different types: Latin, like standard English, represents a language of the type V-NI,[83] which means that negative indefinite pronouns never co-occur with verbal negation, while Italian represents the type (N)V-NI, in which negative indefinites sometimes co-occur with verbal negation and sometimes do not.

(98) a. *Nemo uenit*[84]
'Nobody came' ("There is no x such that x is a person and x came")
b. *Nihil uidit*
'He saw nothing' ("There is no x such that x is a thing and he saw x")

81. Cf. Ernout & Meillet (1951: 788). For all these items, as well as for the sentence negation *non* (< **ne-oinom* 'no one'), the basic negative formative is the Indo-European sentence negation **ne* or **nē*. This indicates that negative indefinites arose within sentence syntax. At the beginning the items affixed to negation had an autonomous meaning; then they crystallized in the new morphological formation. For example, Enn. *ann.* 14: *neque dispendi facit hilum*, Lucil. 1021: *non proficis hilum* clearly show an autonomous use of *hilum.* The creation of *non* was determined by the need to strengthen the negative expression, which is typical of the colloquial language. See Hofmann (1985: 207).
82. For real instances of (98) see, for example, Plaut. *Most.* 948: *puere, nemo hic habitat*; Plaut. *Persa* 211: *nemo homo umquam ita arbitratust*; Cic. *Phil.* 9,4: *nemo tum nouitati inuidebat; nemo uirtutem non honorabat*; Sen. *epist.* 57,6: *nihil inuenies*; Tac. *ann.* 4,49,3: *sed nihil aeque quam sitis fatigabat.*
83. See Haspelmath (1997: 201–221).
84. The suggested paraphrases, which express narrow-scope existential quantification under negation, agree with the canonical representation of propositions containing negative indefinites. The sentences in (98) can also be semantically represented as wide-scope universal quantification over negation and can be paraphrased in this way: 'For all x, if x is a person, then x didn't come'; 'For all x, if x is a thing, then he didn't see x'. Cf. Werle (2002).

5.2 Double negation

Latin being a V-NI language, when a negative indefinite is found with a verbal negation in the same sentence ("double negation"), the sentence is no longer negated but it acquires a positive meaning.[85] This corresponds to the Latin norm stated by handbooks that two negatives in the same clause cancel each other, yielding a positive result. The order of negation and negative indefinite is not irrelevant: by means of order differences, different semantic readings can be expressed. When the negation precedes the indefinite (*non nemo*),[86] the result is a partial affirmation ('someone');[87] when the negation follows (*nemo non*), the result is a total affirmation, equivalent to a positive universal quantifier (*omnes*).[88] Compare (99a) and (99b). The same results

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85. Cf. Werle (2002) for a similar interpretation of *No one saw nothing*, *We didn't see nothing*, defined by him as cases of multiple negation, interpretable as 'at least one person saw something' and 'we saw something', respectively.
86. *Non nemo* ('not nobody') is a *negatio contrarii* expression, equivalent to 'some people' (cf. M. Hoffmann 1987: 145, 1989: 599). The negative particle has only the constituent *nemo* in its scope. Other similar expressions are: *non nihil*, *non nulli* (more often *nonnulli*), *non numquam*, although in most cases they are to be considered fossilized or "frozen" expressions. That they have a fixed meaning relates to their use, which is not as a litotes but is equivalent to a positive expression. This is mainly true for *nonnulli*, which invariably has the meaning 'several', 'not a few', with only a few exceptions, such as Verg. *Aen.* 11,725–726: *at non haec nullis hominum sator atque deorum / obseruans oculis summo sedet altus Olympo* 'but not with unseeing eyes the Sire of gods and men sits throned on high Olympus'.
87. As underlined by Sapir (1930: 21), negated totalizers, as a rule, have the force of partials. Usages of the type *not none* = 'some' or *not nothing* = 'something', however, in standard English are not as common as in Latin.
88. Capelletti (2003), discussing Italian examples like (i) *nessuno venne*, (ii) *nessuno non venne*, (iii) *non venne nessuno* notes that in (i) *nessuno* is an inherently negative quantifier, as in (ii), while in (iii) it loses its negative import, falling within the scope of negation. The different order of *non* and *nessuno* in (ii) and (iii) has two different semantic readings as a result: while the readings of (i) and (iii) are equivalent, the reading of (ii) is the opposite (= 'tutti vennero'). As one can see, *nessuno non* in (ii) has the same reading as *nemo non*. Examples like (iii) are accounted for by the fact that Italian is a negative concord language (cf. Bernini 1998, where *nessuno* can play two different roles depending on its different distribution in the sentence: when it occurs sentence-initially, it is an inherently negative quantifier; when it is within the scope of negation, it is a negative polarity item. Essentially, *nessuno* covers the roles that in English are played by two different items, *nobody* and *anybody*, and in Latin by *nemo* and *quisquam*.

are obtained with quantificational adverbs. In (100a), *nonnumquam* is equivalent to ‘sometimes’, while in (100b), where the negation has scope not on the adverb but on the whole clause, the meaning is the opposite, equivalent to ‘always’. But the rule that double negation conveys a positive meaning seems to be a norm imposed by literary Classical Latin rather than a natural use of the language, which presents cases of non-elided double negation especially in the colloquial register and in the vulgar language (101). These examples have generally been interpreted as cases of emphatic negation, as redundancy typical of familiar Latin, or as due to Greek influence.[89] Sometimes emendations have been proposed: Riemann (1935: 548), for example, is inclined to elide *nullum* in (101c), as if it were an explicative gloss, removing in this way the only instance of emphatic negation in Cicero.

(99) a. Cic. *Catil*. 4,10: *uideo de istis, qui se popularis haberi uolunt, abesse non neminem*
‘I see that some of those who wish to be considered democratic are absent’

b. Sen. *epist*. 120,21: *nemo non cotidie et consilium mutat et uotum*
‘everyone changes his plans and prayers day by day’

(100) a. Cic. *nat. deor.* 3,89: *at nonnumquam bonos exitus habent boni*
‘but sometimes good men come to good ends’

b. Sen. *epist.* 11,4: (*Pompeius*) *numquam non coram pluribus erubuit*
‘Pompey always blushed in the presence of a gathering’

(101) a. Plaut. *Mil*. 1411: *iura te non nociturum esse homini de hac re nemini*
‘swear that you will not harm anybody concerning this matter’

b. *Bell. Afr*. 8: *necne locum excusatio nullum haberet nec moram tergiuersatio*
‘so that there will not be any excuses nor any shuffling involving delay’

89. See Ernout & Thomas (1951: 134).

c. Cic. *Verr.* II 2,60: *debebat Epicrates nummum nullum nemini*
'Epicrates owed no one a penny'

d. Cl. Terentianus *epist.* 39–41 (Pighi 1964: 43): *neque epistule commandaticiae nihil ualunt nesi si qui sibi aiutaueret*[90]
'and the letters of introduction are not worth anything if one does not take pains'

Double negation becomes more productive in Late Latin (102).[91] As emphasized by Molinelli (1988: 36), what is stated about the use of double negation by the grammarian Diomedes is very significant (103). If a grammarian feels it necessary to mention this topic, it means that double negation had become a phenomenon more frequent than can be supposed on the basis of the texts known until that period. It also suggests that the gap between literary and vulgar language had become so wide that they could represent two different subtypes of language: literary Latin was an instance of the type V-NI (i.e., negative indefinites never co-occur with verbal negation), while vulgar Latin was closer to the type NV-NI (i.e., the type well represented by Proto-Romance,[92]

90. Cf. Molinelli (1988, 1989) for other examples.

91. Cf. Rönsch ([1874] 1965); Väänänen (1981: 152); Molinelli (1988, 1989).

92. Cf. Posner (1984). On the basis of cross-linguistic investigation, Haspelmath (1997) has shown that the type V-NI represented by Latin is rather rare and is almost entirely confined to a contiguous area of Europe, from Iceland to the Alps and southern France. The 10 languages of this type are Icelandic, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, English, Frisian, German, French, Occitan, and Maltese (cf. also Bernini and Ramat 1992: 205). In contrast, the type NV-NI is widespread. A third type (N)V-NI, in which negative indefinites sometimes co-occur with verbal negation and sometimes do not, is found in several Romance languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and colloquial Catalan), older Slavic, Albanian, New Testament Greek, non-standard English, non-standard German, and Georgian. These languages admit the variation exemplified by the Italian examples (i) *nessuno è venuto*, (ii) *non è venuto nessuno* – i.e., they tend to use the V-NI pattern when the negative indefinite occurs preverbally and the NV-NI pattern when the negative indefinite occurs postverbally. The motivation for this distribution can be found in Jespersen's Negative First Principle (1917): "There is a tendency to put the negative element as early as possible in an utterance because the contribution of the negation to the meaning of a larger constituent is particularly dramatic and the hearer needs to get this information as soon as possible" (cf. Haspelmath 1997: 206). In both (i) and (ii), this tendency is strictly observed, the result being that the hearer is always informed of the negative character of the sentence before hearing the verb.

where negative indefinites always co-occur with verbal negation).

(102) a. Arnob. *nat.* 1,65: *qui non modo nullum intulerit malum nulli*
'who not only did not do any evil to anyone'

b. *Itin. Eger*. 19,12: *nam postea numquam nec qualiscumque humor ibi apparuit*
'for since then there has never been any water running in it'

c. Chiron 451: *quam numquam nemo scripsit*
'that no one ever wrote'

d. Vet. Lat. *Marc.* 14,60: *non respondes nihil*[93]
'you don't reply anything'

(103) Diom. *gramm.* I, 455: *modus soloecismi fit per geminationem abnuendi, ut si dicas "numquam nihil peccaui" cum debeat dici "numquam peccaui", quoniam duae abnutiuae unam confirmationem faciunt*
'the solecism is made by shaking one's head repeatedly, as if you say "I have never committed no sin" when you must say "I have never sinned", since two negations give an assertion as a result'

5.3 Diachronic change

The existence of the type V-NI has been explained on the basis of two kinds of diachronic change: Jespersen's Cycle, which is exemplified by the history of French and English; and negative absorption, which is exemplified by Latin.[94] In other words, in Latin the creation of the V-NI pattern would be the undesirable side effect of the diachronic absorption of sentence negation into the negative indefinites. The original negator *ne*, which was inherited from Proto-Indo-European, was absorbed into the negative indefinites, thus leading to the origin of the V-NI pattern. But because of the large discrepancy in this type between the semantics, which is that of ordinary sentence negation, and the surface expression of negation, which is on a participant rather than

93. This is the lectio of *cod. Cant*. The Vulgate has *quidquam.*
94. See Haspelmath (1997).

on the verb, this pattern was destined to be disfavored. As demonstrated by the Latin examples seen above, the V-NI pattern represents the norm only for a "certain" Latin, not for the whole language, a norm which was completely abandoned in Proto-Romance, where verbal negation was reintroduced (type NV-NI).[95]

5.4 Double negation: Different interpretations

Among the Latin examples of double negation, the passages from Petronius in (104) are very interesting since they receive two different readings.[96] In

95. In most Romance languages, only the NV-NI pattern is possible (Romanian, standard Catalan, Friulian, Ladin, Romansch, Vegliot, French with reservations), but in Italian (especially central and southern), Sardinian, Spanish, and Portuguese, the sentence negator is omitted when the negative indefinite occurs preverbally. In order to explain this linguistic situation, which seems to contradict Haspelmath's thesis that NV-NI pattern is universally preferred, Haspelmath himself suggests a change with different degrees of development. The Latin V-NI pattern was replaced by the NV-NI pattern first in the case of postverbal indefinites, which violate not only the form–meaning isomorphism, but also the Negative First Principle, and are hence doubly dispreferred. The result of this change is the (N)V-NI pattern. Central and southern Italian and Sardinian stopped at this stage, while most other languages extended the NV-NI pattern to preverbal indefinites as well. Before the standard languages were codified, there was a lot of variation, and in the process of codification, Spanish and Portuguese were influenced by Italian, and all three languages were to some extent influenced by Latin (cf. Posner 1984). The change from uniform NV-NI to (N)V-NI that we see in the texts would then only be a superficial change, resulting from system-external sociolinguistic factors, and not a deep change in the system. Unlike the change from V-NI to NV-NI which is generally expected, the change from NV-NI to (N)V-NI is predicted not to occur, because it would mean that a structure that is optimal on two preference parameters (Negative First Principle and form–meaning isomorphism) is turned into a form that is less preferred on one of these parameters.

96. Perrochat (1962: 80 *ad loc.*) takes these occurrences as cases of "pléonasme vulgaire dans l'emploi de la négation". He notes no difference between the two passages. Another case signaled by Perrochat is Petron. 58: *nec sursum nec deorsum non cresco*. This example, however, falls within the type that normally admits the co-occurrence of two negations in the same sentence without elision, where a general negation (*non, nemo, nihil*) is accompanied (more frequently, followed) by another negation of the type *neque … neque*, or *ne … quidem*, having the function of specifying the first negation, as in

(104b), in agreement with the Latin classical norm for double negation, the interpretation is equivalent to the positive reading *omnes aliquid uolunt*, but in (104a) the classical norm is no longer applied and the sentence receives a negative reading; in this case, *nihil boni* has the same reading as would the more expected *quidquam boni*.[97] The fact that a negative indefinite pronoun such as *nihil* occurs instead of *quidquam* seems to indicate a tendency destined to become more and more productive in Late Latin and the Romance languages, where it is normal that in the presence of a verbal negation or of another indefinite with incorporated negation, negative indefinites can co-occur: *non respondes nihil*, It. *non dice niente*, OFr. *ne dit neient*, Sp. *no viene nadie*, It. *nessuno ha detto niente*.

(104) a. Petron. 42,7: *neminem nihil boni facere oportet*
'nobody should never do no good'
b. Petron. 76,3: *nemini tamen nihil satis est*
'but no one is satisfied with nothing'

5.5 Predicative use of *nullus*

In the archaic texts of comedy as well as in Cicero's letters and in early orations, *nullus* is frequently found in predicative function, where it expresses a negation with scope over the predicate, like the negation *non*, as in (105).[98]

Cic. *Att.* 14,20,3: *nemo umquam neque poeta neque orator fuit qui quemquam meliorem quam se arbitraretur*.

97. Following the analysis by Corblin (1994: 279–280) for the French sentence *personne n'aime personne*, Orlandini (2001a: 64–65) suggests that (104b) has to be interpreted by means of a bi-negative reading, as: 'personne ne se contente de rien', i.e., as equivalent to 'tout homme veut quelque chose'. This interpretation, which is the most normal in Latin, corresponds to one of the two possible readings assigned to the French sentence by Corblin. The other reading, the mono-negative one, according to which the French sentence "prefigure un monde sans amour", is less easy to obtain in Latin than in French. Orlandini (2001a: 66 n. 47) suggests the mono-negative reading for (104a) as well as for the other instances of emphatic negation cited above.

98. Like *nullus* (*nulla*), *nullum* and *nihil* are also sometimes used in this sense in colloquial Latin: Plaut. *Cas*. 795: *qui amat, tamen hercle si esurit, nullum esurit*; Ter. *Haut*. 519: *qui heri tantum biberis* :: *Nil nimis*; Cic. *Att*. 10,5,3: *nihil accuso hominem*. Cf. Lindsay

Nullus is also predicative in (106), but here the sentence is existential. *Nullus* related to the subject noun phrase assumes the function of a sentence negation, asserting the nonexistence of the subject itself.[99] The equivalence between *nullus* and *non* is also shown by late instances, as in *Mulomedicina Chironis*, where (107a) corresponds to (107b) from Vegetius's *Mulomedicina*.

(105) a. Plaut. *Rud.* 143: *ille qui uocauit nullus uenit?*
'has the one who summoned you failed to appear?'
b. Plaut. *Cas.* 980: *nunc Bacchae nullae ludunt*
'there are no Bacchic revels now'
c. Ter. *Hec.* 79: *si non quaeret me, nullus dixeris*
'if he doesn't ask for me, you should never tell him'
d. Cic. *S. Rosc.* 128: *haec bona in tabulas publicas nulla redierunt*
'this sale was not entered on the public registers'
e. Cic. *Att.* 11,24,4: *Philotimus non modo nullus uenit, sed ne per litteras quidem... certiorem facit me*
'not a trace of Philotimus as yet: nay, he has not even informed me by letter'

(106) a. Plaut. *Amph.* 792: *hic patera nulla in cistulast*
'there's no bowl in the chest here at all'
b. Cic. *div.* 2,41: *ut, si nulla sit diuinatio, nulli sint dii*
'if there is no divination, there are no gods'
c. Cic. *Tusc.* 1,87: *de mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt*
'I say this of the dead who do not exist'
d. Ov. *am.* 3,9,36: *sollicitor nullos esse putare deos*
'I am tempted to think there are no gods'

([1907] 1988: 51). This use is considered as an instance of adjectives with adverbial value. See E. Löfstedt (1956: 368–371). An adverbial use of *nullus* is evident when it occurs within a negative answer, as in: Ter. *Andr.* 370: *liberatus sum hodie, Daue, tua opera.* :: *Ac nullus quidem.*

99. The existential reading is not the only one for the expression *nullus sum*. Often in comedy it conveys a different meaning that can be paraphrased as 'I am lost', 'I am dead': Plaut. *Asin.* 922: *nullus sum*; Plaut. *Cas.* 621: *nulla sum, nulla sum*; Ter. *Andr.* 599: *nullus sum!* Sometimes negative indefinites used predicatively may express a negative evaluation, as in Plaut. *Cas.* 305: *si id factum est, ecce me nullum senem!*; Cic. *Att.* 7,3,8: *is quem tu neminem putas*, Cic. *Tusc.* 2,13: *nullum uero id quidem argumentum est* 'that is really no proof'.

(107) a. Chiron 189,11: *insanabile est, quia nullam alligaturam patiatur*
'it is incurable, because it does not endure any bandage'

b. Veg. *mulom.* 139,17: *insanabilis est casus, quia non recipit ligaturam*[100]
'it's an incurable case, because it does not endure any bandage'

5.6 Negative indefinites in Late Latin

Normally *nemo* is used as a pronoun while *nullus* is used as an adjective. However, besides the uses of *nullus* motivated by the lack of certain case forms of *nemo*, some occurrences are found where *nullus* functions as a pronoun, as in (108).[101]

(108) Plaut. *Bacch.* 190: *qui scire possum?* :: *Nullus plus*
'how can I know? :: None better'

The pronominal use of *nullus* instead of *nemo* becomes more frequent in Late Latin, leading up to complete replacement of *nemo* by *nullus* in some authors, including Benedict of Nursia (109).[102] In the passage from Latin to Romance, *nemo* (*neminem*) was preserved only in Rumanian (*nimeni*, *nimenea*), Sardinian (*nemos*) and some Italian dialects (e.g., Tuscan *nimo*, *nimmo*). The disappearance of *nemo* led to new combinations that afterward gave rise to new intrinsically negative indefinites, such as *ne* + *ipsu* + *unu* (cf. It. *nessuno*), *ne* + *unu* (cf. OIt. *niuno*, *neuno*), or *nec* + *unu* (cf. It. dialectal forms *niguno*, *negun*, *negün*).[103] An interesting instance of this last formation is found in (110). In the case of *nihil*, the fact that it was phonetically weak (reduced to *nil* in colloquial Latin) and not very expressive led to its complete disappearance in Romance languages.[104]

100. Cf. Grevander (1926: 58)
101. There are also few cases where *nemo* functions as an adjective: Cic. *leg.* 2,41: *uir nemo bonus.* Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr (1972:205).
102. Cf. Wölfflin (1896: 507).
103. See Tekavčić (1980: 163).
104. In Romance languages, *nihil* was replaced by new formations (cf. It. *niente,* OFr. *neient, nient*), all derived from the combination of items meaning a minimal quantity with the

(109) a. *Itin. Eger*. 36,3: *nullus recedit a uigiliis usque in mane*
'no one leaves the vigil till morning comes'

b. *Itin. Eger*. 17,2: *quoniam nullum christianorum est, qui non se tendat illuc*
'no Christian misses going on the pilgrimage to that place'

c. Eutr. 7,13,2: *Britanniae intulit bellum, quam nullus Romanorum post C. Caesarem attigerat*
'he made war against Britain, where no Roman had gone after G. Caesar'

d. Aurelian. 7,5: *uuam nullus auferat, segetem nemo deterat*
'none shall carry off grapes, or thresh grain'

e. Veg. *mil.* 1,16,3: *in omnibus autem ueterum proeliis funditores militasse nullus ignorat*
'no one can ignore the fact that slingers fought in all the ancient battles'

f. Bened. *reg.* 3,15: *nullus proprii sequatur cordis uoluntatem*
'no one must follow the will of his own heart'

g. Bened. *reg.* 25,2: *nullus ei fratrum in nullo iungatur consortio nec in conloquio*
'no one of his brothers shall join in any assembly nor in any conversation'

(110) *Itin. Eger*. 8,1: *Ramessen ciuitas nunc campus est, ita ut nec unam habitationem habeat*
'the city Rameses is now a level site without a single dwelling'

In a late author such as Commodianus, besides 16 occurrences of *nihil*, one occurrence of *nulla* (= *non*) is found, which can be considered the starting-point of It. *nulla*.

(111) Comm. *instr.* 1,17,17: *maiestas autem illorum nulla locuta est*[105]
'but their dignity did not say anything'

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negation: *nec* + *ente* (i.e., 'nemmeno un solo essere vivente'), *ne* + *gente* (cf. in Occitanic *giens*, *gens*, a reinforcement of negation), or *nec* + *gutta*, which continues in many dialects of Northern Italy, as in *nguta* in Emilian dialect. Cf. Tekavčić (1980: 164).

105. Cf. Tekavčić (1980: 164).

6. Negative polarity: *quisquam*

Less frequently than by negative quantifiers, nonexistence can be expressed in Latin by the use of the series *quisquam.* We consider *quisquam* a negative polarity item. Negative polarity items are lexical expressions which refer to a minimal quantity and occur only in nonpositive environments, such as (*lift*) *a finger*, (*see*) *a living soul*, (*worth*) *a red cent*, etc. Some languages also have indefinite series that show the same properties as negative polarity items. The best-known negative polarity indefinite is the English *any*-series, but similar indefinites can be found in many other languages. This is the case of *quisquam* in Latin.

Quisquam (and the corresponding adjective *ullus*) has a double semantic value. It can be both a full semantic negation and a pragmatic negation. In the first case it is obligatorily under the scope of a syntactic negation, while in the second it occurs in contexts which are syntactically positive but pragmatically negative and has the same value as a negative polarity item.

6.1 *Quisquam* as a semantic negation

The pronoun *quisquam* and the corresponding adjective *ullus* generally occur in the scope of a copulative negation like *nec, neque* or of a negative quantifying adverb like *numquam* (112). *Nec quisquam*, *nec ullus* are to be interpreted as equivalents to *et nemo*, *et nullus* (‘There is no *x* such that ... ’). In some cases, for pragmatic reasons such as emphasis, or for stylistic reasons such as the presence of *et* in a coordinate chain, *et nemo* is used instead of *nec quisquam*, thus preserving the negation on the indefinite and not on the conjunction (113). *Et nemo* is rare in Classical Latin, and in Early Latin there is not even one example, whereas it is used more and more in post-Classical Latin and becomes most frequent in Christian authors: in Tertullian, Augustine, and Jerome, for example, the predominant form is *et nemo* while *nec quisquam* is rarer.

(112) a. Plaut. *Capt*. 590: *neque praeter te in Aulide ullus seruus istoc nominest*
‘and besides you there’s not a slave in Elis of that name’

b. Cic. *fin.* 1,50: *quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper addit aliquid*
'not only does (Justice) never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit'

(113) a. Liv. 1,17,4: *et esse igitur aliquod caput placebat, et nemo alteri concedere in animum inducebat*
'all therefore were agreed that someone should be head, but nobody could make up his mind to yield to his fellow'

b. Cic. *de orat.* 2,170: *si et ferro interfectus ille et tu inimicus ei cum gladio cruento comprensus in illo ipso loco et nemo praeter te ibi uisus est*
'if he was killed by a sword, and you, his enemy, were caught on the very spot with a bloody blade, and none other than yourself was seen there'

As stressed by Riemann (1935: 36 n. 1), the use of *quisquam* or *ullus* in independent nonnegative clauses is extremely rare. As English **anybody came* and **anybody didn't come* are ill-formed, so in Latin *quisquam uenit* and *quisquam non uenit* are both excluded, since there *quisquam* would not be within the scope of negation. Conversely, *quisquam* is frequently found in the absence of a syntactic negation when the context is pragmatically negative.

6.2 *Quisquam* as a pragmatic negation

The implicit negative value of a sentence may be determined by various contexts.[106] We give a detailed list of pragmatically negative contexts with *quisquam*.

(a) Negative rhetorical questions

(114) Cic. *Phil.* 14,9: *est igitur quisquam qui hostis appellare non audeat?*
'is there then any man not bold enough to call these men enemies?'

106. Cf. Orlandini (2000) for more instances of each context.

(b) Clauses containing semantically negative adverbs, such as *raro, uix, parum*

(115) a. Liv. 45,20,3: *raro alias quisquam rex aut priuatus tanto fauore tantoque omnium adsensu est auditus*
‘seldom has anyone else, king or citizen, been heard with as much good will and as much general approval’

b. Cic. *har. resp.* 19: *ut uix quisquam arte ulla ordinem rerum ac necessitudinem persequi possit*[107]
‘that hardly anyone can, with the help of the highest artistry, do justice to the immutable dispositions of the universe?’

c. Liv. 7,39,13: *sed parum spei erat uoluntate quicquam facturum*
‘but there was little prospect that he would voluntarily assist them’

(c) Ironic contexts

(116) Cic. *rep.* 1,10: *quasi uero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere possit, quam accidit nobis*
‘as if any greater emergency could come upon anyone than that with which I was confronted’

Since irony is a favorite device for expressing the speaker’s negative attitude not directly but through stating the opposite sense, it is quite common to find *quisquam* in ironic contexts, such as conditional comparative clauses introduced by *proinde quasi*, or *quasi uero*, as in (116).
(d) Contexts with subordinating predicates such as *caueo, timeo, impedio, interdico*

(117) Plaut. *Epid.* 437: *caue praeterbitas ullas aedis quin roges*
‘mind you, you are not to pass a single house without inquiring’

The occurrence of *quisquam* is explained by the negative reversing semantic value of such verbs: *caueo* means ‘to be careful that not *p*’, *timeo* ‘to be

107. While there are several examples of *uix* used in combination with *quisquam*, we have found only one case of *aegre*: Amm. 22,9,11: *quod aegre sub eo a curialibus quisquam appetitus*.

afraid that something will happen' = 'to wish that something will not happen', *impedio* 'to hinder', *interdico* 'to forbid'.

(e) Temporal clauses introduced by *antequam, priusquam*

(118) a. Caes. *Gall.* 1,19,3: *priusquam quicquam conaretur, Diuitiacum ad se uocari iubet*
'before attempting anything in the matter, (Caesar) ordered Diviciacus to be summoned to his quarters'

b. Cic. *rep.* 2,6: *maritimus uero ille et naualis hostis ante adesse potest, quam quisquam uenturum esse suspicari queat*
'but a seafaring, ship-borne enemy can arrive before anyone is able to suspect that he is coming'

Unlike *antequam*, *postquam* does not co-occur with *quisquam*, since it does not convey any negative idea, presenting the situation as already actualized. There is a certain link between expressions of temporal priority and comparative expressions. This link is evidenced by the strategy common to many languages, by which a temporal expression becomes an expression of comparison: It. *più tosto che* < *piuttosto*, Fr. *plus tôt que* < *plutôt*. In Latin it is the locution *citius quam* in particular that can be interpreted as equivalent either to *priusquam* or to *potius quam*. In any case an indefinite pronoun in the *quam* clause is always expressed by *quisquam* (119).

(119) Cic. *epist.* 5,2,10: *citius amore tui fratrem tuum odisse desinam quam illius odio quicquam de nostra beneuolentia detraham*
'I shall sooner cease to resent your brother's conduct because I love you, than because of that resentment detract anything from our mutual goodwill'

Potius quam may have two interpretations: generally, with the indicative mood an opposition, an exclusive alternative, is expressed. With the subjunctive mood, on the other hand, a subjective preference is presented between two virtual options which have different degrees of acceptability.[108] In both cases, however, a pragmatic negation is conveyed which is signalled by *quisquam* (120).

108. See Bertocchi and Orlandini (1996: 225–226).

(120) Cic. *Cael.* 32: *cum ea, quam omnes semper amicam omnium potius quam cuiusquam inimicam putauerunt*
'with a woman whom everyone has always thought to be everyone's friend rather than anyone's enemy'

(f) Standard of comparison
As shown by *potius quam* and as explained, for example, by Napoli and Nespor (1976) and Fauconnier (1977), the standard of comparison is pragmatically negative. This is explicitly shown by languages that make use of an expletive negation (e.g. It. *più grande di quanto pensassi* or *più grande di quanto non pensassi*). In such cases Latin uses *quisquam*.

(121) Cic. *Verr.* II 4,123: *ac uidete quanto taetrior hic tyrannus Syracusanis fuerit quam quisquam superiorum*
'observe how much more hateful a tyrant of Syracuse this man was than any of his predecessors'

(g) Conditional contexts
In certain conditional contexts, a hypothesis is introduced which is judged by the speaker to be far from the actual world (122).

(122) Plaut. *Aul.* 645: *di me perdant, si ego tui quicquam abstuli*
'may I be damned, if I carried off a thing of yours'

In Early Latin, *quisquam* is rather frequent in conditional clauses and has raised several questions, in particular about the possibility of assigning a positive value to *quisquam*.[109] A convincing reply to the different hypotheses suggested is given by Ferrarino (1942: 117–122), who considers (123). According to Ferrarino, the negative value of *quisquam* is confirmed, since the sentence must be intended as conveying a prohibitive value, comically modeled on the ancient juridical formulas which prescribe what must not be done. Other examples of *si quisquam* are explained by Ferrarino on the basis of their (low) probability. So in (124) the occurrence of *si umquam* in both cases emphasizes that the hypothesis is extremely improbable.

109. Cf. Hahn (1933: 31–32), Methner (1913), Kroll (1915). They all admit cases of nonnegative uses of *quisquam*. Conversely, Ferrarino (1942) excludes this possibility and offers an explanation of apparent counterexamples on a semantic or pragmatic basis.

(123) Plaut. *Capt.* 809–810: *eorum si quoiusquam scrofam in publico conspexero/ex ipsis dominis meis pugnis exculcabo furfures*
'if I spot a sow of any one of them on the public highway, I'll raise my fists and knock the stuffing out of those sows' owners'

(124) a. Naev. *com.* 14: *secus si umquam quicquam feci, carnificem cedo*
'if I have done anything differently from this, bring along your hangman'

b. Naev. *com.* 96: *si umquam quicquam filium resciuero argentum … sumpse*
'if ever I come to know that my son has received any loan of money'

(h) Contexts dependent on certain *verba affectuum*
Relevant for the choice of *quisquam* are some *verba affectuum*, such as *miror*, *moleste fero* (125). In such contexts the speaker's judgment is that an event has taken place which should not have taken place. The meaning conveyed by *miror* is in fact 'I expected that not *p*'. According to Fauconnier (1977: 18), the property of predicates like 'to be astonished' or 'to regret' is to reverse the pragmatic implicatures, and this licenses a negative implication which motivates the occurrence of *quisquam*. This implication may be canceled by the negation: in that case *aliquis* is used in place of *quisquam* (126).

(125) a. Ter. *Haut.* 1004–1005: *miror, quo modo/tam ineptum quicquam tibi uenire in mentem, mi uir, potuerit*
'I can't possibly imagine how such a silly thought could get into your head, no, my dear, I can't'

b. Cic. *Att.* 15,17,1: *permoleste tuli quemquam prius audisse quam me*
'I was very annoyed that anyone heard before I did'

(126) Cic. *Verr.* II 3,17: *non, inquam, miror te aliquid excogitasse*
'I am not surprised, I repeat, at your working out some such idea'

6.3 *Quisquam* as a negative polarity item in nonnegative contexts

That *quisquam* and *ullus* are negative polarity items is also shown by their use in independent nonnegative clauses, where their meaning indicates 'the

smallest quantity', as in (127), where it is said that the servants are severely punished even for the slightest noise. *Quisquam* may also indicate minimal quantity in subordinate clauses, such as those introduced by *si*. In (128), *quicquam* underlines the avariciousness of Verres: he was so covetous of precious things, *even minimally precious ones*, that he could not keep his hands off them. In the same way, *quisquam* referring to a minimal quantity may be found when the clause is introduced by *dum* with the meaning 'as long as' (129). When *dum* means 'until', the use of *quisquam* is expected, since the clause has an implicit negative sense;[110] but when *dum* has the meaning 'as long as', there is no implicit negation and *quisquam* is only motivated by the reference to an extremely small, almost nonexistent quantity.

(127) Sen. *epist.* 47,3: *magno malo ulla uoce interpellatum silentium luitur*
'there is a grievous penalty for the slightest breach of silence'

(128) Cic. *Verr.* II 4,48: *qui cum in conuiuium uenisset, si quicquam caelati adspexerat, manus abstinere, iudices, non poterat*
'when he arrived at a dinner party, if he caught sight of any piece of engraved plate, he could not, I assure you, keep his hands off it'

(129) Liv. 4,39,5: *dum quicquam superfuit lucis hostem tenuit*
'he kept the enemy engaged as long as there was any light'

With countable nouns, the minimal quantity referred to by *quisquam* can assume the value of 'one only'. Krebs and Schmalz (1905: 140, 460) collect examples where the translation assigned to *quisquam* is 'auch nur irgend einer, auch nur der geringste'.[111] See, for example, (130). The same sense of minimal quantity, which has an effect on the interpretation of the modal verb, is shown by *quisquam* in (131). As observed by Ferrarino (1942: 121–122), the truth of the sentence consists in presenting as possible even what is unlikely. *Quisquam*, in fact, is oriented toward the negative pole (*nemo*), while *quiuis* has the opposite orientation, toward the positive pole (*omnes*). *Quod*

110. Cf. It. *finché non*, the equivalent of *until*.
111. Cf. also Kühner & Stegmann (1962: 640): "irgend jemand, überhaupt einer = irgend einer, wenn es nur einer ist, aber vielleicht ist er überhaupt nicht vorhanden".

cuiquam potest accidere expresses an extremely low probability, next to impossibility. But if this low probability can be actualized for a single person, then it becomes possible for anyone.

(130) Cic. *Catil.* 1,6: *quam diu quisquam erit qui te defendere audeat, uiues*[112]
'as long as anyone exists who will dare defend you, you will live'

(131) Publil. ap. Sen. *dial.* 9,11,8: *cuiuis potest accidere quod cuiquam potest*
'it may happen to anyone what hardly happens to a single one'

6.4 *Quisquam* in modal contexts: Problems of NEG-raising

Consider the examples in (132). *Quisquam* must be considered a semantically full negation, equivalent to *nemo*, when it is within the scope of a negation (*non, nec, neque*) occurring in the same clause. Also, when negation occurs in the main clause as a result of NEG-raising, it must be considered a semantically full negation.[113] When the verb does not allow raising the negative, *quisquam* conveys a weaker, implicit negative sense. The modal verb *necesse est* does not permit NEG-raising, as shown by the fact that (132a) and (132b) have two different interpretations: (132a) means both that someone may come and also that nobody comes, while (132b) excludes the former meaning.[114]

112. Cf. also Cic. *p. red. in sen.* 30: *difficile est non aliquem, nefas quemquam praeterire*, a passage which has evoked many comments. The translation proposed by Nettleship (1889: 126) is 'it is difficult not to pass over someone, but wrong to pass over any one'. The translation 'any single person' is proposed by Fordyce (1961: 366) for this example and also for the occurrence of *quisquam* in Catull. 76,7: *nam quaecumque homines bene cuiquam aut dicere possunt aut facere*.

113. The NEG-raising phenomenon is intended as "the availability of a lower-clause reading or understanding for a higher-clause negation"; basically, it means that "we tend to use the form *non debere peccare* to convey *debere non peccare*" (Horn 1989: 308).

114. The two examples in (132) may be suggested as Latin translations of the two Italian examples analyzed by Longobardi (1988: 665) as cases of different scope of the negation: (i) *non è necessario che venga nessuno*; (ii) *e' necessario che non venga nessuno*. *Non* occurs in a specific position, before the verb of the clause over which it has scope. In (i) the scope of *non* is over the whole sentence, while in (ii) it is only over its clause. The

In (132a), the negation relates only to the modal verb *necesse est*; in this context, *quisquam* cannot be equivalent to *nemo* but expresses only a negative implication. Attested instances of (132) are given in (133).

(132) a. *Non necesse est quemquam uenire*
b. *Necesse est neminem uenire*

(133) a. Cic. *Phil.* 2,1: *nec uero necesse est quemquam a me nominari*
'there is in truth no need that any man be named by me'
b. Cic. *Balb.* 27: *ex quo intelligi necesse est aut neminem ex sociis ciuem fieri posse aut etiam posse ex foederatis*
'the deduction which must be drawn from this statement being that no one from our allies nor even from states under treaty can become a Roman citizen'

Unlike *necesse est*, *oportet* admits NEG-raising:[115] in fact, the difference between *non oportet* and *oportet non* is minimal; when the negation syntactically precedes the modal verb, it does not relate only to the modal but has scope over the whole sentence. In this case the indefinite pronoun within the complement clause is interpretable as a semantically full negation. Consequently, *quisquam* within the scope of negation is equal to *nemo*, which constitutes by itself a sentence negation (*non oportet quemquam uenire* = *oportet neminem uenire*), as (134) shows.

(134) a. Cic. *leg.* 2,16: *quid est enim uerius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte adrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet?*[116]
'indeed, what is more true than that no one ought to be so foolishly proud as to think that, though reason and intellect exist in himself, they do not exist in the heavens and the universe'

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double interpretation of (i) depends on scope: *non è necessario che venga nessuno* admits both that someone may come and also that nobody comes. On the contrary, *è necessario che non venga nessuno* has just one interpretation: it excludes that someone may come.

115. Cf. Bertocchi and Orlandini (2001: 56–57).

116. This example can admit a double interpretation, an epistemic ('there may not exist anyone') or a deontic ('there must not exist anyone'). In our opinion, the deontic interpretation of *oportet* here is more probable, confirmed also by its analogy with Publil. *sent.* A 35: *auidum esse oportet neminem, minime senem*, which is indubitably deontic.

b. Suet. *Tit.* 8,1: *non oportere ait quemquam a sermone principis tristem discedere*
'he said that it was not right for anyone to go away sorrowful from an interview with his emperor'

6.5 *Quisquam* in Late Latin

Quisquam appears to be more limited quantitatively in Late Latin than in Classical Latin, but it also appears to differ qualitatively. In some authors, such as Egeria and Filastrius, it does not occur at all. In Jordanes there are only eight occurrences, but they all reflect the classical norm, being used within the scope of a copulative negation (*nec … quisquam*). In Verecundus there are two instances, one in a negative clause (*nec est quisquam*), the other in a clause with no negative feature, whether syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic (135). Other authors show wider use: freer employment appears to correspond to a large number of occurrences. For example, in Fredegarius there are eleven occurrences, most in accordance with classical use, as shown by the copulative negation in (136a) and by the NEG-raising in (136b). But an example like (137) does not contain any negative value that may motivate the use of *quisquam.* Still more complex is the use of *quisquam* by Gregory of Tours, since it includes instances motivated either semantically or pragmatically, as well as uses distant from the classical norm. Of 61 occurrences, most cases of *quisquam* are under the scope of syntactic negation (138). Some uses instead reflect the types that we have included among the cases motivated by pragmatic negation, including semantically negative adverbs (like *uix*), standards of comparison, and conditional clauses expressing a judgment of non-actuality by the speaker (139). But there are also cases distant from the classical use, such as conditional clauses without any negative judgment by the speaker, nonnegative clauses introduced by *cum*, and also a *nisi* clause, which is never attested with *quisquam* in either Early or Classical Latin (140).[117] The characterization of each indefinite appears to be so weak in Late Latin that they can easily substitute for each other. The

117. We have found only one example of *nisi forte quisquam* in Tac. *dial.* 21,6 and one example of *nisi cuiquam* in Colum. 1,3: *nisi forte quisquam* is attested once also in Arnob.

best illustration of this weakening process is given in Gregory of Tours by the cases in which *aliquis* and *quisquam* co-occur in the same context without any semantic difference (141). Evidence of this sort of confusion in the use of the indefinite pronouns is also given by the occurrence of indefinites, which are different from *quisquam* in negative contexts (142). The weakening of precise distinctions among the various indefinites is a generalized phenomenon in Late Latin. As regards *quisquam,* besides the instances already cited, we will simply add Caelius Aurelianus, because in the description of the symptoms of the different diseases and in the enumeration of cases, he uses *si quisquam* in the same sense as the generic *si quis*: *Chron*. 4,61: *si quisquam nauseauerit*; *Chron.* 4,67: *si quisquam harum uirtutum recusauerit usum*; *Chron.* 5,136: *sed si plurimum quisquam sitierit.*

(135) Verec. *in cant.* 8,5: *sic quem ergo reppereris pro suo cuiusquam et inrationabili auditu credibiliter inclinari*
'so the one whom you'll have found to be inclined to rely on faith in his own hearing even without reason'

(136) a. Fredeg. *chron.* 2,62: *nec quisquam ei hanc rem indicare potebat*
'and nobody was able to indicate this thing to him'
b. Fredeg. *chron.* 2,62: *nec oportet quemquam urguere*
'and you need not force anyone'

(137) Fredeg. *chron.* 2,62: *iurantes sibi, quantum cuiusquam ex his causa proficerit, pare sempiternam fidem seruarit*
'they swore to one another eternal faith, as much as the condition of each of them could advance'

(138) a. Greg. Tur. *Franc*. 10,24: *nec quisquam ex eis periit*
'and none of them died'
b. Greg. Tur. *vit. patr*. 4,3: *quaeso, Domine, numquam de hac generatione prouehatur quisquam ad episcopale sacerdotium*
'I pray you, God, that no one of this generation may ever be carried to the episcopal priesthood'

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nat. 1,31, while the only author where there are some occurrences (14) of *quisquam* with *nisi* is Augustine.

(139) a. Greg. Tur. *Franc*. 6,44: *morbus pecorum iteratis inualuit, ita ut uix quicquam remaneret*
'the sickness of the cattle increased again, so that hardly any survived'

b. Greg. Tur. *vit. patr*. 2,2: *magis proficit ad laudem uirtus egressa de tumulo, quam ea quae quisquam uiuens gessit in mundo*
'the virtue coming out of a sepulchral monument is more useful to glory than the things that anyone alive has carried in the world'

c. Greg. Tur. *Franc*. 9,20: *ait rex: 'iudicio Dei ferear, si de his quicquam transcendero, quae hic contenentur'*
'the king says: 'can I be stricken by divine judgment if I go beyond any of what is contained here'

(140) a. Greg. Tur. *vit. patr.* 11,3: *si a quoquam uisitatus fuisset*
'if he were visited by someone'

b. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 9,6: *cum quisque de eo procul et abditae quicquam locutus fuisset mali*
'after that everyone at a distance and secretly had said something evil about him'

c. Greg. Tur. *glor. mart.* 13: *nisi de membris eius mereretur quicquam accipere*
'unless she deserved to receive some relic of his body'

(141) a. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 2,37: *ut nec ibi quidem aut in uia aliquem expoliarent aut res cuiusquam direperent*
'that either there or in the street they must not spoil anyone or rob anyone's things'

b. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 4,12: *ne de hoc cuiquam aliquid enarraret*
'that he does not tell anybody anything about it'

c. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 5,33: *si aliquis ab igne quicquam eripuit*
'if someone carried anything away from the fire'

(142) a. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 10,3: *ita ut prius regionem propriam … adficerent quam quiddam uicturiae de inimica gente patrarent*
'so that they attacked their own region before accomplishing any victory over enemies'

b. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 10,27: *nec remaneret quispiam ex utrisque nisi unus tantum*
‘and there remained no one of them both, except one only’
c. Greg. Tur. *vit. patr.* 13,3: *non hoc sustenet quisque nostrum*
‘each of us does not sustain it’
d. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 7,45: *quibus non erat aliquid farinae*
‘who had no flour’

7. Free choice

The meaning of free-choice indefinites is illustrated in (143). Sentences like this have a clear flavor of arbitrariness and irrelevance: whichever pianist one considers, it doesn’t matter who the pianist might be, that pianist will have the ability to play a piece like the one indicated. The sentence also seems to signal that the property of playing the piece at issue can be satisfied by any member of the class corresponding to the noun *pianist*. This interpretation shows that free-choice indefinites are semantically similar to universal quantifiers.[118] The sentence in (143) can be replaced by (144) without a noticeable difference in the truth conditions. But the logical equivalence between free-choice indefinites and universal quantifiers is not always true; there are contexts where there is a relevant difference in meaning[119] between the two types of items, as illustrated in (145).

(143) *any pianist can play a piece like that*

(144) *every pianist can play a piece like that*

118. That the free-choice meaning of *any* is similar to universal quantification has been common knowledge among semanticists and logicians for a long time. Haspelmath (1995) tries to explain how free-choice indefinite determiners come to be used as universal quantifiers.
119. This difference was pointed out by Vendler (1967: 80–81), who also introduced the notion “freedom of choice”.

(145) a. *you can take any apple*
b. *you can take every apple*
c. *I didn't see anybody*
d. *did Ariadne talk to anybody?*

While (145b) signals that the addressee can take every member of the set of apples (i.e., every apple is eligible and the addressee could also decide to take all the apples of the set), (145a) signals that the addressee is free to take some apple of the set of apples and that the apple chosen may vary according to the addressee's own preference. A likely paraphrase of (145a) is: 'You can take some apple; it doesn't matter which one', where *any* is rendered equivalent to an existential quantifier. Since the meaning of free choice can be taken to contribute a universal quantifier in some cases and an existential quantifier in others, the precise characterization of this meaning has proved to be a very difficult task, as shown by several contributions to recent linguistic literature.[120] The difficulty of reaching a reliable picture of what free choice *sensu stricto* means is mainly tied to the fact that the inquiry has mostly concentrated on English *any*. *Any* is not exclusively employed to express free choice, but it is also found in cases like (145c–d), where it can be characterized as a "negative" polarity item, or better as an "affective" polarity item (cf. Giannakidou 1998, 1999),[121] and where it seems to contribute an existential quantifier.[122] The fact that under negation or question *any* is interpreted as

120. A useful and complete description of the various recent approaches to free-choice indefinites is found in Horn (1999, 2005), Jayez and Tovena (2005), and Sæbø (2001).

121. Affective polarity items are grammatical in "affective" contexts, questions and negation being among such contexts. The term "negative polarity item" is more appropriately reserved for items which are only licensed in negative contexts.

122. According to Davison (1980), the occurrence of the indefinite *any* is restricted to two kinds of environment and the interpretation of *any* is dependent on them: *any* has an "existential" understanding, like *some* or *a*, in negative sentences, yes/no questions, and the protases of conditional sentences; *any* has a "generic" or "universal" interpretation in permission possibility sentences, permission imperatives, and generic sentences. These environments may overlap, and when this is the case, the clause is ambiguous between the "generic" and the "existential" readings of *any.* For instance, a sentence such as (i) *If (just) anyone can swim the English Channel, I can*, without *just,* allows both the "existential" and the "generic" interpretation of *any.* The addition of *just* favors the "generic" interpretation. In more recent linguistic analyses, the existential reading corresponds to

an existential quantifier, while in contexts such as (143) it is interpreted as a universal quantifier, has stimulated a great number of studies. In recent years, many of these studies have converged on the suggestion that both "affective" *any* and free-choice *any* must be regarded as indefinites of one sort or another.[123] More specifically, it has been argued that both *any*s are end-of-scale indefinites: negative polarity *any* is a minimal element on a quantity scale, free-choice *any* a generic indefinite associated with a kind scale.[124] In this perspective, in (143) the universal reading 'every pianist' is constructed on the basis of a scale of technical ability: if even the least able pianist can play that piece, then a pianist in a less extreme position can also do so; in other words, every being of the sort named may be taken as a representative.

An interesting contribution to the semantics of free-choice items is represented by the recent analysis by Giannakidou (2001), based mainly on Modern Greek, a language endowed with a lexical paradigm of free-choice items distinct from that of affective (negative) polarity items.[125] As indefinites, free-choice items are subject to nonveridicality and non-episodicity constraints; in other words, they are ruled out in veridical and episodic contexts (like present progressives and past perfectives) but they are grammatical in nonveridical

the negative polarity *any* while the "generic" or "universal" interpretation corresponds to the "free-choice" *any.*

123. Cf. Heim (1982); Haspelmath (1997); Kadmon and Landman (1993); Dayal (1995); Giannakidou (1998).

124. The idea defended in Horn (1999) is that free-choice *any* is neither an existential nor a universal quantifier; it is a nonspecific scalar indefinite whose semantics involves not only notions such as "attributivity" or "non-episodicity" (cf. Giannakidou 1998) but also the notion of indiscriminacy. Cf also Horn (2000). The notion of indiscriminacy is reinforced by *just*, especially in the context of the anti-indiscriminative *not just any* construction where it often serves as a disambiguator. As shown in the following examples, the presence vs. absence of *just* expresses distinct types of renunciation: (i) *I wouldn't marry anyone* (the speaker renounces "connubiality"), (ii) *I wouldn't marry just anyone* (the speaker renounces "indiscriminacy"). In (ii), an eventual unnegated *(just) any* would emphasize the meaning of 'not-mattering': 'I would marry (just) anyone'.

125. The representative Greek free-choice item is *opjosdhipote* 'anyone/any'. Like Greek, other languages possess a separate series of lexical elements called 'free-choice' items, including Serbian/Croatian *bilo* 'any', French *quiconque* 'anyone', Dutch *wie dan ook* 'anyone/whoever', Spanish *cualquier* 'any', and Catalan *qualsevol* 'any/anyone'. For an analysis of free-choice items in Norwegian and Swedish, see Sæbø (2001). Jayez and Tovena (2004) suggest that the French determiner *tout* is a genuine free-choice item.

contexts (protasis of conditionals, modal verbs, imperatives, habituals, comparatives (phrasal and clausal), generic sentences), with an additional constraint that the nonveridical context must be non-episodic, not about exactly one event.[126]

7.1 *Quiuis*, *quilibet*

The importance of nonveridicality and anti-episodicity in regulating the distribution of free-choice items seems to hold for languages with lexically distinct free-choice items such as Spanish and Catalan.[127] Evidence is found in Latin too, another language lexicalizing the distinction between free-choice *any* and affective polarity *any.* As exemplified in (146), in Latin the free-choice function is expressed by indefinite pronouns of the *-uis* series and the *-libet* series, which do not basically differ. All the sentences in (146) are nonveridical and non-episodic: (a) is a generic sentence; in (b) the embedded clause contains an epistemic modal (*posse*); (c) and (d) are imperative contexts; in (f) *potuit* in the apodosis is used as a permissive possibility modal. The sentences in (146) confirm that the quantificational force of a free-choice indefinite is dependent on the force of the operator that binds it. The generic operator in (a) determines the universal interpretation of the free-choice indefinite. (146a) can also be interpreted as an inherent ability modal, something like 'anybody can err': as such, it shows the same quantificational force as (143), with an explicit ability modal. Also in (146a) *cuiusuis hominis* means 'any individual, it doesn't matter which one'. In addition, thanks to the generic value of the sentence, which can be treated as a universal quantifier,[128] *cuiusuis hominis* is also interpreted as equivalent to 'every individual'. Differently from (a), in (b) the epistemic possibility (*posse*) involves an

126. The anti-episodicity constraint explains the distributional differences between free-choice *any* and affective polarity *any* in the case of negative or interrogative sentences with perfective aspect.
127. Cf. Quer (1998), where the parallelism of subjunctive free relatives with free-choice items in Catalan is brought into evidence.
128. Cf. Giannakidou (2001: 708), where it is argued that ability *can* is a universal quantifier, but epistemic and permissive *can* is an existential quantifier, just like *may*.

existential modal quantifier and licenses an existential reading for the free-choice indefinite, which signals the arbitrariness of what may happen. The same holds for (f), where *quiuis heres* cannot be equivalent to 'every heir', in agreement with the co-occurring permissive possibility modal. Arbitrariness is signalled in (c) and (d) too, where it is part of the command and where the free-choice indefinites are interpreted existentially (= 'with one or another kind of navigation'; 'someone, it doesn't matter which one').[129] A generic sentence is also seen in (e), where *non cuiuis homini* has the same interpretation as the anti-indiscriminative *not just any* construction. That an anti-indiscriminative reading is involved with a negated free-choice indefinite (by analogy with a negated *(just) any*) is also shown by (146)g. That variation in relation to possible worlds is the essential semantic feature of free-choice indefinites, as suggested by Giannakidou (2001: 713), can be seen in Latin examples like (146)h, where the quality of the flour can vary, it being possible to choose one of all the alternatives invoked: the flour can be indifferently (indiscriminatively) any one of the twelve kinds listed.

(146) a. Cic. *Phil.* 12,5: *cuiusuis hominis est errare*
'any man is liable to err'
b. Cic. *Phil.* 12,24: *scio quiduis homini accidere posse*
'for I know that anything may happen to a man'
c. Cic. *Att.* 9,7,5: *abeamus igitur inde qualibet nauigatione*
'so let me depart on any kind of voyage'
d. Cic. *ac.* 2,132: *quemlubet* (*sequere*), *modo aliquem*
'follow anybody you like, just follow somebody'
e. Hor. *epist.* 1,17,36: *non cuiuis homini contingit adire Corinthum*
'not anyone has the long purse needed for the expensive vices of Corinth'
= 'there are pleasures and dignities which are not for every one'

129. This is similar to the free-choice *any* in the imperative *press any key to continue*. Cf. Giannakidou (2001: 660).

f. Cic. *Flacc.* 59: *si licuit . . . , patris pecuniam recte abstulit filius; si non licuit, tamen illo mortuo non modo filius sed quiuis heres rectissime potuit auferre*
'if he had the right, then the son was justified in taking his father's money. If, however, he did not have the right, after the father's death not only the son but any heir could take it quite legitimately'

g. Sen. *suas.* 7,10: *memoriae consulendum, quae magnis uiris aeternitatem promitteret, non qualibet mercede uitam redimendam esse*
'regard must be paid to fame, which promised eternal life to the great. Life was not to be bought at any and every price'

h. Cels. 2,33: *calefacit uero ex qualibet farina cataplasma, siue tritici, siue farris, siue hordei, siue erui, uel lolii, uel milii, uel panici, uel lenticulae, uel fabae, uel lupini, uel lini, uel foeni graeci, ubi ea deferbuit, calidaque imposita est*
'but those which are heating are poultices made of meal, whether of wheat or spelt or barley or bitter vetches or darnel or millet or panic or lentil or bean or lupine or linseed or fenugreek, when one of these has been boiled and applied hot'

i. Lucr. 6,653–655: *numquis enim nostrum miratur, siquis in artus / accepit . . . febrim, . . . / aut alium quemuis . . . dolorem?*
'for is there any of us who feels wonder, if someone has gotten into his limbs a fever, or any other pain?'

j. Cic. *Caecin.* 62: *si tu solus aut quiuis unus cum scuto et gladio impetum in me fecisset atque ego ita deiectus essem, auderesne dicere interdictum esse de hominibus armatis, hic autem hominem armatum unum fuisse?*
'suppose that you or anyone else had attacked me singly with sword and shield and I had been thereby driven out, would you dare to say that the injunction specifies armed men but here there was only one armed man?'

Besides generic sentences, sentences containing a possibility modal, imperative contexts functioning as suggestions or invitations, and also hypothetical sentences can be the context of free-choice items, as in (146i), (146j).

7.2 The diachronic source of free-choice indefinites

As demonstrated by Haspelmath (1995) for a wide range of languages, free-choice indefinites consist of *wh*-elements plus an indefiniteness marker of some kind. In Latin, the indefiniteness marker is the second person singular present indicative of *uelle* ('you want') or the third person singular present indicative of the impersonal verb *libet* 'it pleases'. This transparent etymology shows that indefinite pronouns of the series *-uis* and *-libet* can be considered instances of a grammaticalization process whose starting-point is found in the sentences in (147),[130] where in both cases the predicate (*want/pleases*) is the predicate of a nonspecific free relative clause which serves as an argument of the main clause.[131] When the sentential status of the free relative clause is lost and the verb 'want' ceases to vary for person and number, it comes to be directly attached to the *wh*-word and to function as an indefiniteness marker.

(147) a. *you may take what you want* [*to take*]
b. *you may take what it pleases* (*you*) [*to take*]

The hypothesized source construction in (147) finds some evidence in the fact that a sentence like (147a) is a close paraphrase of a sentence with a free-choice indefinite pronoun like 'You may take anything' and in the fact that languages lacking free-choice indefinites use precisely such constructions to render the same meaning. In Latin, some support is also given by early examples where tense-mood forms of *uelle,* as in (148), are found along with forms already grammaticalized,[132] as in (149).

130. Cf. Haspelmath (1997: 134).

131. A free relative clause is a relative clause that does not modify a noun phrase but constitutes a noun phrase itself. It may be semantically specific (*she told him what she had seen the day before*) or nonspecific (generalizing). Only nonspecific free relative clauses allow the relative pronoun *wh-ever* in English (*she used to tell him what/whatever she saw*).

132. That the indefinite pronouns *quiuis* and *quilibet* are the result of the grammaticalization of relative clauses allowing a generalizing interpretation is also suggested by H. Rosén (2000).

(148) Cato *agr.* 147,99: *si non ante ea exportaueris, dominus uino quid uolet faciet*
'the lord will do what he wants (= anything) with the wine'

(149) Plaut. *Amph.* 26–27: *ille, cuius huc iussu uenio, Iuppiter/non minus quam uostrum quiuis formidat malum*
'that Jupiter, who ordered me to come here, is just like any one of you in his hour of trouble'

7.3 *Quisquis* and *quicumque*

As shown by (150), in Latin the free-choice function may also be expressed by two other series of indefinites, the *-cumque* series and the reduplicated *quisquis* series. Examples like these are not usual: reduplicated indefinites and indefinites in *-cumque* are more commonly used as relative pronouns in nonspecific free relative clauses (151a, c) or universal concessive conditional clauses (151b, d).[133]

(150) a. Tac. *hist.* 1,15,4: *adsentatio erga quemcumque principem sine adfectu peragitur*
'to agree with a prince, whatever sort of prince he is, is a thing accomplished without real feeling'

133. According to Haspelmath and König (1998), the two constructions differ in that only a free relative is a constituent of the containing clause and fills a functional slot within it. This distinction is clear in English: (i) *I'll buy whatever you are selling* (nonspecific free relative), (ii) *whatever you are selling, I'll buy it* (universal concessive conditional), and has consequences for word order in verb-second languages like German, where a universal concessive conditional does not trigger subject-verb inversion: (iii) *was immer du verkaufst, ich werde es kaufen* (cf. König and van der Auwera 1988).
Universal (or parametric) concessive conditionals are structurally very similar to nonspecific free relatives, but they do not occupy a noun phrase position in the clause; rather they modify the main clause adverbially. Semantically, they can be analyzed as conditionals, but what differentiates them from ordinary conditionals is the fact that not a single protasis, but a set of protases, is related to the apodosis. The basic conditional meaning of these sentences can be captured by the semantic representation $(\forall x)$ (if p_x, then q).

b. Cic. *Att.* 14,12,3: *tu, si quid erit de ceteris, de Bruto utique, quidquid*
'you, send me any news you have, especially about Brutus, but about anything else too'

(151) a. Plaut. *Amph.* 309: *quisquis homo huc profecto uenerit, pugnos edet*
'any man that comes this way shall eat fists'

b. Plaut. *Men.* 811–812: *quisquis es, quidquid tibi nomen est, senex, summum Iouem/deosque do testes*
'whoever you are, whatever your name is, old gentleman, I call Heaven and God on high to witness'

c. Verg. *Aen.* 11,848–849: *nam quicumque tuum uiolauit uolnere corpus, / morte luet merita*
'for whoever profaned your limbs with this wound will pay the debt with death'

d. Lucan. 8,746–749: *"quaecumque es" ait "neglecta nec ulli/ cara tuo, sed Pompeio felicior umbra/. . . /da ueniam"*
" 'whoever you are – neglected, dear to none of your own, yet a luckier soul than Pompey, please grant pardon' "

This distribution is generally noted by handbooks of Latin syntax, which distinguish between "absolute indefinites" (*quiuis/quilibet*) and "relative indefinites" (*quisquis/quicumque*) and observe that in the Classical period the absolute use of reduplicated indefinites and indefinites in *-cumque* is restricted to particular expressions such as *quoquo modo*, *quocumque modo*, *quacumque ratione* ('in any way')[134] – that is, to expressions in which it is plausible to think that they are derived from elision of a predicate like *posse, fieri posse.*[135] That the free-choice function, clearly present in (150a–b), came to be expressed by relative indefinites too, is not surprising if one takes two facts into consideration. First, there is great semantic closeness between the meaning of free choice and the meaning of irrelevance (indifference) or ignorance

134. Cf. Traina and Bertotti (1985: 174) and Orlandini (1981, 1995).

135. Actually, the difference in interpretation of *quacumque ratione* between (i) and (ii) is very slight: (i) Cic. *Catil.* 2,11: *quae sanari poterunt, quacumque ratione sanabo*; (ii) Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 1,2,4: *quoscumque de te queri audiui quacumque potui ratione placaui*.

conveyed by free relative pronouns: sentences such as (151a–b) presuppose that the speaker cannot identify the referent of the free relative and that he is indifferent to this identification (i.e., a minimal change in the identity of the free-relative referent would not make a difference in the truth of the sentence). Second, it has been shown by Haspelmath (1995, 1997) that universal concessive conditional clauses with a copular predicate can account for the origin and use of free-choice indefinites in some languages.[136]

The sentence in (151b) is an instance of universal concessive conditional clause of the type 'Whoever you may be, . . . '.

7.4 *Quisquis*

Examples like (151b) are very frequent in Early Latin.[137] Another instance is given in (152). In both (151b) and (152), the expression *quisquis es* indicates that the identity of the person in question is unknown and irrelevant. In other words, we hear the speaker signalling that he does not know who his addressee is while at the same time asserting that it does not matter who he/she is. Ignorance and irrelevance is the original meaning; but stating that the identity of the person involved is irrelevant is in a way the same as asserting free choice over a set of alternatives. This close semantic relationship between the two meanings may explain how *quisquis*, from its original condition of marker of parametric (or universal) concessive conditional clause,[138] could come to be used as a free-choice indefinite (equivalent to *quiuis/quilibet*), as in (150b) or (153). In (150b), Cicero asks his friend to write him whatever he comes to know about Brutus ('something, it doesn't matter what'), with a clear indiscriminative meaning. In (153), *quisquis de meliore nota* underlines

136. For example, in Russian *kto by to ni bylo* 'anyone' is literally 'who(ever) it may be'.
137. Plautus has 35 occurrences of *quisquis*; in 3 of them, *quisquis* functions as a nonspecific free relative pronoun (see (151a)), while in the remaining 32 it occurs within parametric concessive conditional clauses of the type shown in (151b).
138. According to Haspelmath (1997: 135–136), parametric concessive conditional clauses are the source construction for free-choice indefinites in many languages; for example, in French the indefiniteness marker *qui que ce soit* 'anyone' has its source construction in the 'whoever it may be' type.

the irrelevance of the identity of the rival in love ('someone, it doesn't matter who, of higher reputation').[139]

(152) Plaut. *Cist.* 610: *conteris tu tua me oratione, mulier, quisquis es*
'you wear me out with your chatter, woman, whoever you are'

(153) Catull. 68,27–30: *quare, quod scribis Veronae turpe Catullo / esse, quod hic quisquis de meliore nota, / frigida deserto tepefactet membra cubili, / id, Mani, non est turpe, magis miserumst*
'so, when you write "Catullus, it is a disgrace for you to be in Verona", because here anyone of higher reputation warms up his cold limbs in a lonely bed – it is not a disgrace, Manius, it is more a pitiful state of affairs'

The same development may be suggested for *quicumque* (see (151c–d) and (150a)). In this case the situation is more complex because of some differences between *quicumque* and *quisquis*, at least in Early Latin.

Traditional grammars tend to consider *quisquis* and *quicumque* semantically equivalent, with one proviso: that *quisquis* is primarily used as a substantive, *quicumque* as an adjective. A more detailed investigation of the archaic use of the two indefinites seems to show, instead, that reduplicated forms and forms in *-cumque* are not so equivalent as the classical use might suggest.

7.5 *Quicumque*

In Early Latin,[140] *quicumque* does not seem to convey a sense of ignorance/ indifference with respect to a single entity.[141] In agreement with its etymolog-

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139. On this passage see in particular Ferrarino (1942: 146–150), who strongly contrasts the common opinion that the Catullus passage is an instance of *quisquis* = *quisque* 'everyone'. Cf. the Loeb translation 'all the best people'.

140. Plautus has 9 examples; Terence 3 (*Andr.* 63, 263; *Haut.* 484). Of these, *Andr.* 63 contains a plural *quicumque*: *cum quibus erat quomque una, eis sese dedere*.

141. See Ferrarino (1942). *Quicumque* is formed from *quis* + *cum* + *que*, where *cum* signifies eventuality, *-que* signifies generality, and *qui* is not the relative pronoun *qui*, but the interrogative-indefinite *quis,* as can be argued from Cat. *Or. quescumque* ap. Charisium,

ical components, it expresses three different senses: generality and distributivity (like *quisque*), and eventuality, the last sense being determined by the application of generality and distributivity to the temporal dimension (*cum*). These meanings emerge in all the examples in (154), but they are particularly clear in (154b), where the term *occasio* contributes to the eventuality interpretation, and in (154c), where the plural and the correlation with the universal quantifier *omnes* in the main clause suggest that *quicumque* does not mean ignorance/indifference but has a quasi-universal force. In (154a), the parasite Saturio speaks of the profession of *quadrupulator*, which he does not like (*neque quadrupulari me uolo, neque enim decet sine meo periclo ire aliena ereptum bona neque illi qui faciunt mihi placent*); but he is also ready to admit the good intentions of the people practicing that profession.[142] As for

p.115, 29 Barwich. *Quisquis* consists of two full instances of the pronominal form *quis*. This formation corresponds to Osc. *pispis* (cf. Baldi 2002: 347). For both *quisquis* and *quicumque*, the question is whether originally *quis* was an interrogative or an indefinite. For Pisani (1974: 198), *quicumque* is the interrogative-indefinite *quis* plus "*-cumque*, old *-quomque*, in where the conjunction *-que* is added to *quom*, *cum* 'quando', literally 'uno, quando che sia'" [trans. A.B., M.M., & A.O.]. The interrogative origin is strongly argued for by Ferrarino (1942: 69–71) for whom the basic meaning of *quicumque* is 'chi mai (eventualmente) via via'; the indefinite origin is held by Hahn (1933) and to a large extent is shared by Gonda (1954–1955). Gonda (1949: 177) clearly states that the indefinite force of Hitt. *kuiš* may be made explicit by doubling: *kuiš kuiš* = Lat. *quis-quis*. See also Oettinger (1983). Whether *quisquis* is derived by reduplication of the interrogative *quis* or of the indefinite *quis* is a complex question; while on the one hand, as suggested by Hahn (1933), the parallelism with Hittite seems to support the indefinite derivation, on the other hand, the parallelism with other languages with reduplicated indefinites seems to confirm the interrogative derivation. In any case, as with reduplicated interrogatives of other languages (cf. Haspelmath (1997: 179–182)), *quisquis* is used primarily as a nonspecific free relative pronoun, in free relative clauses or in parametric concessive conditional clauses, where it expresses the notion of irrelevance. On this matter, cf. Maraldi (2002).

142. That an idea of eventuality is implied in (154a) by *quicumque* is supported by Ernout's French edition, where the *quicumque* clause is translated with of a conditional clause: "Du reste, si quelqu'un se charge de cette besogne dans l'intérêt public plutôt que pour son profit personnel, je ne me refuse pas à le regarder comme un loyal et bon citoyen." The semantic relationship between a relative indefinite in *-cumque* and a conditional clause is also confirmed in late texts; in *Mulomedicina Chironis*, for example, the alternation of sentences such as (i) and (ii) is very frequent: (i) 2,62: *si quod iumentum e radice auricula uel ad commissuram et tumorem durum et grandem fecerit, sic curato*; (ii) 2,105: *quodcumque iumentum flemina habuerit, sic curabis*.

(154b), it has the generality value peculiar to *quicumque*, seen as the sum of single possible occasions (*occasio*) distributed in a temporal succession. Unlike *quisque*, which quantifies on a "static" domain formed by the sum of the single individuals of the contextually relevant set, *quicumque* quantifies on a "dynamic" domain constituted by the sum of the single individuals who may be present in a temporal succession.[143]

(154) a. Plaut. *Persa* 65–67: *nam publicae rei causa quicumque id facit/ magis quam sui quaesti, animus induci potest / eum esse ciuem et fidelem et bonum*
'of course, when a man does it more for the public welfare than for his personal profit, one may be induced to believe him a good and loyal citizen'

b. Plaut. *Persa* 210: *quid male facio aut quoi male dico?* :: *Quoi pol quomque occasio est*
'what do I do that's bad? or whom do I say bad things to? :: To everyone you get a chance to'

c. Plaut. *Bacch.* 1087–1089: *quicumque ubique sunt, qui fuerunt quique futuri sunt posthac / stulti, stolidi, fatui, fungi, bardi, buccones, / solus ego omnis longe antideo stultitia et moribus indoctis*[144]
'of all the silly, stupid, fatuous, fungus-grown, doddering, driveling dolts anywhere, past or future, I alone am far and away ahead of the whole lot of them in silliness and absurd behavior'

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143. The quantificational force of *-cumque* is similar to that of Eng. *-ever*. Jacobson (1995: 480) suggests that the two contrasting readings of (i) *I'll read what you read* (singular definite reading) and (ii) *I'll read whatever you read* (universal reading) can be accounted for assuming that *-ever* broadens the atomic domain (it can, for example, be broadened over times). In other words, the maximal plural entity denoted by the free relative is constructed in (ii) from a larger domain of atoms than in (i); as a consequence it is less likely that this entity itself will be atomic. The opposite is true for (i).

144. According to Coussin (1952), this Plautine example closely follows a type of juridical formula, well attested in epigraphic texts of *leges* and *senatus consulta* of the second and first centuries BCE. See, for instance, the following generalizing formula of the *lex Coloniae Genetiuae Iuliae*: *CIL* I 594, I, 5, 11: *quicumque pontiff(ices) quique augures C(oloniae) G(enetiuae) I(uliae) … in demortui damnatiue loco… lectus cooptatusue erit, is pontifex augurue in C(olonia) I(ulia) in conlegium pontifex augurue esto.*

The meaning of the plural *quicumque* in (154c) is considered by Ferrarino (1942: 210) to be a quantitative value[145] signalling the entirety, the totality of the portion defined by the relative clause. This quasi-universal meaning[146] characterizes other occurrences of indefinites in *-cumque* found in Plautus,[147] such as (155). Up to the first century CE, the plural *quicumque* has a predominantly quantitative sense,[148] which will be preserved in late texts, as we shall see.

(155) a. Plaut. *Asin.* 44: *di tibi dent quaequomque optes*
'may the gods grant you all your wishes'
b. Plaut. *Cist.* 497: *quodcumque optes, tibi uelim contingere*
'I hope that you achieve your every wish!'

145. According to Ferrarino (1942), the quantitative meaning contrasts with the qualitative meaning, a sense that *quicumque* seems to acquire later similarly to *quisquis*.
146. The universal quantificational interpretation of *quicumque* finds some support in Coussin's (1952) analysis of *quicumque* in poetry. Coussin suggests that alongside stylistic and metric reasons, the frequency of *quicumque* in poetry is motivated by its ability to generalize. The generalization sense makes this indefinite particularly suitable for statements with a religious or solemn character (supplications or maledictions), which are particularly frequent in poetry. This prevailingly religious use would not be an innovation but the continuation of a preexistent tradition of religious and juridical formulas in which the use of *quicumque* fulfills the need for precision and generalization. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the close similarity between the Plautine examples in (155) and formulas *defixionis* such as *commendo tibi … ut … faciat quodcumque desidero Vettia quam peperit Optata* (Audollent, *Def. Tab.* 266), where "la généralisation du but de l'invocation" is sought via *quodcumque* (Coussin 1952: 297).
147. See also Plaut. *Mil.* 1038; *Trin.* 436–437. The four similar Plautine examples share the subjunctive mood, contrary to the common rule (cf. Krebs and Schmalz s.v. *quicumque,* Hofmann & Szantyr 1972: 709–710), that reduplicated and *–cumque* indefinites require the indicative mood. In Cicero himself instances are found where this norm is not valid, for example Cic. *div.* 2,110,10: *callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum uideretur hominum et temporum definitione sublata*; Cic. *de orat.* 3,60: *(Socrates) quam se cumque in partem dedisset, omnium fuit facile princeps* (where the *tmesis* makes the constitutive components of the indefinite determiner evident). See Ghiselli (1961) for other cases where the subjunctive seems to be normal, at least when eventuality and generality come into play.
148. Cf. Bertocchi and Maraldi (2003).

7.6 *Quisquis* and *quicumque* in Classical and Late Latin

It is mainly in Cicero that *quisquis* and *quicumque* begin to overlap, losing their distinctive features.[149] In particular, it is mainly in the singular that *quicumque* starts to be used to convey an interpretation of irrelevance/indifference. It becomes a marker of universal concessive conditional clauses (156); or it can be found in nonspecific free relatives such as (157), by analogy with *quisquis* (158).[150] The possibility of using *quicumque* with the same meaning as *quisquis* can also explain why *quicumque* is sometimes employed as a free-choice indefinite. In Classical Latin this use is limited to ablative expressions such as *quacumque ratione*, but from Livy onward examples of *quicumque* in place of *quiuis* tend to increase and can be found in cases other than the ablative as well (159).[151] Palladius frequently uses *quicumque* in place of *quiuis* with the same sense of a free-choice indefinite ((160); cf. Detmer 1922). This usage is also frequent in Gregory of Tours ((161); cf. Bonnet [1890] 1968: 303).[152] In the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, *quiuis* (*quilibet*) and *quisquis* are not found. Rather, *quicumque* does, primarily in the plural (162). In both examples, the interpretation of *quicumque* is more quantitative than one of irrelevance; as emphasized by the correlative *omnes*, in (162a) *quicumque* conveys a value of totality. As for (162b), an irrelevance interpretation would not make much sense; the right interpretation is again related to the notion of totality: 'the monks in their completeness'.

(156) a. Cic. *epist.* 10,31,3: *quicumque is est, ei me profiteor inimicum*
'whoever he is, I declare myself his enemy'

149. Cf. Maraldi (2000).

150. *Quicumque* acquires meanings previously peculiar to *quisquis*. In its turn, *quisquis* can be found with a quantitative reading: Cic. *Verr.* II 2,63: *quod Heraclium restitui iusserat ac non restituebatur, quisquis erat eductus senator Syracusanus ab Heraclio, duci iubebat.*

151. The same holds also for *quisquis* in the sense of *quiuis*: Liv. 41,8,10: *liberos suos quibusquibus Romanis in eam condicionem ut manu mitterentur mancipio dabant*.

152. A brief check of the lexicon of others, such as the authors of the *Historia Augusta*, Ammianus, and Paulus Orosius, confirms this tendency.

b. Cic. *orat.* 12: *et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis extitisse*
'and I confess that whatever ability I possess as an orator comes, not from the workshop of the rhetoricians, but from the spacious grounds of the Academy'

(157) Cic. *Verr.* II 3,217: *ubicumque hoc factum est, improbe factum est; quicumque hoc fecit, supplicio dignus est*
'wheresoever this thing has been done, it has been ill done; and whosoever has done it merits punishment.'

(158) a. Petron. 46,6: *quidquid dederis, contentus est* (universal concessive conditional clause)
'whatever you give him, he is quite pleased'
b. Petron. 76,8: *quidquid tangebam crescebat tamquam fauus* (nonspecific free relative clause)
'whatever I touched grew like a honeycomb'

(159) a. Tac. *Germ.* 21: *quemcumque mortalium arcere tecto nefas habetur*
'they think it impious to turn any person at all from the door'
b. Quint. *inst.* 10,1,105: *nam Ciceronem cuicumque eorum fortiter opposuerim*
'for I would set Cicero against any one of their orators without fear of refutation'

(160) a. Pallad. 1,17,2: *sed si aliquando in quocumque loco pauimenti uel parietis tectura succumbat, hoc genus malthae adhibebimus*
'but if sometimes in whatever place the covering of the floor or of a wall is damaged, we will use this kind of cement'
b. Pallad. 4,13,3: *canus cum quouis colore*
'white with any color whatsoever'

(161) Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 9,30: *non est mirum enim, si pro inimicitiis horum ciuium in cuiuscumque domo reseruatus est*
'it is not to be wondered if it has been kept in whatever house because of the hostilities of these citizens'

(162) a. *Itin. Eger.* 15,5: *presbyter … dixit nobis … quicumque essent baptizandi in ipso uico … omnes in ipso fonte baptizarentur*
'the presbyter told us that the candidates who are to be baptized in the village all receive their actual baptism in the spring itself'
b. *Itin. Eger.* 25,12: *loci ipsius monachi, quicumque sunt, usque ad lucem in ecclesia in Bethleem peruigilant*
'all the Bethlehem monks, however many there are, keep vigil in the church at Bethlehem, until it is day'

The only unusual use of *quicumque* is (163), where each of the three occurrences is interpreted as referring to a nonspecific single individual chosen from the set defined by the partitive phrase. No nuance of irrelevance is conveyed in this case. Further, we can conclude that *quicumque* in (162) has a universal interpretation, while *quicumque* in (163) has an existential interpretation.

(163) *Itin. Eger*. 24,9: *dicet psalmum quicumque de presbyteris et respondent omnes … Item dicit psalmum quicumque de diaconis … dicitur et tertius psalmus a quocumque clerico*
'a psalm is said by one of the presbyters, with everyone responding, then a psalm is said by one of the deacons, then a third psalm is said by one of the clergy'

7.7 The relationship between *quisquis* and *quisque*

Hahn (1933: 33) maintains that in the pre-classical period, *quisque* and *quisquis* are practically interchangeable and that this form of confusion still persists in the classical period.[153] Paradigmatic cases of this presumed confusion are shown in (164). Ferrarino (1942: 144–145) objects that in these

153. In Hahn's view, the confusion of *quisquis* and *quisque* supports her thesis that both were originally mere variants of the indefinite *quis*. Hahn's view is based on Wölfflin's (1882a: 449–450) suggestion that originally the two words were identical, the final element of *quisque* (like that of *quicumque*) being a weakened and uninflected form of the final element of *quisquis*.

examples[154] the meaning of the indefinite that better agrees with the interpretation of the whole passage is not the meaning normally conveyed by *quisque* (generality and distributivity)[155] but the meaning normally conveyed by *quisquis* (irrelevance with respect to a single entity). A strong sense of indifference is perceptible in both examples: in (164a), people's voracity is so great that 'as soon as they touch something, they hold it, whatever it is' and there is nothing that can disgust them. In (164b), emphasis is put on the behavior of beasts that not only eat everything offered to them but also do not care about food quality. An interesting example where both pronouns are present is (165). The Loeb edition translates *quisquis* as 'everyone' and *quisque* as 'all', assigning them a distributive-universal reading. But this interpretation does not seem to correspond to the real meaning of the passage, where the choice of *quisquis* is not arbitrary but required to stress an irrelevance/indifference reading.[156]

(164) a. Plaut. *Aul.* 198: *ego istos noui polypos, qui ubi quidquid tetigerunt tenent*
'I know all about those octopuses that stick to whatever they touch'

154. For analysis of all the passages usually considered to be instances of the interchange between *quisquis* and *quisque*, see Ferrarino (1942: 144–172) and Hahn (1933). The presumed confusion *quisquis/quisque* hypothesized by Hahn is also rejected by Calboli (1961). But Calboli also rejects Ferrarino's idea that *ut* (*ubi*) *quidquid* can never be equivalent to *ut* (*ubi*) *quidque*. Some passages from *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and from Cicero's *de inuentione*: *Rhet. Her.* 1,9,15: *rem dilucide narrabimus, si ut quicquid primum gestum erit, ita primum exponemus*; Cic. *inv.* 1,20,29: *aperta narratio poterit esse, si, ut quidque primum gestum erit, ita primum exponetur* show that, at least in this type of context, the difference between *quidquid* and *quidque* is more stylistic than semantic. Cf. Calboli (1961: 110).

155. Cf. Serbat (1986: 314): "*Quisque* ajoute au sémantisme fondamental de *quis* ('être discret') la valeur 'généralisante' de *-que*". An "additiv-summierend" sense is assigned to *-que* of *quisque* by John (1954).

156. Cf. Ferrarino's (1942: 156) translation: "Chicchesia passi per la strada voglio lo si inviti a far baldoria con noi. :: Va bene, purché però, ciascuno che verrà venga col suo vino". The contrasting opinions of Hahn and Ferrarino both find partial support in the data; therefore it is not easy to follow one suggestion to the exclusion of the other. The relationship between *quisquis* and *quisque* is made difficult both by problems tied to the dubious tradition of the manuscripts and by the semantic closeness between nonspecific free relatives with a generalizing reading and universally quantified sentences.

b. Cic. *Tusc.* 5,98: *quae* (*bestiae*), *ut quidquid obiectum est . . . eo contentae non quaerunt amplius*
'which animals, when a thing of any sort is flung to them, are content with it and look for nothing further'

(165) Plaut. *Stich.* 686–687: *quisquis praetereat, comissatum uolo uocari.* :: *Conuenit, dum quidem hercle quisque ueniet ueniat cum uino suo*
'I want everyone that goes by called over to help us celebrate! :: I agree, yes sir, I agree, so long as all comers come with their own wine'

A similar contrast can be found in English, where the meaning distinction between 'any' and 'every' is quite subtle. The *whatever* free relative in (166a) is largely synonymous with (166b).[157] This has led to the suggestion to analyze *whatever* as a universal quantifier over individuals. As far as Latin is concerned, this semantic closeness can be considered one of the reasons favoring the lack of distinction between *quisquis* and *quisque*[158] that has been suggested. In sentences such as (167), the nonspecific free relative pronoun can be interpreted as equivalent to a universal-distributive quantifier. It is evident that in sentences where both *quisquis* and *quisque* can occur (mainly where another relative, such as *ubi* or *ut*, precedes) the exchange between the two indefinites can be easier. In such cases, only a deeper reading of the surrounding context can give the right interpretation.

(166) a. *there is a lot of violence in whatever Parker writes*
b. *there is a lot of violence in everything Parker writes*

(167) a. Cic. *fin.* 1,38: *quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in uoluptate esse aut in dolore*
'a man who is conscious of his condition must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain'

157. Cf. von Fintel (2000).

158. An account of the passage of *quisquis* into the semantic domain of *quisque* is proposed by John (1954). This explanation uses *omnes* (i.e., universal quantification) as the common feature shared by both indefinites beyond the specific original properties tied to their etymology.

b. Tib. 2,1,1: *quisquis ades faueas*
'keep silent, all present'

Further difficulties are added by examples such as (168), where the same indefinite appears in similar structures but with a different meaning. In (168a) *quisque* is used for *quisquis*,[159] referring to a single nonspecific individual whose identity is irrelevant ('somebody else, whoever might fall in the way of the soldiers'), but in (168b) it has the usual universal distributive interpretation.

(168) a. Tac. *hist.* 1,26,1: *sed ne per tenebras, ut quisque Pannonici uel Germanici exercitus militibus oblatus esset, ignorantibus plerisque, pro Othone destinaretur*
'but they feared that in the darkness any man who fell in the way of the soldiers from Pannonia or Germany might be identified as Otho, for the majority did not know him'

b. Tac. *hist.* 1,29,1: *simul ex tota urbe, ut quisque obuius fuerat, alii formidine augentes*
'at the same time people came from the whole city – some, who had happened to meet the procession, exaggerating the facts through terror'

8. Universal quantifiers

Whether universal quantifiers can be classed as indefinites or not is an open question: traditionally they are assigned to the indefinite pronouns, but this can be rejected because universal quantifiers can also be considered semantically definite. This is the opinion of Haspelmath (1997: 12),[160] who does

159. The use of *quisque* for *quisquis* is rare; Hahn (1933: 34) cites Liv. 1,24,3 as the only occurrence of this use in the classical period, but this instance is deleted in Teubner's edition, which has *cuius* instead of *cuiusque* (*ut, cuius populi ciues eo certamine uicissent, is alteri populo cum bona pace imperitaret*). In Late Latin instances become more frequent; see Petschenig (1889).

160. One of the reasons motivating their definiteness is their compatibility with the definite article in many languages (e.g., Eng. *all the children*, Fr. *tous les enfants*, It. *tutti i bam-*

acknowledge, however, that there are close connections between distributive universal quantifiers (*every*) and indefinite pronouns expressing irrelevance of choice (*any*). Moreover, that a universal quantifier like *every* lacks a specific reference is proved by the fact that a personal pronoun anaphorically related to *every* cannot have a specific reference (169).[161] If there is no accord about the (in)definiteness of universal quantifiers, there is instead general agreement about the necessity of introducing a distinction between those quantifiers which quantify over a unity considered in its entirety (*totality quantifiers*) and those quantifiers which quantify over an exhaustive set of unities (*universal quantifiers*).[162] In Latin, *totus* is a totality quantifier, while *omnis* and *quisque* are universal quantifiers.[163] The distinction between totality and universal quantifiers is the result of a long development by which in most languages the universal quantifier 'all' is derived only secondarily by the totality quantifier 'whole'.

(169) *Every teacher*$_i$ *respects the students that discuss matters with him*$_i$

8.1 Totality quantifiers

The Latin totality quantifier expressing entireness is *totus*. In accordance with this semantic value, *totus* is usually singular. Consider (170). *Totus* is also

bini, Sp. *todos los niños*). According to Sapir (1930: 15), who recognizes the difficulty of this classification, *all* in *all the people* is an indefinite totalizer; but *all* in *all the cardinal points* is an implicitly definite totalizer, since in the former case the totality is predicated of a number which need not be known, in the latter of a known but unexpressed, i.e. an implied, number.

161. See Putzu (2001: 22).

162. Among traditional grammars see for example Brøndal (1943), Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 199). Recent analyses are given in Putzu (2001) and Haspelmath (1995).

163. In Latin there are two other universal quantifiers, *cunctus* and *uniuersus*, which are not part of everyday speech (as shown by Hofmann, 1948: 285–286, through a count of their occurrences in various Latin authors) and are not preserved in the Romance languages. Originally, *cunctus* belonged to the sacral register. It predominantly had the meaning 'whole' in the singular and 'all' in the plural. *Uniuersus* is mostly found in contrast to *singuli*.

frequently used predicatively, in close to an adverbial sense (‘wholly’, ‘completely’; (178)).[164] *Totus* expresses undividedness and indivisibility, in such a way that not even a small part is excluded (172). It also means ‘whole’ in the plural, albeit less frequently: for example, in Plautus (173) and Cicero (174).

(170) a. Plaut. *Asin*. 633: *ut hanc ne quoquam mitteret nisi ad se hunc annum totum*
‘for letting no one else but him have my girl the whole of this next year’
b. Caes. *Gall*. 1,26,5: *ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia cxxx superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt*
‘some 130,000 persons survived the action and marched continuously the whole of that night’
c. Cic. *dom*. 146: *tota urbe careo*
‘I am deprived of the whole city’

(171) a. Plaut. *Amph.* 335: *timeo, totus torpeo*
‘I’m scared, I’m completely stiff!’
b. Cic. *dom.* 116: *domus illa mea prope tota uacua est*
‘nearly the whole site of my house is still unconsecrated’

(172) Cic. *Quinct*. 90: *uti . . . totum agrum, qui communis est, suum facere possit*
‘so that he can make the whole field his own, which, as a whole, is indivisible’

(173) a. Plaut. *Aul.* 72–73: *peruigilat noctes totas, tum autem interdius / quasi claudus sutor domi sedet totos dies*
‘he never shuts his eyes all night: yes, and then in the daytime he’s sitting around the house the whole day’
b. Plaut. *Curc*. 409–410 *noui edepol nomen: nam mihi istoc nomine, / dum scribo, expleui totas ceras quattuor*
‘I know that name, by god; for it is my name. I filled four whole pages of my ledger writing it down’

164. Properly adverbial are the expressions *ex toto*, *in totum* (cf. Wölfflin 1887: 144–145), which are more usual than the adverbial use of the neuter *totum*, which is frequent in the *Itin. Eger.* 1,2: *habebat . . . forsitan quattuor milia totum per ualle illa*; *uia enim illic penitus non est, sed totum heremi sunt arenosae* (cf. E. Löfstedt 1962: 49).

c. Plaut. *Stich.* 153–154 *nam dies totos apud portum seruos unus adsidet: / sed tamen uolo interuisi*
'even though I do have a slave stationed at that harbor all the time, I want someone to go and look'

(174) a. Cic. *nat. deor*. 2,108: *et relicum quidem corpus Draconis totis noctibus cernimus*
'and while the rest of the Serpent's body is visible all night long'

b. Cic. *Tusc*. 5,19,55: *se non modo quattuor consulatus uni anteponere, sed unum diem Cinnae multorum et clarorum uirorum totis aetatibus*
'that not only did he put four consulships before one, but a single day of Cinna's rule before the whole lifetime of many illustrious men'

According to Haspelmath (1995: 366–367), 'whole' and 'all' both express the notion of completeness or totality, differing mainly in that 'whole' is used for single objects, while 'all' is used for sets (or aggregates) of objects. But 'whole' may be extended to aggregates, and presumably an intermediate step in this extension is represented by collective nouns or mass nouns. In the same way, though many plural uses of *totus* still preserve the value of totality ('whole'), it is precisely from the plural uses that the universal value ('all') of *totus* develops in the Romance languages. Two uses in particular signal the passage of *totus* to the semantic field of *omnis* and prepare its use in the Romance languages:

(a) its frequent use with *pluralia tantum*.
(b) some plural uses, in particular time expressions, which can be considered borderline, since the value of *totus* can still be considered to be 'whole' in some cases, but it is decidedly 'all' in others.[165]

165. Cf. Wölfflin (1882b: 107): "Die klassische Sprache gebraucht den Plural von *toti* nur in dem Sinne von 'ganze', nicht 'alle'. Also Tac. *Germ.*17 *totos dies iuxta focum agunt* ganze Tage lang, nicht alle Tage; und ebenso bei *Pluralia tantum*, *totis castris* im ganzen Lager." Wölfflin admits, however, that "von diesem Sprachgebrauche ist schon in Cäsars Zeit die Soldatensprache abgewichen, indem sie *totae copiae* für *omnes copiae* sagte".

8.2 The use of *totus* with *pluralia tantum*

The number of occurrences of *totus* with *pluralia tantum* is decidedly higher than that of *omnis*, in particular with those *pluralia tantum* expressing a collective sense in relation to spatial extension. This is the case for example of *castra*, *aedes*, and *moenia*.

8.2.1 Castra

Castra is usually found with *totus* in Livy, Caesar, Curtius Rufus, and Tacitus (175), but similarly in later authors as well (176).

(175) a. Liv. 2,45,11: *totis castris undique ad consules curritur*
‘from all over the camp they came running to the consuls’
b. Caes. *Gall.* 6,37,6: *totis trepidatur castris*
‘there was confusion throughout the camp’

(176) a. Frontin. *strat.* 1,1,7: *Mithridates … ignes etiam frequentiores per tota castra fieri iussit*
‘Mithridates ordered numerous fires to be lighted throughout the camp’
b. Iust. 2,11,16: *tumultus totis castris oritur*[166]
‘a tumult rises throughout the camp’

8.2.2 Aedes

When *aedes* is used as a *plurale tantum* (meaning ‘house’, as composed of several rooms) it is found with *totus* (177). When it is not used as a *plurale tantum* but as the plural of *aedis* (‘temple’), it is usually accompanied by the adjective *sacer*: in that case it co-occurs with *omnis* (178).

166. B. Löfstedt (1958: 102–104) thinks that not only *pluralia tantum* can be collective unities, but also that other plural substantives can have a collective sense and are thus found with numeral distributives. This is the case for example of *vasa*. According to B. Löfstedt (1958: 104), there is a difference in meaning between *bina vasa* and *duo vasa*: *bina vasa* in Cato and Varro “bedeutet also *zwei Keltern mit Zubehör*”, while “*duo vasa* bedeutet *zwei Gefässe*”.

(177) a. Plaut. *Cas.* 763: *omnes festinant intus totis aedibus*
'everyone is bustling about all over the house'
b. Apul. *met.* 8,13: *nudatis totis aedibus*
'having emptied every house'

(178) a. Liv. 45,2,6: *cum consul edixisset ut omnes aedes sacrae aperirentur*
'when the consul proclaimed that all sacred buildings should be opened'
b. Gell. 14,7,7: *non omnes aedes sacras templa*
'not all sacred edifices are temples'

8.2.3 Moenia

With *moenia* as well, *totus* is the predominant quantifier (179), and we have found just one example with *omnis* (180).

(179) a. Caes. *Gall.* 2,6,2: *ubi . . . totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt*
'when there has begun a rain of stones from all sides upon the wall'
b. Rut. Nam. 1,103: *totaque natiuo moenia fonte sonant*
'all the walls resound with natural springs'

(180) Hist. Apoll. *rec. A* 47: *pro hoc tanto munere condono huic ciuitati uestrae ad restauranda omnia moenia auri talenta centum*
'for so great a favor, I remit to this city a hundred golden talents to restore all the walls'

That the replacement of *omnes* by *toti* in the Romance languages was prepared by the use of *totus* with *pluralia tantum* was Wölfflin's opinion (1886: 470): "Der unklassische Gebrauch heftete sich somit zunächst an die Pluralia tantum". Wölfflin notes the expression *totae copiae*, which he relates to the soldiers' language in Caesar, and the frequent use of *totis uiribus*: of such form we have found 93 instances in the *Cetedoc corpus* and 39 in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*.

In his typological study, Haspelmath (1995: 365–367) states that the diachronic change from 'whole' to 'all' is unidirectional (i.e., the opposite

change from ‘all’ to ‘whole’ never occurs) and can be seen as an instance of the general tendency for meanings to become more abstract in the course of grammaticalization. According to Haspelmath, we can also presume that collective nouns or mass nouns are an intermediate step in the extension of the use of ‘whole’, because they are semantically akin to both simple things and aggregates.[167]

The Latin *pluralia tantum* usually found with *totus* agree with this reading of the meaning of collective nouns. These *pluralia tantum* are nouns with internal complexity, where their constituent parts are gathered together: *aedes,* for example**,** is the house composed of a number of rooms. This notion of “constituent part” seems to be central, and it seems to be the core of the meaning both of the *pluralia tantum* which combines with *totus* and of *totus* itself. According to Richter (1909: 143), in fact, while *omnis* is composed of single wholes, *totus* is composed of pieces, which form a whole only by their unification.[168] The *pluralia tantum* found with *totus* and which can be considered integrated wholes combine with collective numerals, such as *uni, trini*, and not with cardinals (e.g., *binae, trinae aedes* vs. **duae, tres aedes*).[169]

There are also *pluralia tantum* which are not found with *totus*: terms which refer to a plurality of individuals named collectively and not individually, such as *liberi, maiores* (cf. Madvig 1885: 33). Although such *pluralia tantum* refer to collections of personal entities, they are still aware of the individuals making up the collection. Interestingly, these *pluralia tantum* combine with cardinals and not with collective numerals (e.g., *tres liberi* vs. **trini liberi*).

167. For the definition of aggregate, see Sapir (1930).

168. Cf. Richter (1909: 143): “*Omnis* setzt sich aus einzelnen Ganzen zusammen, *totus* aus Bruchstücken, die erst in ihrer Vereinigung ein Ganzes bilden.” Dominicy (1980) seems to agree with Richter in his explanation of why Caesar uses *omnis* and not *totus* at the beginning of *The Gallic war*: *Gallia est omnis diuisa in partes tres* and not *Gallia est tota diuisa in partes tres*. He proposes that Caesar does not use *totus* because it means ‘omnes partes’. *Tota Gallia* would have meant ‘omnes partes Galliae’, giving the false sentence *Omnes partes Galliae diuisae sunt in partes tres* as a result, which corresponds neither to the truth nor to Caesar’s intent.

169. See Ojeda (1997).

8.3 Plural uses where *toti* means *omnes*

As shown by (173) and (174), in many cases *totus* maintains the meaning 'whole' in the plural. Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 203) suggest that surely in (181) it can still be translated by 'whole'. There are also examples where it is difficult to decide whether *totus* means 'whole' or 'all', as in (182), where both interpretations seem to be possible: 'all the nights' and 'whole nights through'.[170]

(181) Cic. *nat. deor.* 2,105: *cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus*[171]
'and the latter's extremely bright stars, visible to us all night long'

(182) Cic. *div.* 2,121: *totas noctes somniamus, neque ulla est fere, qua non dormiamus*
'we dream every night/whole nights through and there is scarcely a night when we do not sleep'

There are, however, cases in which the interpretation can only be 'all'. According to Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 203), the penetration of *toti* into the meaning domain of *omnes*, already attested at early stages, is primarily a phenomenon of the popular language. Example (183) is considered the earliest plural use of *toti*. In later Latin this change is more extended, in particular from the time of Apuleius (184).[172] Brakman, too, suggests that the use of *toti* with the meaning 'all' arose in the popular language. He quotes an instance by Pliny (185).[173] In Late Latin, *toti* can still be found with the double reading 'whole' and 'all' where the two notions of number and dimension meet

170. The universal quantifier interpretation ('all the nights') seems to be supported by the related pronoun *ulla*, which is a (negative) universal quantifier, while the totality quantifier interpretation ('whole nights through') is defended by Pease (1963: 547). According to him, understanding *totas noctes* as 'whole nights through' would be well chosen for the subjective impression of dreaming.

171. Putzu (2001: 148) instead takes *totis noctibus* to mean 'all the nights'. We agree with Hofmann & Szantyr's interpretation.

172. Cf. Wölfflin (1882b: 107): "In Prosa treffen wir *toti* = *omnes* zuerst massenweise in den Metamorphosen des Apuleius". Later examples of *toti* = *omnes* are collected by Rönsch (1965: 338).

173. Cf. Brakmann (1930: 221): "*tota maria* ad sermonem plebeium pertinet".

(186), but the examples where it means 'all' or 'eveyone' become more frequent (187). With numerals, *totus* is already used in Ovid, but it assumes the value of *omnis* only in Late Latin (188). Another usage that can be found only in Late Latin and only sporadically is *totus* with singular collective nouns, meaning *omnis* (189).[174]

(183) Plaut. *Mil.* 213: *quoi bini custodes semper totis horis occubant*[175]
'a couple of custodians always lying on him hour after hour'

(184) a. Apul. *met.* 7,12: *totos istos hostes tuos statim captiuos habebis*
'you will soon have all those enemies of yours in bonds'
b. Apul. *met.* 7,10: *totarum mulierum secta moresque de asini pendebant iudicio*
'the character and principles of all womankind depended on the verdict of an ass'

(185) Plin. *nat.* 7,97,2: *postea ad tota maria et deinde solis ortus missus*
'subsequently he was dispatched to the whole of the seas and then to the far east'

(186) a. *Itin. Eger*. 25,12: *in Bethleem autem per totos octo dies cotidie is ornatus est*
'in Bethlehem celebrations go on for eight days continuously'
b. *Itin. Eger.* 28,3: *in totis quadragesimis in medio quinta feria cenant*
'in the whole of Lent they eat a dinner halfway through Thursday'

(187) a. *Itin. Eger*. 2,6: *ut… toti illi montes, quos … uideramus*
'so that all the peaks we had seen'

174. Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 203) who quote also phrases such as Firm. *math.* 1,10,1: *totum quidquid*; Ambr. *off.* 1,30,152: *totum quod* as preparatory of Romance developments (Fr. *tout ce que*; It. *tutto ciò che*).

175. In our opinion, a similar interpretation may be assigned also to *totae* in Plaut. *Aul.* 405–406: *Attatae, ciues, populares, incolae, adcolae, aduenae omnes! / Date uiam, qua fugere liceat! Facite totae plateae pateant*!

b. *Itin. Eger*. 36,3: *omnes usque ad unum, maiores atque minores, diuites, pauperes, toti ibi parati*
'every single one of them, old and young, rich and poor, goes on, everyone is present there'

c. *Itin. Eger.* 37,3: *omnis populus transit unus et unus toti acclinantes se*
'all the people go past one by one, everyone bowing'

(188) a. Ov. *trist.* 5,2,13 *paene decem totis . . . annis*
'for almost ten whole years

b. Alc. Avit. *epist.* 57: *sub totis tribus personis*
'under all the three persons'

(189) Prud. *psych.* 450: *his se Sobrietas et totus Sobrietatis abstinet exuuiis miles*
'Soberness and all the soldiers of Soberness refrain from handling these spoils'

8.4 Universal quantifiers

The pronoun expressing universal quantification in Latin is *omnis*. *Omnis* is the Latin formation which ousted pre-literary *sollus* from the meanings 'whole' and 'all', but in turn it gave way to *totus* for the expression of the notion 'whole'.[176]

In general, *omnis* means 'whole' only in the singular and mostly with mass nouns (190). In the singular, it may often be interpreted as 'whole', but at the same time the distributive value of 'every' cannot be excluded.

176. According to Hofmann (1948: 283), "auch da, wo der Begriff 'all' von Anfang an überwiegt, wie bei lat. *omnis* . . . , ist dieser, soweit nachweisbar, nicht ursprünglich, sondern aus einer älteren Bedeutung, 'vollständig, ganz' u. dgl. hervorgegangen". The form *sollo-*, which Latin had in common with the dialects, as an adjective was already dead in prehistoric Latin, but it survived in compounds such as *soll-emnis* ('annual') or *soll-ers* ('skillful', cf. Ter. *Eun.* 478) and gave rise to *solidus*, which occurs in various authors meaning 'whole, complete', as in Cic. *Rab. Post.* 46: *ita bona ueneant ut solidum suum cuique soluatur*; Hor. *carm.* 1.1.20: *nec partem solido demere de die*; Liv. 5,4,7: *an tu aequum censes militia semestri solidum te stipendium accipere?*

Example (191) seems to have two possible readings, since *omnis* may well refer both to the sight seen as a whole in its entirety, or to all the single points that comprise the sight itself.

(190) a. Enn. *ann.* 1,35: *uires uitaque corpus meum nunc deserit omne*
'now strength and life too leave all my body'
b. Plaut. *Amph.* 458: *nam hic quidem omnem imaginem meam, quae antehac fuerat, possidet*
'for, my word, this fellow has got hold of my complete image, mine that was'
c. Ter. *Ad.* 89–90: *ipsum dominum atque omnem familiam / mulcauit usque ad mortem*
'he beat the owner and all the household almost to death'
d. Cato *agr.* 76,3: *ubi omne caseum bene siccaueris, in mortarium purum manibus condepsito*
'when you have dried out the cheese completely, knead it in a clean bowl by hand'

(191) Enn. *trag*. 182: *ecce autem caligo oborta est, omnem prospectum abstulit*[177]
'but see, a mist rose over him and hid him from all view'

Few are the examples where *omnis* and *totus* co-occur in relation to one and the same object, as a reciprocal reinforcement, not as the expression of different meanings or points of view: (192); but usually, when *omnis* and *totus* are found together in relation to the same object, they express the separate and distinct meanings 'all' and 'whole', respectively (193). When *omnis* and *totus* relate to different objects in the same passage, they generally show their different properties: *omnis* accompanies entities that can be analyzed as comprising distinct, countable unities, while *totus* accompanies indivisible entities. But there are also examples where it is difficult to perceive any semantic difference between their co-occurrences (194). As regards the meaning 'every' of *omnis*, it develops first in the attributive use, as in (195a), and then it comes to be used also as a substantive, as in (195b).

177. Cf. Richter (1909: 144): "*omnis* besagt hier jede Aussicht, d. i. die ganze."

(192) Plaut. *frg. inc.* 3: *gannit odiosus omni totae familiae*[178]
'he growls, hateful to the whole family'

(193) Plin. *nat.* 6,98: *Arcturum neque omnibus cerni noctibus nec totis umquam*
'Arcturus is not visible at all on some nights and never all night long'

(194) a. Cato *agr.* 92: *granarium totum oblinito crasso luto; postea cospargito amurca omne, quod lutaueris*
'cover the whole granary with the thick slime, and then add a coat of *amurca* over the whole'
b. Cic. *Arat.* 449–450: *omnis iam panditur Hydra. / At caput et totum sese Centaurus opacis eripit e tenebris*
'the Hydra stretches completely. But the Centaur snatches his head and the whole body away from shady darkness'

(195) a. Plaut. *Bacch.* 129: *non omnis aetas, Lyde, ludo conuenit*
'not in every age are we schoolboys, Lydus'
b. Hor. *sat.* 2,2,76: *uides, ut pallidus omnis cena desurgat dubia*?
'don't you see how everyone rises pallid from a meal in which there's too much to choose?

In the evolution toward Romance, one could say with Tekavčić (1980) that there is a general process of replacement by which one pronoun ends up occupying the position of another: so, in the passage from Latin to Italian, *totus* takes the place of *omnis* while *omnis* takes the place of *quisque*. But in Italian the process of substitution of *totus* for *omnis* mainly concerns the plural forms. In the singular, *totus* maintains its meaning 'whole' and does not replace *omnis* in its distributive meaning 'every'.[179]

178. On pleonastic uses in Plautus cf. E. Löfstedt (1912: 172–173).
179. It is different in other Romance languages, such as French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Catalan. In Portuguese it is *totus* that expresses the meanings 'whole', 'all' as well as the distributive meaning 'every': *toda casa* means 'every house'. Similarly, in Spanish alongside *todo el mundo* 'the whole world', *todos los hombres* 'all the men', there is *todo hombre* 'every man'. According to Putzu (2001: 36), for the sake of disambiguation, such languages distinguish totality from universal quantification through the use of the article. Latin, which had no article, developed distinct forms.

The distributive sense, which can already be found in Early Latin, becomes the exclusive sense of the descendant of *omnis* in Italian: *ogni linguista conosce Chomsky* has the value of a universal quantifier with distributive meaning, corresponding to English *every*.[180] *Omnis* thus passes from a simple universal quantifier (which may occur with any noun) to a distributive universal quantifier, which may occur with only a subclass of nouns, those of high countability preference (see Gil 1995: 326).

As regards the semantic difference in the way the two Latin pronouns *quisque* and *omnis* express distributivity, *quisque* takes its referents one by one, stressing their individuality, while *omnis* stresses the completeness or exhaustiveness of its referents. To sum up, *quisque* is always marked as distributive and forces a distributive interpretation, while *omnis* may have different senses, including distributive. When *omnis* is distributive, it is similar to 'every'.

The similarities between 'every' and *omnis* cease when one considers their diachronic origin. According to Haspelmath, 'every' comes from a free-choice determiner, with cardinality not greater than one. This would explain why 'every' combines with the singular: it maintains the syntactic behavior of a free-choice determiner, although it has acquired a new meaning and refers to a set with cardinality greater than one. *Omnis*, on the other hand, is a simple universal quantifier, which already in Early Latin could mean 'all', 'whole', and 'every'. Since languages operate to reduce possible ambiguities, *omnis* gradually yielded the sense 'whole' to *totus*, while keeping both the collective meaning 'all' and the distributive meaning 'every', until *toti* began to be used in the collective meaning in place of *omnes* as well. At the end of this process, in a Romance language like Italian only its distributive meaning was preserved.

180. Since *ogni* is only distributive, it is used exclusively in the singular. The only plural exception is constituted by the specific distributive meaning of such phrases as *ogni otto giorni*, *ogni tanti giorni*.

8.5 Disambiguation in Latin

The ambiguity between a totality and a universal interpretation of *omnis* was neutralized by the use of *totus* as a totality quantifier, while the ambiguity between a collective and a distributive interpretation remained. Latin could, however, rely on *quisque* to have a distributive interpretation, as in (196), where the semantic value of the predicate involves the choice of one or the other of the quantifiers: the soldiers can be praised collectively (hence, *omnis*) but must be rewarded individually (hence, *quisque*). Moreover, the use of *omnis* in the singular also assures a distributive reading, as in (197). However, even in the plural uses of *omnis*, Latin has the means of disambiguation. Compare the ambiguity of (198), which can have a collective reading where the number of books is one, or a distributive reading where the number of books is equal to the number of students. The possible ambiguity between a collective and a distributive reading of *omnis* in a Latin example like (199) is resolved by the context, where the use of *inuicem* excludes the distributive reading: the Gorgons shared a single eye and did not have one eye each. Another possibility for solving the ambiguity in such cases is the use of a distributive numeral, like *singuli* in (200).

(196) Liv. 38,23,11: *laudati quoque pro contione omnes sunt donatique pro merito quisque*
‘before an assembly he praised everyone according to his merits’

(197) Sen. *epist.* 78,6: *tria haec in omni morbo grauia sunt: metus mortis, dolor corporis, intermissio uoluptatum*
‘in every disease there are three serious elements: fear of death, bodily pain, breaking off of pleasure’

(198) *all the students bought a book*

(199) Serv. *Aen.* 6,289: *Gorgones Phorci filiae tres fuerunt in extrema Africa circa Atlantem montem, quae omnes unum oculum habebant, quo inuicem utebantur*
‘the Gorgons, the daughters of Phorcus, were three, and they lived in the extreme end of Africa near the mount Atlas. They had all one eye only, which they used in turn’

(200) Prisc. *gramm*. III 413,24: *singulos oculos habebant cyclopes*[181]
'every Cyclops had one eye only'

9. Distributive universal quantifiers

Gil's (1991) cross-linguistic exploration of universal quantifiers has identified two independent features relevant for their typology: distributivity and anaphoricity. A *distributive* universal quantifier may be marked as either distributive-key or distributive-share;[182] alternatively, it may remain unmarked, or not necessarily distributive. With relation to anaphoricity, a distributive universal quantifier may be marked as either determinate or free-choice; alternatively, it may be unmarked, or non-anaphoric. There seems to be considerable cross-linguistic variation in the extent and manner of marking distributivity. Within Gil's typology, English universal quantifiers are characterized as follows: *all* is the simple or unmarked universal quantifier, *every* combines universal quantification with distributive-key, *each* combines universal quantification with distributive-key and determinateness, and *any* combines universal quantification with free-choice. Gil's typology provides a valid scheme for analyzing and classifying the universal quantifiers in Latin, a language which, like many others, lexically distinguishes between simple and distributive-key universal quantifiers (*omnis* vs. *quisque*) and is able to distinguish between non-anaphoric distributive-key and determinate distributive-key universal quantifiers (*omnis* vs. *quisque* and *unusquisque*), like Eng. *every* vs. *each*. Moreover, while English numerals are unmarked for distribu-

181. On the basis of (200), it could be said that in (199) Servius would use *singulum* instead of *unum* if the meaning were distributive. But referring precisely to the Cyclops we find Gell. 9,4,6: *unum oculum in frontis medio habentes* and Serv. *Aen.* 8,649: *unde et Cyclopas 'coclites' legimus dictos, quod unum oculum habuisse perhibentur.*

182. The distributive-key designates the entities being distributed over, the distributive-share designates the entities being distributed. For example, *every* in *every man carried three suitcases* is distributive-key in that it forces a relationship of distributivity, while *suitcases* is distributive-share, in this case determined by the predicate: [[*every man*]$_{\text{key}}$ [*carried three suitcases*]$_{\text{share}}$]$_{\text{S}}$. *Every* permits only the interpretation that the men have acted individually. In many instances "distributive-key" corresponds to "wide scope" and "distributive share" to "narrow scope". Cf. Gil (1991: 6).

tivity, Latin has a separate series of distributive numerals marking distributed share,[183] as we will see later in relation to *singuli.*

9.1 *Quisque*

Unlike *omnis*, which is a simple, unmarked universal quantifier and permits either a distributive or a nondistributive (collective) universal interpretation, *quisque* can only have a universal distributive interpretation ((201)–(202)). In (201), *omnia uitia* admits the collective reading while *in omnibus* receives a distributive interpretation, which is explicitly marked by *singulis* in the second adversative clause.[184] In (202), the choice of one or the other quantifier is congruent with the meaning of the predicate involved: in (a) the soldiers can be praised collectively, but they are rewarded one by one. In (b), the soldiers are all shocked and everyone, individually, feels threatened by the axe. Following Gil's (1991) terminology, *quisque* is the distributive-key, in that it forces a relationship of distributivity. *Quisque* combines universal quantification and distributivity; it quantifies on sets of which all the members are taken into account, but individually, as in (203).

(201) Sen. *benef.* 4,27,3: *omnia in omnibus uitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant*
'all vices exist in all men, yet not all are equally prominent in each individual'

183. Distributive-share universal quantifiers are uncommon cross-linguistically. Conversely, distributive-share numerals are rather common. Besides Latin, we can list some languages quoted by Gil (1995: 346–347): Georgian and Hungarian, where distributive-share numerals are formed by reduplication; Maricopa and Turkish, where they are formed by suffixation of *-xper* or *-er* respectively, Russian, Malayalam, Tagalog, and Japanese.

184. See Bertocchi and Orlandini (1994a: 48).

(202) a. = (196) Liv. 38,23,11: *laudati quoque pro contione omnes sunt donatique pro merito quisque*[185]
'before an assembly he praised everyone according to his merits'

b. Liv. 8,7,20: *exanimati omnes tam atroci imperio nec aliter quam in se quisque destrictam cernentes securem*
'all were astounded at so shocking a command; every man looked upon the axe as lifted against himself'

(203) a. Cic. *Mur.* 30: *nunc de studiis ad honorem appositis, non de insita cuiusque uirtute disputo*
'I am now talking about careers that lead to office, not about individuals' personal qualities'

b. Caes. *civ.* 1,51,2: *erant praeterea cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI ... sed ... nullum imperium certum cum suo quisque consilio uteretur*[186]
'there were, moreover, about six thousand men of every class, but there was no fixed authority, each following his own devices'

As shown by (202) and (203), the universal-distributive *quisque* is enclitic: that is, it is ordinarily found in non-initial position after another word. The items that *quisque* preferably follows are:

185. The use of a plural predicate with *quisque* is not rare. This is not surprising: semantically distributive-key universal quantifiers are of plural cardinality and allude to sets containing more than one member. More frequently they are associated with singular number marking, but can sometimes occur with plural marking (cf. Gil 1991: 13).

186. In the locution *cuiusque generis* the universal distributive value is similar to that expressed by the locution *omnis generis*: what prevails is the meaning of generality and great variety. A more explicit distributive value is expressed instead by the second occurrence where *quisque* is postponed to the possessive *suo*. The same difference is evidenced by Liv. 24,3,4: *ubi omnis generis ... pecus pascebatur ... separatimque greges sui cuiusque generis nocte remeabant ad stabula* ('where cattle of all kinds ... used to pasture. And at night the flocks of each kind would return separately to their stalls').

(a) ordinal numerals and superlatives

(204) a. Plaut. *Pseud.* 973: *nam in foro uix decumus quisquest qui ipsus sese nouerit*
'why, at the forum you can find hardly one man in ten who knows himself'

b. Macr. *Sat.* 1,14,6: *statuit ut quarto quoque anno sacerdotes, qui curabant mensibus ac diebus, unum intercalarent diem*
'he ordained that the priest in charge of the months and days should insert one day every fourth year'[187]

c. Cic. *Arch.* 26: *trahimur omnes studio laudis et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur*
'we are all drawn by the quest for praise, and each and every great man is led inexorably by glory'

d. Liv. 25,38,18: *fortissima quaeque consilia tutissima sunt*[188]
'the bravest decisions are always the safest'

187. With *primus* the interpretation is more complex. As suggested by Ernout & Thomas (1951: 168), *primus quisque* has two other possible interpretations, exemplified by (i) and (ii), respectively: (i) Cic. *nat. deor.* 3,7: *primum quidque uideamus* 'voyons chaque point l'un après l'autre' 'each point in turn'; (ii) Cic. *epist.* 13,57,1: *primo quoque tempore* 'à la première occasion' 'at the first possible opportunity'. Moreover, as shown by Liv. 27,51,1: *primus quisque oculis auribusque haurire tantum gaudium cupientes* 'everyone eager to be the first to take in a joy so great with eyes and ears', *primus* may function as a predicative.

188. Often when *quisque* follows a superlative the verbal phrase contains another superlative: Cic. *fin.* 2,81: *in ipsa uirtute optimum quidque rarissimum est* ('in right conduct itself, supreme excellence is extremely rare'). The interpretation of these examples is very close to the one obtained from superlatives co-occurring in corretative *ut... ita* structures: Cic. *off.* 1,15: *ut quisque maxime opis indigeat ita ei potissimum opitulari*.

(b) possessives and reflexives

(205) a. Sall. *Catil.* 38,3: *bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant*[189]
'under pretense of the public welfare each in reality was working for his own advancement'

b. Cic. *de orat.* 3,33: *minime sibi quisque notus est et difficillime de se quisque sentit*[190]
'everybody is very little acquainted with himself and has the greatest difficulty in forming an opinion about himself'

(c) subordinating items (relative and interrogative pronouns or adverbs; *ut*)

(206) a. Cic. *off.* 1,59: *sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis uidendum erit quid cuique maxime necesse sit*
'but in the performance of all these duties we shall have to consider what is most needful in each individual case'

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189. In some cases, *quisque* constitutes a sort of unity with the possessive and can assume the same case as the possessive even where logically a different relation would be expected: Caes. *civ.* 1,83,2: *aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequebantur* 'and again three reserve cohorts came, each from its respective legion'.

190. Sometimes in the classical prose too, cases are found where reflexive and *quisque* or possessive and *quisque* are dissociated : Cic. *Lael.* 56: *quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis*; Cic. *off.* 1,113: *id maxime quemque decet, quod est cuique maxime suum.* Cf. Traina and Bertotti (1985: 176).

b. Cic. *Tusc.* 1,41: *quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat*[191]
'the art which each man knows, in this let him employ himself'

c. Tac. *ann.* 14,35,1: *Boudicca … ut quamque nationem accesserat, solitum … Britannis feminarum ductu bellare testabatur*
'as she approached each tribe, Boudicca proclaimed that it was customary … for the Britons to wage war under the leadership of women'

(d) correlative adverbs

(207) a. Cic. *de orat.* 1,120: *ut enim quisque optime dicit … ita maxime dicendi difficultatem … pertimescit*
'for the better the orator, the more profoundly is he frightened of the difficulty of speaking'

b. Liv. 35,17,3: *quia quo quisque asperius aduersus Romanos locutus esset, eo spes gratiae maior erat*
'since each thought that he would win greater favor in proportion to the severity of his attitude toward the Romans'

With the items listed, *quisque* operates quantificationally in two different ways. With a superlative or an ordinal numeral, *quisque* individuates one by one all the individuals having the property conveyed by the superlative or by

191. When the item preceding *quisque* is a relative pronoun, it is frequently proleptic. For a different interpretation of *quisque* in (206b), see H.B. Rosén (1998). He maintains that the *quam quisque* type constitutes a sequence of two relatives, where *-que* is a marker of syndesis rather than of indefiniteness of the pronoun. This sequence would represent the bi-focused relative clause, which is common in Old Indic and occasionally found in Hittite. According to H.B. Rosén (1998: 712), in Plaut. *Mil.* 460: *intro rumpam recta in aedis quemque hic intus uidero … eum ego optruncabo extempulo*, *quemque* must be understood as a simple *quem* with a sentence connective *-que* 'and I will right away slaughter him who' rather than as the accusative of *quisque*, as the manuals would have one believe. H. B. Rosén's analysis differs not only from traditional manuals but also from Ferrarino's analysis, which suggests that *quemque* should be emended as *quemque⟨m⟩*, in agreement with the individual value of the pronoun in this case. Though different, these two analyses agree that here the pronoun has only one referent.

the ordinal adjective: for example, in (204c) it individuates all the noblest men (*optimus quisque*) in the set of men who are attracted by the desire for praise; in (204a) it informs us that in the set of the people *in foro*, the predication *ipsus sese nouerit* is valid only for a subset of almost one out of ten; and in (204b) from the set of years considered in their temporal succession, *quisque* individuates one year out of four.[192]

When *quisque* co-occurs with *se/suus*, as in (205), or with a relative or interrogative item, as in (206), or with correlative structures, as in (207), its quantifying operation is more complex: in this case each individual of the set quantified by *quisque* is put into a reciprocal relationship with one single individual of the set denoted by the possessive, the reflexive, the relative or interrogative item, or the second member of the correlation.[193] As evidenced by (207), the correlation *ut* … *ita/sic* involves superlatives while the correlation *quo* … *eo/hoc* uses comparative forms. In both cases, *quisque* states a reciprocal relationship between two qualities or states of affairs; this relationship is valid for every individual satisfying the quality or the state of affairs expressed in the first member of the correlation.

The anaphoric relation that *quisque* establishes with its antecedent when the latter is a superlative, an ordinal, or a reflexive/possessive, and the one-to-one correspondence that *quisque* establishes between the members of two sets when it occurs in relative, interrogative, or correlative structures, are features that permit *quisque* to be characterized as a determinate distributive quantifier. The term "determinate" means that it is coindexed with an antecedent.

9.2 *Unusquisque* and *singuli*

Another item which *quisque* can follow is the cardinal number *unus* (208). The combination of *quisque* with *unus* strengthens the individualizing value of *quisque* and conveys a stricter meaning similar to that of Eng. *each* or It.

192. Mellet (1994) and Bortolussi (2001) speak of "parcours exhaustif" whose modality is defined by the term preceding *quisque*.

193. Cf. Mellet (1994: 52) and Bertocchi and Orlandini (1994a: 49), who suggest that *suus* with *quisque* can correspond to It. *proprio* in generic contexts or with reference to non-specific noun phrases.

ciascuno.[194] In (208b), for example, where *unus quisque* occurs in one of the usual contexts for *quisque* (after a possessive), the choice of *unus quisque* emphasizes the individual character of one's interest.[195]

(208) a. Cic. *Cato* 15: *earum ... causarum quanta quamque sit iusta una quaeque, uideamus*
'let us examine each of these reasons separately and see how much truth they contain'
b. Cic. *fin.* 5,5: *suo enim unus quisque studio maxime ducitur*
'for we are all specially influenced by our own favorite study'
c. Cic. *leg. agr.* 2,85: *si iam campus Martius diuidatur et unicuique uestrum ... bini pedes adsignentur*
'supposing for the moment the Campus Martius were divided and two feet of standing room were assigned to each of you'

Another term expressing the "individualizing" distributive value is *singuli*, the distributive numeral corresponding to 'one by one'. In (208c), where *unicuique* is used in combination with the distributive numeral *bini*, it shows a distributive force closer to *singuli* than to *quisque*.[196] Like *singulis* in (209), *unicuique* also has wide scope and multiplicative effects, thus serving to measure the cardinality of the entities related.

(209) Liv. 3,69,8: *bini senatores singulis cohortibus praepositi*
'two senators were put in command of each cohort'

Some evidence for the characterization of *unus quisque* as a distributive quantifier with a strong "separative"[197] reading is found in several examples where other quantifying items are present, which can contrast or agree with the individual value conveyed by *unus quisque*. A clear instance is (210), where the individual meaning of *uni cuique* is strengthened by *singillatim* and is opposed both to the universal-distributive interpretation of *optimum quemque*

194. According to Vendler (1967: 76–77), *each* directs one's attention to the individuals as they appear, in some succession or other, one by one. For *ciascuno* see Longobardi (1988: 694).
195. Cf. Ferrarino (1942: 130).
196. Cf. Bertocchi and Orlandini (1994a: 49).
197. Cf. the Italian term *separativo*, as suggested by Ferrarino (1942: 134).

et nobilissimum ('every one of the best and most distinguished men', 'all the best and most distinguished men') and to the universal nondistributive (collective) interpretation of *uniuersis*. The separative meaning of *unusquisque* is also indirectly supported by the fact that it normally has scope over a circumscribed and well-defined set.[198] As evidenced by the examples above, this set can be expressed by a partitive genitive or can be implicitly contained in the surrounding context. It seems then that *unusquisque* can, like or even more than *quisque,* be considered a determinate distributive-key universal quantifier, according to Gil's classification. *Singuli* can also be treated in the same way, when it is a quantifier.


(210) Cic. *Verr.* II 4,76: *praeterea magistratus eorum euocabat, optimum quemque et nobilissimum ad se arcessebat, circum omnia prouinciae fora rapiebat, singillatim uni cuique calamitati fore se denuntiabat, uniuersis se funditus euersurum esse illam ciuitatem minabatur*
'in addition, he would summon their magistrates to his presence, sending for their best and most distinguished men, and dragging them round all the assize-towns of the province; he would tell each man severally that he would ruin him, and all of them together that he meant to smash their community to pieces'

9.3 *Singuli* as a distributive-share quantifier

Singuli may be used quantificationally or predicatively. In the latter use, it carries information about the way an action is performed, as shown by (211), where *singuli* underlines the individual, separate character of the action for every member of the set. In this respect, *singuli* is different from It. *ciascuno,* which is never predicative. This is shown by the postposed use of *ciascuno*, which requires the occurrence of a noun phrase to be interpreted as dependent on a plural quantifier. If in the clause there is no noun phrase that can receive such a reading, *ciascuno* is not possible (212).[199] The predicative use of *singuli* is particularly evident in the cases where it co-occurs with *uniuersi* (213).

198. See Mellet (1994: 53).
199. Cf. Longobardi (1988: 692–693).

Table 2. Four-way ambiguity of (214)



T = thief
H = house

When it is used as a quantifier, it is distributive-share and mainly combined with other distributive numerals.

(211) Liv. 26,41,22: *neque singuli nobis resistere poterunt*
'nor will they be able singly to resist us'

(212) a. *I ragazzi hanno comprato un biglietto ciascuno*
b. **I ragazzi sono venuti ciascuno*

(213) Liv. 6,15,11: *et tum uniuersis quam potui opem tuli et nunc singulis feram*
'just as then, to the best of my ability I helped the people at large, so now will I help single persons'

The use of distributive numerals allows us to overcome several problems in the interpretation, as shown by Bertocchi and Orlandini (1994a) through comparison with Italian. For example, the Italian sentence (214) is ambiguous between four possible readings, corresponding to the four schemata given in Table 2. In A, B, and C the ransacked houses are two, in D they are four. In A the thieves acted separately, in B they acted together, in C they acted separately on the same two houses, in D they acted separately on two different houses for each thief.

(214) *Due ladri hanno svaligiato due case*
'Two thieves ransacked two houses'

Latin examples correspond to the four situations described.

A. two ransackings, the thieves acted separately
Liv. 1,8,3: *quod ex duodecim populis communiter creato rege singulos singuli populi lictores dederint*
'because each of the twelve cities which united to elect the king contributed one lictor'

B. two ransackings, the thieves acted together
Liv. 3,69,8: *bini senatores singulis cohortibus praepositi*
'two senators were put in command of every cohort'

C. four ransackings, the thieves acted separately, on the same two houses
Sen. *benef.* 7,12,1: *quomodo patri matrique communes liberi sunt, quibus cum duo sunt, non singuli singulos habent, sed singuli binos*
'as children are the common possession of their father and mother, who, if they have two, do not each claim one, but they each claim two'

D. four ransackings, the thieves acted separately on two different houses each
Plin. *nat.* 7,17: *quod pupillas binas in oculis singulis habeant*
'that they have two pupils in each eye'

The only possible ambiguity in Latin is between C and D because the same structure may have multiplying effects, as in D, or may not, as in C. The context in C, however, is extremely rare, so it can be concluded that, compared to languages without distributive numerals, Latin can avoid almost any ambiguity.

9.4 *Quisque* in Late Latin

Indefinite *quisque* strictly constrained by a series of normative rules is typical of Classical Latin. *Quisque* is used much more freely in both Early and Late Latin.

In Early Latin, it is already possible to find in Plautus instances of an autonomous use of *quisque*, such as (215). In some cases *quisque* can even be found in the first position of the clause, as in (216).[200]

(215) Plaut. *Amph.* 558: *proinde ut commodumst et lubet quidque facias*
'so do anything that suits your convenience and taste'

(216) Plaut. *Amph.* 241: *quisque ut steterat iacet*
'as each had stood, so he lies'

In Late Latin, the free and autonomous uses of *quisque* increase (217) and are explained by Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 199) as a consequence of parallelism in meaning between *quisque* and *quiuis.* According to Hofmann & Szantyr, autonomous uses of *quisque* with the value of *quis* ('someone') found in Late Latin are due to a general weakening of *-que.* On the other hand, in Late Latin there are also cases in which *qui/quis* are used in the place of *quisque* (218).

(217) a. Aug. *civ.* 2,4: *sed respondetur, quod uoluntate propria quisque malus est*
'but someone replies that it is by his own will that every bad man is bad'

b. Greg. Tur. *Franc*. 10,1: *percussus quisque ante rapitur, quam ad lamenta paenitentiae conuertatur*
'everyone who is stricken is taken away before being converted for the groans of penance'

(218) *Itin. Eger*. 37,9: *maxima autem turba peruigilant, alii de sera, alii de media nocte, qui ut possunt* [201]
'most of the people watch, but some only come later on, and some at midnight, as everyone can manage'

Plural *quisque* is still rare in Early Latin; it becomes more frequent from Livy onward and occurs particularly in Pliny the Elder. In Late Latin, when *quisque*

200. According to Hofmann & Szantyr, it is for metrical reasons that *quisque* may appear at the beginning of a verse, as in: Verg. *Aen.* 6,743: *quisque suos patimur manes.*

201. This use is similar to structures like 43,4: *unusquisque quomodo potest* 'each at his own pace', as emphasized by E. Löfstedt (1962: 272) and Väänänen (1987: 54).

is used in the plural it has the same sense as *singuli* or *omnes* (219). Frozen uses of *quisque* are found in the *Mulomedicina Chironis* (220). To express the meaning of *quisque*, Late Latin borrowed from Greek the preposition κατά (in Latin *cata*), which became a kind of distributive adjective,[202] as in (221). The Latin form *cata* was the source of Portuguese and Spanish *cada*, which combined with *unu* to give rise to Sp. *cada uno*. A similar source is assigned to It. *cadauno*. However, It. *ciascuno* and Fr. *chacun* are due to the inverted form *quisque unus* of Late Latin, which condensed to **quiscunu*, **ciscunu*, then blended with *catá* (cf. Tekavčić 1980: 169) to form *ciascuno*.

(219) a. Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 10,1: *habitatores quique non ex parte subtrahuntur, sed pariter corruunt*
'every inhabitant is not removed by side, but he runs together'
b. Greg. Tur. *Mart.* 1,39: *o si totum proderetur in publico, quod singuli quique … latenter accipiunt!*
'O, if it would become public all that everyone secretly receives!'
c. Pallad. 3,25,16: *interlegenda sunt quaeque uitiosa* (= *omnia*)[203]
'all the defective fruits must be chosen'

(220) Chiron 333: *haec omnia sibi quisque bene trita commisce*[204]
'mingle together all these things after rubbing them to pieces'

(221) a. *Itin. Eger*. 24,1: *et cata singulos ymnos fit oratio*
'there is a prayer between each of the hymns'
b. *Itin. Eger*. 15,5: *semper cata pascha … omnes in ipso fonte baptizarentur*
'always at Easter all receive their baptism in the spring itself'

As regards *unusquisque*, whose inverted form gave rise to some Romance distributives, it is extremely rare in Early Latin (Plaut. *Asin.* 153, *Bacch.* 708, *Curc*. 295) and becomes more frequent from Varro onward. Since Val. Max.

202. Usually, the meaning of κατά is rendered in Latin by *secundum,* even in the distributive meaning, cf. Lundström (1955: 190). On *catá*, see also Meyer (1873).
203. Cf. Detmer (1922: 76).
204. Cf. Veg. *mulom.* 2,97,3: *quae omnia bene trita commisces.* See Svennung (1935: 316).

4,3,6 it is also found instead of *quisque* with a superlative: *unusquisque pauperrimus.* In Late Latin, some authors never use *quisque* but exclusively *unusquisque*, such as Oribasius.[205] The high frequency of *unusquisque* in Late Latin is also evidenced by a quantitative comparison. In Early Latin there are rare examples (222). In Classical Latin through Apuleius there are about 1450 cases of nominative *quisque*, while *unusquisque* numbers only 45. In the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* there are 388 occurrences of *quisque* and 277 *unusquisque*: the difference is almost irrelevant as compared to Classical Latin. In Gregory of Tours the number of *unusquisque* is higher than that of *quisque* (27 to 19) (223).

(222) Cato *orig.* 5,2: *nam unusquisque nostrum … summa ui contra nititur*
‘for each of us makes an effort against it with the utmost energy’

(223) Greg. Tur. *Franc.* 5,49: *et sic unusquisque in loco suo regressus est*
‘and so everyone came back to his place’

10. Binary Quantification

Latin has an extended system of lexical items for binary quantification, richer than that of Romance languages, such as Italian or French, where the different meanings conveyed by the various Latin binary quantifiers generally find expression in analytical forms. To *uterque* corresponds, for example, the Italian *l’uno e l’altro dei due*,[206] *neuter* is *nessuno dei due*, *uteruis/uterlibet*

205. On Oribasius, see Mørland (1932: 138): “In unseren Übersetzungen finden wir nur *unusquisque* - nicht *quisque* -”.

206. In Italian, the quantifiers with dual semantics are *entrambi* and the less common *ambedue*. They are more frequent in written than in spoken language, where *tutti e due* is preferred (cf. Calboli and Moroni 1989: 151). *Entrambi*, like English *both*, triggers distributivity effects and can appear as the subject of distributive predicates but not of cumulative predicates: *entrambi i ragazzi erano stanchi*; *i ragazzi erano entrambi stanchi*; **entrambi erano una coppia* (cf. Zamparelli 2000). However, when *entrambi* is the subject of a predicate ambiguous between a cumulative and a distributive reading, it becomes ambiguous itself, and only the context can orient toward the right reading: without context a sentence such as *entrambi vennero* can correspond to both *uterque uenit* and *ambo uenerunt*.

find their parallel in *uno qualsivoglia dei due*, and *alteruter* is equivalent to *(l') uno dei due*. The interrogative *uter*[207] also has no Italian parallel, and its meaning is expressed by the analytical expression *chi dei due*. Besides the compounds of *uter*, two other items fall within binary quantification: *alter*, when it means 'l'uno dei due', and *ambo* 'entrambi', which, unlike *uterque*, expresses collective duality.

In richness of these elements, Latin is fairly close to English, where items such as *either*, *both* and *neither* express binary quantification.[208]

The interpretation of Latin sentences containing binary quantifiers is fairly complex and involves a variety of notions, such as contrastive coordination (positive and negative),[209] disjunction (inclusive and exclusive), distributivity, and free choice.

207. The interrogative pronoun *uter* constitutes the basis for the formation of many Latin binary quantifiers. *Vter* specializes as an interrogative form (Liv. 40,55,3: *si scire … possis, uter ab utro petitus … sit* 'if you can learn which of the two was attacked by the other'), but it also has some rare and well-limited uses as an indefinite. As such, it occurs only in conditional clauses and in the nexus *nec uter*: Cic. *Verr.* II 3,35: *si uter uolet recuperatores dabo* 'if either party requires it, I shall appoint a court myself'; Gell. 2,4,6: *cum accusator et reus quasi cognatae coniunctaeque sint neque utra sine altera constare possit*; Lucr. 4,1217: *et neque utrum superauit eorum nec superatumst*. In such cases *uter* is similar to *either* in the following uses: *if you go to either city, you will be arrested*; *we're not going to either city*. Cf. Rullmann (2002).

208. The correspondence between Latin and English binary quantifiers is only partial. Unlike *uterque*, *neuter*, *uteruis*, or *alteruter*, in addition to their use as quantifiers *both*, *neither*, or *either* can also occur in binary coordination as initial coordinators: *both … and*, *neither … nor*, *either … or*. For instance, with *both* we find sentences such as: (i) *both the boys were tired* (*both* is a quantificational determiner); (ii) *the boys were both tired* (*both* is a floated quantifier); (iii) *both every boy and many of the adults were sleepy* (*both* is an initial coordinator). Cf. Zamparelli (2000). In Italian the *both* of (i) and (ii) is rendered with *entrambi*, while *both … and* of (iii) is rendered by *sia … sia* or *sia … che*. In Latin too, binary coordination is rendered by elements different from binary quantifiers (e.g., *et … et*, *nec … nec*, *neque … neque*), but binary coordination remains basic for the interpretation of sentences with binary quantifiers.

209. This term is suggested by Haspelmath (2007), who compares the contrastive *both Franz and Sisi will travel to Trieste* with the noncontrastive *Franz and Sisi will travel to Trieste*. Contrastive coordination emphasizes that each coordinand belongs to the coordination, and each of them is considered separately. Likewise, the disjunctive coordination *either X or Y* emphasizes the contrast between the coordinands and requires that they be con-

10.1 Contrastive coordination: *uterque* and *neuter*

Contrastive positive coordination (*both … and*) and contrastive negative coordination (*neither … nor*) can be considered the basic meanings of *uterque* and its opposite *neuter*, respectively. In (224a), each bank of the river, considered separately, had its buildings and villages. In (224b), *neutra* forces a reading with the conjunction of two negative sentences: 'Rutulians didn't come off rejoicing and Trojans didn't come off rejoicing, either'. That the two entities of the set are considered separately is particularly evident here, where Rutulians and Trojans are represented with similar feelings of sadness, but for completely different reasons: the Rutulians, because they were beaten; the victorious Trojans, because they had lost their leader Latinus.

(224) a. Caes. *Gall.* 4,4,2: *ad utramque ripam fluminis agros aedificia uicosque habebant*
'(the Menapii) possessed lands, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river'

b. Liv. 1,2,2: *neutra acies laeta ex eo certamine abiit*
'neither army came off rejoicing from that battle'

The universal and distributive quantificational force of *uterque* and *neuter* is evident in (225). The distributive value of *uterque* becomes more evident if we compare it with *ambo.*

(225) a. Cic. *Phil.* 11,4: *in Galliam inuasit Antonius, in Asiam Dolabella, in alienam uterque prouinciam*
'Antonius has invaded Gaul, Dolabella, Asia, each of them another man's province'

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sidered separately. That emphasis and "separate combination" are involved in the expressions *both … and*, *neither … nor* is also suggested by Dik (1968: 272–273). Hendriks (2004) argues that the coordinators *both*, *neither*, and *either* are better analyzed as focus markers than as initial coordinators. Whereas *either* and *neither* resemble the restrictive focus particle *only*, *both* resembles the additive focus particle *also*. According to this view, then, there is no need to distinguish contrastive (or initial) coordination as a special kind of coordination. Rather, only one type of coordination exists, in which a focus marker may or may not appear in the first conjunct.

b. Plin. *epist.* 9,19,8: *meo quidem iudicio neuter culpandus, quorum uterque ad gloriam pari cupiditate, diuerso itinere contendit*
'in my own opinion, indeed, neither of them is blameworthy, since they both pursued glory with equal passion, but by different roads'

10.2 Distributive and collective reading: *uterque* and *ambo*

The difference between *uterque* and *ambo* concerns the distributive versus the collective readings of these quantifiers. The distinction between them was commented on by ancient grammarians.[210] Considering the first attested instances of *ambo*, it turns out that the temporal concomitance suggested by Charisius finds some support[211] but does not cover all uses of *ambo*. As suggested by Forcellini, the true notion distinguishing *uterque* from *ambo* is distributivity. What is relevant is whether the predication is realized by the two entities separately (distributive reading) or at the same time or together (collective reading), as shown by (226). That the choice between *uterque* and *ambo* relates to a distributive or a collective interpretation seems to find some evidence in passages where the two quantifiers co-occur, such as (227). The alternation *uterque/ambo* in these examples appears to be well justified. In (227a), for example, the expression *tu alterum, ego item alterum* is a clear signal that *uterque* has scope over the two brothers (*Micio* and *Demea*) taken

210. For example, Charisius explained it by appealing to the temporal dimension (cf. Char. *gramm.* I 65,26: *ambo … non est dicendus nisi de iis qui uno tempore quid faciunt, ut puta 'Eteocles et Polynices ambo perierunt', quasi ' una'. Romulus autem et Africanus non ambo triumphauerunt, sed uterque, quia diuerso tempore*). In quoting Charisius's definition, Forcellini ([1864–1926] 1965 (s.v.)) remarks that *rectius tamen Charisio non tempus dicendum erat, sed ratio per verbum significata*. Forcellini does not explicitly suggests a different explanation but resorts to this practical exemplification: *ambo fecerunt domum, significat duos coniuncta opera unam domum fecisse*; *at uterque fecit uel fecerunt domum (ambo cum uerbis semper plur. num. iungitur, uterque et cum singularis) ualet perinde ac si dicam a duobus duas domus fuisse factas.*
211. See, for example *Lex XII tab. Gell.* (17,2,10): *cum perorant ambo praesentes*; Enn. *ann.* 106: *aeternum seritote diem concorditer ambo.*

individually. The distributive reading for *uterque* is also compatible with the intention of Micio of taking care of the education of the young Demea's son, who has been entrusted to him by his father. Conversely, the use of *ambos*, with its collective reading, is interpreted by Micio as the expression of a contrary intention by Demea, to take back the entrusted son and to look personally after the education of both his sons. As for (227b), the alternation fits well with the meaning of the respective predicates: 'to have confidence in oneself' requires a distributive reading, while 'to seem to be on a level of equality' invites us to consider the two members together.

(226) a. Cic. *Top.* 1: *cum enim mecum in Tusculano esses et in bibliotheca separatim uterque nostrum ad suum studium libellos quos uellet euolueret*
'when we were together in my Tusculan villa and were sitting in the library, each of us according to his fancy unrolling the volumes which he wished'

b. Cic. *epist.* 5,8,4: *quos quidem ego ambo unice diligo*
'I am singularly attached to them both'

(227) a. Ter. *Ad.* 129–132: *uerum, Demea/curemus aequam uterque partem: tu alterum, ego item alterum/nam ambos curare propemodum/reposcere illum est quem dedisti*
'but, Demea, let the concern for it be divided between us, you looking after one and I after the other. Your looking after both is as good as asking back the son you gave me'

b. Caes. *civ.* 3,10,7: *hoc unum esse tempus de pace agenda, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo uiderentur*
'this was the one time for treating of peace, when each had confidence in himself and both seemed equal'

The difference between *uterque* and *ambo*, however, is not clear-cut. Ernout & Meillet (1951), for example, affirm that *ambo* was often mistaken for *uterque* and cite (228) as an example of confusion of the two forms, where *ambo* has the same sense as *uterque*.[212] That the distinction *uterque/ambo* is

212. Ferrarino's effort (1942: 124) to argue against Ernout & Meillet is not very convincing: while it can explain the use of *utraque* (it would stress that each of the two women is

not strictly observed by Ovid is also evidenced by (229), where the predicate *peperisse* cannot denote a unique event and cannot have a collective reading.

(228) Ov. *am.* 2,10,5: *utraque formosa est, operosae cultibus ambae*
'each one is beautiful, both tasteful in their dress'

(229) Ov. *fast.* 6,287: *utraque nupserunt, ambae peperisse feruntur*
'the other two married; both are reported to have had offspring'

The same difficulty is faced by (230), where the plural form *utraeque* agrees with a plural verb (*perierunt*). Traina and Bertotti (1985: 183) explain such plurals as cases where a collective interpretation seems to predominate: in this case the collective value would be linked to the fact that Ariovistus's two wives were killed in the same rout (even though the predicate 'perish' requires an individual (distributive) reading).[213] In our opinion, even if it is not

beautiful in her own way, "a modo suo"), it does not offer any explanation for *ambae*. In other words, it is not clear in what the second predicate (*operosa esse*) is different from the first one (*formosa esse*) so as to require not a distributive but a collective reading. The presence or absence of a collective reading is often related to the kind of predicate. Certain predicates (such as *sneeze*) impose a distributive reading on their subject. Other predicates (such as *meet* in the intransitive meaning) impose a collective reading. A well-known observation is that *both* yields an unacceptable result if combined with a collective predicate (**both John and Mary met*; (**both*) *the boys were* (**both*) *a couple*). The lack of the collective reading signals that *both* triggers distributivity effects, and this happens both when it accompanies a noun phrase and when it appears in a "floated" position. Cf. Hendriks (2004); Zamparelli (2000). Spanish *ambos*, unlike Latin *ambo*, shows similar restrictions (cf **ambos forman una buena pareja*), so that it is analyzed as an intrinsically distributive universal quantifier. When a collective duality is to be expressed, Spanish has recourse to *los dos*, which has replaced the archaic *entrambos* which was formed by the fusion of the preposition *entre* with the quantifier and keeping the collective value of Latin *ambo*. As long as *ambos* and *entrambos* could coexist, they were in complementary distribution. When *entrambos* began to be used in the contexts of *ambos*, the repetition of the preposition was needed to express the collective reading, as shown by Cervantes, *El Quijote* 2,60: *entre entrambos podrían llevar hasta sesenta reales*. Thus while in *Es más alto que ambos* two superiority comparisons are made in relation to height, one for each individual denoted by *ambos*, in *Es más alto que los dos* one speaks about someone whose height exceeds the amount of the heights of the other two individuals taken together (see Sánchez Lopez 1999: 1067).

213. The plural form is normal with *pluralia tantum* or with reference to two groups of people or things; cf. Sall. *Catil.* 38,4: *utrique uictoriam crudeliter exercebant* 'both parties (i.e., *optimates* and *populares*) used their victory ruthlessly'.

correct to speak of a collective interpretation for verbs like ‘perish’, a special relation must still be underlined. In the present case, the strict relation is given by the fact that the two wives were associated by their common fate. See also (231a), where the *inopia rei familiaris* and the *conscientia scelerum* are considered by Sallust to both be properties indissolubly tied to Catiline. But if an intimate link of the events, properties, or individuals may be assumed in some plural instances of *uterque* such that a relation between this plural use and a “collective” reading might be suggested, there are also cases where a different explanation is needed. Consider for example (231b), where *utraque maria* cannot be intended collectively, since reference is made to two different and separate seas. Consider also (231c), where the plural is only on the verb. Here it is clear that the plural predicate denotes not a unique event, but two distinct events, one for each individual denoted by the dual *uterque,* which cannot be read collectively. To sum up, if one can say that *ambo* has a prevailing collective interpretation, while *uterque* is prevailingly distributive, there are also cases where their interpretation is not clear-cut. Since both have universal quantificational force, they share the property of having scope over the whole set of reference constituted by two entities. When a disjunction is implied, they cannot be used to express quantification over only one member of a duality. In this case, Latin resorts to other binary quantifiers: *uteruis* (or *uterlibet*), *alteruter*, and *alter*.

(230) Caes. *Gall.* 1,53,4: *duae fuerunt Ariouisti uxores, una Sueba natione, … altera Norica, … utraeque in ea fuga perierunt*
‘there were two wives of Ariovistus, one of Suebian nationality, the other a woman of Noricum; both wives perished in the rout’

(231) a. Sall. *Catil.* 5,7: *agitabatur … animus ferox inopia rei familiaris et conscientia scelerum, quae utraque … auxerat*
‘his haughty spirit was goaded by poverty and a sense of guilt, both of which he had augmented’

b. Mela 2,87: *illas fluuius Anas separat, et ideo Baetica maria utraque prospicit, ad occidentem Atlanticum, ad meridiem Nostrum*
‘the other parts are separated by the river Anas and so the province of Baetica overlooks two seas, in the west the Atlantic Ocean, in the south the Mediterranean Sea

c. Caes. *civ.* 3,30,3: *eodemque uterque eorum … exercitum educunt: Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdiu*
'and on the same day they each led out their forces, Pompey secretly by night, Caesar openly by day'

10.3 Disjunction: *uteruis* and *alteruter*

In the field of logic, a semantic distinction has been made between inclusive and exclusive disjunction. This distinction is defined in terms of truth values: an inclusive disjunction is true if and only if one or both disjoined propositions are true, while an exclusive disjunction is true if and only if just one of the disjoined propositions is true. To illustrate this difference in natural language, typically logicians cite the contrast between Latin *uel* and *aut,* where the former indicates inclusive and the latter exclusive disjunction. But, as argued by Dik (1968: 274–276), the logical distinction between inclusive and exclusive disjunction cannot be applied well to natural languages, and not even the Latin distinction between *uel* and *aut* corresponds exactly to their use in logic.[214] Finally, no language makes the inclusive/exclusive distinction precisely, as shown by Haspelmath (2007).[215] The distinction between *uel* and *aut* does not involve the alternative itself but the way in which the alternative is presented: *uel* offers an alternative just like *aut*, but in the former case it is further implied that the choice between *a* and *b* is left to the hearer, or is irrelevant to the argument, while in the latter case it is essential.[216] Even if not on logical grounds, the distinction between inclusive and exclusive disjunction thus seems to have some evidence in Latin.[217]

214. For similar remarks, see Pelletier (1977: 65).
215. Haspelmath emphasizes that no coordinator of the type 'and/or', which can be said to express inclusive disjunction, is found in ordinary speech.
216. The distinction proposed by Dik (1968) is similar to that generally found in handbooks of Latin syntax: cf. Kühner & Stegmann (1962: 107–108); Traina and Bertotti (1985: 328–330).
217. As an instance of true exclusive disjunction, Orlandini (2001b: 126) quotes Cic. *ac.* 2,95: *quidquid enuntietur … aut uerum aut falsum*. According to Orlandini, it is also possible to speak of exclusive disjunction in cases where *aut* means 'ou sinon', 'ou autrement', as in Plin. *nat.* 19,5,30: *effodiuntur bulbi ante uer: aut deteriores fiunt*; Nep. *Epam.* 4,3: *et*

But since the distinction between exclusive and inclusive readings of disjunction in natural languages does not mirror the distinction suggested by logicians, linguists have recently proposed a different kind of approach to interpreting disjunctive statements: that the exclusive reading results from a kind of Gricean implicature.[218] On this view, an operator of disjunction like ‘or’ always stands for inclusive disjunction, but a speaker who says *A or B* is interpreted as making a claim with the following implication: *not (A and B)*.[219] More pertinently, as suggested in particular by Horn (1976; 2005), the derivation of the exclusive disjunction is obtained by Quantity-based upper-bounding implicatures.[220] This signifies that an assertion such as (232) is upper-bounded by implicature; that is, it implicates (233) and hence it communicates (234).

(232) *Maggie is (either) patriotic or quixotic*

(233) *Maggie isn’t (both) patriotic and quixotic*

(234) *Maggie is patriotic or quixotic but not both*

In the domain of Latin binary quantification, the interpretation of the disjunction underlying disjunctive quantifiers such as *uteruis* and *alteruter* seems to be less complex than the case of standard disjunction operators like ‘or’, because *uteruis* and *alteruter* tend to lexicalize the inclusive and exclusive reading of disjunction, respectively: *uteruis* corresponds to the basic lower-bounded value of ‘or’ (i.e., ‘one, and perhaps both’); *alteruter* corresponds to the implicated upper-bounded value of ‘or’ (i.e., ‘one, but not both’).

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tu, Micythe, argentum huic redde aut, nisi id confestim facis, ego te tradam magistratui. The latter example is the exact parallel of the English sentence *eat your veggies or you won’t get any dessert*, which Crain and Pietroski (2002: 169) cite as a case of exclusive interpretation of *or*, implying that not both disjuncts are satisfied. It is a case of disjunction with the value of a deterrent or threat. Cf. Fillenbaum (1986); Bertocchi and Maraldi (2005: 463–464).

218. Cf. Grice (1975).

219. This is in agreement with the general principle by which the assertion of a weak scalar value implicates the negation of stronger values in the same domain. See Horn (1976).

220. Q-based implicatures are based on the Q Principle “Say enough”, a generalization of Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity. Cf. Horn (1989). The distinction between what is said (basic meaning) and what is implicated (derived meaning) in a disjunctive construction is based on recent analyses by Crain and Pietroski (2002) and Sauerland (2004).

Let us compare (235a–b). They show that both *uteruis* and *alteruter* semantically involve a disjunction and both can be paraphrased as 'the one or the other of two'. But a substantial difference exists that agrees well with their transparent formation: while *uteruis* implies 'either *a* or *b*, it does not matter which', *alteruter* implies 'either *a* or *b*, only one of the two'. In its formation and etymology *uteruis* corresponds to *quiuis*, the difference being that in the case of *uteruis* the set of reference comprises only two entities. As with *quiuis*, the element *-uis* in *uteruis* evokes a notion of free choice;[221] *uteruis* quantifies over only one member of the duality but the choice of this member is left open. Like *uel*,[222] *uteruis* does not convey any exclusive force but rather expresses indifference or irrelevance with respect to the choice between alternatives. It is just this indifference or free choice that determines the inclusive force of the disjunction. If the choice is open, it can fall indifferently on one or the other member and therefore, in some way, on both as well. In (235a), the two alternatives contained in the correlation *siue … siue* are not antithetical and by means of *utriusuis rei* the speaker underlines his indifference toward either of them.

(235) a. Cic. *Att.* 7,3,2: *siue enim ad concordiam res adduci potest siue ad bonorum uictoriam, utriusuis rei me aut adiutorem uelim esse aut certe non expertem*
'for if matters can be brought either to a peaceful settlement or to victory for the honest men, I should in both of these two cases wish to help or at any rate not to be on the outside'

b. Sen. *epist.* 78,17: *breuis morbus ac praeceps alterutrum faciet: aut extinguetur aut extinguet*
'a short and rapid illness will do one of two things: it will either destroy or be destroyed'

221. The property of expressing free choice attributed to *uteruis* can be generalized to *uterlibet* and the less common *utercumque*; see, for example, Cic. *Quinct.* 26: *utrumlibet elige, alterum incredibile est, alterum nefarium* and Cic. *epist.* 6,4,1: *ita (copiae) paratae sunt ad depugnandum esse dicuntur ut, utercumque uicerit, non sit mirum futurum.*

222. Like *-uis*, *uel* too is etymologically related to the predicate *uelle*; it seems to be the original second person of *uolo* 'to want' (cf. Traina and Bertotti 1985: 329).

As with *uteruis,* in the case of *alteruter* the identification of the basic elements is completely transparent. The presence of *alter*[223] with its meaning of opposition contributes to the interpretation of exclusive disjunction conveyed by *alteruter*: ‘only one of the two’. Like the exclusive *aut*, *alteruter* implies a strong negation: ‘x, and not y’ or ‘y, and not x’. Thus in (235b) the two verbal forms, one active and one passive, are mutually exclusive and hence compatible with the value of *alterutrum*. That *alteruter* may be considered semantically equivalent to an exclusive disjunction realized by *aut* … *aut* is evidenced by examples where the correspondence is made explicit, as in (235b) and (236a). In (236a), *alterutrum* also has the two contradictories *uiuere* and *non uiuere* as its domain of reference, and within this domain it necessarily quantifies over only one of them. The reading we obtain with *alteruter* is therefore ‘one or the other, but not both’. This exclusive value is also implied by a strong modal like *necesse.* When the context does not contain lexical oppositions (like *aut uiuere aut non uiuere*) or strong modal verbs, the interpretation of *alteruter* is less direct, as in (236b). The meaning of *alterutra* can be paraphrased as ‘one of the two cities’, ‘Carthage, and not Rome’, or ‘Rome, and not Carthage’. In this case *alterutra* expresses a speaker’s choice or preference: in the speaker’s intent (the speaker is Hannibal), it is Rome that must be destroyed and not Carthage (and for this reason *uteruis*, with its sense of irrelevance or indifference, would not be appropriate).[224]

223. *Alter* contains the suffix *-t(e)r* that always signifies an opposition between two things, as in *dexter–sinister*, *intra–extra*; *uter* ‘which one of the two?’; *ceteri* ‘all the others’ (indicating a group as a whole in opposition to another group or to an individual). Cf. Traina and Bertotti (1985: 181).

224. In the absence of strong modality, the meaning of the exclusive disjunction is weak and corresponds to a sufficient condition: that one of the two cities realizes the predication ‘to be destroyed’ is a sufficient condition to achieve the end of the war. The meaning is not ‘one only’, but simply ‘one’. The same sense also appears in Liv. 8,6,11: *hos ubi nocturnos uisus inter se consules contulerunt, placuit … ut … alteruter consulum fata inpleret.*

(236) a. Cic. *ac.* 2,97: *'si enim', inquit, 'alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut uiuere aut non uiuere*
' "if", he says, "I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermarchus must tomorrow be either alive or not alive" '

b. Val. Max. 9,3, *ext.* 3: *idem significare cupiens quanto inter se odio Karthago et Roma dissiderent, . . . , tunc inter eas finem fore belli dixit, cum alterutra in habitum pulueris esset redacta*
'since he wanted to express how much Carthage and Rome were divided by hatred, he said that the war between them would find an end only when one of them had been reduced to dust'

In negative contexts, *alterуter* gives a conjunctive interpretation to the underlying disjunction, in accordance with the logical equivalence between *not* (*A or B*) and (*not A*) *and* (*not B*), known as De Morgan's Law. Thus in (237), *alteruter* appears in a negative sentence and the result is that the negation has scope over both armies (= neither one . . . nor the other).

(237) Caes. *civ.* 3,90,2: *neque (se) rem publicam alterutro exercitu priuare uoluisse*
'he had never, he said, wished to deprive the republic of either of its armies'

The suggestion to consider *uteruis* and *alteruter* lexicalizations of the inclusive basic meaning and of the exclusive derived meaning of disjunction, respectively, expresses a tendency, not a rule. There are occasional non-classical examples where *alteruter* is used with the same value of *uterque*, as in (238), where *alterutro* signifies *tam matutino quam uespertino exortu*.

(238) Plin. *nat.* 2,38: *(stella Veneris) in alterutro exortu genitali rore conspergens non terrae modo conceptus implet, uerum animantium quoque omnium stimulat*
'at both of its risings it (the star Venus) scatters a genital dew with which it not only fills the conceptive organs of the earth but also stimulates those of all animals'

10.4 *Alter* in binary quantification

With the meaning *unus ex duobus (excluso tertio)*, *alter* is particularly used with terms that refer to entities forming a couple (a pair) by nature or by law: *oculus, crus, pes, manus, consul, ripa (fluminis), cornu*, as in (239). With these terms *alter* can mean 'one of the two', as in (239a) and (239b), or 'the other (of two)', as in (239c). When *alter* does not accompany lexical items designating a pair, the dual domain is given by the context. Frequent are the cases where *alter* contrasts with other binary quantifiers, such as *duo, bini, ambo, uterque*, which assure that the domain of reference is dual, while *alter* quantifies over only one individual within this domain, as in (240).

(239) a. Nep. *Ages*. 8,1: *nam et statura fuit humili et corpore exiguo et claudus altero pede*
'he was short, slim, lame in one leg'
b. Suet. *Aug*. 11: *adicit his Aquilius Niger alterum e consulibus Hirtium in pugnae tumultu ab ipso intereptum*
'Aquilius Niger adds to this that Octavian himself actually killed one of the consuls, Hirtius, in the heat of the battle'
c. Plin. *epist.* 6,2,2: *illud ipsum, quod oculum modo dextrum modo sinistrum circumlinebat, dextrum, si a petitore, alterum, si a possessore esset acturus*
'he besmeared now his right, now his left eye, the right one, if he was counsel for the plaintiff, the other one, if counsel for the defendant'

(240) a. Plaut. *Amph.* 1139: *uno partu duos peperit simul. Eorum alter ...*
'at one birth she bore them both. One of them ...'
b. Cic. *Att.* 8,11,3: *quod illi alterum metuunt, nos utrumque*
'for they have only one to fear, while we have both'

The quantificational value of *alter* may be therefore the same as that of *alteruter.* As with *alteruter*, with *alter* the disjunction semantically implied at the interpretive level can be exclusive, as in (241a). In negative or downward-entailing contexts, *alter* has a conjunctive interpretation in accordance with De Morgan's Law. In (241b), the external negation *numquam* has scope over

altera and causes the reading 'neither of you', as in (241c) the downward entailing environment licensed by *sine* yields a conjoined interpretation. More difficult is the interpretation of (241d), since the negated strong modal *necesse* is equivalent to the weak modal *posse*: this could be responsible for the apparent interpretation of inclusive disjunction of *alterius* (not necessary = possible that the reputation of one or the other be put on trial). However, while *alteruter* normally has an exclusive disjunctive interpretation, *alter* is more subject to variation in its meaning. There are in fact instances where it is interpreted as *uteruis*, with the sense of inclusive disjunction. See for example (242). In all these examples, it is the occurrence of the particle *certe* that assures the inclusive interpretation: in such cases *certe* means 'at least x, and possibly even more'. In the terms used by pragmatics, it can be said that *certe* asserts 'one of the two' but it leaves the possibility open that the greater quantity, that expressed by *uterque*, holds as well. With such an inclusive interpretation, *alter* is on the same scale as *uterque*, even if at a lower degree, and the possibility that *alter* reaches *uterque* is not excluded. This is typical of inclusive disjunctions. So, in (242), one of the two alternatives is certain, but both are possible. The exclusive disjunction is an upper bounded implicature which operates on the usual inclusive interpretation: the inclusive value 'one and perhaps two' is blocked, making the exclusive value 'one and not both' possible. When *certe* focuses on *alter*, it prevents the upper bounded implicature from operating and *alter* receives the inclusive disjunctive interpretation.

(241) a. Cic. *Tusc.* 1,97: *necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus, ut aut sensus omnino mors auferat aut in alium quendam locum… morte migretur*
'for there must follow one of the two consequences, either that death takes away all sensations altogether, or that by death a passage is secured to another place'

b. Ov. *ars* 3,519–520: *numquam ego te, Andromache, nec te, Tecmessa, rogarem, / ut mea de uobis altera amica foret*
'never would I ask you, Andromache, nor you, Tecmessa, to be either of you my mistress'

c. Liv. 1,13,3: *melius peribimus quam sine alteris uestrum uiduae aut orbae uiuemus*
'it will be better for us to perish than to live, without either of you, as widows or as orphans'

d. Cic. *Quinct.* 30: *ut aut uterque inter se aut neuter satis daret; non necesse esse famam alterius in iudicium uenire*
'so that either both parties or neither of them should give security; that there was no need for the reputation of either being put on trial'

(242) a. Cic. *Att.* 11,18,1: *siue enim bellum in Italia futurum est siue classibus utentur, hic esse me minime conuenit: quorum fortasse utrumque erit, alterum certe*
'for whether there is going to be a war in Italy, or whether he will employ his fleet – and it may be either, but one it must be – this is a most inappropriate place for me'

b. Liv. 10,44,6: *iamne tempus esset deducendi de Samnio exercitus aut utriusque aut certe alterius*
'whether the time had now come for withdrawing both armies, or at any rate one of the two'

c. Liv. 7,21,7: *rem difficillimam tractatu et plerumque parti utrique, semper certe alteri grauem*
'in the discharge of a very difficult duty, involving always a hardship for one of the parties, and in most instances for both'

That *alter* can receive an inclusive interpretation is confirmed by the occurrence of the expression *alter amboue* (243), frequently found in the decrees of the senate concerning the consuls, as evidenced by Cicero. By this formula it is meant that at least one of the consuls must be involved, but the interpretation is not excluded that they both can be.

(243) Cic. *Phil.* 8,33: *uti C. Pansa A. Hirtius consules, alter amboue, si eis uidebitur … ad senatum referant*
'let G. Pansa and A. Hirtius, the consuls, one or both of them, if it shall seem good to them, refer the question to the Senate'

10.5 Non quantificational uses: *alter/alius*

The difference that Italian usually expresses through the article accompanying *altro* is expressed in Latin by the use of two different items: *alius* is equivalent to *un altro* ('another' among many), *alter* means *l'altro* ('the other' of a known pair; (244)).[225] While *alius* properly indicates a qualitative difference and its original meaning is 'different', *alter* indicates a numerical opposition and, besides its value 'one of (the) two', it can also mean 'the/an other of the same kind'.[226] See, for example, (245). With this meaning *alter* can accompany a proper noun, usually yielding a metaphorical interpretation (246).[227] *Alter* emphasizes the strong similarity between the two referents of the proper noun, such that the former referent is seen as identical to the latter. In this way *alter* contrasts with *alius*, which instead stresses the difference between the two referents, as shown by 'another Alexis' (different from this one) in (247). The semantic difference between *alter* and *alius* is not so neatly preserved in post-Classical Latin (248), but already in Plautus and Virgil examples with a proper noun are found, where *alius* is used in the place of *alter* (249). There are also examples where *alter* with a proper noun expresses the meaning 'different', such as (250).

(244) a. Plaut. *Bacch.* 593: *alium illa amat, non illum*
'it's another man she loves, not him'

b. Sen. *dial.* 1,4,1: *semper esse felicem . . . ignorare est rerum naturae alteram partem*[228]
'to be always happy is to be ignorant of one half of nature'

(245) a. Cic. *Vatin*. 11: *de altero consulatu*
'about a second consulship'

225. The difference between *alter* and *alius* recalls the Latin distinction between comparative and superlative.

226. With such a meaning in Italian it can be preceded by the undeterminate article.

227. On the metaphorical use of proper nouns with indefinites, see Bertocchi and Maraldi (2006).

228. In some cases the two entities involved are in opposition to each other: Liv. 5,38,5: *in altera acie* (i.e., *hostium*); Liv. 9,36,10: *porta . . . altera egressus*; Liv. 9,17,5: *(Alexander) adulescens, in incremento rerum, nondum alteram fortunam expertus decessit* (i.e., *aduersam*).

b. Cic. *Mil.* 102: *qui (liberi) te parentem alterum putant*
'who count you as a second father'

c. Liv. 28,39,7: *ut iterum periremus et alterum excidium patriae uideremus*
'that we perish again and witness a second destruction of our native city'

(246) a. Hor. *epist.* 2,1,50: *Ennius et sapiens et fortis et alter Homerus*
'Ennius, noble and profound, a second Homer'

b. Cic. *Brut.* 43: *ut Coriolanus sit plane alter Themistocles*
'in order to make of Coriolanus a plainly second Themistocles'

(247) Verg. *ecl.* 2,72: *inuenies alium, si te hic fastidit, Alexim*
'you will find another Alexis, if this one scorns you'

(248) Suet. *Tit.* 7,1: *propalam (Titum) alium Neronem praedicabant*
'people even publicly spoke of him as another Nero'

(249) a. Plaut. *Amph.* 785: *tu peperisti Amphitruonem, ego alium peperi Sosiam*[229]
'you have spawned another Amphitryon; I have spawned another Sosia'

b. Verg. *Aen.* 6,89–90: *alius Latio iam partus Achilles,/natus et ipse dea*
'even now another Achilles is raised up in Latium, he, too, goddess-born'

(250) Ov. *ars* 3,115–116: *adspice, quae nunc sunt Capitolia quaeque fuerunt/alterius dices illa fuisse Iouis*
'see what the Capitol is now, and what it was: you would say they belonged to different Jupiters'

229. In this example, the proper noun does not have the usual metaphorical reading, but a referential one: the second Sosia actually is the god Mercury, who has taken the appearance of the servant Sosia to give place to a series of misunderstandings.

10.6 *Alter* in enumerations

When *alter* ... *alter* or *unus* ... *alter*[230] are used in a correlation, they mean 'the one ... the other' (of two), while when *alius* ... *alius* are used correlatively they mean 'one ... another' (of more than two); see (251).[231] But already in Caesar or Livy one can find instances of *alius* with the meaning of *alter* (252). When the enumeration covers more than two terms, *alter* expresses the value of *secundus*: *unus* ... *alter* ... *tertius* (253). In the plural, *alteri* ... *alteri* and *alii* ... *alii* exhibit the same difference as in the singular form: *alteri* ... *alteri* refers to two groups exhausting the totality of the entities involved, while *alii* ... *alii* means 'some ... others' and does not exclude the possibility that the enumeration can go on (254). However, there are also examples where *alii* is used in place of *alteri* even when reference is made to only two groups (255). When repeated in a polyptoton, *alter* may have a reciprocal (256a) or a distributive (256b) sense.[232] When more than two entities are involved, the reciprocal (257a) or distributive (257b) sense is expressed by the repetition of *alius*.[233]

230. The correlation *alter* ... *alter* is no longer possible in the Romance languages, where only forms deriving from *unus* ... *alter* are found.

231. Besides the cases we examine in this section, there are many types of occurrences which we prefer not to take into consideration because they appear to be marginal, as for example *unus aut alter*, *unus et alter* (indicating a small quantity): Plin. *epist.* 3,11,6: *nam ex omnibus, qui nunc se philosophos uocant, uix unum aut alterum inuenies tanta sinceritate* 'of all those who now call themselves philosophers, you will scarcely find one so genuine'; Cic. *Cluent.* 72: *unus et alter dies intercesserat cum res parum certa uidebatur* 'a day or two passed, and the scheme was looking far from safe'. Consider also *alius atque alius*: Plin. *nat.* 13,105: *magnitudo huic fabae, color croci, sed ante maturitatem alius atque alius, sicut uuis* 'this one is the size of a bean and saffron-colored, but it changes color several times before it is ripe, like grapes'.

232. On the reciprocal sense cf. Hofmann & Szantyr (1972: 178), Thielmann (1892: 373). In Late Latin, *alterutrum* is sometimes used with the reciprocal meaning of the classical *alter alterum*. According to Thielmann, the first instance of this usage is *manu alterutrum tenentes* in Annius Florus. In Late Latin, the reciprocal is also expressed by *unus alterum*. This expression, already found in Vitruvius, is the only one which continues in Romance (cf. Fr. *l'un l'autre*; It. *l'un l'altro*).

233. There are, however, examples with *alius* instead of the expected *alter*, such as Liv. 1,25,5: *duo Romani, super alium alius, uulneratis tribus Albanis expirantes corruerunt* ('one upon the other'). But in this case the polyptoton expresses the simple repetition of an

(251) a. Cic. *Pis.* 62: *eorum neuter triumphauit, quod alteri illum honorem collega, alteri mors praeripuit*
'neither of these held a triumph; the one was robbed of that honor by his colleague, the other by death'

b. Liv. 1,20,2: *duos flamines adiecit, Marti unum, alterum Quirino*
'he added two other *flamens*, one for Mars, the other for Quirinus'

c. Liv. 26,49,2: *praesidium Punicum alius decem, alius septem, alius haud plus quam duum milium fuisse scribit*
'one writes that the Carthaginian garrison consisted of ten thousand men, another of seven thousand, another of not more than two thousand'

(252) a. Caes. *civ.* 3,21,2: *duas (leges) promulgauit: unam, qua mercedes habitationum annuas … donauit, aliam tabularum nouarum*
'he promulgated two other laws, one whereby he made a free gift of a year's rent of houses, another authorizing a repudiation of debts'

b. Liv. 26,5,6: *alia parte ipse adortus est, alia Campani omnes*
'on one side he himself attacked, on the other all the Capuans'

(253) Cic. *fin.* 2,35: *tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi uel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius*
'there are three ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades'

(254) a. Cic. *Tusc.* 1,91: *in quo quid potest esse mali, cum mors nec ad uiuos pertineat nec ad mortuos? Alteri nulli sunt, alteros non attinget*
'what evil can be in this, seeing that death does not appertain either to the living or to the dead? The dead do not exist, the living it will not touch'

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action rather than a reciprocal or distributive sense (cf. Bertocchi and Orlandini 1994b: 45).

b. Cic. *nat. deor*. 2,122: *alia animalia gradiendo, alia serpendo ad pastum accedunt, alia uolando, alia nando*
'some animals approach their food by walking, some by crawling, some by flying, some by swimming'

(255) Cens. 22,1: *mensum genera duo; nam alii sunt naturales, alii ciuiles*
'there are two kinds of month: for the one group is according to nature, the other according to politics'

(256) a. Sen. *benef.* 6,5,1: *nec ego illi gratiam debeo nec ille mihi poenam: alter ab altero absoluitur*
'but I do not owe you gratitude, nor do you owe me my revenge – the one is absolved by the other'

b. Plaut. *Amph.* 1116: *alterum altera prehendit eos (angues) manu*
'he grabs them (the two serpents) one in each hand'

(257) a. Plaut. *Stich.* 370: *alius alium percontamur: quoiast nauis?*
'we are just asking each other whose ship it is'

b. Cic. *off.* 1,115: *ipsarumque uirtutum in alia alius mauult excellere*
'while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another'

10.7 Some late uses of *alter*

While *alius* has almost completely disappeared in Romance languages, *alter* has survived and is found in every Romance language (cf. It. *altro*, Fr. *autre*, Sp. *otro*, Rum. *alt*), where, in passing from Latin to Romance, it took on the meanings of both *alter* and *alius.* In Romance, the distinction between 'another of two' and 'another of many' is not made through the lexicon, but through two different articles, the definite article 'the' and the indefinite article 'a': 'the other' corresponds to *alter*, while 'another' corresponds to *alius*.[234] We do not want to enter into this matter, but we simply note that the

234. According to Tekavčić (1980: 159), Vulgar Latin preferred *alter* because of its greater expressive power, since an opposition between only two terms is stronger than an opposition among many.

substitution of *alius* for *alter* begins to be perceived already in post-Classical Latin, in particular in less literary uses of the language. In the Latin of the Imperial period or even later, besides the cases of *alius* instead of *alter* (as shown above),[235] there are also occurrences of *alter* used instead of *alius* (258). When *alter* is in the scope of a negation, its meaning tends to be similar to that of *alius* (259). The development of *alter* toward the semantic domain of *alius* is anticipated by examples where it assumes the meaning of *diuersus* which is proper of *alius* but not of *alter* in Classical Latin (260). The progressive attenuation of the alternation *alter/alius* and the disappearance of *alius* in favor of *alter* in the Romance languages is further evidence of the general weakening process which characterizes the passage from the Latin to the Romance indefinite pronominal system.

(258) Chiron 199,21: *cutem aperiebis et de tribus neruis super alterum intro haerentibus unum medianum ferramento praecidis, sic ne alteros neruos laedas*[236]
'you will open the skin and, of the three nerves inside adhering one to the other, you will cut the middle one so that you don't hurt the other nerves'

(259) a. Ov. *fast.* 2,224: *nec metus alter inest*
'no other fear is there'
b. Liv. 26,8,2: *neque Capuae neque ullius alterius rei memor*
'with no thought of Capua or of anything else'
c. Sen. *clem.* 1,5,3: *nec ulla (uirtus) altera melior*
'no one virtue is better than another'

(260) Hier. *epist.* 98,14,3: *nostras quoque animas non alterius a Deo naturae esse*
'our souls too aren't of a nature different from God'

235. In the *Mulomedicina Chironis* there are correct occurrences such as 11,13: *alterum pedem* along with cases such as 209,16: *simili modo alium pedem curabis*. Instead of the usual *altero*(*/a*) *die*, where *alter* is equivalent to *sequens*, *alio*(*/a*) *die* is often found. Oribasius uses the pleonastic expression *alius alter*, where *alter* strengthens an already weakened *alius*. Cf. E. Löfstedt (1956: II 194) and Mørland (1932: 138).

236. Cf. Grevander (1926: 56). Also in the example, *super alterum* is used in a non-classical way; it is equivalent to *inter se* and expresses a reciprocal value concerning more than two entities.

Along with *alter/alius* and binary quantification in general, we would finally like to draw attention to the distinction marked by *quis/aliquis* (according to the context), the discrimination between universal and totality quantifiers (*omnis/totus*), the existence of a specific indefinite pronoun that expresses 'knowledge of the speaker' (*quidam*), the different semantic values of the free-choice pronouns *quicumque/quisquis/quiuis*, the use of different pronouns in relation to negation (*nemo/quisquam*): they all are signs which are indicative of the lexical and semantic richness of Latin in the field of indefinite pronouns. We have tried to examine such richness in detail and to show how it progressively weakens in Late Latin and Romance.

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Jesús de la Villa

Numerals

A complete study of the syntax of Latin numerals has yet to be written. What we find in grammars and monographs is a partial description, mainly focused on morphology and the semantics of numeral expressions. Moreover, we almost completely lack detailed statistical studies of the syntactic behavior of numerals as constituents of higher structures. This situation has two consequences for our study. First, in the organization of this chapter, the descriptive component receives considerable attention, because we must start by describing the main lines of the system of numerical expressions in Latin before we consider the changes this system underwent through time. Second, some of the proposals about the development of the system are necessarily provisional, since they are based on a rather limited number of works.

The description of the system and its development is in three parts: we first consider the configuration of the system of numerical expressions in Latin (Section 1); then we study the behavior of numerals as constituents of syntactic structures, in particular in sentences and noun phrases (Section 2); next, we consider the internal syntax of numeral expressions such as *uiginti et unus* 'twenty-one', *decies centum* literally 'ten times one hundred', that is, 'thousand', or *duo de uiginti* literally 'two from twenty', that is, 'eighteen' (Section 3); finally, as an independent section, we revisit one of the most important diachronic changes concerning numerals in Latin: the creation of an indefinite article as the result of the evolution of some uses of the numeral *unus* 'one'.

1. The system of Latin numerals: categories and their semantics

From the first attested documents up to classical times, the quantifier system of literary Latin can express both absolute quantities (*unus, duo, decem*, 'one, two, ten', etc.) and relative quantities – related to a whole which is always

in the mind of the speaker and which is not necessarily expressed – (*aliqui* 'some', *pauci* 'few', *multi* 'many', *omnes* 'all', etc.). In Latin the semantic proximity of the two groups appears clear if we consider the following shared features.

(i) Both groups belong to the same syntactic categories: nouns, adjectives, and adverbs.
(ii) The two groups develop in parallel semantic series, such as ordinal (*primus* 'first', *secundus* 'second'; *prior* 'previous', *posterior* 'later') or frequency (*quinquiens* 'five times', *sextiens* 'six times'; *pauciens* 'few times', *totiens* 'every time').
(iii) The same terms must be used in questions of both absolute and relative quantification (*quantus* 'how many', *quotiens* 'how many times'), and both can be used anaphorically (*tantus* 'so many', *totiens* 'so many times').

Because relative quantifiers are treated elsewhere (Bertocchi *et al.*, this work, vol. 3), I only deal with absolute numerals here.

The system of absolute numerals in Latin can be described along two main axes: the numerical sequence, which corresponds to the semantics and morphology of numerals; and the syntactic characteristics of numerical expressions. I consider each aspect separately.

1.1 Atoms, bases, and operations

As in most languages, in Latin the sequence of numbers is not organized as a series of independent lexical items. In fact, it is organized by means of certain basic numbers and their combinations. Technically we can speak of the existence of atoms, bases, and operations.[1]

Atoms are those numbers which are expressed by means of independent lexical terms that cannot be synchronically derived from any other terms, as in English 'one, two, three', etc.

Bases are those numbers that, by themselves and with their multiples, are systematically and serially combined with other numbers to obtain new

1. E.g., Greenberg (1978), Stampe (1976), Seiler (1990).

numbers, as Eng. *fifteen* = *five* + *ten*, *sixteen* = *six* + *ten*, etc., or 100 in 'two hundred', 'three hundred', etc. In French 60 is also a base in expressions such as *soixante-dix* 'seventy' (lit. 'sixty-ten'), *soixante-treize* 'seventy three' (lit. 'sixty-thirteen'), and so on.

Finally, operations are the basic arithmetical combinations that result in new numbers. The main operations among the languages of the world are: addition (Span. *treinta y uno* 'thirty and one'), multiplication (Eng. 'two hundred'), and subtraction (Lat. *undeuiginti* 'nineteen', lit. 'one from twenty').[2]

The combination of atoms, bases, and operations allowed Latin speakers to form any possible number. Nevertheless, in accordance with typological predictions, in Latin the combination of atoms, bases, and operations is not random but is highly codified and follows fixed parameters, which include the following:

(i) Latin numerals are built on a few atoms:
  - The numbers 1 to 10 (*unus, duo, tres, quattuor, quinque, sex, septem, octo, nouem, decem*), 100 (*centum*), and 1000 (*mille, milia*)
  - The numbers 11 to 17 – and, as a secondary possibility, also 18 – (*undecim, duodecim, tredecim, quattuordecim, quindecim, sedecim, septemdecim, octodecim*), tens (*uiginti* 'twenty', *triginta* 'thirty', etc.), and hundreds (*ducenti* 'two hundred', *trecenti* 'three hundred', etc.). All these numbers, though etymologically transparent and historically formed by the combination of the atoms and bases using certain operations, became atoms by means of univerbation, that is, the morphological unification of two originally independent terms; this is the stage already attested in our first texts.
  - Similarly, the series 19, 29, 39, . . . , 99, originally formed by subtraction of the unity (*unus*) from the tens (*undeuiginti*, literally 'one from twenty' ['nineteen']; *undetriginta*, literally 'one from thirty' ['twenty-nine'] etc), were already fossilized forms at the time of our first attestations through apocope of the first member (*unus* > *un-*) and subsequent univerbation.

2. Division is a fourth possibility, but it is very rare and is always expressed as multiplication by a fraction, see Greenberg (1978: 261).

(ii) Latin is fundamentally a language with a base 10, used to form alternative expressions for numbers between 11 and 19, such as *septem decem,* literally ‘seven ten’ (‘seventeen’); *decem et octo,* literally ‘eight and ten’ (‘eighteen’), etc. Secondary bases are 100 (= 10 × 10) (*centum et uiginti* ‘[one] hundred and twenty’; *ducenti triginta et tres* ‘two hundred thirty and three’, etc.) and 1000 (=10 × 100) (*duo milia* ‘two thousand’*, decem milia* ‘ten thousand’, etc.).

(iii) To obtain complex expressions for numbers, Latin uses the three main operations: addition, multiplication, and subtraction. In any operation, one of the members is a base, the other can be an atom (*centum et decem* ‘ [one] hundred and ten’) or another complex number (*centum uiginti et unus* ‘[one] hundred twenty and one’).

(iv) Addition is employed for the expression of all the complex numbers formed on a ten (*uiginti et tres* ‘twenty and three’ [‘twenty-three’]*, quattuor et quinquaginta* ‘four and fifty’ [‘fifty-four’], etc.); on a hundred (*ducenti triginta octo* ‘two-hundred thirty-eight’, *quingenti triginta tres* ‘five-hundred thirty-three’, etc.); or on a thousand (*mille ducenti et uiginti*, ‘[one] thousand two-hundred and twenty’, etc.).

(v) Multiplication was used in different periods in the history of Latin to create the tens (*triginta,* originally ‘three tens’), hundreds (*ducenti* literally ‘two-hundreds’), and the thousands, but over time most multiplications became fossilized as atoms. Throughout Latin, multiplication was only productive for thousands, using as a multiplier either a cardinal number (*decem milia* ‘ten thousand’) or an adverb of frequency (*sexies milia* ‘six times thousand’ [‘six thousand’]).

(vi) In subtraction, the subtrahend is always smaller than the minuend. As reflected in extant texts, the subtrahend is an atom (*duo*), the minuend is always a multiple of the base (the tens from 20 on); for example, *duo de uiginti*, literally ‘two from twenty’ (‘eighteen’), *duo de triginta* ‘two from thirty’ (‘twenty-eight’), etc. The number 19, and likely 29, 39, etc. were originally also formed as subtractions.[3]

3. On the origin of Latin subtractions see Lejeune (1981).

1.2 The series of numerals

1. In addition to the several series of numerals inherited from Indo-European, Latin developed other numerals during its history. Each has its own categorial and syntactic characteristics.

The numeral series of Latin are the following.

(i) Cardinals (*unus, duo, tres*, ... 'one, two, three, ...'). Their function is simply counting entities.

(ii) Ordinals (*primus, secundus, tertius,* ... 'first, second, third, ...'). Their function is to determine the relative position of an entity within a certain range. A series of adverbs was derived for ordering events and parts of discourse (*primum/primo* 'first, in the first place', *secundum/secundo* 'secondly', ...).

(iii) Collectives. They refer to all the members of a certain group quantified absolutely. Latin only developed this possibility for certain numbers: *ambo* 'both', *decena* 'a group of ten', *centena* 'a group of one hundred'.

(iv) Frequentatives (*semel, bis, ter,* ... 'once, twice, three times, ...'). They are used to count the occurrences of a certain event.[4]

(v) Distributives. These show the distribution of entities into groups of fixed members (*singulus* 'one by one', *bini* 'in groups of two', *trini* 'in groups of three', ...).

(vi) Multiplicatives.[5] These are expressions for entities (*simplex* 'of only one component', *duplex* 'twofold, formed out of two members', *triplex* 'threefold, formed out of three members', etc.) and for events (*simpliciter* 'simply, in a single way', *dupliciter* 'in two ways', etc.). This series was probably never completely developed: no forms for *eight* or *nine* are attested and the highest is *decemplex* 'of ten parts', except for the isolated *centumplex*.

(vii) Proportionals. These constitute an absolute quantification in relation to another quantity (*duplus* 'double', *triplus* 'triple', etc., and also *simplex, duplex, triplex*, etc.). From this series are derived the causative verbs

4. See Lewis (1975) on the quantification of events.

5. This is an erroneous label, as this series is mainly used to express the internal complexity of an entity formed from several parts. The multiplication of units is properly expressed by means of the series usually called Proportional.

simplificare ‘to make one out of several’, *duplicare* ‘to make two out of one’, etc. The only forms attested are the numbers from one to four, seven (*septuplus*), and eight (*octoplus*).

(viii) Fractions. These are the number of parts of a whole that are referred to (*medius* ‘half’, *triens* ‘one third’, *quadrans* ‘one fourth’, etc.). The highest number attested is for eight (*octans*); the forms corresponding to five and seven are lacking.

(ix) Prefixes for compound terms (*semi- duum-, bi-,* etc.). They typically describe the number of constituents of complex entities: *semianimus* (*semi* + *animus*) ‘with half of the life, almost dead’, *quinquennalis* (*quinque* + *annus*) ‘of every five years’, *sexangulus* ‘of six angles’, *octipes* (*octo* + *pes*) ‘of eight feet’; also the quality of being a member of a complex entity whose constituents are numbered: *duumuir* ‘one of a group of two men’, *decemuir* ‘one of a group of ten men’.

2. From these series, different kinds of derived formations appeared; among them, for example:

(i) Nominal-adjectival terms with the very common suffix *-arius*. This suffix is present in many formations such as *frumentarius* ‘related to wheat’ (*frumentum*), *legionarius* ‘member of a legion’, etc. Among numerals, formations in *-arius* are derived from ordinals, distributives, numerals of internal complexity, multiplicatives, and fractions, characterizing the entities associated in any form to a certain order, distribution, or proportional amount: *primarius* ‘what corresponds to the first range’, *quaternarius* ‘the member of one of the four groups that form a whole’, *duplicarius* ‘one entity which has double of something’, *duplarius* ‘id.’, *quadrantarius* ‘corresponding to a fourth of anything’.

(ii) Nominal-adjectival forms with the suffix *-anus*, also present in such terms as *Romanus* ‘from Rome’, *paganus* ‘from the countryside (*pagus*)’, etc. They form terms derived from ordinals – in late times they even replace ordinals[6] – and qualify the members of a group that occupies a certain place in a range: *tertianus* ‘the member of a group that is the third in a certain range’.

6. Löfstedt (1911: 67–69).

(iii) Abstract nouns derived from numerals of internal complexity: *simplicitas* 'the quality of being in the first range', *duplicitas*.

(iv) Verbal causatives derived from multiplicatives: *duplicare* 'to multiply something by two', *decemplicare* 'to multiply something by ten'.

(v) A particularly interesting type of compound is formed with the prefix *sesqui-* < *_semisque-_ 'and a half', which is employed for different types of spatial and temporal measures: *sesquimensis* 'one month and a half', *sesquihora* 'one hour and a half'. Combined with ordinals, this prefix results in a particular kind of adjective related to fractions: *sesquioctauus* 'one and one-eighth times as great'. The word *sestertius*, the name of the coin whose value was 2.5 asses, was formed from a reduced form of the prefix *semis-* > *ses-* and literally means '⟨two⟩ and a half of the third' < *_semis-tertius_.[7]

3. Latin never developed a separate series for approximative numerals but used cardinals modified in different ways, most often through prepositions (1a–d), but also adverbs (2a–d), and comparative expressions (3a–d):[8]

(1) a. Liv. 6,20,7: *spolia hostium caesorum* ***ad triginta***
'the spoils of as many as thirty slain enemies'[9]

b. Liv. 27,42,8: ***circa*** *quingentos Romanorum sociorumque uictores ceciderunt*
'about five hundred Romans and allies fell although victorious'

c. Liv. 3,31,4: ***supra*** *septem milia hostium caesa*
'over seven thousand of the enemy were slain'

d. Vulg. *act.* 1,15: *erat autem turba hominum simul* ***fere*** *centum uiginti*
'together the crowd numbered about one hundred and twenty people'

7. On the meaning and uses of these compounds, see Prosdocimi (1995: 343–350).

8. On the Greek origin of adverbial expressions such as *plus minus* for approximative quantifications, see Löfstedt (1936: 206–207).

9. Translations, when possible, have been taken from or based on the English text of the Loeb Classical Library. The translations of the Vulgate are based on the New Revised Standard Version.

(2) a. Liv. 28,1,7: *cum decem* ***circiter*** *milia ab hoste adessent*
'when they were about ten miles from the enemy'
b. Liv. 26,14,3: *septem et uiginti* ***ferme*** *senatores*
'about twenty-seven senators'
c. Liv. 6,2,3: *per annos* ***prope*** *centum*
'for close to a hundred years'
d. Vulg. *Ezech.* 8,16: ***quasi*** *uiginti quinque uiri dorsa habentes contra templum domini et facies ad orientem*
'there were about twenty-five men, with their backs to the temple of the Lord and their faces toward the East'

(3) a. Liv. 10,38,13: ***paulo plus*** *uiginti milium*
'a little over twenty thousand'
b. Liv. 28,3,16: *Romanorum* **haud amplius** *nonaginta*
'not more than ninety of the Romans'
c. Liv. 38,16,9: ***non plus*** *ex uiginti milibus hominum quam decem armata erant*
'of their twenty thousand men, no more than ten thousand were armed'
d. Vulg. *II Macc.* 10,17: *omnes simul* **non minus** *a uiginti milibus trucidauerunt*
'they all conjointly killed no fewer than twenty thousand'

1.3 Historical changes

1.3.1 The structure of the sequence

1.3.1.1 From Indo-European to Latin. The history of terms for numerals as they developed from Indo-European to Italic and to Latin is rather well known and can be reconstructed by means of morphology.[10]

10. See Coleman (1992). On the cognitive basis of the system, see Hurford (1987), Pannain (1995). On the reconstruction of the numeral system in Indo-European see, e.g., Delbrück (1893,1: 521–535), Szemerényi (1970: 204–211), Gvozdanović (1992), Winter (1992), Sihler (1995: 402–438), Luján (1999).

(a) Latin inherited the basic atoms 1–10, 100, and 1000.
(b) The comparison with other Indo-European languages suggests that at least complex formations for 11, 12, 20, and the rest of the tens and hundreds, although originally complex numerals (see above), were probably inherited by Latin already as atoms: there is a strong parallelism, for example, between Lat. *undecim, duodecim* and Gk. ἕνδεκα, δώδεκα; Lat. *uiginti* and Gk. εἴκοσι, literally 'two tens', etc. The rest of the atoms of historical times, that is, the numbers 13–17 (*tredecim, quattuordecim*, etc.), which are not common to all Indo-European dialects, were perhaps analogical formations on *undecim, duodecim* within Latin.
(c) The bases 10, 100, 1000 can be reconstructed for Indo-European; there are, however, perhaps traces of other bases different from 10: *octo* has the morphology of a dual (cf. Skt. dual *aṣṭā́u*, *aṣṭā́* '[small] hand'), and this can be explained because eight is two times four; this would imply the existence in prehistoric times of a base 4.[11] More important are particular formations associated with measures that seem to be related to a base twelve.[12] This is the case for fractions, where we have forms such as *medium* 'one half', *triens* 'one third', *quadrans* 'one fourth', *sextans* 'one sixth', but not **septans* 'one seventh'; it seems, then, that only divisors of twelve were considered. A base twelve is also present in some terms for weights and measures etymologically related to numerals, such as *uncia*, which is one twelfth of a whole such as an *as*; it is obviously derived from *unus* and has parallels in other Indo-European languages.[13] On *uncia* other fractional weights were formed as *quincunx* 'five ounces', *septunx* 'seven ounces', *deunx* 'ten ounces').
(d) Turning to operations, addition and multiplication present the same distribution in all the Indo-European languages, and therefore they belong to the inherited part of the language. Some formations, however, are relatively late (*duo mille, bis mille*), but they are probably only instances of lexical and morphological replacement of older formations of the same

11. On the evidence for such a system already in Indo-European, see Rischel (1997: 292–297); for Latin, see Prosdocimi (1995: 285 ff.). On the typological possibility of the coexistence of more than one system within a language at a time, see Heine (1997: 26).
12. Seiler (1990); Heine (1997: 19–34).
13. See Ernout & Meillet (1959[4]: *s.v.*)

type. In contrast, if we take into consideration the morphology of subtractive forms in Latin (*undeuiginti, duo de tringinta*) and the absence of these formations anywhere else among Indo-European dialects, it seems clear that this operation appeared rather late and that it is chronologically the last one to be introduced among Latin operations.[14]

1.3.1.2 Evolution from historical times to Romance. The evolution of numerals from Latin to the Romance systems is well known.[15] Early in the history of Latin we find traces of change in the sequential system. The oldest changes affect the reduction of the upper limit of atoms; already in the first century BCE there were replacements of atoms by complex formations: *decem et tres* (Caes.), *septem decem* (Caes.), and later, even *decem duo* (Frontin.) instead of the more usual forms *tredecim, septemdecim*, and *dodecim*. This fluctuation in the limit of lowest atoms will find its way to the Romance languages. Among them, Romanian is the language that has evolved farthest from Latin: the limit of atoms is 10 (*zece*) and the rest of the numbers to 20 are regularly formed by means of addition (*unsprezece* 'one plus ten', *doisprezece* 'two plus ten', etc.).[16] The other Romance languages end the list of atoms higher: in Spanish betweeen 15 (*quince* < Lat. *quindecim*) and 16 (*dieciséis* = *diez y seis* 'ten and six'); in Italian between *sedici* and *diciassette* (16 / 17); in French between *seize* and *dix-sept* (16 / 17).

Among bases, 10 and its multiples 100 and 1000 remained main bases, and in most Romance dialects are the only ones. Nevertheless, in some dialects 20 and 60 appeared as secondary bases for tens at a certain time in the history of those languages. That is the case in French, where there are formations such as *soixante-dix* 'seventy' (lit. 'sixty-ten'), *quatre-vingt douze* 'ninety two' (lit. 'four-twenty ⟨and⟩ twelve'). It is difficult, however, to reconstruct such formations for Vulgar Latin, because in most Romance di-

14. This is in accordance with the typological prediction of Greenberg's (1978) generalization 9 concerning the priority of addition and multiplication with respect to subtraction.
15. See, for instance, Meyer-Lübke (1899), Price (1992).
16. Beyrer (1987: 136–146). It should be noted that this construction is also attested in Late Greek, which probably influenced Romanian; also on this point, as in many other aspects of grammar, see Solta (1980: 101–105).

alects there are no traces of them; it may well be, then, that their creation is relatively late.[17]

Finally, for operations, addition and multiplication stayed throughout the history of Latin up to the appearance of Romance languages, and they maintained the same distribution as in classical times. On the other hand, subtraction seems to have always been weaker; actually, already in classical literature, forms such as *duodeuiginti* (lit. 'two from twenty') or *undeuiginti* (lit. 'one from twenty') were often replaced by additive expressions such as *decem octo* 'ten eight' (18) (Livy), *decem et nouem* 'ten and nine' (19) (Livy) etc.

The system of subtractive expressions had probably disappeared in the standard language already in the fourth century CE: in the text of the Vulgate the sole formations that appear are the additives *decem et octo, decem et nouem, uiginti octo, uiginti nouem, uiginti et nouem*, etc.[18]

As a general conclusion, the changes were attested early, even in literary texts, and the evolution of the Latin system into its Romance heirs gives the impression that the whole system as described in grammars was probably never developed except in the highest literary and official registers. We may guess that it was simpler in the spoken registers and that important regularizing forces were soon at work, in particular in the reduction of atoms to the first ten numbers and the elimination of subtractive operations.

1.3.2 The series of numerals

1.3.2.1 From Indo-European to Latin. The etymology of single Latin numerals and of the different series is rather well established.[19] Morphology is a good instrument for reconstructing the progressive creation of numeral series in Indo-European and subsequently in Latin. A detailed commentary on this topic would belong more properly to a study of morphology than to one devoted to syntax. Nevertheless, two characteristics of the series should be noted. First, not every series seems to have been developed for all possible numbers. Actually, only cardinals and ordinals are attested for very high

17. Roessler (1910).
18. For the formations with or without copulative conjunction, see Section 3. below.
19. Coleman (1992), Sihler (1995: 402–435), Baldi (2002: 352–357).

or complex numbers. The other series – collectives, frequentatives, distributives, etc. – are only attested for some numbers, mainly units, simple tens, and one hundred. This is in accordance with typological observations and is most probably related to the more basic cognitive nature of simple counting – cardinals – or of ordering of entities in a single series – ordinals – instead of other, more complex groupings (see Gvozdanović 1985).

A second interesting fact is that there seems to be a correspondence between the patterns of morphological evolution of the series and some of their notional and syntactic characteristics. Therefore, we first briefly revisit the morphological evolution of the series and afterward examine the syntactic aspect.

To start with, it is interesting that the general lines of evolution of numerical series in Indo-European and Latin accord with two important typological predictions.[20]

(a) Cardinals are more basic than ordinals and the other series; and therefore, cardinals are the morphological source of most other series. Next, ordinals are less basic than cardinals, but more basic than other series; in fact, they can be the source of other series. The third most basic series seems to be the frequentative adverbs.
(b) Lower numbers are less marked than higher numbers. Therefore, lower numbers are more frequently independent of other forms, whereas higher numbers are very often formed as derivations either from lower numbers of the same series or from the most basic numeral series, the cardinals.

For Indo-European it is possible to reconstruct at least partially the series of cardinals (*unus, duo, tres*, ...), ordinals (*tertius, quartus,* ...) and frequency adverbs (*bis, ter, quater*, ...). These three series are the morphological source of most of the other series.

According to their morphology, the series have the following characteristics.[21]

20. Greenberg (1966a: 42–44); Croft (1990: 92–93).
21. On the morphology of Italic numerals, see Coleman (1992); for Latin, see Baldi (2002: 351–357).

(a) Cardinals are, as expected, the basic series and cannot be derived from any other series. Their forms derive from common terms found in most Indo-European dialects.

(b) The lowest ordinals – *primus, secundus* – are also independent of cardinals and cannot be traced back even to a common Italic stage.[22] The rest of the ordinals, although many details remain only hypothetical, seem to derive from cardinals by means of the addition of different suffixes: **-ti̯os* for *tertius* (< **tri-ti̯os*, cf. Gk. τρίτος); **-tos* for *quartus* (< **quor-tos* < **twortos* < * *k^{w}twr-tos*, cf. Gk. τέταρτος < * *k^{w}etr̥-tos*, with *-e-* vocalism), *quinc-tus, sex-tus*; simple **-os* for *septim-us* and the rest of the sequence up to 20; *-simus* for the tens and hundreds.

(c) Frequency adverbs take the first number from a well-attested Indo-European root for ‘one’ **sem-*, which gives the form *semēl*. The rest seem to derive directly from the cardinal stems by means of different formations, either **-s* (*bis* ‘two times’ < **du̯i-s*, cf. Greek δίς; *ter* < **tri-s*; *quater* < **k^{w}tur-s*), or the adjectival **-i̯ents* (*quinquies* < **quinqu-ients*; *sexiens, septiens*, etc.).

(d) Distributives derive the form for ‘one’, *singulus*, from the stem **sem-*, also present in the frequency adverb for ‘one’. From ‘two’ to ‘four’ they seem to be formed on frequency adverbs plus the suffix **-nos* in plural (*bini <*bis-ni*), *ter-ni, quater-ni*. Higher formations from ‘five’ on are modeled on cardinals: *quini* (<**quinqu-ni*), *seni* (<**sex-ni*), *septeni* (<**septem-ni*), etc.[23]

(e) Multiplicatives also derive their form for ‘one’ from **sem-*: *sim-plex*. The rest apparently come directly from cardinals: *du-plex, tri-plex, quadru-plex, etc.*

(f) Proportionals are derivations of multiplicatives: *dupl-us, tripl-us, quadrupl-us.*

22. See Ernout & Meillet (1959^4). The suppletive character of lower ordinals is common among the languages of Europe (Hurford 2003: 565–567).

23. The existence of distributive adjectives is typologically associated with languages in which there are syntactic and distributional differences between terms expressing countable entities (man, book) and those expressing noncountable entities (water, food) (Gil 1987: 254–260).

(g) Fractions, except for the expression for 'a half', which has a different etymology (*medius, dimidium* < **med*^{h}*ii̯o-*), are derived from cardinals: *tri-ens, quadr-ans, oct-ans*, or from ordinals: *sext-ans*.
(h) For approximatives, cardinals are directly employed within different syntactic constructions (see above).
(i) For the derived series of terms that contain numeral expressions, sometimes cardinals are the basis (*duum-uir, septem-uir*; *tri-ennius*; *quadratus*; *quinque-remis*; *septem-ber, octo-ber)*, sometimes ordinals (*tertianus, quart-anus*); sometimes distributives (*quatern-arius, den-arius*).

The main patterns of the morphological formation of numerals are represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Morphological foundations of numeral series in Latin

1.3.2.2 Cross-patterns. Besides the regular use of numerals according to the semantic and syntactic characteristics of the different series, there is a large number of cases in pre-Classical and Classical Latin where elements of one series are used instead of another series.[24] These instances are interesting for two reasons. First, they show the relative notional proximity of the different series; second, as mentioned above, there seems to be a high degree of correspondence between these cross-uses and the lines of morphological

24. A fairly full account of those substitutions may be found in Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 210–214).

derivation presented in Figure 1. The attested cross-patterns are the following.

(a) Cardinals are sometimes used instead of ordinals (4) and distributives (5).

(4) Cic. *epist.* 14,5,1: *de naue exeuntibus nobis Acastus cum litteris praesto fuit* ***uno et uicesimo*** *die sane strenue*
'as we came ashore, Acastus met us with letters after a rather quick trip of twenty-one days'

(5) Varro *rust.* 2,3,10: *de maribus et feminis idem fere discrimen, ut alii* ***ad denas*** *capras singulos parent hircos, ut ego; alii etiam* ***ad quindecim****, ut Menas; non nulli etiam, ut Murrius,* ***ad uiginti***
'as to the proportion of males to females, there is about the same difference of opinion, some keeping one buck to every ten does, which is my own practice; others such as Menas, one to fifteen; and still others, such as Murrius, one to twenty.'

These substitutions appear mainly when the expected form corresponds to a complex numeral. It seems that cardinals acted in those cases as a default series. This is in accordance with the typological predictions of Greenberg (1978: 288) and with the central position of cardinals in the formation of different numeral series in Latin.[25]

(b) Inversely, distributives can be used instead of cardinals (6). It typically happens in contexts where a plurality has the characteristics of a collective and can therefore be taken as a whole. In fact, it has been shown that collectives and distributives share semantic characteristics with universal quantifiers of the type 'all', 'many', and so on. It is not strange, then, that they can be used instead of cardinals in contexts where quantification affects not very clearly delimited groups of entities.[26]

25. On some typical conditions of using cardinals instead of ordinals see also Plank (2003: 363–365).
26. See, for example, Gil (1996, 2001).

(6) a. Plaut. *Persa* 471: *nam ego hodie compendi feci* ***binos*** *panes in dies*
'I have just now saved two loaves a day'
b. Cic. *Att.* 11,17: *Tullia mea uenit ad me ... litterasque reddidit* ***trinas***
'my Tullia came to me and she delivered three letters'
c. Liv. 37,28,8: ***denis*** *nauibus ad promuntoria stantibus*
'with ten ships standing at the same time off each promontory'

(c) Frequency adverbs are sometimes used instead of cardinals (7). This always happens for rather long complex numbers. We can guess that in such instances a decomposition of the numeral into different operations – multiplication plus addition – helped to organize the calculation of the resultant number.

(7) *Mon. Ancyr*. 8: *quo lustro ciuium Romanorum censa sunt capita* ***quadragiens centum milia et sexaginta tria milia***
'in that lustrum four million and sixty three thousand Roman citizens were inscribed in the census'

(d) Ordinal numerals can be used, sometimes combined with some typical words such as *pars*, instead of fractions (8). We must remember that ordinal formations were also at the origin of some of the members of the series of fractions (see above).

(8) Cic. *Att.* 12,38a: *heredes Scapulae si istos hortos ...* ***partibus quattuor*** *factis liceri cogitant ...*
'if Scapula's heirs are thinking of dividing those gardens of his into four parts and bidding for them among themselves, ...'

(e) Ordinals (9) and distributives (10) can be used instead of frequency adverbs, at least from 'three' on. Distributives appear in combination with words like *uicis*.

(9) Liv. 4,32,7: *qui se dictatorem* ***tertium*** *dixerint*
'who had named him dictator for the third time'

(10) Plin. *nat.* 36,143: *Phrygius lapis … uritur ante uino perfusus, flatuque follibus donec rufescat, ac rursus dulci uino extinguitur* ***ternis uicibus***
'Phrygian stone after being soaked in wine it is roasted, and bellows are used to fan it until it turns red, whereupon it is quenched with sweet wine and the process is repeated three times on each occasion'

All of these types of cross-uses are represented in Figure 2.

Now if we compare this figure with Figure 1, it becomes immediately apparent that the lines between the series overlap in both to a high degree, except for the instances of ordinals used instead of frequency expressions (9). This agreement allows us to formulate a hypothesis that can account for both phenomena: both the diachronic patterns of formation of the series of numerals and the synchronic possibility of using some of them instead of others probably reflect the existence, at least in Latin, of a particular map of cognitive proximity among the different types of numerical series. A more in-depth investigation is necessary to establish the extent of the phenomenon in Latin and, what would be even more interesting, to what extent it reflects wider typological and cognitive principles.




Figure 2. Cross-uses of series in Classical Latin

1.3.2.3 The series in Vulgar and Late Latin. The different series were still in use in Vulgar and Late Latin, and many forms found their way into the Romance languages.[27] Nevertheless, important changes and simplifications are attested in Vulgar and Late texts. As expected from typological studies, the main changes affected high numbers – that is, the most marked ones – and also some particular series, such as frequency adverbs, distributives, and fractions.

A special problem for the study of the evolution of the system is that there are significant differences among diverse texts and authors. Several factors affect the quality of our evidence, such as the genre of the text or the level of its Latin. In consequence, it is difficult to try to reconstruct the whole system for a particular moment. It probably diverged considerably among speakers.

In order to give a general impression of the facts, this section contains data from several important texts corresponding to different centuries and to diverse types of content: the laconic domestic annotations of the Vindolanda Tablets (1st–2nd centuries CE),[28] the religious and more careful translated texts of the Vulgate (4th century), the veterinary tractate *Mulomedicina Chironis* (4th–5th century),[29] and the detailed narration of a voyage preserved in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (6th century).

Uses of series in the Vindolanda Tablets

(a) Cardinals are used as in literary texts. There are examples of units (*unus, duo, tres, sex, septem*), tens (*uiginti, quinquaginta*), hundreds (*centum, ducenti, trecenti, quingenti*), and thousand (*milia*).
(b) Ordinals are attested only for the lowest numbers: *primus, secundus.*
(c) Distributives (*singulus, quini*) are apparently used as in literary texts.

Uses of series in the Vulgate

(a) Cardinals and ordinals are used as in classical times in very high numbers.

27. Price (1992).
28. Bowman and Thomas (1994).
29. Data from §§ 1–200.

(b) Frequency expressions, in particular for numbers over two, are often replaced by phrases that combine a cardinal or an ordinal with the term *uicis* (11).
(c) Distributives, although still present even for high numbers (*quinquageni, centeni*), are most often accompanied by reinforcing expressions such as directional or perlative prepositions (*in, per*) or partitive genitives (12).[30] This is perhaps evidence of a progressive weakening of this series.
(d) Multiplicatives are normally used for lower numbers (*duplex, triplex*) but are replaced by distributives for high numbers (12).
(e) Proportionals are normally used: *duplus, quadruplus, septuplus*.
(f) Among fractions only *quadrans* is used. They are basically expressed by means of phrases that combine a cardinal (14a) or an ordinal with the noun *pars* (14b).

(11) a. Vulg. *num.* 14,22: *homines qui … tentauerunt me iam per **decem uices***
'the people who have tested me these ten times'
b. Vulg. *iud.* 20,30: *et **tertia uice** sicut semel et bis contra Beniamin … exercitum produxerunt*
'they went up against Benjamin for the third time as they had done once and twice already'

(12) a. Vulg. *Marc.* 6,40: *discubuerunt in partes **per centenos** et **per quinquagenos***
'they sat down in groups of hundreds and of fifties'
b. Vulg. *apoc.* 4,8: *et quattuor animalia **singula eorum** habebant alas senas*
'and the four living creatures, each of them with six wings'

30. Already in Classical literary Latin there are examples of the use of distributives with prepositions: Liv. 34,46,3: *militibus ex praeda diuisit **in singulos** ducenos septuagenos aeris triplex equiti* 'from the booty, he gave to each of his soldiers two hundred and seventy asses, and three times that amount to each cavalryman.'

(13) Vulg. *Matth.* 13,8: *alia autem ceciderunt in terram bonam: et dabant fructum aliud* ***centesimum*** *aliud* ***sexagesimum*** *aliud* ***trigesimum***
'still other seeds fell on good soil, and brought forth grain, some a hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty'

(14) a. Vulg. *deut.* 19,3: *in* ***tres*** *aequaliter* ***partes*** *totam terrae tuae prouinciam diuides*
'you shall divide into three regions the land you are receiving as a possession'
b. Vulg. *num.* 15,4: *offeret, …* ***decimam partem*** *oephi*
'he will present a grain offering, a tenth of an ephah'

Uses of series in *Mulomedicina Chironis*
(a) Cardinals are used as in classical times, although only units and *decem*.
(b) Ordinals: only up to *nouenus.*
(c) Frequentatives: *semel, bis, ter, quater.*
(d) Distributives: *singulus, bini, terni, quaterni.*
(e) Multiplicatives: *duplex.*
(f) Fractions: *triens, quadrans, sextans.*

Uses of series in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*
(a) Cardinals: as in classical times up to high numbers (*quadraginta, septuaginta, ducentae, quattuor milia,* etc.)
(b) Ordinals: up to 25.
(c) Frequentatives: only *semel.*
(d) Distributives: *singulus, binus, trinus*. Frequent substitution for different expressions: *unusquisque, unus et unus, cata singulos* (15).
(e) Fractions: Only expressions with the noun *pars* (16).

(15) a. *Itin. Eger.* 43,4: *reuertitur ergo omnis populus* ***unusquisque*** *in domum suam*
'then, all the people go back, each one to their own home'
b. *Itin. Eger.* 37,3: *omnis populus transit* ***unus et unus*** *toti acclinantes se*
'all the people cross one after another, everyone bowing reverently'

c. *Itin. Eger.* 24,1: ***cata singulos*** *ymnos fit oratio*
'a prayer is said after each hymn'

(16) *Itin. Eger.* 43,7: *et apertis ualuis maioribus, quae sunt de* ***quintana parte****, omnis populus intrat in martyrium*
'and after the larger gates are opened, which are of the fifth part, all the people go into the *martyrium*'

Table 1 offers the result of the comparison between these four texts. The differences among the genres of the texts can explain some of the results. So, for instance, it was expected that a very simple text such as the Vindolanda tablets, written by soldiers in a remote province of the Empire, would offer a limited sample of numerals. On the other hand, it is not surprising that a technical book such as the *Mulomedicina Chironis* still maintained the main characteristics of the classical system, in particular for those numerical series more appropriate to its subject.[31] Nevertheless, the data of the Vulgate and of the *Itinerarium* admit more interesting readings. In the case of the Vulgate, although all the series of the system are used, many of them show clear traces of weakening and of replacement by other expressions. Finally, the *Itinerarium Egeriae* already reflects the drastic reduction of the series undergone in Late Latin, whose result is the much simpler systems of the Romance languages. All these changes can be summarized in the following points.

(i) There are clear traces of reduction in the use of numerical series. The Vulgate and the *Mulomedicina* offer examples of the whole system, but in the Vulgate four out of seven series have developed alternative expressions that reinforce or completely replace the former terms. In the cases of substitution, forms of other series, in particular cardinals and ordinals, are employed.

(ii) Except for cardinals and ordinals, the series, when attested, are reduced to rather low numbers. As noted earlier (Section 1.2), the series of multiplicatives, proportionals, and fractions were apparently never developed for high numbers in Latin.

31. Fractions are very much in use for recipes, and the *Mulomedicina* makes wide use of them. Something similar happens, for instance, in the later *Carmen de ponderibus et mensuris* (Riese, Teubner, 1906), dated to the fifth century CE.

Table 1. The use of numeral series in some Vulgar and Late Latin texts[a]

	Vindolanda	Vulgate	*Mulomedicina*	*Itinerarium*
Cardinal	S	S	S (< 10)	S
Ordinal	S (< 2)	S	S (< 9)	S
Frequentative		S (< 2); [*uicis*]	S (< 4)	*semel*
Distributive	S (< 5)	S; [+ *in*, *per*]	S (< 4)	S (< 3); [several expressions]
Multiplicative		S (< 3); [Ord.]	S (< 2)	
Proportional		S		
Fractions		S (< 4); [*pars*]	S (< 6)	[*pars*]

a. S, standard, i.e., as in literary classical texts; when possible, the highest attested number is shown in parentheses. [ ], replaced by another expression.

(iii) Both tendencies basically coincide, but in an inverse way, with the lines of historical development of series presented in Figure 1 and the crossed uses of series summarized in Figure 2 (cf. p. 188 and p. 191 respectively). This offers new and important evidence in favor of the existence of regular patterns in the development of series of numerals in Latin.

1.4 Preliminary conclusions on the semantics of numerals in Latin

The semantic structure of Latin numerals developed a complex and rich system of expression for different numbers and for diverse series of numerals. The lines of development of this system are in accordance with what we know about cross-linguistic patterns from typological studies. The rather complicated system of Latin was probably never fully used in the spoken language, at least for higher numbers. Therefore, both the system and the series underwent a process of regularization and simplification that is already reflected in classical texts and much more clearly in late texts.

2. External Syntax: Numerals as constituents of larger structures

2.1 Numerals and word classes

The different numerical series belong to various syntactic word classes, according to the following distribution:

(i) Nouns: cardinals (*milia*), fractions (*triens, quadrans*), proportionals (*duplus, triplus*).

(ii) Adverbs: frequency (*semel, bis, ter*), ordinals (*primum, primo*), and distributives (*singulatim*).

(iii) Adjectives: cardinals (*unus, duo*), ordinals (*primus, secundus*), distributives (*singulus, bini, trini*), collectives (*ambo*), multiplicatives (*simplex, duplex*).

This syntactic distribution is valid both for literary Latin and for Vulgar and Late Latin, to the extent that the different series of numerals remained in use. It is typologically in accord with the studies developed in this field.[32]

In the following paragraphs we present a general view of the different syntactic uses of numerals as constituents of sentences and noun phrases.

2.2 Numeral nouns

1. The most typical cardinal noun is *milia* 'thousands'. As a noun, it is the head of the noun phrase where it is inserted. Therefore, it can receive an adjectival determination (17), and partitive genitives also depend on it very often (18):

(17) Liv. 6,42,7: ***multa milia*** *barbarorum in acie, multa captis castris caesa*
'**many thousands** of barbarians fell in the battle, and many after the camp was taken'

(18) a. Liv. 21,5,11: *Vaccaeorumque* ***centum milia*** *fuere*
'and of the Vaccei, there were one hundred thousand'

32. E.g., Hurford (2003: 566–567) on the differences between cardinals and ordinals.

b. Liv. 22,16,3: *ad* ***duo milia peditum*** *… transfugiunt*
'up to two thousand infantrymen deserted'

Sometimes it can also be used as an adjective, as in (19).

(19) Cic. *epist.* 10,17,1: *qui locus a Foro Iuli quattuor et uiginti* ***millia passus*** *abest*
'a pace which is twenty-four miles from the Forum Iulii'

The fact that a term usually employed as noun is used as an adjective in some contexts, and vice versa, is typologically in accordance with the system of word classes of Latin, where nouns and adjectives share many categorial features. It is also consistent with the normal characteristics of numeral systems that, when there is a possible fluctuation between numeral nouns and numeral adjectives within a series, the highest numbers are preferentially nouns.[33]

The situation of *milia* did not change in Late Latin, where we find a large majority of nominal uses, often accompanied by adjectives (20) and partitive genitives (21), together with some examples of adjectival uses (22).[34]

(20) Lampr. *Comm.* 13,3: *singulis ictibus* ***multa milia*** *ferarum ingentium conficeret*
'he killed many thousands of enormous animals, each one with a single stroke'

(21) Dict. 5,6: *tum Diomedes* ***quinque milia talentorum auri*** *… optat*
'then Diomedes seeks five thousand talents of gold'

(22) Vulg. *iud.* 21,10: *miserunt itaque* ***decem milia uiros robustissimos***
'then they sent ten thousand of the strongest men'

In Romance languages, *milia* was replaced as a numeral by *mille*, except in Italian and Romanian.[35] Nevertheless the process of substitution has not

33. Stampe (1976: 598–599); Corbett (1978); Greenberg (1989); Heine (1997: 27).
34. For example, in the Vulgate there are 10 examples of adjectival *decem milia* out of 54 instances, that is, almost 20 % of the occurrences.
35. Meyer–Lübke (1899: 98).

been detected in the Latin record.[36] As a hypothesis, the final preference for *mille* instead of *milia* could be the result of the pressure on the system for similar use of all the members of each numeral series. In that sense, the predominant use of *milia* as noun was rather atypical for cardinals.

2. The rest of the cardinals, including *mille*, besides their more frequent use as adjectives, can also be used as heads of nominal phrases (23), usually together with partitive expressions (24):

(23) Cic. *div.* 2,144: *is autem: 'Vincare', inquit, 'necesse est; an non intellegis* ***quattuor*** *ante te cucurrisse?'*
'and the other said: "You are bound to lose, for do you not see that four ran ahead of you?"'

(24) a. Liv. 22,16,10: *ducenti ab Romanis,* ***octingenti hostium*** *cecidere*
'two hundred Romans and eight hundred enemies fell'
b. Liv. 3,60,3: *castris* ***mille passuum*** *ab hoste positis copias continebat*
'he established his camp a mile from the enemy and kept his men within the works'
c. Liv. 36,38,6: ***ex uictoribus*** *mille quadringentos octoginta quattuor cecidisse*
'of the victors the losses were one thousand four hundred eighty-four fell'

The situation seems to be identical in Late Latin.

(25) a. Vulg. *Luc.* 24,33: *et inuenerunt congregatos* ***undecim***
'and they found the eleven assembled'
b. Vulg. *gen.* 18,31: *si ibi inuenti fuerint* ***uiginti***
'if only twenty could be found there'

(26) Vulg. *num.* 35,13–14: ***de ipsis . . . urbibus*** *tres erunt trans Iordanem et tres in terra Chanaan*

36. *Milia* is still five times more frequent than *mille* in the Vulgate. In the corpus of authors corresponding to *Infimae Latinitatis* in the BTL CD the numbers are 442 and 230, respectively.

‘of these cities three will be beyond the Jordan and three in the land of Canaan’

3. Collective *ambo* has a pronominal nature. It can be used as a noun, that is, as the head of the noun phrase (27), or as an adjective (28).

(27) a. Cic. *Phil.* 1,36: *populi quidem Romani iudicia multa* ***ambo*** *habetis*
‘you both have before you many judgments of the Roman people’
b. Liv. 2,1,8: *si* ***ambo*** *fasces haberent, duplicatus terror uideretur*
‘if both of them had **fasces**, the fear would appear double’

(28) a. Cic. *de orat.* 2,9: … *eorum, quibus ambo illi oratores cogniti sunt*
‘… of those to whom both those famous orators were personally known’
b. Liv. 3,9,6: *si* ***ambo consules*** *infesti circumstarent tribunum* …
‘if **both the consuls** were present facing down the tribune… ’

4. Fractions are always used as nouns in Classical Latin (29), and this is also the situation insofar as they continue to be used in Late Latin (30).

(29) a. Cic. *epist.* 13,29,4: *heres ex parte dimidia et tertia est Capito; in* ***sextante*** *sunt ii quorum pars sine ulla cuiusquam querela publica potest esse*
‘he left Capito five-sixths of his estate. The remaining **sixth** is left to persons whose portion may be confiscated by the state without exciting any official complaint’
b. Gell. 9,4,11: *pygmaeos …, quorum qui longissimi sunt, non longiores esse quam pedes duo et* ***quadrantem***
‘pygmies, the tallest of whom are not more than two and a quarter feet in height’

(30) a. Macr. *sat.* 1,13,9: *qui trecentis sexaginta quinque diebus et* ***quadrante*** *zodiacum conficit*
‘who completes the zodiac with three hundred sixty five days and a fourth’

b. Chiron 1,144: *postero die potionem dabis: ysopi pondo quadran⟨tem⟩, costi pondo sextan⟨tem⟩, apii uiridis pondo trien⟨tem⟩*
'the next day you will give it a drink: a fourth of the total will be of *hysopus*, a sixth of *costus*, a third of celery'

5. Proportionals also behaved like nouns while they were kept in use in the classical period (31), although, as noted above, only the lowest numbers were used in late times (32):

(31) a. Cic. *Tull.* 2,5,7: *eius rei taxationem nos fecimus; aestimatio uestra est. Iudicium datum est in* ***quadruplum***
'we did the evaluation of the thing; the estimation is yours. It has been judged at four times its value'

b. Cic. *Flacc.* 49: *frater meus . . . decreuit ut, si iudicatum negaret, in* ***duplum*** *iret*
'my brother decided that if he (Heraclides) disputed the verdict he should try to double the penalty'

(32) Auson. *epist.* 16,5: *hoc mihi paene* ***duplum*** *est*
'this is almost twice as much for me'

2.3 Numeral adverbs

1. Frequency always refers to events, that is, to second-order entities. When referring to verbs, frequency is expressed by means of adverbs both in standard literary Latin (33) and in Vulgar and Late Latin (34):

(33) a. Cic. *p. red. ad Quir.* 10: *at me in patriam* **ter** *suis decretis Italia cuncta reuocauit*
'all of Italy called me back home three times with its decrees'

b. Plin. *nat.* 18,76: *madescit dulci aqua in ligneis uasis, ita ut integatur* ***quinquies*** *in die mutata*
'it is soaked with fresh water, changed five times a day, in wooden tubs, in such a way that it is totally covered'

(34) a. Chiron 1,79: *acerrimo collirio nimis assidue iungebis* ***ter aut quater*** *diurnum*
'you will join it very often with a strong salve three or four times daily'
b. Vulg. *II reg.* 13,19: *si percussisses* ***quinquies aut sexies siue septies*** *...*
'if you had struck five, six, or seven times ...'

When events are referred to by means of nouns, it is distributive adjectives or, more frequently, cardinal adjectives that are used (see (11)–(12)). Noun phrases that include a numeral adjective are at the origin of the expressions that developed into adverbs in all Romance languages.[37] As mentioned in Section 1.3.2.2, the first attestations of these expressions instead of simple adverbs already appear in Classical Latin.

2. Some neuter forms of the lowest ordinals can also be used as adverbial adjuncts that indicate the relative position of a certain event in a sequence: 'for the first time, ... for the second ...'. For 'second' the form *iterum* is usually employed (35); for the rest, either the accusative form (36) or the ablative form (37) of ordinals can be used.

(35) Cic. *Quinct.* 5: *uereor ne se derideri putet quod* ***iterum*** *iam dico 'optimus'*
'I am afraid he may think he is being laughed at because I call him "excellent" for the second time'

(36) a. Cic. *Pis.* 11: *quem in senatu sententiam rogabas* ***tertium***
'whom you interrogate in the Senate three times'
b. Liv. 9,15,11: *consul* ***tertium*** *creatus*
'elected for a third time as a consul'

(37) a. Cic. *inv.* 1,71: *ac* ***primo*** *quidem decipi incommodum est; iterum, stultum;* ***tertio****, turpe*
'to be deceived once is annoying, to be deceived twice is foolish; the third time it is shameful'

37. Meyer-Lübke (1899); Price (1992)

b. Liv. 9,43,26: *cum Carthaginiensibus eodem anno foedus* ***tertio*** *renovatum*
'in the same year the treaty with the Carthaginians was renewed for the third time'

These terms can also be used either to organize the presentation of events within a narration or the sequence of sentences within a discourse in a certain temporal or logical order: 'First . . . , second . . . , . . . '.

(38) Cic. *p. red. ad Quir.* 18: *quirites, pollicebor:* ***primum*** *qua sanctissimi homines pietate erga deos inmortalis esse soleant, eadem me erga populum semper fore . . . ;* ***deinde*** *. . .*
'senators, I promise to you, first, that I will always have for the people the same kind of reverence which the most pious men usually have for the immortal gods . . . ; second, . . .

(39) Cic. *Caecin.* 23: *maxime fuit optandum Caecinae, recuperatores, ut controuersiae nihil haberet,* **secundo loco** *ut ne cum tam improbo homine*, ***tertio*** *ut cum tam stulto haberet*
'what Caecina would have most desired, gentlemen, was to have no quarrel with anyone: secondly, to have no quarrel with such a bad man; and thirdly, to have a quarrel with such a fool'

As can be seen in these sentences, several ordinal adverbs usually appear in juxtaposition (38), or in juxtaposition with temporal adverbs like *deinde* (39).

The origin of the adverbial uses of ordinals with neuter form can probably be traced back to a predicative use, as in (40), where *tertium* is in agreement with *illud* exactly like *tertius* in (41).

(40) Cic. *de orat.* 2,236: *ut ad* ***illud tertium*** *ueniam . . .*
'to come to our third topic . . . '

(41) Liv. 25,34,10: ***tertius*** *insuper aduenit* ***hostis***
'a third enemy also arrived'

In a sentence such as (40), an analysis that focuses on the relationship of *tertium* to the event as a whole (and not so much on the relationship to

another member of the sentence) would immediately lead to an adverbial interpretation of the predicative. This is the same as with other cases of adverbs that originate from former predicatives.[38] As for *primo, secundo*, and so on, perhaps they were originally elliptical forms for *primo loco, secundo loco*, and so forth, as in (39).

The adverbial use of ordinal neuter forms, although different from frequency adverbs, is close to them in notional terms in a sequence of the type "twice X and in the third place Y". This allows combinations such as those of (42).

(42) a. Cic. *Att.* 1,16,9: ***bis*** *absolutum esse Lentulum,* ***bis*** *Catilinam, hunc* ***tertium*** *iam esse a iudicibus in rem publicam inmissum*
'Lentulus was acquitted twice, twice Catiline, and this is the third criminal let loose on the country by a jury'

b. Liv. 42,22,7: *M. Popilius rogatione Marcia* ***bis*** *apud C. Licinium causam dixit;* ***tertio*** *praetor … idibus Martiis adesse reum iussit*
'Marcus Popilius twice stood trial before Gaius Licinius in accordance with the Marcian decree; on the third occasion the praetor ordered him to appear on the fifteenth of March'

Apparently there are no syntactic differences between the use of the accusative form (*primum, tertium, …*) and the ablative form (*primo, tertio, …*).

The use of neuter ordinals as adverbs is maintained until Late times, both as adjuncts within sentences (43) and as narration-discourse organizers (44).

(43) a. Chiron 1,42: ***primo*** *lino ipsam uerrugam ligabis,* ***deinde*** …
'first, you will bind the wart itself with linen, then … '

b. Vulg. *gen.* 28,34: *concepit* ***tertio*** *et genuit alium filium*
'and she conceived for the third time, and gave birth to another son'

(44) a. *Itin. Eger.* 19,6: *itaque ergo duxit me* ***primum*** *ad palatium Aggari regis*
'therefore he led me, first, to the palace of King Abgar'

38. Brugmann (1910).

b. Chiron 1,192: *denique* ***primum*** *inuenitur in uno iumento, non in omnibus*
'finally, it is found, first, in only one donkey, not in all of them'

The use of ordinals as frequency adverbs within sentences was later replaced in all the Romance languages by phrases related to frequency expressions: Fr. *pour la troisième fois*, It. *per la terza volta*, Sp. *por tercera vez*. We already find traces of this evolution in Late Latin texts:

(45) = (11b) Vulg. *iud.* 20,30: *et* ***tertia uice*** *sicut semel et bis contra Beniamin exercitum produxerunt*
'they went up against Benjamin for the third time as they had done once and twice already'

The use of ordinals as narration-discourse organizers was inherited by the Romance languages: Sp. *primero . . . , segundo . . .* ; It. *primo . . . , secondo . . .* ; etc.

3. The prepositional phrases *in primo, in primis*, equivalent to *primum, primo*, appeared in classical times (46) and maintained their use in Late Latin (47).[39] This form has been preserved in Rheto-Romance *emprim*.

(46) a. Sen. *dial.* 9,13,3: ***in primis*** *autem cogitauit aliquid posse propositis suis resistere*
'in the beginning, he thought that he could resist his intentions'
b. Suet. *Tit.* 8,2: *populum* ***in primis*** *uniuersum tanta per omnes occasiones comitate tractauit ut . . .* 'in the beginning he treated all the people on every occasion with so much familiarity that . . . '

(47) Chiron 1,57: *nec* ***in primo*** *. . . curato*
'not at the beginning . . . should it be cured'

Probably, the origin of this construction can be traced back to a syncopated phrase that either referred to the circumstances – *in primis actis* 'in the first actions' – or to the actors within the event – *in primis qui fecerunt* 'among the first to do that' – as in (48):

39. Löfstedt (1959: 111–112).

(48) Vulg. *I par.* 11,6: *omnis qui percusserit Iebuseum* ***in primis*** *erit princeps et dux*
'whoever attacks the Jebusites first shall be chief and commander'

4. Latin had a rare distributive adverb: *singulatim* 'one by one', attested in pre-classical texts.

(49) a. Cato *agr.* 76,4: *tracta singula in totum solum primum ponito, deinde de mortario tracta linito, tracta addito* ***singulatim***
'first, place a layer of separate *tracta* over the whole crust, cover it with the mixture from the bowl, add the *tracta* one by one'
b. Ter. *Phorm.* 1032: *quid ego nunc commemorem, Demipho,* ***singulatim*** *qualis ego in hunc fuerim?*
'do I need to go over the details one by one, Demipho, of what I've been to him?'

Singulatim was isolated as an adverb among distributives, because there were no adverbial expressions for 'two by two', 'three by three', and so on. Apparently, these were replaced early on by prepositional expressions with the adjective *singulus* (50):

(50) a. Liv. 34,46,3: *militibus ex praeda diuisit* ***in singulos*** *ducenos septuagenos aeris, triplex equiti*
'from the booty, he gave each of his soldiers two hundred and seventy asses, and three times that amount to each trooper'
b. Sen. *dial.* 4,10,4: ***in singulos*** *seueritas imperatoris destringitur*
'the Emperor's severity is applied to each one'

This is the expression that survives in later times:

(51) Vulg. *Ios.* 7,18: … *cuius domum* ***in singulos*** *diuidens* ***uiros*** *inuenit Achan …*
'by dividing his house into single men he found Achan'

2.4 Numeral adjectives

2.4.1 Adjectival numerals

In Latin, several series of numerals behave as adjectives. Their most frequent use is as attributes within noun phrases. The adjectival numerals are cardinals (52), ordinals (53), distributives (54), and multiplicatives (55); examples for collectives were already given in (28).

(52) a. Cic. *Verr.* II 2,27: ***centum*** *cohortes fugitiuorum*
'one hundred cohorts of fugitives'
b. Liv. 30,29,7: *cum aliis* **decem** *legatis*
'with ten other envoys'

(53) a. Cic. *Verr.* II 2,92: *horam* ***tertiam*** *noctis*
'in the third hour of the night'
b. Liv. 5,21,2: ***decimam*** *partem praedae uoueo*
'I promise a tithe of the spoils'

(54) a. Cic. *Font.* 6: ***quaternos*** *denarios in singulas uini amphoras*
'four denarii for every amphora of wine'
b. Liv. 35,40,6: ***quina dena*** *iugera agri data in singulos pedites sunt*
'fifteen *iugera* of land were given to each infantryman'

(55) a. Cic. *Tusc.* 3,34: *ut … aduersis casibus* ***triplici*** *consolatione sanetur*
'so that … in adversity he may be restored with a threefold relief'
b. Liv. 33,15,5: *ipse confestim agmine* ***duplici*** *sequitur*
' he himself followed rapidly in two columns'

As long as these series were kept in use, their syntactic characteristics seem not to have changed.

2.4.2 Basic word order of adjectival numerals

From a syntactic point of view, the most interesting phenomenon concerning adjectival numerals is their relative position within the noun phrase, in relationship to the head and to the rest of the constituents of the phrase.

Table 2. Relative position (A/P) of some cardinal numerals in relation to the head of the noun phrase in Classical and Late Latin[a]

	Cicero	Livy	Sample of late authors[b]	Vulgate
quattuor	56/18 = 3.1:1	30/3 =10:1	19/16 = 1:1.3	33/17 = 1.9:1
decem	48/10 = 4.8:1	110/11 =10:1	28/28 = 1:1	85/27 = 3.1:1
undecim	1/0	6/1 = 6:1	2/6 = 1:3	11/7 = 1.6:1
uiginti	7/2 = 3.5:1	25/4 = 6.3:1	17/10 = 1.7:1	65/16 = 4:1
octoginta	1/0	6/4 =1.5:1	0/2	10/3 = 3.3:1
centum	11/2 = 5.5:1	36/12 = 3:1	27/17 = 1.6:1	15/3 = 5:1
Total	109/32 = 3.4:1	213/60 = 3.5:1	93/79 = 1.2:1	219/73 = 3:1

a. A, anteposition; P, postposition. To avoid problems related to the position of the different constituents of complex numbers, in this table and the following ones I consider only simple numbers.
b. The sample is based on the work of several authors of the 4th and 5th centuries CE: Ammianus Marcellinus, Apicius, Aurelius Victor, Iustinus, Vegetius, and the authors of the *Historia Augusta.*

It is generally assumed that adjectival numerals in Latin tend to precede the head, as in most languages of Europe (Rijkhoff 1998). In this position they would coincide with deictics as well as attributive – qualifying, nonrestrictive – uses of the rest of the adjectives.[40] In contrast, possessives, genitival determiners, complex attributes (relative sentences, etc.), and adjectives in determinative – restrictive – uses prefer postposition.[41] But apart from general statements, there are no statistical studies focused on numerals that allow us to go beyond these generalizations. The results of my own research on a sample of numerals within different Classical and Late Latin texts are presented in Table 2 to Table 5.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these tables. First, although anteposition is by far the most usual one for every type of numeral, postposition is also possible for every series in every period in the history of Latin. More-

40. For the general principles that predict these coincidences see Croft (1990: 208–211).
41. See, for example, Pinkster (1995: 108–111).

Table 3. Relative position (A/P) of some ordinal numerals in relation to the head of the noun phrase in Classical and Late Latin

	Cicero	Livy	Sample of late authors	Vulgate
tertius …	58/36 = 1.6:1	111/37 = 3:1	35/12 = 2.9:1	64/65 = 1:1
decimus …	10/6 = 1.7:1	18/6 = 3:1	7/3 = 2.3:1	10/8 =1.2:1
vicesimus …	4/0	–	–	15/3 = 5: 1
centesimus …	3/1 = 3:1	3/1 = 3:1	3/0	0/1
Total	75/43 = 1.7:1	132/44 = 3:1	45/15 = 3:1	89/77 = 1.1:1

Table 4. Relative position (A/P) of some multiplicative numerals in relationship to the head of the noun phrase in Classical and Late Latin

	Cicero	Livy	Sample of late authors	Vulgate
duplex	20/2 = 10:1	25/4 = 6.2:1	17/10 = 1.7:1	11/16 = 1:1.4
triplex	6/0	2/1 = 2:1	1/1 = 1:1	0/2
Total	26/2 = 13:1	27/5 = 5.4:1	18/11 = 1.6:1	11/18 = 1:1.6

Table 5. Relative position (A/P) of some distributive numerals in relationship to the head of the noun phrase in Classical and Late Latin

	Cicero	Livy	Sample of late authors	Vulgate
quaterni …	7/0	3/0	6/2 = 3:1	–
seni …	1/0	2/0	2/1 = 2:1	1/2 = 1:2
deni	3/3 = 1:1	9/1 = 9:1	9/1 = 9:1	2/0
quinquageni	–	4/1 = 4:1	1/0	1/1 = 1:1
centeni	0/1	6/0	1/4 = 1:4	–
Total	11/4 = 2.7:1	24/2 = 12:1	19/8 = 2.3:1	4/3 = 1.3:1

over, a more detailed examination of postposed numerals shows that most of these cases correspond to focalized elements, typically lists of items, as in

(56a), but also in the enumeration of temporal periods, as in (56b), or those cases where the numeral represents the most relevant information of the sentence, as in (56c) and (56d).

(56) a. Liv. 30,35,3: *par ferme numerus captus cum signis militaribus* ***centum triginta duobus,*** *elephantis undecim*
'about the same number were captured, together with one hundred and thirty-two military standards and eleven elephants'
b. Cic. *Phil.* 2,77: *hora diei* ***decima*** *fere*
'about the tenth hour of the day'
c. Liv. 39,55,9: *in singulos iugera data* ***dena***
'ten *iugera* were given to each one'
d. Cic. *epist.* 10,5,1: *ex quibus (litteris) cepi fructum* ***duplicem***
'from these letters I received a double satisfaction'

Almost three quarters of all the postpositions correspond to these focalized contexts.[42] As for the rest, we usually have predicative uses of numerals, as in (57a), or attributes in restrictive use (57b), whereas in anteposition the numeral is always simply qualifying the entity (58).

(57) a. Liv. 2,21,7: *Romae tribus una et uiginti factae*
'in Rome twenty-one tribes were created'
b. Varro *ling.* 5,45: *cum Argeorum sacraria septem et uiginti in ⟨quattuor⟩ partes urbi⟨s⟩ sunt disposita*
'when the twenty-seven shrines of the Argei were distributed among the four parts of the city'

(58) a. Liv. 45,9,3: *regnauit undecim annos*
'his reign lasted eleven years'
b. Caes. *Gall.* 1,12,4: *omnis ciuitas Heluetia in quattuor partes uel pagos est diuisa*
'the whole state of Helvetia is divided into four parts or cantons'

42. For example, in Livy, two of the three postposed instances of *quattuor*, the sole instance of postposed *undecim*, two of the four instances of *uiginti*, and eight of the twelve instances of postposed *centum* are of this kind.

In conclusion, numerals usually precede the head of the noun phrase but can also be postposed when they are focalized and, as with other adjectives, when they have a distinctive function.

A second result that can be obtained from Table 2 to Table 5 is related to the evolution of the position of numerals over time. Our data do not reveal any significant diachronic change, except for multiplicatives. It is noticeable that, until as late as the fourth century (the date of most texts of the sample of late authors and of the Vulgate translation of the Bible), there is no statistical evidence, at least in written texts, of the most important change undergone by numerals with respect to word order, that is, the fixing of numerals almost exclusively in anteposition within the Romance languages, as shown in (59)–(60):

(59) Fr. *Ils viennent deux hommes / *Ils viennent hommes deux*
It. *Arrivano due uomini / *arrivano uomini due*
Sp. *Llegan dos hombres / *llegan hombres dos*

The only exception is the multiplicatives, where there is a clear tendency to switch from anteposition to postposition. This goes in the direction of the later evolution of the language, because in the Romance languages postposition of these adjectives is as common as anteposition:

(60) Fr. *J'ai vu la double porte de l'église / J'ai vu la porte double de l'église*
Sp. *He visto la doble puerta de la iglesia / He visto la puerta doble de la iglesia*

Apart from this, it is difficult to imagine that by the fourth century CE the general tendency to establish a fixed anteposition of numerals was not yet current. So, my suggestion is that, as regards the word order of numerals, particularly cardinal numbers, the written records are highly conservative.

2.4.3 Word order within noun phrases of more than two elements

When the noun phrase is made up of more than two elements, most European languages maintain the position of simple numerals (Hurford 2003: 602). By contrast, Latin offers a wide range of possibilities: numerals precede or follow

the head noun; and adjectives, deictics, and other determiners precede, follow, or are interposed into the group numeral–noun. However, not every possibility is available. In fact, Latin seems to fit into the most usual order proposed by cross-linguistic typological studies of the structure of noun phrases:[43]

deictic numeral adjective noun adjective numeral deictic

This pattern predicts a mirror-image placement of elements depending on their syntactic characteristics, on both sides of the head noun. In a language with strict anteposition of determiners, these elements will follow a sequence

deictic numeral adjective noun

In a language with strict postposition, the order will be the inverse. In the case of a language such as Latin, where both anteposition and postposition are possible, it is predicted that the relative order of constituents will respect this pattern.

Although detailed studies of this point are lacking for Latin, the first results show that in the classical literary language there is a ratio of approximately 7.5:1 in the adherence to the pattern (141/22 instances). The possible combinations found in our research that fit in the pattern are given in (A) below. For the sake of simplicity we limit ourselves to combinations of only three elements within the noun phrase. We give an example of each pattern.

43. Greenberg (1966b), refined by Rijkhoff (2002: 213–238).

(A) Possibilities of combination of cardinals in Classical Latin that fit the pattern described above[44]

(a) num. adj. noun [48×] (61)[45]
(b) num. noun adj. [41×] (62)
(c) noun adj. num. [21×] (63)
(d) num. noun gen. [16×] (64)
(e) num. gen. noun [8×] (65)
(f) gen. noun num. [2×] (66)
(g) num. deict. noun [2×] (67)
(h) adj. noun num. [1×] (68)
(i) deict. noun num. [1×] (69)

(61) Liv. 25,31,14: *cum* ***centum triginta onerariis nauibus***
'with one hundred thirty transport-ships'

(62) Cic. *Verr.* II 4,1: *ea tanta est urbs ut ex* ***quattuor urbibus maximis*** *constare dicatur*
'that city is so big that it could be said that it is formed out of four enormous cities'

(63) Liv. 36,38,6: ***signa militaria centum uiginti quattuor***
'one hundred twenty-four military ensigns'

(64) Cic. *Phil.* 9,4: ***quattuor legatos populi Romani***
'four ambassadors of the Roman people'

44. The list is ordered according to their relative frequency in my sample. The sample is composed of all the uses of *quattuor, decem, undecim, uiginti, octoginta*, and *centum* in Cicero and Livy. Their uses in complex numbers are also included. When two or more of those numbers together form a complex number, they have been counted only once in the data within the highest number of the combination. So, for example, *centum uiginti* is counted only once, among the uses of *centum.* The selection of numbers tries to eliminate deviations caused by possible differences between low and high numbers and between ones used more often, like *decem* and *centum*, and less used items, like *undecim* or *octoginta*. Inmediately after each schema, I offer the number of occurrences in my sample in square brackets.

45. Num. = numeral, adj. = adjective, gen. genitive; deict. = deictic. We use the conventional label "deict." for proper deictics such as *hic, iste, ille*, as well as for other determiners that belong to closed classes, such as anaphorics (*is, idem*) and indefinite adjectives (*quidam, aliquis*).

(65) Cic. *p. red. ad Quir.* 21: *me* ***quattuor*** *omnino* ***hominum genera uiolarunt***
'all in all four types of men did violence against me'

(66) Liv. 37,59,3: *tulit in triumpho ...* ***oppidorum simulacra centum triginta quattuor***
'he carried in the triumph ... representations of towns to the number of one hundred and fifty four'

(67) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,22: *haec et similia eorum in* ***horum quattuor generum*** *inesse nullo putat*
'these and similar activities are to be found, he thinks, in none of the first four classes'

(68) Liv. 41,28,2: *et* ***maioribus hostiis uiginti*** *sacrificatum*
'and twenty full-grown victims were sacrified'

(69) Cic. *Phil.* 2,1: *quonam meo fato, patres conscripti, fieri dicam ut nemo* ***his annis uiginti*** *rei publicae fuerit hostis qui non ... ?*
'to what fate of mine, Conscript Fathers, shall I attribute the fact that no man has in these twenty years been the enemy of the State without at the same time ... ?'

Of course, the schemata under (A) do not exhaust all the possibilities of combination in Classical Latin. Some other less frequent schemata could be added if we take into consideration other numbers, such as *duo* (70a), or material from other contemporaneous authors (70b).

(70) a. Cic. *part.* 6: *quomodo igitur* ***duo genera ista*** *diuidis?* [num. noun deict.]
'how then do you distinguish between those two kinds (of arguments)?'

b. Caes. *Gall.* 6,29,3: ***turrim tabulatorum quattuor*** *constitit* [noun gen. num.]
'he set up a tower of four stories'

Nevertheless, the difference in frequency of use of each schema of (A) offers a good idea of the most common patterns.

In constrast to those combinations that fit in the general pattern, we have found the following combinations that do not conform.

(B) Possibilities of combination of cardinals in Classical Latin that do not fit the expected pattern

(j) num. deict. noun [8×] (71)
(k) adj. num. noun [5×] (72)
(l) noun num. adj. [5×] (73)
(m) gen. num. noun [3×] (74)
(n) noun num. gen. [1×] (75)

(71) Cic. *Manil.* 28: *ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatores* ***quattuor has res*** *inesse oportere*
‘I consider that a perfect general must possess four attributes’

(72) Cic. *rep.* 2,17: *ac Romulus cum …* ***haec egregia duo firmamenta*** *rei publicae peperisset …*
‘and after Romulus had established those two outstanding foundations of our commonwealth … ’

(73) Cic. *Att.* 6,2,5: *quaesiui ipse de iis qui* ***annis decem proximis*** *magistratum gesserant*
‘I questioned the men who had held the office of magistrate during the last ten years’

(74) Liv. 1,30,3: ***equitum decem turmas*** *ex Albanis legit*
‘he recruited ten squadrons of cavalry among the Albans’

(75) Cic. *ac.* 2,11: ***isti libri duo*** *Philonis*
‘these two books of Philo’

Again, an increase in the sample would add new schemata to this series, such as that of (76).

(76) Cic. *Sest.* 114: ***populares illi duo*** *quid egerunt?* [noun deict. num.]
‘how did those two (tribunes) fare who were “Friends of the People”?’

Investigation of the causes of these apparent violations of the general cross-linguistic pattern is beyond the limits of this chapter. They pertain to the

general problem of word order in Latin.[46] What is important is that these unexpected combinations are a minority among the ordering possibilities within noun phrases.

If we compare the classical data with those of Late Latin, we note that the combinatory possibilities of classical texts are basically maintained in later ones, although the order of frequency in our sample varies and some other possibilities are present. The continuity is particularly clear for the combinations that do not fit the cross-linguistic pattern, where, except for one minor type, the four more usual types are the same as in Classical Latin.

The most interesting fact that emerges from the comparison of the Classical and Late Latin data is that, although the schemata are more or less preserved, the proportion of instances that fit in the schema is much higher in late texts than in classical ones: 87/7, making a ratio of 12 : 1.

(C) Possibilities of combination of cardinals in Late Latin that fit into the pattern above[47]

(d) num. noun gen. [31×] (77)
(b) num. noun adj. [23×] (78)
(c) noun adj. num. [12×] (79)
(e) num. gen. noun [6×] (80)
noun gen. num. [5×] (81)
deict. num. noun [4×] (82)
(a) num. adj. noun [2×] (83)
(h) adj. noun num. [2×] (84)
(f) gen. noun num. [1×] (85)
num. noun deict. [1×] (86)

(77) Amm. 17,10,8: ***quattuor comites eius*** … *non ante absoluit dum omnes rediere captiui*
‘he did not release his four attendants … until all the captives returned’

46. See Hurford (1987: 223–225), Bauer, this work, vol. 1.
47. The sample is based on the uses of the same numbers as were used in (A) in the works of the authors cited in n. 5 to Table 2 plus the Vulgate. The order of the structures is again that of the frequency in our sample. The letters that identify each structure follow the series under (A). When a schema is not preceded by a letter, it was not present in (A).

(78) Veg. *mil.* 4,38: ***quattuor uentos principales*** *a singulis caeli partibus flare credebant*
'they thought that the four main winds each blew from a single point of the sky'

(79) Veg. *mil.* 2,5: *additis etiam* ***exercitiis cottidianis quattuor***
'even when four exercises were added daily'

(80) Lampr., *Alex.* 44,9: *in templis sane numquam praeter* ***quattuor aut quinque argenti libras*** *posuit*
'He never deposited in the sanctuaries more than four or five pounds of silver'

(81) Vulg. *gen.* 32,13: *separauit de his quae habebat munera Esau fratri suo capras ducentas … asinas uiginti et* ***pullos earum decem***
'from what he had with him he took a present for his brother Esau: two hundred female goats, twenty female donkeys, and ten male donkeys'

(82) Iust. *praef.* 4: ***horum*** *igitur* ***quattuor et quadraginta uoluminum …***
'then, from these forty five volumes …'

(83) Vopisc. *Prob.* 19,5: *[a]edidit alia die in amphit⟨h⟩eatro una missione* ***centum iubatos leones***
'another day he brought out in the amphitheatre at a single performance one hundred maned lions'

(84) Vulg. *Ios.* 21,26: ***omnes ciuitates decem*** *et suburbana earum datae sunt filiis Caath*
'all these ten towns and their pasture lands were given to the rest of the Kohathites'

(85) Vulg. *I par.* 22,14: *ecce ego in paupertate mea praeparaui impensas domus domini* ***auri talenta centum milia***
'with great pains I have provided for the house of the Lord one hundred thousand talents of gold'

(86) Vulg. *I reg.* 17,17: *accipe …* ***decem panes istos***
'take these ten loaves of bread'

(D) Possibilites of combination of cardinals in Late Latin that do not fit the pattern above

(j) num. deict. noun [2×] (87)
(k) adj. num. noun [2×] (88)
(l) noun num. adj. [2×] (89)
(m) gen. num. noun [1×] (90)

(87) Vopisc. *Prob.* 8,6: *cum* ***quattuor illi milites*** *inter se contenderent* …
'and when the four soldiers contended with one another …'

(88) Spart. *Ael.* 5,7: *nam lectum* ***eminentibus quattuor anacliteriis*** *fecerat*
'he had made a bed with four pillows on it'

(89) Vopisc. *Tac.* 10,5: ***columnas centum Numidicas*** *pedum uicenum ternum Ostiensibus donauit de proprio*
'to the people of Ostia he presented from his own funds one hundred columns of Numidian marble, each twenty-three feet in height'

(90) Lampr. *Heliog.* 23,1: ***elephantorum quattuor quadrigas***
'four *quadrigae* of elephants'

Although the results of the tables are highly provisional because of the limits of the corpus reviewed, two interesting facts emerge from the comparison of the Classical and Late Latin data. First, the proportion of instances that fit in the schema is much higher in late texts than in classical ones: 87/7, a ratio of 12 : 1, much higher, then, than the classical ratio. Second, the four more usual combinations[48] represent three quarters of all instances (66 of 87). All of them belong to the class of schemata that fit into the general typological pattern universally proposed for noun phrases.

It is also interesting to compare the most frequent combinatory possibilities of Classical and Late Latin with the types that later become normal in the Romance languages. As for Classical Latin, three of the four most frequent combinations – types "num. adj. noun", "num. noun adj.", and "num.

48. Namely, "num. noun gen." (*quattuor comites eius*), "num. noun adj." (*quattuor uentos principales*), "noun adj. num." (*exercitiis cottidianis quattuor*), "num. gen. noun" *quattuor aut quinque argenti libras*).

noun gen." – are among the most common types in Romance. Two of those types – "num. noun gen." and "num. noun adj." – are also among the most frequent combinations in Late Latin. Nevertheless, in both Classical and Late Latin the type "noun adj. num." (*exercitiis quotidianis quattuor*) is rather frequent, whereas in Romance languages, when possible, it seems to be a rather pragmatically marked alternative.

Another difficulty comes from the fact that one of the most usual Romance patterns, "num. adj. noun" (*centum triginta onerariis nauibus*), although very frequent in Classical Latin, is less present in our sample for Late Latin. Nevertheless, the limitation on the data studied so far does not allow us to propose any hypothesis on this point. Much more work needs to be done on this entire field.

2.4.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems clear that adjectival numerals, in relationship both to the head noun and to other constituents of noun phrases, tend to follow the expected typological patterns through every period and every level of the language. Moreover, the diachronic development of the possible combinations shows a clear tendency to a more strict ordering of constituents and to a preference for the same types of patterns; among them are those that will most often be employed by the Romance languages.

2.5 Preliminary conclusions on the external syntax of numerals

We can draw the following conclusions about the syntactic characteristics of numerals as constituents of sentences and noun phrases.

(i) The different semantic series of numerals (cardinals, ordinals, etc.) keep their syntactic characteristics as members of different word classes all through the history of Latin up to the Romance languages. In this respect, the system appears strongly conservative.

(ii) There is a clear tendency toward the regularization of the syntactic characteristics of all the members of each semantic class. Thus, cardinals tend to always be adjectives and, in consequence, from *milia*, which was exclusively a noun, there develops a form *mille*, which behaves like

other cardinals. In the same sense, *singulatim*, isolated among distributives as an adverb, changes into the adjectival uses of other distributives such as *singulus, bini,* etc.

(iii) The position of adjectival numerals within noun phrases shows a clear tendency to follow typological patterns consistent with the syntactic characteristics of Latin. In this respect, the diachronic evolution also follows the general changes of the language in two main ways: numerals are progressively placed more often before the head of the noun phrase, and there seems to be a tendency to reduce the number of possible places that numerals can occupy with respect to the other determiners; in this case, we have not detected the total disappearance of possible combinatory schemata in Late Latin, but some typical combinations become overwhelmingly favored.

3. The internal syntax of numbers

As we have seen in Section 1, Latin could create new numerals through the combination of bases and atoms. These complex numerals form phrases with their own syntactic structure. Insofar as numerals are nouns, adverbs, and adjectives (cf. Section 2), numerical phrases usually follow the regular patterns of syntactic association of those classes of words. Only in certain cases do numerical phrases present their own syntactic characteristics.

From a diachronic point of view, as we will see, the evolution of the numerical phrases shows a progressive reduction of the ways of forming complex numbers and an increasing degree of fixation of the structures, as a step toward univerbation.

3.1 The system in pre-Classical and Classical Latin

3.1.1 Addition

3.1.1.1 Morphology. Morphologically, additions in Latin are of two types: overtly expressed and non-overtly expressed operations. Among the world's languages, overt additions follow three possible patterns: they are shaped on

coordinations, on comitative expressions, or on local expressions.[49] Latin is a coordination-type language. The overt additions are marked, as is normal among the world's languages,[50] through the regular particles in Latin for coordination, mainly *et* (*uiginti et septem* Liv. 42,27,3; *quattuor et triginta* Liv. 23,35,19) and, much less often, other coordinators like *ac* (*ducentum ac uiginti* Liv 22,37,5) or *atque* (*tres atque decem* Aur.Vict. 17,7).

Non-overt additions are compounded through asyndetic juxtaposition (*uiginti septem* Liv. 3,8,10; *octoginta tres* Liv. 39,42,3). We know that, within Latin, this type of asyndetic association is restricted either to fixed constructions or to strongly marked coordinations (see Torrego, this work, vol. 1). Insofar as complex numerals do not seem to express marked coordinations, we must probably see in these phrases a form of fixed construction and perhaps a first step toward univerbation, as likely happened with *undecim, duodecim,* etc.

In pre-Classical and Classical literary Latin, both overtly expressed and non-overtly expressed operations can be used for any of the complex numbers formed by addition. In theory, there were four possible formal combinations of an atom and a base:[51]

(a) with coordinating conjunction: "atom + base"or "base + atom"
(b) asyndetic: "atom-base"or "base-atom"

In Latin only three combinations are normally attested: atom *et* base (91), base *et* atom (92), and base-atom (without nexus) (93).[52]

(91) Liv. 1,60,3: *quinque et uiginti*

(92) Liv. 42,27,3: *uiginti et quinque*

49. Heine (1997: 23).
50. Hurford (1987: 226).
51. Typologically, the order higher + lower is more frequent. It is explained on the basis of cognitive (Greenberg 1978: 274) or pragmatic factors (Stampe 1976: 603).
52. Apparently, Prediction 33 of Greenberg (1978) is not valid for Latin: "When there is word order variation in addition between larger and smaller, and one order has an overt link and the other has not, it is always the order smaller + larger which has the link". This prediction seems to be applicable only to languages where there is complementary distribution between overtly and non-overtly expressed addition. In Latin, overt and non-overt additions are used for both possible word orders.

(93) Liv. 6,5,8: *uiginti quinque*
'twenty five'

As for the fourth structure (asyndetic atom-base), I have not found any instances among cardinal numerals. However, it does not seem completely impossible if we take into consideration the existence of ordinal formations like that of (114).

(94) Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 3,1,17: *septimo uicesimo die*
'on the twenty-seventh day'

3.1.1.2 More than two additions. When a complex number is formed through more than two additions, the following patterns can be found in literary Latin:
(i) Only the last addition is expressed (95).
(ii) Only the addition between the highest one and the rest of the numbers is expressed (96).
(iii) None of the additions is overtly expressed (97).

(95) Colum. 2,12,8: *centum decem et quinque*
'one hundred fifteen'

(96) Liv. 37,59,5: *vasorum argenteorum … mille pondo et quadraginta uiginti tria*
'of silver cups one thousand and four hundred twenty-three pounds'

(97) Liv. 37,59,5: *vasorum … aureorum mille pondo uiginti tria*
'of golden cups one thousand twenty-three pounds'

3.1.1.3 Non-grammaticalization. In pre-Classical and Classical Latin, complex numerals, in spite of their strong semantic unity, have not yet reached a high degree of grammaticalization as fixed constructions. This is proved by the fact that they do not require contiguity between their components. In fact, other parts of the sentence can be interposed between them.

(98) a. Liv. 27,29,8: *octaginta erant et tres naues*
'there were eighty-three ships'
b. Cic. *rep.* 2,53: *ducentos annos et uiginti*
'two hundred years and twenty'

3.1.2 Multiplication

In Latin, multiplication had the following characteristics.

(i) As in most languages where it is used, multiplication is never overtly expressed in Latin (Greenberg 1978: 268). This undoubtedly facilitated the creation of one-word formations, such as *uiginti, triginta* (lit. 'two tens', 'three tens'), etc., and *ducenti, trecenti* (lit. 'two hundreds', 'three hundreds'), etc., formed by the combination of an atom and the bases for tens and hundreds, respectively.

(ii) The multiplier always precedes the multiplicand.[53]

(iii) The multiplicand is always a simple term, not a complex one.[54]

Productive patterns of multiplication in historical times are restricted to two types of formations.

(a) The numeral noun *milia* constitutes the multiplicand of complex numbers by preposing other cardinals that act as adjectival multipliers. Multiplier can be any number, either simple atoms (99) or complex numerals (100).

(99) Liv. 21,5,11: *centum milia*
'one hundred thousand'

(100) Liv. 40,38,6: *centum et quinquaginta milia*
'one hundred and fifty thousand'

(b) An adverb of frequency (*bis, ter, quater*, etc.) can be preposed to numerals of other series, such as cardinals (101) or distributives (102), to generate high numbers. Sometimes it is possible to find sequences of adverbs in a sequence of multiplications (103).

(101) Cic. *Cluent.* 28: *deciens centum milium aeris*
'one million in coined bronze' (lit. 'ten times one hundred thousand of bronze')

(102) Liv. 10,30,5: *peditum sexiens centena milia*
'six hundred thousand infantry' (lit. 'six times one hundred thousand')

53. Greenberg (1989).
54. Stampe (1976).

(103) Liv. *perioch.* 89: *redactum est sestertium* ***ter milies quingenties***
'they collected three hundred fifty million sesterces'

As in the case of addition, in pre-Classical and Classical Latin complex numerals formed through multiplication do not constitute closed phrases, and in certain cases other constituents of the sentence can appear between the members of the numeral (104).

(104) Liv. 30,7,13: *omnis exercitus fuit triginta ferme milium armatorum*
'the total strength of the army was about thirty thousand armed men'

3.1.3 Subtraction

In Latin, subtraction is always overtly expressed; it takes the form of a regular prepositional phrase with the preposition *de*. Subtrahend always precedes minuend: *duo de uiginti, duo de triginta*, and so on.

Subtractive complex numerals present features of univerbation, in particular when the number 'one' is the subtrahend. In those cases the term *unus* appears apocopated (*undeuiginiti, undetriginta*), and the number is conventionally written as a single word.

3.2 Patterns of development

In general, throughout the history of the Latin language the internal syntax of numerals undergoes a process of simplification of the many possible patterns. Additionally, there is a progressive stabilization of complex numerals; this extends into Romance languages, with the creation of new morphological units (atoms): Sp. *veinticuatro* < *veinte y cuatro* 'twenty-four'; It. *trentuno* < *trenta uno*. The main lines of this development in Latin are as follows.

(a) Although the distribution among atoms, bases, and complex numerals remains basically the same, atoms over 10 (*undecim–septemdecim*)[55] develop into regular additive formations: *unus et decem, decem septem,* etc.

55. Atoms over 10 in Latin are the result of univerbation of former complex formations.

This substitution is not restricted to vulgar registers or late varieties of the language but also appears in literary Latin, especially in Livy. As is well known, this process was to be successful in all the Romance languages for the highest tens, although to different degrees (cf. Section 1.3.1.2).

(b) Among operations, subtraction tends to disappear. Regular additive formations are present already in pre-Classical Latin (*octo et decem, decem octo*). In Late Latin only the lowest subtractions are still present (*duodeuiginti, undeuiginti, duodetriginta, undetriginta*, very isolated *undequadraginta*). The most usual formations in the texts of the third and fourth centuries CE[56] are those formed on the ten plus the unit: *decem octo, decem nouem*; *decem et octo, uiginti et octo*, etc.

(c) Multiplication is maintained for *milia* up to late times in the patterns of Classical literary Latin. However, the use of multiplicative adverbs decays progressively.[57]

(d) Addition undergoes a process of simplification of patterns. So the type "larger number + smaller number" is much more frequent than the other way around. The operation can be overtly expressed or not, but the absence of the copulative conjunction is much more frequent. Table 6 shows these tendencies.

3.3 Preliminary conclusions on the internal syntax of numerals

Basically, complex numerals in Latin are built on the patterns of regular syntagms, either with coordination, adjectival determination, or prepositional phrases. In pre-Classical and Classical times, however, they are not yet strongly fixed constructions.

Over the course of time, the internal syntactic patterns became simplified and complex numbers underwent a process of stabilization that, in certain cases, resulted in univerbation.

56. Results from the BTL CD corpus.

57. Although we do not have detailed statistical studies on this topic, it is noticeable that in the whole Vulgate there seem to be only three instances of multiplication by means of frequency adverbs: *decies milies centena milia* (*Dan.* 7,10); *decies centena milia* (*II Esdr.* 14,9); *uicies milies dena milia* (*apoc.* 9,16).

Table 6. The development of the patterns of addition among complex numbers[a]

	Cicero		Livy		Late authors[b]		Vulgate	
higher *et* lower	5	(33 %)	4	(3 %)	1	(5 %)	14	(12 %)
lower *et* higher	7	(47 %)	61	(52 %)	7	(33 %)		
higher-lower	3	(20 %)	53	(45 %)	13	(62 %)	102	(88 %)
Total (100%)	15		118		21		116	

a. The table offers the results of all the complex numbers in which the higher number is *uiginti, octoginta*, or *centum*. When either *uiginti* or *octoginta* is combined with *centum* the number is counted only once among the data of *centum*.

b. See Table 2.

4. The evolution of *unus* into the indefinite article

4.1 The process

In the preceding sections we have reviewed the most important semantic and syntactic changes undergone by numerals in the history of Latin. All these changes have affected the structure and form of the Latin numeral system apparently without further consequences, either syntactic or semantic, outside that system. There is, however, an important change that affects the whole system of semantic reference in Latin. This is the evolution of *unus* 'one' from numeral to the main marker of indeterminacy. In contrast to the rest of the syntactic phenomena related to numerals, this important topic has been widely studied and we have enough information to reconstruct the diachronic development of the phenomenon.[58]

The departing point of the evolution of *unus* is, obviously, its use as a singulative numeral, which is its original function. Actually, in most cases

58. A selected bibliography can be found in Wehr (1984: 39–46), together with a collection of early examples of uses of *unus* as indefinite determiner. The phenomenon is also studied within a typological frame by Lehmann (1995: 49–55) and Haspelmath (1997: 253–256). It is considered together with the grammaticalization of the rest of the determiners in Late Latin and Romance languages by Selig (1992). Among recent contributions, that by Meisterfeld (2000) offers a summary of the *status quaestionis*.

in Classical and post-Classical Latin, *unus* is used regularly as a numeral. It appears as an adjective (105) or a pronoun (106).

(105) a. Cic. *Q. Rosc.* 42: *ex his* ***unus*** *mihi* ***testis*** *est producendus qui pecuniam datam dicat*
'I must produce one witness from among these men to say that the money was paid'

b. *Itin. Eger.* 29,4: *ad quingentos passus de eodem loco dicitur* ***unus ymnus*** *et* ***una antiphona***
'five hundred feet from the same point a hymn and an antiphon are recited'

(106) a. Cic. *S. Rosc.* 139: *dum necesse erat resque ipsa cogebat,* ***unus*** *omnia poterat*
'while it was necessary and the state of affairs demanded it, one man alone possessed all power'

b. *Itin. Eger.* 24,5: ***unus*** *ex diaconibus facit commemorationem singulorum*
'one of the deacons reads the *memento* of every one of the names'

In general, *unus* refers to indefinite specific entities, and its function as a numeral is to stress their singularity. This was the difference between *unus* and *quidam* 'certain', the normal Latin marker for indefinite specific entities, but without singulative effect (107).[59]

(107) Cic. *Tusc.* 5,61: *nam cum* ***quidam*** *ex eius adsentatoribus, Damocles, commemoraret in sermone copias eius . . .*
'for when one of his flatterers, named Damocles, was engaged in conversation about his troops. . . '

Nevertheless *unus* is also attested referring to nonspecific entities in some contexts, such as with negation (108) or when referred to a member of a limited group (109).

59. See, e. g., Codoñer (1968), Orlandini (1981), and Bertocchi et al. (this work, vol. 3).

Table 7. Development of *unus* into an indefinite determiner

Latin		Romance
−definite +singulative + (±) specific	⇒	−definite −singulative ±specific

(108) Cic. *Phil.* 1,14: ... *sed* ***ne unus*** *modo consularis ... dignus illo honore, dignus re publica inueniretur*
'... but in order that not one consul only might have been found worthy of the honor he held, worthy of the State'

(109) a. Cic. *de orat.* 1,132: *id enim est maxime uitandum et de hoc uno minime est facile praecipere non mihi modo, qui sicut* ***unus*** *pater familias his de rebus loquor, sed etiam ipsi illi Roscio*
'for that is above all else to be avoided, and as to this particular failing it is especially difficult to lay down rules, difficult not only for me, who talks of these matters like the patron of the house, but even for the great Roscius himself'

b. Cic. *Att.* 9,10,2: *non omnibus in rebus labentem uel potius ruentem Pompeium tamquam* ***unus*** *manipularis secutus sim*
'I did not follow Pompey like a private soldier, when he was slipping in all things or rather rushing to ruin'

The development of *unus* into an indefinite determiner implies semantically two important changes: first, the loss of the singulative meaning, and, second, the generalization of the nonspecific uses. Indefiniteness was simply maintained.[60]

Table 7 reproduces the first and the last steps of the change.

Three questions must be answered to understand the process:

(i) What were the stages of the development and its chronology?

(ii) What were the conditions where the change took place?

(iii) What was the relationship to other Latin markers of indefiniteness: the specific *quidam* and the nonspecific *aliquis*?

60. Typologically, terms which evolve into indefinite articles acquire first indefinite uses and only later nonspecific uses (Lyons 1999: 355–356).

4.2 Stages of development

The stages of the development can be reconstructed in comparison with similar phenomena in other languages. It has been proposed that crosslinguistically,[61] in particular for Romance languages,[62] the singulative feature is the first to disappear. Afterward, specificity would also lose its predominance, and *unus* would become neutral with respect to this feature. The pattern of development would, then, be: indefinite, singulative, (mostly) specific quantifier > indefinite, nonsingulative, (±)specific determiner > indefinite determiner. Each step implies the elimination of a feature. In Latin there is partial evidence for this evolution. There are traces of the loss of the singulative meaning as early as Plautus, where we find plural forms for *unus* (110).[63]

(110) Plaut. *Trin.* 166: *ruri dum sum ego* ***unos*** *sex dies*
'I was in the country for a mere six days'

For a long time *unus,* in the singular, probably remained ambiguous as to whether or not it had a singulative meaning. Nevertheless, the frequency of the reinforcement of *unus* with other singulative elements in late texts (111) is evidence of the loss of the singulative meaning. By that time, the use of *unus* alone would have probably led to an interpretation of the term as a marker of indefiniteness and nonspecificity.

(111) a. *Itin. Eger.* 25,6: ***una tantum*** *die dominica*
'only on one single Sunday'
b. *Itin. Eger.* 35,2: *dicitur ibi* ***unus*** *ymnus* ***tantum***
'and only one hymn is recited there'

As for specificity, there are also examples in Plautus of the nonspecific use of *unus* even when it is not used in some of the marked contexts already mentioned.

(112) Plaut. *Amph.* 697: *paulisper mane, dum edormiscat* ***unum somnum***
'wait a while till she has completed one sleep'

61. See, for instance, Givón (1981), Wright and Givón (1987).
62. Price (1971), Elvira (1994).
63. Grandgent (1962: 33–34).

The loss of specificity left *unus* as a simple marker of indefiniteness. When that happened, its combination with *aliquis* (113) and, apparently, also with *quidam* (114) became possible.

(113) Cic. *Phil.* 10,3: … *ut* … *numquam tam frequens senatus fuerit ut* ***unus aliquis*** *sententiam tuam secutus sit?*
‘ … that the Senate has never been so full that a single Senator supported your opinion?’

(114) Quint. *inst.* 8,3,68: *apparebunt effusae per domus ac templa flammae et ruentium tectorum fragor et ex diuersis clamoribus* ***unus quidam*** *sonus*
‘there will come into view flames racing through houses and temples, the crash of falling roofs, a single sound made up of many cries’

These combinations were only possible if *unus* was already ambiguous about the feature of specificity. The data of Plautus show that the change had already started in the second century BCE.

In conclusion, the chronology of the development of *unus* is partially understood; it seems that already in early texts the process of its evolution into a marker of indefiniteness, with or without specificity, had started. As for the relative chronology of the two phenomena, we do not have direct evidence. It can be supposed, on the basis of what happens in other languages, that the loss of the feature of specifity implies somehow the previous loss of the singulative feature. In fact, quantification often implies specificity, because, in general, when we number a certain quantity of items, we are referring to concrete and specific entities. Only if *unus* had previously totally or partially lost its singulative meaning could it be used as a nonspecific determiner. Nevertheless, by the time of our first Latin texts the process had already started.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that *unus* maintained its original function as a quantifier all through the history of Latin up to the Romance languages. This is proved by the fact that in every Romance language both the term for ‘one’ and the indefinite article derive from Latin *unus*. We must, then, imagine a progressive separation of the uses of *unus*, as in other languages, so that in certain contexts it became progressively grammaticalized

as determiner of indefiniteness in addition to retaining its original use as a quantifier.[64]

4.3 Causes of the development

We pass now to our second question, that of the causes of the development, where we reveal through analysis of the contexts where *unus* has totally or partially lost its features of singulativity and specificity.

It has been proposed for languages where the numeral became the marker of indefinitiness that loss of the singulative feature began in contexts where the pragmatic interest was not in the singular condition of the entity referred to, but in some other information. This typically happens, for instance, in the very frequent contexts where a new topic is introduced into the discourse.[65] An example of this is (115), which can be compared with (116).

(115) Petron. 30,5: *cum conaremur in triclinium intrare, exclamauit* ***unus*** *ex pueris, qui supra hoc officium erat positus: . . .*
'we tried to get into the dining room, when one of the slaves, who was entrusted with this duty, cried: . . . '

(116) Petron. 41,6: *dum haec loquimur,* ***puer*** *speciosus . . . calathisco uuas circumtulit*
'as we were speaking, a beautiful boy brought around grapes in a little basket'

In such contexts, *unus* did not receive the focus of the attention and, in fact, as can be seen in (116), it was not at all necessary in the narration. The quantifying information was more or less expletive, because it was already given by the grammatical number of the head noun. In these cases, as the quantifying function of the term was not informatively relevant, only the feature of indefiniteness could be understood as justifying the use of *unus*. Ultimately, the term could be reinterpreted exclusively as a marker of indefinitiness.

64. Hopper and Traugott (1993: 116–117).
65. Givón (1981).

The absence of focus on the numeral is also frequent in the syntactic environment of focused attributes (117), or in the progressively grammaticalized juxtaposition *unus* … *alter* … (118).

(117) Ter. *Andr.* 117–119: *effertur; imus; interea inter mulieres / quae ibi aderant forte* ***unam*** *aspicio adulescentulam / forma…* :: *Bona fortasse?*
'(the body) was carried out, and we went along. Meanwhile among the women who were present I caught sight of a young girl whose looks were … :: Good, perhaps?'

(118) Cic. *orat.* 80: *ornatus autem uerborum duplex,* ***unus*** *simplificum,* ***alter*** *collocatorum*
'the embellishment given by words is twofold, from single words and from words as they are connected together'

Finally, this phenomenon is also present in sentences such as (108) and (109), where *unus* is used to determine a term that designates an individual within a certain group characterized by some common generic features (*consularis, pater familias, manipularis*). Under those conditions the focus of the informative interest is directed to the specific features of the group, and in consequence the nonspecificity of the member within the group is reinforced. The development would have been from 'each single member of the group' into 'any single member of the group'.[66]

In consequence, it seems rather clear that the loss of the singulative meaning in *unus* is associated with contexts where it was not focalized.

4.4 Relationship to *quidam* and *aliquis*

Finally, as a third question, we must consider the appurtenance between *unus* and *quidam*/*aliquis.* In fact, considering that *unus* lost the singulative feature, its meaning should have become very close to that of *quidam*, which marked specificity and indefiniteness. In a similar way, once *unus* lost the feature of specificity it also became more like *aliquis.* The final development of the

66. Meisterfeld (2000: 321–325).

Romance languages shows that *aliquis* survived in some zones (e.g., Sp. *alguien, algo* < *aliquem, aliquod*), whereas *quidam* disappeared throughout the Romance dominion. Nevertheless, it was still in use in late times (119).

(119) a. *Itin. Eger.* 1,1: *interea ambulantes peruenimus* ***ad quendam locum****, ubi se tamen montes illi … aperiebant*
'In the meantime, marching, we arrived at a certain place, where those mountains opened'

b. *Itin. Eger.* 20,5: *et martyrium ibi positum est, id est sancti* ***cuiusdam monachi*** *nomine Helpidi*
'and there a tomb has been erected; it is for a certain monk named Helpidius'

Why *unus* finally became the normal form for the indefinite in all the Romance languages, and the cause of the differing historical result for *quidam* and *aliquis*, have not been clearly established. As a hypothesis, it is possible to relate it to the process of reinforcement of the feature "definite/indefinite" within Latin. When a specific marker for "definite" was created, mainly by reinterpretation of the deictic *ille*, Latin had three different ways to express indefiniteness: one for specific referents (*quidam*), one for nonspecific referents (*aliquis*), and one neutral (*unus*). The fact that *unus* became an exclusive marker for indefiniteness, without indication of specificity or nonspecificity, made it a better candidate for wider distribution, useful in all those contexts where a precise indication of specificity or nonspecificity was unnecessary.

5. Summary and conclusions

The numeral system of Latin presents typologically consistent characteristics and, compared with those of other Indo-European languages, reached a high degree of development, both in the precision of its expressive possibilities and in the different specialized semantic series (cardinals, ordinals, distributives, etc.). As a second characteristic of Latin, the numeral system was a relatively conservative part of grammar and thus kept its main distinctive features throughout the history of the language. However, except for the lowest numbers, probably, the numeral system was never fully developed in its use.

Already in Classical Latin, and more clearly in late times, the system underwent a process of simplification that affected the following aspects.

(i) The procedures for creating numerals were reduced (disappearance of subtractive numerals).

(ii) Certain series of numerals (fractions, multiplicatives, frequency numbers) evolved progressively into expressions formed with cardinals and ordinals.

(iii) The categorial features of numerals were regularized (cardinals as adjectives, frequency words as adverbs).

(iv) The position of adjectival numerals tends to be fixed before the head of the noun phrase.

(v) The internal syntax of complex numbers reduced their structural possibilities.

Finally, in a particular change that affected only the numeral *unus*, we see the origin of the grammatical marker of indefiniteness in noun phrases.

All of these changes are in keeping with cross-linguistic typological predictions for numerals.

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Possession

1. Introduction

1.1 Relevant notions

The term “possession” includes a wide range of distinct linguistic phenomena that can differ either in their form or in their function. Possession is a complex domain which is expressed in conventionalized constructions in all the languages of the world. But despite its universality, possession presents a number of difficult problems to be resolved by linguistic analysis. If we try to single out the core of the vast, differentiated range of possibilities within human language, the essence of possession is, or is centered around, a relationship between at least two linguistic items. This characterization, though effective as a working rule of thumb, nevertheless includes too large a set of phenomena to be considered the realization of a single linguistic category or function. As a cognitive category, possession is a concept that tends to be described as being inherently vague or fuzzy. For example, the same possessive verb (*have* = *habeo*) is used in all the following expressions, no two of which share a common semantic core in terms of the possessive:

(a) *I have some money*
(Ter. *Haut.* 835: *minas decem habet filia*)

(b) *I have a favor to ask*
(Ter. *Andr.* 40: *habeo gratiam*)

(c) *I have three children*
(Ter. *Haut.* 93–94: *filium unicum habeo*)

(d) *I have an idea*
(Plaut. *Amph.* 545: *bonum animum habe*)

(e) *I have things to do*
(Cato *agr.* 156,4: *negotii si quid habebit*)

(f) *I have a project I'm working on*
(Plaut. *Mil.* 637: *ut apud te exemplum experiundi habeas*)

(g) *I have your books outside in my car*
(Cato *agr.* 88,2: *muriam … in sole habeto*)

(h) *I have no time*
(Plaut. *Epid.* 645: *non habeo ullam occasionem, ut apud te falsa fabuler*)

(i) *I have a bad cold*
(Cato *agr.* 157,9: *et si febrim non habebit*)

(j) *I have my paper done*
(Cato *agr.* 143,2: *cibum uti coctum habeat*)

(k) *We're having a nice summer in the east this year*
(Plaut. *Cist.* 49: *istam quam nunc habeas aetatulam*)

(l) *This building has two doors*
(Caes. *Gall.* 7,15,5: *urbs … unum habeat et perangustum aditum*)

Compare also the following "genitive" expressions, which show an equally diverse set of semantic concepts:

(m) *I love the city of Rome*
(Verg. *Aen.* 1,27: *urbem Pataui*)

(n) *This is the husband of my sister*
(Liv. 24,41,5: *Hasdrubal Gisgonis filius*)

(o) *The legs of the table*
(Catull. 17,3: *crura ponticuli*)

(p) *The legs of that little dog*
(Colum. 7,5,18: *fracta pecudum non aliter quam hominum sanantur*)

(q) *The last day of the month*
(Plin. *nat.* 8,94: *quattuorque menses hiemis*)

(r) *He is a person of the highest character*
(Caes. *civ.* 3,74: *superioris ordinis nonnulli*)

(s) *Max's sister was shocking*
(Cic. *Cluent.* 16,3: *molestia cotidianis querimoniis et assiduo fletu sororis*)

(t) *Max's death was shocking*.
(Cic. *Phil.* 13,46: *ulcisci parati sunt una nobiscum Caesaris mortem*)

The list could be greatly expanded to include possessive pronouns (cf. the semantic difference in the possessive in *my father/pater meus* vs. *my inheritance/patrimonium meum*), as well as other "possessive" expressions (e.g., *San Francisco's weather is pleasant*), but the implication should be clear: possession is not a simple monosemantic category, nor is there a single construction used to express it. Furthermore, possessive expressions carry not only semantic functions, but also syntactic ones such as the marking of the perfect tense (*habeo factum*), and so on. Given this complexity, we may take Seiler's characterization as a working definition: possession is the representation of a relationship between a substance [A] and another substance [B]. The characteristics of A and B are defined in prototypical terms; that can be summed up as follows: the possessor entity is prototypically higher in empathy, animate (more specifically, human), close to the cognitive category labeled "ego", and normally the topic; the *possessum*, the possessed entity, is prototypically lower in empathy and is the comment. The nature of the "relationship" between A and B is described semantically as follows by Seiler (1983: 11):

> the domain of POSSESSION can be defined as bio-cultural. It is the relationship between a human being and his kinsmen, his body parts, his material belongings, his cultural and intellectual products.

He offers the following syntactic characterization (ibid.):

> Syntactically speaking, POSSESSION is a relation between nominal and nominal, which is not mediated by a verb. Predication, specifically a verb of possession, does contribute to the expression of POSSESSION – but only to the extent that such a predication or such a verb refers to the particular mode of the possessive relationship and to nothing else.

It should be pointed out that such a wide, semantically vague profile has much in common with the notion of the *sphère personnelle* that was elaborated and defined by Charles Bally (1926) and that appears, essentially, as a semantic category: "Les choses et les êtres associés à une personne d'une façon

habituelle, intime, organique (p. ex. le corps et ses parties, les vêtements, la famille, etc.)". It is important to stress that such a large category does not coincide with a specific kind of relation (either at the referential, the semantic, or, more generally, the linguistic level), like ownership, kinship, or prototypical possession. Nor should it be conceived of only as an inherent relation, as established relationships may also be represented in the personal sphere (e.g., *my car*).

In Seiler's view, the expression of possession instantiates a scale of linguistic structures that constitute what he calls an "operational dimension", which ranges from the possessive noun phrase (characterized in its simplest instances by mere sequence of nominals) to the possessive predication. At the ends of this dimension are ideally placed two "functional principles", to which correspond two different kinds (or instantiations) of possession: inherent possession versus established possession (cf. Seiler 1983: 80). Inherent possession refers to a relation inherently given by the very nature of the possessor and the *possessum* (like that between a human being and one of his body parts, e.g., a NP like Eng. *my hand*) and it is, therefore, conceptually "included" in the *possessum*. Established possession is, on the other hand, the result of a process, namely a process of acquisition of a certain state of possession, which represents new information; a temporal *prius* and *postquam* therefore seem implied.

A further step toward the refinement of a prototypical definition of possessor and *possessum* is the "Reference Point model" put forth by Langacker (1995) as the basic cognitive principle common to all possessive constructions: the possessor is the known, more salient entity and it is the topic to which the *possessum* has to be related in order to be individuated. Such a framing represents a step (though not the only one; see for example Velazquez Castillo 1996) toward accounting for the feature of asymmetry that seems to characterize possession in natural languages.

A further enumeration of the issues and categories relevant to the analysis of possession includes the degree of control exercised by the possessor over the *possessum*; the duration (temporary or permanent) of the possession; the physical proximity of the possessor to the *possessum*; the relative autonomy and the alienability/inalienability of the *possessum*. These concepts intersect with other notions critical to possession such as the nature of the possessor (e.g., animate/inanimate), the nature of the *possessum* (e.g., abstract/concrete,

relational/nonrelational), and the nature of the verb (e.g., an abstract verb of existence, a copula, or a concrete verb of grasping or holding). These in turn interact with certain discourse-based linguistic features, such as givenness, focality, topicality, or vividness to mark various types of possession and related notions. Of course, not all of these factors come into play in specifying every possessive relation; for example, proximity does not seem to play a part in Indo-European languages. One consistently relevant factor seems to be the relative values of animacy for the *possessum* and the possessor.

The two different approaches adopted by Seiler and Langacker are interpreted by Ch. Lehmann as two aspects of the same matter. Lehmann frames them into a picture of possession as both a *Grundbedeutung* and a *Gesamtbedeutung*: "The former identifies a prototype on the basis of the properties and semantic roles of the entities involved, the latter looks for a general schema based on cognitive processing" (1998a: 3). Another relevant feature highlighted by Lehmann is that "the relationship between the possessor and the possessum prototypically has zero intension"; or, in other words, "the possessive relation itself is basically empty" (1998a: 6). Possession, therefore, is not simply characterized by polysemy (a feature that becomes obvious even from a simple glance at the examples considered in (a)–(t) above), but also by the considerable semantic opacity characteristic of this domain. The important consequence of such a state of affairs, given the asymmetry in terms of empathy and individuation between possessor and *possessum*, is that control of the possessum by the possessor is the default assumption and is also the default interpretation of the possessive relation:

> In the present context, control is not an action or activity. Instead, it is the basis of the relationship between an actor and an undergoer of a situation. For X to control Y means that X has Y under its control, that X is somehow prior to Y and Y somehow depends on X. Incidentally, this corresponds to the traditional analysis of the general meaning (*Gesamtbedeutung*) of the verb *have*. It may be specified by additional semantic features which yield interpretations of the sort that X possesses Y, that X has produced Y, that Y stems from X etc. The status of control as a default corollary to the prototypical possessive relationship needs to be clarified. It means that although prototypically the possessive relation itself has zero intension, the semantic vacuum is filled up by implicature. This implicature may become a conventional semantic feature in a language system. (Lehmann 1998a: 6–7)

In short, the domain of possession can be described as a sort of constellation of forms, functions, and semantic categories that are related (as linguistic phenomena are) to psychological and physical phenomena at the referential level. Consequently, the approach adopted here is strongly based on the following principles and methodological foundations:

(a) A functional perspective seems to be the one most consistent with the object under investigation, because the phenomena of possession can be recognized among the vast and differentiated panorama of forms and traced back to a single rationale only at the functional level. Far from being simply an example of circularity, such a state of affairs is the consequence of adopting a notion that is, in part, the product of an empirical generalization made from a wide, cross-linguistic experience, where the existence and consistency of a linguistic phenomenon such as possession in general is a demonstrable fact.[1]

(b) The set of relationships and functions that characterize the domain of possession in a certain language shapes a sort of constellation-structure. This structure seems to be a general, constant feature of the domain but shows a specific, differentiated profile according to the language under examination. As it has proved to be effectively useful in a number of previous works devoted to possession, we will often refer to a prototypical notion of possession, in order to set some sort of a firm landmark within the very heterogeneous range of phenomena and relations that characterize this constellation.

(c) Semantically, the domain of possession is considered to be structured around a recurrent, limited number of categories, such as prototypical possession, physical possession, part–whole relations, and kinship and body part

1. To adopt the functional perspective as a methodological framework enables us not to exceed the scope of the investigation. In principle, a one-to-one correspondence between a possessive function and a possessive structure can be deceptive. For example, the function of a predicate of possession (i.e., the predication of a possessive relation) can be fulfilled by a construction that is not possessive but, apparently, simply existential, as in Kobon (Papuan) *yad kay mid-öp* = I pig exist-3SG.PF = ‘I have a pig’ lit: ‘as far as I am concerned, a pig exists’ (Stassen 2001: 98). The predicate of possession can also be simply identificatory, as in *this is my dog*. A strictly form-based analysis would imply a failure to recognize that the motivation behind these sentences is not completely understood by reference to the functions of existential or identificatory predicates, nor of possessive noun phrases.

relations, the number and nature of which may depend on language-specific factors. The defining lines of a prototypical relation of possession will be kept as simple as possible, in order not to multiply and obscure the complexity of relations that are expressed in a given language by possessive constructions. For instance, as a working definition of prototypical possession we suggest that in a prototypical relation of possession, the possessor should be characterized in terms of the following:
(i) a human being;
(ii) the topic and/or given information.
The *possessum* is characterized as follows:
(i) a concrete, inanimate entity;
(ii) the comment and/or new information.
The prototypical instance is one containing a human possessor and a concrete object the possessor can use, control, or the like, according to the specific features of the *possessum*. Such a relation of prototypical possession is characterized as essentially asymmetrical in terms of empathy, cognitive salience, agentivity, control, and so on, such that these and other general definitional parameters always present a higher value in the possessor than in the *possessum*.

(d) The semantic content of prototypical possessive expressions is centered around the semantic space of the personal sphere, which, because of its extremely wide and highly differentiated extension, will be considered only as a generic reference for the entire domain.

(e) The polysemous character of the domain has a manifold nature. A possessive structure can be characterized by polysemy. The same form can express more than one possessive category, as in *I have a car* and *I have a son* (prototypical possession and kinship). A possessive structure can be characterized by specific markers which formally reflect a different possessive category at the semantic level, as in *I have a car, I own a car* (prototypical possession and ownership).[2] In possessive structures, semantic ambiguity can be context-related in a functional way. For example, *I have a car* does not mean *I own it*, but it implies this meaning in the absence of other specifica-

2. See again Velazquez Castillo (1996) for an illustration of a different noun phrase possessive structure according to the alienable or inalienable character of the *possessum*.

tions; it can express a different kind of possessive relation when an expression like [*I have the car*] *that you own* is introduced into the discussion.

1.2 Structures and functions: Attributive possession and predicative possession

As the functional approach we have adopted is essentially a matter of perspective, it has to be integrated with a careful analysis of the formal structures involved. On the morphosyntactic level, possession has two main structural realizations: the noun phrase and the sentence. Possession is said to be predicative when it is expressed by a syntactic construction whose function is to predicate the existence of a possessive relation. This construction often involves a verb such as *have* or *be*, which expresses the possessive notion, though not necessarily. Attributive possession consists of nominal phrases which are linked together according to certain parameters, such as word order or the presence/absence of possessive marker(s). The main function of attributive possession is the characterization and/or identification of the *possessum*, as this is lower in empathy with respect to the possessor (according to the Reference Point schema of Langacker 1995), although other functions, such as the specification of the kind of possessive relation involved, are also possible. Given this state of affairs, *possessum* and possessor in attributive possession are generally referred to as, respectively, Head and Modifier of the possessive noun phrase. Attributive possession differs from predicative possession in that attributive possession presents typically presupposed rather than asserted information (Heine 1997: 143).[3]

3. Other kinds of morphosyntactic phenomena, mainly at the noun phrase level, could in principle be taken into consideration, such as compounding and adjectivalizations. Such structures often carry a possessive function, as they can express attributes and properties related to a nominal which has much in common with a possessor. However, as pointed out by Lehmann (1998a: 12), these constructions are characterized by a change at the semantic level in the notion expressed by the nominal to which they refer. This places the basic function of these phenomena almost outside the functional boundaries of the domain of possession (where attributive possession fundamentally has a characterizing function, and predicative possession has an existential function) and they will be dealt with only to a minor extent. As far as compounding is concerned, despite the fact that

Given the characteristics of the possession domain, there are consequences that bring about two rather different functional-semantic profiles: in the case of predicative possession, the prototypical instance involves an established kind of possession. That is, a simple, declarative, unmarked possessive sentence contains information about a possession that is not inherent in the nature of the possessor and the *possessum*. A predication stating such an obvious state of affairs (e.g., *I have a head*) would be nonfunctional and therefore cannot be a typical instance.

Prototypical attributive possession, on the other hand, does not simply hold an identical relation with inherent possession: *my head, my father* are just as typical as *my son* or *my car*. The semantic sphere beyond attributive constructions seems somehow larger and tends to overlap with the *sphère personelle*.

Within a cross-language perspective, all of the world's languages have a coding for the expression of "being", which they can also use to predicate the possessive relation; additionally, there are many languages which also have a specific verb to express possession, a kind of "have" verb. Stassen (2001) identifies four types of predicative possession:[4] (a) the "topic" possessive type, where the *possessum* is marked as the grammatical subject of a locational/existential verb 'be' and the possessor is constructed outside the sentence nucleus, as a sentential topic;[5] (b) the "locational" type, where the

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bahuvrihi compounds played a considerable role in some ancient Indo-European languages (namely Greek and Indo-Iranian), their essential character remained peripheral in Latin throughout its history. Indeed, apart from a few inherited possessive compounds such as *magnanimus, bipes*, and the like, and inherited adjective or noun-plus-verb formations of the *calefacio, tergiuersor* type, *bahuvrihi* and indeed most other compounds found in Latin are almost entirely literary calques based on Greek. They therefore lie outside the specific examination of possession in Latin, though they deserve attention in a wider discussion of attributive possession. See Baldi (2002b) for discussion.

4. See Hagège (1982: 48) for a similar overview. For a different ordering of the phenomena, see Heine (1997).

5. Stassen (2001) offers an example from Tondano (Austronesian, Philippine): *si tuama si wewean wale rua* = AN.SG man TOP exists house two = 'The man has two houses'. It should be noted that under this type can also be classified a kind of verbless possessive predicate that occurs, for example, in Guaraní (Velazquez Castillo 1996: 13): (*che*) *cheróga* = I INACTIVE-house = 'I have a house'. This kind of predicate is structurally very similar to the normal Guaraní possessive noun phrase, which has the simple form

possessum is marked as the grammatical subject of a locational/existential verb 'be' and the possessor is marked by means of a locational case (locative, dative, etc.);[6] (c) the "conjunctional" possessive, where the possessor is marked as the grammatical subject of a locational/existential or copular verb 'be' and the *possessum* is constructed as a comitative phrase;[7] (d) a transitive type, where the possessor is the grammatical subject of a formally transitive verb and the *possessum* is the direct object.[8] Proto-Indo-European and many of its descendants seem to instantiate the locative possessive type.[9] As Latin displays a possessive sentence being built on the verb *sum* 'be' and the dative case (which has always been considered the main possessive predicative construction in this language), it is traditionally regarded as belonging to the locational type or, in Isačenko's terms, as a so called "*be*-language".[10]

Attributive possession, on the other hand, includes genitival (source) constructions (*Bill's hat, the tail of the dog, the dog from Bill*), adnominal (goal)

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possessor *possessum* (ibid. 49). The distinctive features of such a type of predicative possession seem to be centered, therefore, not on the kind of verb, but on the character of the topic and on the initial position of the possessor. It is the "simplest" type and it can consequently be hypothesized that it has features in common with the structure of attributive possession, and that its possessive status relies consistently on the semantic values of the nominals involved.

6. Cf. Written Mongolian *na-dur morn bui* = 1SG-LOC horse be.3SG.PRES = 'I have a horse', from Stassen (2001). In this type, we note that the possessor is not external to the sentence nucleus, but it is somehow an adjunct, and is encoded within a prepositional noun phrase having a formally locative value, which accompanies a presentative-existential sentence. As is typical with presentative-existential sentences, the subject does not show a purely topic status but is instead rhematic since it is the major piece of information carried by the presentative-existential verb, as in English *there*-sentences (see Givón 1990: 746–747; Perrot 1994: 22, 1998: 642). Given the general characteristics of the possessor, the constituent in the prepositional noun phrase is likely to be the sentence topic and can be expected to precede the *possessum* in the syntactic sequence.
7. Cf. Sango (Niger-Kordofanian, Ubangian) *lo eke na bongo* = 3SG be and/with garment = 's/he has garment', from Stassen (2001).
8. Cf. Albanian (Indo-European) *Une kam një laps* = 1SG.NOM have.1SG.PRES INDEF pencil = 'I have a pencil', from Stassen (2001).
9. For a typological/geographical survey of Indo-European predicative possessive expressions, see Baldi and Cuzzolin (2005). Note, however, that the transitive type is well attested even outside Indo-European; cf. e.g. Malagasy (Austronesian, West Indonesian).
10. See Isačenko (1974).

dative constructions (*the father to/for her*), locative constructions (*the dog at Bill*), companion constructions (*the dog with Bill),* possessive pronoun constructions (*my car*), topic constructions (*As for Bill, his car*) and compound (*bahuvrihi*) constructions (*big-hearted, redhead*). A general typological classification of the possible phenomena of attributive possession deals with the following parameters: (a) word order, the order of the constituents of the noun phrase; (b) the presence/absence of possessive markers; (c) the location and number of possessive markers within the noun phrase; (d) the nominal or pronominal character of the possessor. Cross-linguistic data seem to provide all the logical possibilities, as far as combinatory variants are concerned. Both possessor–*possessum* and *possessum*–possessor sequences occur: e.g. *John's book* and It. *il libro di Giovanni*. The possessive marker on the Modifier is common among Indo-European languages, as in *Catulli liber*. The other types are well attested inside and outside the Indo-European family.[11] Still another parameter can be put into play. There are languages that show a different marker, according to the different semantic content of the possessive relation expressed by the possessive noun phrase (e.g., alienable vs. inalienable), such as Fijian *ulu-qu* 'my head' (as body part) vs. *kequ-ulu* 'my head' (e.g., a head which is being taken as food); cf. Gamkrelidze and Ivanov (1995: 252).

1.3 Texts and parameters

To assign a typological frame to a language like Latin is not a simple task. Word order is emblematic. Judging from Caesar or Cicero, Latin generally places the verb at the end of the sentence. But the majority of data from Plautus shows SVO sentences (see Adams 1976). The picture of possession does not appear to be much simpler. Consequently, as many texts as possible have

11. See Heine (1997: 148) for examples of possessive marker on the Head (e.g., Afrikaans: *die boer se huis* = the farmer his house-3.SG.POSS = 'the farmer's house') and of possessive markers on either the Head and the Modifier (e.g., Turkish *Ahmed-in ev-i* = Ahmed-GEN house-3.SG.POSSESSIVE = lit. 'Ahmed's his house' = 'Ahmed's house'). See Velazquez Castillo (1996: 50) for an example of no (overt) possessive marker (Guaraní *ña Maria róga* = Ms. Maria house = 'Ms. Maria's house' (see also the Old French facts in Heine 1997: 150).

been examined. The reduced availability of large corpora from the archaic period forced us to undertake an examination of the full corpora of Plautus, Terence, and Cato's *de agricultura*, plus some of the most significant epigraphic texts. In this way, influences due to potentially misleading metrical factors have been reduced considerably by considering them against the vast number of occurrences which have proven independently to be quite coherent and consistent regardless of author, or whether the texts in which they are found are prose or poetry. For the Classical period and for Late Latin, a certain preference has been given to prose texts, thereby eliminating metrical influences.[12]

Given the complexity of the semantic aspect of possession, much attention has been focused on the following parameters: the animate character of the constituents (±human); their abstract/concrete status; the established or inherent character of the relation expressed; the kind of possessive relation according to a limited set of types that are typically relevant: prototypical possession (as previously defined), physical possession, kinship, body parts, part–whole relations, and the so called "experiencer" relation.[13]

Especially for predicative possession, the definiteness of the constituents has been considered, as well as major pragmatic-communicative factors. In this respect, we have focused considerable attention on pragmatics at the sentence level, which implies an analysis of the topic–comment characterization of the elements. We have also given special attention to discourse-oriented

12. The complete list of all Latin texts examined for predicative constructions is: Plautus (entire corpus); Terence (entire corpus); Cato, *de agricultura*; Caesar, *de bello Gallico*; Cicero, *epistulae* (61 letters: *ad Atticum* 1,2; 2,8; 3,1; 3,2; 3,3; 3,4; 3,7; 3,25; 3,26; 3,27; 4,1; 7,10; 12,35; 12,36; 14,1; 14,2; 14,3; 14,4; 14,5; 14,6; 14,7; 14,8; 14,12; 15,4; 15,4a; 16,5; *ad familiares* 1,9; 2,2; 2,4; 4,5; 4,6; 4,13; 5,1; 5,2; 5,4; 5,6; 5,7; 5,12; 6,15; 6,16; 6,17; 7,1; 11,1; 14,1; 14,2; 14,3; 14,4; 14,5; 14,6; 14,7; 14,8; 14,9; 14,10; 14,11; 14,12; 14,17; 14,18; 14,19; 14,20; 16,21; *ad Brutum* 1,17); Vergil, *Aeneis* (book 1); T. Livy (book 1); Seneca, *ep*. (book 1); Pliny the Younger, *ep*. (book 1); Tacitus, *Agricola*; Petronius, *Satyricon*; Apicius, *de re coquinaria*; *Itinerarium Egeriae*. Given the higher numerical occurrence of genitive phrases and the like, the spolium for attributive constructions is limited to the following texts: Plaut., *Amph.*; Cato, *agr.* (1–30); Caes., *Gall.* (1.1–30); Petron. 1–20; *Itin. Eger.* 1–10. The purpose of the spolium of the aforementioned texts is mainly to provide numerical data to support our analysis and conclusions. Of course, occurrences from other texts are also quoted any time they are relevant to discussion.

13. See Bossong (1998: 259–260).

factors, either of a pragmatic or a semantic nature, and to their possible correlations. Word order has also been deemed (at least) symptomatic of syntactic and pragmatic phenomena and therefore has often been taken into account, but given the nonrigid character of word order in Latin, it has been approached and analyzed mainly in terms of tendencies.

2. Predicative possession: From the archaic period to Late Latin

2.1 *Mihi est x* and *habeo x*

Throughout the history of Latin, predicative possession is linked to two main basic predicative types: the dative + *esse* construction and the verb *habeo*.[14] These constructions are found through every chronological stage of the language, with *habeo* finally dominating as the major syntactic device for predicative possession by the beginning of the Late Latin period. We will try to describe the "working" patterns of the two constructions (i.e., to see how they work *in vivo*, within the texts) and to follow their developments from the earliest attestations. This is done by means of a contrastive, comparative analysis of the specific features of the two constructions in order to highlight their functional differences, if indeed there are any.[15]

14. Given our functional approach, as well as the broad characterization of possession that was adopted in the introduction as "the expression of a relation", it could be argued that other syntactic devices might be claimed as "possessive", such as the expression of feelings and mental operations by verbs such as *aestuo*, *memini*, etc. Because of the clear importance and centrality shown by the dative + *esse* and the verb *habeo* alone, we deal mainly with these constructions. For a history of these constructions in Latin and Germanic, see Justus (1999a, 1999b); for Slavic, Danylenko (2000). For Latin again, Baldi (2002a); for Old Irish, see Nuti (2004).
15. B. Löfstedt (1963) drew attention to a certain tendency for the dative construction to occur mainly with abstract nouns, vs. a *habeo*-construction that would most commonly be used with a concrete *possessum*, at least at the beginning of its appearance (for Plautus see also Bennett 1914). But this fact does not seem to give sufficient grounds for a clear semantic distinction. The relationship that seems to occur between the *mihi est* type and abstract subjects has been related by Magni (1999) to the tendency to appear in interrogative, negative, and non-affirmative sentences and, more generally, predications belonging to the *irrealis* mood. Magni explains the *mihi est* type as a construction characterized by

The criteria for extracting possessive data from the texts were established in light of our decision to study the two syntactic types dative + *esse* and *habeo* exclusively in their relation to the predication of possession. As possession is prototypically a relationship between two nominals/pronominals, namely possessor and *possessum*, we considered only bivalent, essentially two-constituent constructions and therefore omitted from consideration all dative and *habeo*-constructions that do not conform to the patterns dative + *esse* + subject and *habere* + object.[16] That is, we considered only sentence types such as *mihi est x* and *habeo x*, as instantiated in (1)–(2):

(1) Plaut. *Curc*. 43: *ei ancillula est*
'he has a wench'

(2) Plaut. *Pseud*. 1125: *habet argentum*
'he has the money'

Thus, many sentence types have been omitted from our study.[17] However, one should take note of the existence of a syntactic type such as *x est y mihi* (this order of constituents being purely random):

(3) Plaut. *Asin*. 614: *tu uita's mihi*
'you are life to me'

In this type, *y* is the predicative nucleus, which can be a noun, an adjective, or a complex noun phrase:

(4) Plaut. *Bacch*. 310: *ne* ***ille*** *hercle mihi sit* ***multo tanto carior***
'by Hercules, he certainly would be much dearer to me'
ille = *x*, *multo tanto carior* = *y*

a minor degree of transitivity (referring to notions developed in Hopper and Thompson 1980), which in turn would be a typical feature of the predication of possession.

16. Cf. the similar approach adopted in Cabrillana (2003: 80).

17. Sentence types containing a constituent in the dative are of course very common, because of the wide semantic and syntactic range of functions of this case. Clearly, a sentence like Plaut. *Amph*. 15: *ita huic facietis fabulae silentium* (traditionally considered a *dativus commodi*) has little to do with an analysis focused on possession. The same can be said of the double dative (*esse auxilio alicui*).

(5) Ter. *Ad.* 354: *curre,* ***obstetricem*** *arcesse, ut quom opus sit ne* ***in mora*** *nobis siet*
'run, get the midwife, so that, when the need comes, she won't be the cause for us to be delayed'
obstetrix = *x*, *in mora* = *y*

This sentence type is semantically related to the role of experiencer. That is, the constituent in the dative refers to the animate entity who experiences (mentally or physically) the entity *x* in a way that is specified by the predicative *y*, which, consequently, is very often an adjective (e.g., *carus*). The subject *x* is often [+def(inite)] and the verb *sum* has a basic copular character. As is to be expected, the semantic range of this construction is very wide, but the most typical instance can be labeled a predication of experience. It is not surprising, then, that the type *x est y mihi* is very common, from Plautus to Petronius. Most often it exceeds the *mihi est x* type in number of occurrences. In Terence, for example, the experiencer construction scores by our count 107 occurrences, while the possessive construction shows 73 attestations. The same ratio holds even more clearly in other authors: Cato, *agr.*: *mihi est x* 3, *x est y mihi* 12; Caes., *Gall.*: *mihi est x* 11, *x est y mihi* 52; Petron.: *mihi est x* 3, *x est y mihi* 15.

To avoid an undesirable imbalance between the number of occurrences of the *mihi est x* type and the *habeo* type, we used an analogous elimination procedure with *habeo* and did not consider, except when necessary, occurrences of *habeo* in constructions such as *habeo x y*, where *y* is a third constituent with a predicative function, as in (6):[18]

(6) Ter. *Andr.* 436: *hoc* ***male*** *habet* ***uirum***
'this goes badly for the man'
uirum = *x*, *male* = *y*

18. Examples with a predicative perfect participle represent a topic that exceeds the domain of possession. We can refer to studies like Pinkster (1987) or to surveys like Jacob (1995) and Nuti (2005a). We only remark that examples are numerous even in the earliest texts, with every kind of *possessum* (cf. Plaut. *Pseud.* 602: *illaec omnia missa habeo quae ante agere occepi*; *Stich.* 362: *immo res omnis relictas habeo prae quod tu uelis*). Cf. also Cato *agr.* 143,2: *cibum tibi et familiae curet uti coctum habeat* 'she must take care of the food for you and the family, in order to have it cooked', where *cibum* = *x*; *coctum* = *y*.

Cases of a predicative constituent as in the examples above are quite numerous. If we limit our analysis to the archaic authors we examined, the 710 attestations of *habeo* in Plautus, 184 in Terence, and 78 in Cato's *de agricultura* show a predicative element 75 times in Plautus (in 19 cases *y* is a passive past participle), 20 in Terence (5 passive past participles), and 7 in Cato's *de agricultura* (4 passive past participles).

All kinds of constructions containing a dative constituent (like *mihi est x*, *x est y mihi*, etc.) are of course more frequent than the overall occurrences of the verb *habeo*. But once we have narrowed our scope to the domain of possession and considered only two-participant constructions, the ratio between the number of occurrences of the two possessive constructions is reversed and *habeo x* has by far the highest score (Table 1). Therefore, we can already draw a preliminary conclusion: leaving semantics aside, if we consider only sentence types expressing a binary relation, this function was fulfilled more commonly by *habeo x* in the most archaic stage of Latin. *Habeo* becomes the basic means of expressing possession by the Classical period, as is shown by the data from Caesar and Cicero. Generally speaking, in Latin the most frequently used possessive construction is *habeo x*. The predominance of this construction becomes overwhelming in later authors such as Seneca (*epistulae ad Lucilium*) and Petronius, and in Late Latin the occurrence of *mihi est x* is mainly limited to fixed expressions (as in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*), or it may be the result of stylistic (intentional) archaism. Given this state of affairs, not only are we facing a very clear tendency to abandon the dative construction from the time of the Classical period; as far as the well-known opposition between *have*- vs. *be*-languages is concerned, we have to acknowledge that, in spite of the traditionally held view according to which the dative construction is the main possessive sentence, Latin has to be classified as a "mixed" type, with a noticeable preference for the transitive construction from its earliest stage.

2.1.1 Possessive relations and semantic content

A common feature that strongly characterizes the *habeo x* and *mihi est x* constructions is the expression of an established relation. We also acknowledge a high percentage of the [+human] feature in the possessor: the ratio of a human possessor is overwhelming within both constructions (Table 2). A gen-

eral overview of the occurrences of both constructions shows the persistence of a limited series of specific relationships.

Table 1. Occurrences of *habeo x* and *mihi ext x*

	habeo x		*mihi est x*
Plaut.	619	vs.	390
Ter.	164	vs.	73
Cato *agr.*[a]	71	vs.	3
Caes. *Gall.*	149	vs.	11
Cic. *epist.*	68	vs.	8
Verg. *Aen.* 1	2	vs.	1
Liv. 1	29	vs.	4
Sen. *epist.* 1	45	vs.	5
Plin. *epist.* 1	15	vs.	8
Tac. *Agr.*	7	vs.	3
Petron.	140	vs.	3
Apic.	12	vs.	0
Itin. Eger.	51	vs.	4

a In the fragments of Cato's orations *habeo* has 25 occurrences, *mihi est x* only 3.

Table 2. Percentage of [+hum] possessors in the database

	habeo x		*mihi est x*	
Plaut.	96 %	(599 of 619)	98 %	(384 of 390)
Ter.	94 %	(155 of 164)	98 %	(71 of 73)
Cato *agr.*	66 %	(47 of 71)	33 %	(1 of 3)
Caes. *Gall.*	87 %	(129 of 149)	90 %	(10 of 11)
Cic. *epist.*	68 %	(55 of 68)	100 %	(8 of 8)
Verg. *Aen.* 1	50 %	(1 of 2)	100 %	(1 of 1)
Liv. 1	93 %	(27 of 29)	100 %	(4 of 4)
Sen. *epist.* 1	64 %	(29 of 45)	100 %	(5 of 5)
Plin. *epist.* 1	93 %	(14 of 15)	100 %	(8 of 8)
Tac. *Agr.*	85 %	(6 of 7)	66 %	(2 of 3)
Petron.	84 %	(118 of 140)	100 %	(3 of 3)
Apic.	50 %	(6 of 12)	0 %	
Itin. Eger.	41 %	(21 of 51)	100 %	(4 of 4)

2.1.1.1 [+Human] possessor & [+Human] possessum *and kinship relations.* Given the predominant [+human] nature of the possessor in both constructions, it is not surprising that a certain number of occurrences show an animate (specifically [+human]) *possessum* as well, as is summarized in Table 3. The use of one specific type instead of the other does not imply any semantic change in the relationship itself. In Plautus the number of attestations formally reflects the general ratio between *mihi est x* and *habeo x*, which is roughly 2 to 3. Predictably, these occurrences often express a kinship relation, but this is only one particular case. More often, various kinds of personal relations between two humans are expressed, as for instance (7)–(8):

(7) Cato *agr*. 5,4: *(uilicus) parasitum ne quem habeat*
'(the farmer) shall have no permanent guest'

(8) Ter. *Ad*. 529: *cluens amicus hospes nemost uobis?*
'someone renowned, a friend, a guest, don't you have anyone?'

Thus, if we focus on kinship relations, we see that only a minor portion of [+human] & [+human] cases expresses such a specific relation (Table 4). Although some of the authors we examined do not always contain examples

Table 3. Percentage of [+hum] possessor & [+hum] *possessum* relations

	habeo x		*mihi est x*	
Plaut.	18 %	(112 of 619)	13 %	(53 of 390)
Ter.	32 %	(56 of 164)	16 %	(12 of 73)
Cato *agr.*	5 %	(4 of 71)	0 %	(0 of 3)
Caes. *Gall.*	19 %	(28 of 149)	0 %	(0 of 11)
Cic. *epist.*	26 %	(18 of 68)	0 %	(0 of 8)
Verg. *Aen.* 1	0	(0 of 2)	100 %	(1 of 1)
Liv. 1	17 %	(5 of 29)	0 %	(0 of 4)
Sen. *epist.* 1	22 %	(10 of 45)	20 %	(1 of 5)
Plin. *epist.* 1	13 %	(2 of 15)	0 %	(0 of 8)
Tac. *Agr.*	42 %	(3 of 7)	33 %	(1 of 3)
Petron.	12 %	(18 of 140)	0 %	(0 of 3)
Apic. *coq.*	0 %	(0 of 12)	0 %	
Itin. Eger.	0 %	(0 of 51)	0 %	(0 of 4)

Table 4. Percentage of kinship relations[a]

	habeo x		*mihi est x*	
Plaut.	14 %	(16 of 112)	41 %	(22 of 53)
Ter.	28 %	(16 of 56)	66 %	(8 of 12)
Cato *agr.*	0 %		0 %	
Caes. *Gall.*	7 %	(2 of 28)	0 %	
Cic. *epist.*	0 %		0 %	
Verg. *Aen.* 1	0 %	(0 of 2)	0 %	(0 of 1)
Liv. 1	20 %	(1 of 5)	0 %	(0 of 4)
Sen. *epist.* 1	0 %	(0 of 10)	0 %	(0 of 1)
Plin. *epist.* 1	50 %	(1 of 2)	0 %	(0 of 8)
Tac. *Agr.*	33 %	(1 of 3)	0 %	
Petron.	27 %	(5 of 18)	0 %	
Apic.	0 %	(0 of 12)	0 %	
Itin. Eger.	0 %		0 %	

a Ratio based on the number of occurrences of a [+hum] & [+hum] relation (see Table 3).

of kinship relations, such relations are normally expressed by both constructions in every period. The semantics of the data clearly show no relevant difference for the two constructions. In Plautus, for example, the majority of occurrences concern a descendant relative (10 cases for *mihi est x*, 6 for *habeo x*). Pair-level relatives such as *mulier*, *soror*, and *cognatus* are attested for both types, as are ascendant ones, like *pater* (1 case for *habeo x*, 5 for *mihi est x*) and *mater* (1 case for *habeo x*, 1 for *mihi est x*). Terence shows a similar pattern: *habeo* expresses a descendant relative (such as *filius*) in 5 cases, a pair relative (mostly *uxor*) in 8 cases, and an ascendant relative (*pater, mater*) in 3 cases, while *mihi est* expresses descendant kinship in 3 cases (*filius*), pair-level in 2 cases (*soror, uxor*), and ascendant kinship in 1 case (*mater*). In some cases, such as Cato's *de agricultura*, the absence of kinship relations is a natural consequence of the subject of the text.

Given such an even distribution, no claim can be made about the inherent and/or established character of the kinship relations (such as, hypothetically, *mihi est mater* vs. *habeo filium*) which theoretically might alternate according to the different sentence types. There is simply no difference between a kinship relation expressed by *mihi est x* or by *habeo x*. The same is true for

any other relation between two animates expressed by the two sentence types, such as (9)–(10):

(9) Plaut. *Merc*. 966: *tibi amicam esse nullam nuntio*
'I inform you that you have no mistress'

(10) Plaut. *Bacch*. 145: *tu amicam habebis?*
'will you have a mistress?'

In short, the use of *habeo* or the alternative dative construction bears no consequence for the content of the sentences where both the possessor and *possessum* are human. Along with the general decrease of occurrences of *mihi est x*, kinship as well as other kinds of personal relations are increasingly expressed more frequently by *habeo x* as we move forward in time.

2.1.1.2 Body part relations. Not surprisingly, body parts constitute another kind of relationship that can be singled out for analysis. Given the unlikelihood of inherent relationships such as those including body parts in predicative constructions, most of the relevant cases show a body part noun + an adjective with attributive function that represents the informational core of the predication. Cf. examples like (11)–(12):

(11) Plaut. *Stich*. 260: *nulla tibi linguast?*
'have you got no tongue?'

(12) Plaut. *Bacch*. 128: *si decem habeas linguas*
'even if you had ten tongues'

There is no tendency for either construction to be used with specific body parts, and no significant difference can be claimed to correspond to the use of one type or the other. Apart from Plautus, Terence, and to some extent Petronius, not many authors in our survey provide a substantial quantity of examples. This is apparently due to the highly inherent character of the body–part relation, which tends to be expressed within the domain of a noun phrase in attributive possession more than within that of predicative possession. However, the indication of body–part relations is covered by both constructions in every period of the language (Table 5). Just as we noticed with personal relations, body–part relations are expressed more frequently by *habeo x* in the later stages of Latin.

Table 5. Percentage of body–part relations

	habeo x		*mihi est x*	
Plaut.	5 %	(32 of 619)	4 %	(17 of 390)
Ter.	0 %	(0 of 164)	0 %	(0 of 73)
Cato *agr.*	0 %	(0 of 71)	0 %	(0 of 3)
Caes. *Gall.*	0.5 %	(1 of 149)	0 %	(0 of 11)
Cic. *epist.*	0 %	(0 of 68)	0 %	(0 of 8)
Verg. *Aen.* 1	0	(0 of 2)	0	(0 of 1)
Liv. 1	0 %	(0 of 29)	0 %	(0 of 4)
Sen. *epist.* 1	0 %	(0 of 45)	0 %	(0 of 5)
Plin. *epist.* 1	0 %	(0 of 15)	0 %	(0 of 8)
Tac. *Agr.*	14 %	(1 of 7)	0 %	(0 of 3)
Petron.	10 %	(15 of 140)	33 %	(1 of 3)
Apic.	0 %	(0 of 12)	0 %	
Itin. Eger.	0 %	(0 of 51)	0 %	(0 of 4)

2.1.1.3 Mental/emotional activities and experiencer. *Habeo x* and *mihi est x* constructions can also express a relation that is semantically included within the domain of mental/emotional activities. In Plautus we counted 14 occurrences of *mihi est x* expressing a relation of this kind, such as (13)–(14):

(13) Plaut. *Capt.* 496: *est illic mi una spes cenatica*
'there I have some hope of a dinner'

(14) Plaut. *Mil.* 887–888: *siquid faciendum'st mulieri male atque malitiose, / ea sibi inmortalis memoriast*
'if a woman has to do something bad and vicious, she has an eternal memory'

This kind of relation can also be expressed by *habeo x*:[19]

(15) Plaut. *Capt.* 892: *dubium habebis etiam, sancte quom ego iurem tibi?*
'will you still have doubts, even if I might swear solemnly to you?'

19. In Plautus we counted 37 occurrences of this kind: in 32 of these the object of *habeo* is *gratiam/gratias* or co-radical lexemes; after that *fides* (3), *confidentia* (1), and *dubius* (1).

(16) Plaut. *Persa* 785: *quia ei fidem non habui argenti, eo mihi eas machinas molitust*
'because I didn't trust him for the money, he brought on this trick against me'

A very frequent, idiomatic construction (which can be defined as expressing a relation of *sphère personnelle*) is the following, always showing the imperative mood in its 20 occurences:

(17) Plaut. *Aul*. 192: *tace, bonum habe animum, Euclio*
'shut up, keep a good mind, Euclio'

If we narrow our scope to the experiencer relation, in spite of the fact that it is most typically expressed by the trivalent construction *x est y mihi*, in Plautus a considerable number of occurrences of *mihi est x* referring to mental/emotional activities clearly show a relationship semantically included in the domain of experiencer, where the human participant has no control over the mental/physical experience. These contrast with cases like *animum bonum habe*, where the imperative reveals a certain degree of control. Cf. examples like (18)–(19):

(18) Plaut. *Capt*. 620–621: … *me insaniam / neque tenere neque mi esse ullum morbum*
'that I am not affected by madness nor do I have any disease'

(19) Plaut. *Cas*. 382: *quod bonum atque fortunatum [tuum] sit mihi* … :: *Magnum malum*
'I wish that I might have a good and lucky … :: Great hardship!'

The same experiencer relationship can also be expressed by *habeo x*, as is the case with possessive verbs in other languages (e.g., Eng. *I have a headache*, It. *ho freddo* 'I am cold'). See for example (20):

(20) Plaut. *Stich*. 312: *hae fores* … *et ea causa haberent malum magnum*
'and because of that, a door would have big trouble'

But such instances are not very common in the archaic period. In spite of the higher frequency of *habeo x*, in Plautus we counted only 7 occurrences where the subject of the verb is a human participant that can somehow be related to

the semantic role of experiencer. This contrasts with 35 examples of this kind with *mihi est x*. Such an inversion of the ratio suggests that the expression of an experiencer relation, although not inconsistent with *habeo*, is a minor function of this verb and is a primary function of the dative construction in an early author like Plautus.

A rather revealing comparison can be made with phrases containing a nominal denoting mental disposition like *fides*: Terence shows 3 instances of the expression *habeo fidem*, including (21):

(21) Ter. *Hec.* 870–871: *Myrrina ita Phidippo dixit iuri iurando meo / se fidem habuisse*[20]
'Myrrina told Phidippus that she trusted my oath'

In this case, the subject of *habeo* points to the Actor, the human performer of the mental operation designated by the object/*possessum*; namely, the one who trusts. The one occurrence of the other construction with the same lexeme in Terence implies an "other way round" interpretation, and a reversal of the semantic roles:

(22) Ter. *Phorm.* 810: *itan paruam mihi fidem esse apud te?* :: *Vin me credere?*
'Do you have such little faith in me? :: Do you want me to believe you?'

The constituent in the dative simply points to the passive experiencer of an act, or feeling, of trust that is felt or held by someone else. This must be indicated by another phrase, external to the *mihi est x* construction, that takes the shape of a locative phrase with *apud*.[21]

In Cato, the weak attestation of the *mihi est x* type, by itself a meaningful datum, allows no internal comparison. It is, however, worth noting that among the few occurrences of a mental operation or experiencer expressed by *habeo* (4 of 71), the affecting experience can also be physical:

20. Cf. the same expression *fidem habere*, with "active meaning" (i.e. *habeo fidem* = 'I trust'), in Ter. *Andr*. 586, *Eun*. 139.
21. Cf. Ter. *Phorm*. 35–38 (= (131)).

(23) Cato *agr*. 157,13: *et si quis ulcus taetrum uel recens habebit*
'and if someone will have a bad sore, even an open one'

Compare also the Plautine expression *mihi esset febris*:

(24) Plaut. *Mil*. 719–720: *si ei forte fuisset febris / censerem emori*
'if he had had a fever, I'd reckon that he would die'

In Cato, this is expressed by means of *habeo x*:

(25) Cato *agr*. 157,9: *dato panem purum ibidem madefaciat. Et si febrim non habebit, dato uinum atrum bibat*
'give (the sick person) white bread, so that he soaks it in the same place (cabbage broth). And, if he doesn't have a fever, give him red wine to drink'

In later authors, the experiencer is still commonly expressed by the dative construction, in spite of its scanty occurrence:

(26) Cic. *epist*. 7,1,3: *sed quae potest homini esse polito delectatio, cum … homo imbecillus a ualentissima bestia laniatur?*
'but what pleasure can it possibly be to a man of culture, when … a weakly human being is mangled by a very powerful beast?'

(27) Petron. 92,5: *siccatoque auide poculo negat sibi unquam acidius fuisse*
'having greedily drunk the cup dry, he denies that he has ever had anything sharper'

If one of the three attestations of *mihi est x* in the whole *Satyricon* expresses such a relation, it confirms that experiencer is one of the relations more strongly connected to the dative construction, and that it is still currently employed even in a time when the use of *mihi est x* is considerably reduced to express other possessive relations. Given the progressive strengthening of *habeo x*, the experiencer relation is currently attested in Imperial Latin and in later times, where it is one of the many relations expressed by this construction:

(28) Cic. *epist.* 7,1,3: *ne tu haud paulo plus quam quisquam nostrum delectationis habuisti*
‘you have had much more pleasure than any one of us’

(29) Petron. 106,1: *utinam quidem hac se inscriptione frontis maculassent: haberemus nos extremum solacium*
‘I only wish that they had defiled themselves with this inscription on their foreheads: we would have some final consolation’

2.1.1.4 Other relations. As is to be expected with possessive sentences, several instances show a relation between two entities with a semantic characterization that can hardly go beyond the mere notion of “relationship” itself. Given the higher number of occurrences from archaic comedy, examples are best represented from these texts, but the phenomenon, of course, characterizes Latin at all stages. Examples of the *mihi est x* type are:

(30) Plaut. *Curc*. 59–60: *ut quaeque illi occasiost / subripere se ad me, ubi sauium oppegit, fugit*
‘as soon as she has the chance she gets away to me, once she has given a kiss, she flees’

(31) Plaut. *Most*. 217: *dum tibi nunc haec aetatulast*
‘as long as you have this young age’

(32) Cic. *epist*. 1,9,22: *quocumque tempore mihi potestas praesentis tui fuerit*
‘at whatever time I will have the power of your presence’

Examples of *habeo x* are:

(33) Plaut. *Epid*. 645: *non habeo ullam occasionem, ut apud te falsa fabuler*
‘I don’t have any chance to tell you lies’

(34) Plaut. *Cist*. 49: *semperque istam quam nunc habeas aetatulam optinebis*
‘and you will always maintain this young age that you have now’

(35) Caes. *Gall.* 7,23,5: *hoc … opus … ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium summam habet opportunitatem*
'this work has the suitability for the advantage and greatest defense of cities'

In Plautus and Terence, we have identified dozens of occurrences of the *mihi est x* type and the *habeo x* type that can be considered to have such a broad semantic profile. In this case, we hesitate to provide a clear table of quantified data, as any form of classification referring to this sort of semantically vague category of "relation" has a purely symptomatic value, and its degree of arbitrariness is very high. In principle, any group of heterogeneous relations could be subdivided into further, more specific relations. For example, if we take the data from Cato, we observe that there is a certain number of occurrences (at least 6) where the relation expressed by *habeo x* is, far from being established, between an entity and one of its intrinsic properties.

(36) Cato *agr*. 157,12: *brassica erratica maximam uim habet*
'the cabbage *erratica* has the greatest (curative) power'

(37) Cato *agr*. 161,1: *locum subigere oportet bene, qui habeat humorem*
'it is necessary to cultivate a field that has moisture'

More importantly, it is to be noted that 3 occurrences of *habeo x* in Cato unambiguously express a part–whole relation, including (38)–(39):

(38) Cato *agr*. 154,1: *labrum … facito: id habeat ad summum ansas IIII, uti, transferri possitur*
'make a cask: it should have four handles on the top, so that it can be carried'

(39) Caes. *Gall*. 2,8,3: *is collis … ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat*
'that hill had slopes from either side'

Examples of this kind are usually not found with *mihi est x*. Thus, two phenomena are particularly significant: first, the presence of a considerable number of cases showing a heterogeneous set of relations since the earliest attestations; second, the use of a possessive verb for the predication of intrinsic prop-

erties and part–whole relations.[22] Approaching the phenomenon as a whole, we see that it simply represents what has been shown to be one of the main characteristics of possession. That is to say, a possessive construction normally expresses a generic, semantically broad relation (cf. "zero-intension" as defined by Lehmann 1998a: 7). As a consequence, there is a high degree of semantic overlap between the *mihi est x* and *habeo x* constructions. The absolutely equal semantic content of sentences like *occasionem habeo/occasio est mihi* or *aetatulam habeo/aetatula est mihi* is evident. Such an overlap, however, can be seen also when more specific relations are expressed, for example kinship.[23] The extensive use of *habeo x* by Plautus to express a wide set of semantically broad and vague relations (even outside the scope of established relations) is clear evidence that this verb, even at this early stage, had almost achieved the status of a standard expression of possession.

22. The semantic rationale beyond these phenomena is not difficult to explain: parts of a whole, intrinsic properties like the *natura* of a *brassica*, or *possessa* that clearly belong to the personal sphere of a human possessor (like a human being and her age), all have in common the fact that they are relations between entities that are typically (although not necessarily and inherently) found within the conceptual domain of the entity encoded as possessor. Therefore, these kinds of relations represent metaphorical or metonymic extensions of a more general principle that can be brought back to the Reference Point model.
23. The degree of specificity here is tuned according to the phenomenology of the object of our study, i.e., possession. E.g., body parts or kinship are considered to represent more specific and defined relations because they are well-defined forms of relation on the semantic/referential plane, and it has been empirically observed that they are relevant within the domain of possession.

2.1.2 Agentivity, stativity, and habeo as a "light verb"

The (formally) transitive character of *habeo* fits the original meaning of the form, 'take, seize, grasp', fully retained in cognate forms in other languages.[24] This sense is still attested in early Latin:

(40) Plaut. *Poen.* 1414–1415: *leno, tu autem amicam mihi des facito aut auri mihi reddas minam /.* :: *Vin tibicinam meam habere?*
'pimp, make sure to give me a girl, or give me back my money. :: Do you want to take my flute-player?'

That said, it is clear that even in Plautus's time, 'take' is no longer the basic meaning of the verb in Latin[25] which, as we have seen, mostly displays a possessive function, namely, the indication of a state. The meaning 'take' is consistent with the semantic feature of [control] but, as just noted, such a meaning is peripheral. A more relevant sign of the consistency of such a feature is, however, the presence of imperative forms, of which we counted 46 occurrences in Plautus (20 with the expression *bonum animum habe*; cf. Plaut. *Aul.* 192 [= (17)]),[26] only 1 in Terence, 7 in Cato (consistently 2nd

24. Cf. OIr. *gaibid* 'takes, grips'. *Habeo* and *gaibid* come from IE *$*g^hab^h$-* (cf. further Skt. *gábhasti-* 'forearm, hand', Goth. *gabei* 'wealth'). For the meaning 'grasp', 'hold', cf. expressions like *habere comitia* 'to hold an assembly of the people', *habere contionem* 'to hold a public meeting', *habere senatum* 'to hold the senate'; textually e.g. Plaut. *Cas.* 40: *habeo viros* 'I am holding the men fast'. Cf. also the Oscan *Tabula Bantina*: *Suaepis contrud exeic fefacust auti comono hipust* [Lat. *Siquis contra hoc fecerit aut comitium habuerit*] 'If anyone should act against this or hold an assembly', and lexical derivatives like *inhibeo* 'I hold back' and *cohibeo* 'I contain' (cf. Osc. *pruhipust* [Lat. *prohibuerit*]).

25. Interestingly, the Oscan and Umbrian counterparts to *habeo*, namely Umbr. **habia**, Osc. *hafiest* and their many paradigmatically associated forms, display a much stronger physical meaning of 'grasp, hold' than does Lat. *habeo.* This is in all likelihood due to the fact that by all etymological accounts the Oscan and Umbrian forms represent a contamination of two PIE roots, namely *$*g^hab^h$-* (Lat. *habeo*) and **kap-* (Lat. *capio*). See most recently Untermann (2000: s.vv.). While it could be a function of the nature of the Oscan and Umbrian documentary evidence, the evidence for the *mihi est* construction is scant and open to alternate interpretations in the few examples which actually occur.

26. A phrase like **bonum animum cape* is never attested in Plautus. The semantic difference between **bonum animum cape* and *bonum animum habe* could hardly be seen if we did not refer to the resultative/stative meaning of *habeo* (vs. a more telic character of *capio*). *Habeo* fully expresses the state of being in a good mental disposition, as well as the

sing. fut.). Cicero also makes extensive use of the 2nd sing. fut. in his letters: in the *epistulae ad familiares* we examined, the form *habeto* occurs 16 times. Consider for example (41)–(42):

(41) Plaut. *Men.* 689–690: *dedisti eam dono mihi; / eandem nunc reposcis: patiar. Tibi habe, aufer, utere*
'you gave it (the mantle) to me as a gift; now you ask for it back. Oh, well. Have it for yourself, take it away, use it'

(42) Cic. *epist.* 7,25,2: *secreto hoc audi, tecum habeto*
'hear this in secret, keep it to yourself'

Apparently, in these sentences not only does *habeo* refer to the moment of establishing a possession (i.e., 'take'), but it also refers to the high degree of control and to the volitional character implied in the action of keeping the established possession over the *possessum* by the possessor. Such an action is not confined exclusively within the moment of the establishing event but is continuative. The imperative form simply highlights the feature [+eventive], as is normal with verbs expressing established possession (cf. Eng. *Have some more!*). An even clearer example is (43):

(43) Cato *agr.* 88,2: *eam muriam in labella uel in patinas in sole ponito: usque adeo in sole habeto donec concreuerit*
'put the brine in the sunlight, in a bowl or a pan. Keep it in the sunlight until it hardens'

The meaning 'take', which is telic, is excluded by the preceding verbal form *ponito*, which fulfils the expression of the telic-eventive action, whereas *habeo* expresses the action of keeping an object in a certain state.

This character is clearly present in occurrences where *habeo* refers to the action of "controlling"an entity (often animate) encoded as the object,

moment of achieving such a state (through the imperative), while *capio* expresses only the telic event. The reason that only *bonum animum habe* occurs is also to be connected with the particular involvement that a polysemous possessive verb like *habeo* (and only *habeo*) shows with the *sphère personnelle* and the expression of mental activities, already by the time of Plautus. Imperative forms are not uncommon in the Oscan and Umbrian counterparts to *habeo*.

though not in the imperative. This can be seen in many instances of the syntactic schema *habeo x y* (already frequent in the archaic period: according to our scrutiny, 75 in Plautus, 20 in Terence, 7 in Cato), where *y* is usually an adjective with predicative function specifying the effect of the action performed by the subject, to which, in these cases, we can ascribe a high degree of agentivity. Cf. for example (44):

(44) Plaut. *Cas*. 590: *miserrimum hodie ego hunc habebo amasium*
'today, I'll treat this smart guy very badly'

Examples can be found also with an adverb with predicative function, such as the common expression *aliquem male/bene habere*, as in (45):

(45) Plaut. *Men*. 568–569: *quid ego nunc cum illoc agam? /* :: *idem quod semper: male habeas*
'what shall I do with him now? :: The same as always: you should treat (him) badly'

Given the wide semantic status of verbal modifiers like *bene* and *male*, sometimes, as in this passage, *habeo* might be interpreted as a so-called "light verb" (see below). Other instances, however, when viewed in light of the semantic content of the adverbs employed, give ground for a full lexical-semantic interpretation of *habeo*, as in (46):

(46) Plaut. *Asin*. 78: *illum mater arte contenteque habet / patres ut cons⟨ue⟩uerunt*
'the mother has him under her control, tightly and securely, like once fathers used to'

The meaning of the sentence is not, of course, that the mother has a son, but that she has him under her own control, tightly (*arte*) and securely (*contente*).

Compared to the simple *habeo x* type, the different number of constituents in these sentences with *habeo x y* structure could be claimed to be the basis of the semantic involvement with agency. But examples can also be found with the basic *habeo x* structure, such as (47)–(48):

(47) Ter. *Eun*. 668–674: *exi foras, sceleste. At etiam restitas, / fugitiue? Prodi, male conciliate.* :: *Obsecro.* :: *Oh / illud uide … paulum*

si cessassem, Pythias, / domi non offendissem, ita iam adornarat fugam. / :: *Haben hominem, amabo?* :: *quid ni habeam?*
'come out, you jerk. Are you still struggling, fugitive? Get out, unwelcome one. :: Please… :: Oh! Look at him, if I hesitated a bit I would have not run into him and he would be fleeing by now. :: You have the man, ok? :: Yes, I have him, don't I?'

(48) Petron. 102,8: *ego uos in duas iam pelles coniciam uinctosque loris inter uestimenta pro sarcinis habebo*
'I will throw you together in two bales, and I will keep you as luggage among my clothes, bound up with straps'[27]

Habeo also occurs in passive forms, whose attestations, though scant in number, tend to show up occasionally in Classical Latin (cf. Ramos Guerrera 1998: 677–680). Not all cases, however, can be regarded as referring to a relation of possession (cf. *habetur* 'it is deemed'), and even when such a profile can be assigned to *habeo*, often the function of the passive form is simply the reversal of the relation possessor–*possessum* at the syntactic and informative level (e.g., Sen. *epist.* 117,12: *puto concede duo esse haec, id quod habetur et eum qui habet: habetur sapientia, habet qui sapit*). The advancing process in the direction of a purely relational function is clearly responsible for the scarcity of passive forms. Nonetheless, a few cases seem to sporadically require a full lexical meaning (cf. Sall. *Iug.* 2,4: *animus incorruptus, aeternus, rector humani generis agit atque habet cuncta neque ipse habetur*, where the semantic content of *habeo* appears to be very close to that of *possideo*).

Nothing similar can be claimed for dative constructions. Not only does the *mihi est x* type not provide examples with imperative verbal forms; the large number of occurrences of the three-argument type *x est y mihi*, being an experiencer sentence, shows a general meaning that assigns to the participant encoded in the dative a "patient-like" more than an "agentive" role. And, as we have seen, instances of sentences semantically connected with the experiencer are more frequent with *mihi est x*.

27. Careful reading of the text shows that Phedria has just caught the poor Dorus, who was trying to escape from the house. The action expressed by *habeo* is clearly the physical control held by Phedria over Dorus. Physical control is also implied in (48).

Some instances of *habeo x* present a very specific character, when the object is a *nomen actionis*. In these cases, the function borne by the verbal form is such that *habeo* can be described as a sort of "supportive" (or "light") verb, a verb whose semantic content is underspecified or totally empty and whose main function is being a predicative-syntactic support of another constituent. Among the archaic authors examined, we counted 7 examples in Plautus and 4 in Terence where the object is a verbal noun, such as (49)–(50):

(49) Plaut. *Merc*. 960: *at e[r]go expur⟨i⟩gationem habebo, ut ne susceseat*
'but I will have an excuse, so that she won't get angry'

(50) Ter. *Hec*. 381–382: *hanc habere orationem mecum principio institit: / "O mi Pamphile . . . "*
'this one started addressing a speech to me: "My dear Pamphilus . . . "'

The phenomenon is probably quite ancient, as it is found in the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* (186 BCE):

(51) *S.C. de Bacch.* 3–4: NEIQVIS EORUM BACANAL HABVISE VELET; SEI QVES ESENT QVEI SIBEI DEICERENT NECESVS ESE BACANAL HABERE . . .
'let none of them have a mind to attend a Bacchic rite; if there are some who say that they need to attend a Bacchic rite . . .[28]

The phrase *bacchanal habere* 'attend, perform a Bacchanal', is the equivalent of the verb *bacchor*, 'id.', and it might be a specific feature of judicial language.[29] In this particular case, the meaning of *bacchanal*, 'a Bacchic rite',

28. Note that the other occurrence of *habeo* in the *S. C. de Bacch.* clearly involves prototypical possession: *S.C. de Bacch.* 11: NEVE PECVNIAM QVISQVAM EORUM COMOINEM [H]ABVISE VELET.

29. The same can be claimed for the use of the perfect infinitive form HABVISE. While it is possible that the perfect form is employed in this text to mark the accomplished status of the action expressed by *habeo* (basically a stative verb), this seems to be ruled out by the following facts: (a) perfect infinitives do not show up in analogous contexts from other texts; and moreover, (b) the same phenomenon marks the occurrence of FECISE (*S.C. de Bacch.* 15). The most likely explanation is that the occurrence of the perfect form

is to be considered a *nomen actionis*, as it points to and designates the complex of activities and performances that constitute the very ritual. Note that, a few lines further, a very similar context (showing the equipollent term *sacra* 'rituals') employs, quite naturally, the typically agentive verb *facio*:

(52) *S.C. de Bacch.* 15: SACRA IN [O]QVOLTOD NE QVISQVAM FECISE VELET
'let nobody have a mind to perform rituals in secret'

That *habeo* and *facio* bear the same function in these constructions can also be proved by many other analogous comparisons, such as that between *orationem habere*, seen in (50), and parallel expressions like *orationem facere*, *verba habere/facere, sermonem habere/facere*, etc.[30] This kind of "light verb" function is by no means inconsistent with possessive verbs (cf. Eng. *to have a drink* vs. *to drink*) and does not per se call for any particular explanation.[31]

The same phenomenon is attested also with the dative construction. Compare the following occurrences, where the subject of the *mihi est x* sentence is a verbal noun:

(53) Plaut. *Cas*. 406: *quid tibi tactio hunc fuit?* :: *Quia iussit haec Iuno mea*
'why are you beating this one? :: Because my Juno ordered it!'

(54) Ter. *Hec*. 650: *nullast tibi, Pamphile, hic iam consultatio*
'now, Pamphilus, you have no deliberation to make anymore'

is an idiosyncratic feature of this specific text, due essentially to the special needs and requirements of judicial language (see Baldi 2002c: 212).

30. Cf. Cic. *epist.* 5,4: *orationem … habuisses*; see Roesch (2001).

31. In our opinion, the semantic content of *habeo* as "light verb" should not be taken to be totally empty. In these contexts *habeo* does not serve as the formal support of a predication of an action whose semantic core is specified by the verbal noun. Because of its transitive character it also expresses the "Actor role" of the subject. Such a function is normally performed by a transitive, agentive verb like *facio*, and this could hardly be accomplished by a verb that has no involvement with agentivity. Indeed, no example can be found with a reading such as *orationem habere* *'listen to a speech'; nor does the agentive/Actor role of the subject of *habeo* + verbal noun present any counterexamples.

Plautus shows 15 examples of this type, Terence only one, Cato none. Note that a modal value is probably involved, at least in the passage from Terence, and nothing similar can be claimed for the analogous constructions with *habeo x* in Archaic Latin.

It must be acknowledged, then, that *habeo* has been employed as a light verb since its first attestations. This phenomenon is due to the wide semantic range held by this verb since the archaic period, which creates a partial obscurity of the lexical semantic core, as well as of its original, transitive character, which allows such an underspecified verb form to be effectively employed in periphrasis, where the subject of the verb is also the actor/agent of the activity expressed by the following verbal noun.

The above uses of *habeo* represent a statistical minority of all the functions displayed by this verb within the archaic period. These phenomena, however, continue to develop in Classical and Imperial Latin. Constructions with a verbal noun or the like as the object are well represented in Caesar and Cicero, even in (perfect participle) passive forms, and they are attested in what apparently looks like everyday language uttered by Trimalchio, as in Petron. 74.[32] It is also significant that expressions suggesting a functional overlap with *facio* stubbornly persist from the *XII Tables* to Late Latin, as is shown in the twin expressions *iter facere / iter habere* occurring in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*:

32. Cf. Cic. *epist.* 5,4,2: *tuam orationem, quam in senatu habuisses* 'your speech, which you gave in the senate'; Caes. *Gall.* 1,29,3: *eorum qui domum redierunt censu habito* 'a census having been taken of those who returned home'; 1,32,1: *hac oratione ab Diuitiaco habita* 'when this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus'; 5,44,2: *hi perpetuas inter se controuersias habebant* 'they had continuous arguments among themselves'; Petron. 74: *nolo statuam eius in monumento meo ponas, ne mortuus quidem litem habeam* 'I am unwilling for you to put a statue of her on my tomb, or else I will have nagging even in death'; *Itin. Eger.* 24,7: *haec operatio cottidie per dies sex ita habetur ad Crucem et ad Anastasim* 'this religious festival is thus held daily for six days at the Church of the Holy Cross and the Church of the Resurrection'.

(55) *Itin. Eger*. 9,4: *iter* ***fecimus*** *semper inter uineas, quae dant uinum, et uineas, quae dant balsamum, et inter pomaria et agros cultissimos et hortos plurimos iter* ***habuimus*** *totum super ripam fluminis Nili inter fundos frequentissimos*
'we always took a trip among the vines which give wine, and the vines which give balsam, and we made a complete trip among the orchards and the heavily cultivated fields and the many gardens beyond the bank of the Nile river among the most numerous plots of land'

Since the earliest attestations, in several cases *habeo* shows a plain stative meaning, such as in (56):

(56) Plaut. *Aul*. 3–5: *hanc domum / iam multos annos est cum possideo et colo / patri auoque iam huius qui nunc hic habet*
'it's already many a year that I own this house and I protect it, for the father and the grandfather of the one who now dwells here'[33]

Apparently, *habeo* can be employed as a one-argument predicate with the sense 'live', as in Plaut. *Aul*. 5, where it shows a purely locative-stative meaning (compositionally: −agentive, +stative, +locative). This is a highly marginal function of the verb, as is suggested by the fact that this particular function is usually expressed by the common frequentative form *habito* 'dwell', an independent verb since the earliest period.[34] It is rather common, however, to employ *habeo* with an accompanying predicative element, usually an adverb or an adjective, in cases like (57)–(59):[35]

33. Cf. also Plaut. *Bacch*. 114, *Cist*. 26, *Mil*. 594.
34. Note, however, that a certain differentiation seems to hold between the two expressions. The highly specific sense 'to dwell' is the exact meaning of the frequentative form. What is indicated by the simple form *habeo*, on the other hand, is a semantically wider presence or location in a certain place, with no specific reference to the typical act of dwelling. Cf. Plaut. *Men*. 68–69: *is illic habitat, geminus surrupticius. / Nunc ille geminus, qui Syracusis habet / hodie in Epidamnum venit* 'That stolen twin dwells in that place. Now, that [other] twin, who is in Syracuse, is coming to Epidamnum today'. Cf. also Plaut. *Aul*. 5 (= (56)), *Bacch*. 114, *Cas*. 749, *Epid*. 696, *Trin*. 193, 390, *Truc*. 77, 246, 406.
35. Cf. also Plaut. *Cist*. 9; Ter. *Phorm*. 479, 820; *Ad*. 365; *Haut*. 701.

(57) Plaut. *Cas*. 338: *opinione melius res tibi habe[a]t tua / si hoc impetramus ...*
'your business is going better for you than you think, if we get this...'

(58) Plaut. *Pseud*. 935–936: *sed uide, ornatus hic me satis condecet?* :: *Optume habet!*
' but hey, do I look becoming enough in this disguise? :: It's great!'

(59) Ter. *Phorm*. 429: *bene habent tibi principia*
'the start (of the story) is good for you'

In these cases, the concrete locative reading is completely obscured, and the verb simply expresses durativity; that is, *habeo* is a purely stative verb pointing to the (temporal) permanency of the subject in a certain state, just like *sum*. This makes [+stative] the relevant feature, a feature shared by the majority of other uses of *habeo*, prototypical possession included. Note, however, that in (57) a sentence like **melior/melius res tibi est tua* would probably call for an "inherent property" reading, such as 'your business is intrinsically better for you'. And the quick, colloquial answer *optume habet!* in (58) has the function of describing the positive character of a newly established state of affairs (the disguise) in such a way that could not be expressed by a sentence like **optume/optumus est*: here the most typical reading would be the rather different designation of the inherently good quality of the disguise.[36] Within the boundaries of this specific function, the expression of (temporal) stativity by *habeo* seems to display an established character that, given the general profile of *sum*, tends to be obscured in the basic copular verb.

The employment of *habeo* in order to express pure stativity, which therefore gives rise to quasi-copular performances, is very marginal in Latin but nonetheless is attested in the most colloquial expressions in the letters of Cicero, down to the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, although it does not seem to have had a consistent outcome in Romance:

(60) Cic. *Att*. 2,8,1: *bene habemus*
'we are all right'

36. Note the presence of a dative constituent in Plaut. *Cas*. 338 and Ter. *Phorm*. 429, which call for a comparison with the three-constituent syntactic type *x est mihi y*.

(61) Petron. 58,3: *bene nos habemus, at isti nugae, qui tibi non imperant*
'we are doing fine, but these fellows are fools who cannot keep you in line'

(62) *Itin. Eger.* 19,5: *si libenter habes, quaecumque loca sunt hic grata ad uidendum Christianis, ostendimus tibi*
'if you would have it gladly, we will show you the places which the Christians love to visit'

The involvement with a simply existential predication is potentially so strong that even in the archaic period we find an occurrence of *habeo* in a purely existential sentence, where the verbal form has only one argument, whose existence constitutes the only informational core of the predication:

(63) Cato *agr.* 80,1: *encytum ad eundem modum facito uti globos, nisi calicem pertusum cauum habeat*
'prepare the encytum [a pastry dish] in the same way as the (cheese) balls, except that there is a bowl with a pierced hole'

In this passage, which has consistent parallels only in Late Latin texts[37] and in the Romance languages (cf., most typically, Sp. *hay*, Fr. *il y a*), the function of *habeo* is similar to that usually expressed by *sum*, and the sentence shares the features normally associated with presentative constructions[38] (e.g., the rhematic character of the one argument, here presumably reflected in the morphosyntactic coding of the form, i.e., the accusative case). Examples of this type are extremely rare in Classical Latin, and the occurrence of features that might imply a consistent development of the phenomenon makes its appearance only in Late Latin:

37. Such a function has been identified in several passages from Petronius (see H. B. Rosén 1992: 110), although a nearby nominal element can be found within the discourse which could reasonably be defined as the subject of the possessive (not existential) verbal form (cf. Petron. 33,2–3: *tabula ... habebat denarios*; 45,3: *patria ... homines haberet*; 57,4: *ridet. Quid habet quod rideat?*; 77,4: *hanc domum ... casula erat; nunc templum est. Habet quattuor cenationes*). We have adopted an impersonal interpretation for (63) because no other nominal in the nominative can be argued to be the subject of *habeo*, nor does any alternative interpretation of the sentence seem to make sense.

38. See Perrot (1994: 22), Givón (1984;1990).

(64) *Itin. Eger*. 19,1: *ac sic denuo faciens iter per mansiones aliquot perueni ad ciuitatem, cuius nomen in scripturis positum legimus, id est* ***Batanis, quae ciuitas*** *usque in hodie est. Nam et* ***ecclesia cum episcopo*** *uere sancto et monacho et confessore* ***habet et martyria*** *aliquanta*
'And thus continuing again through several stops I arrived at a city whose name we read placed in the Scriptures, **that is Batananea, a city which** exists still today. **There is** a church **with a** truly holy **bishop**, a monk and confessor, and **various shrines to martyrs**'

(65) *Itin. Eger*. 1,2: *in eo ergo loco cum uenitur, ut tamen commonuerunt deductores sancti illi, qui nobiscum erant, dicentes: "consuetudo est, ut fiat hic oratio ab his, qui ueniunt, quando de eo loco primitus uidetur mons Dei": sicut et nos fecimus.* ***Habebat*** *autem de eo loco ad montem Dei forsitan* ***quattuor milia***
'When we arrived therefore in that place we did just as the holy guides who were with us, saying: "it is the custom that a prayer is made by those who come and who see the mountain of God for the first time" and we did this. From this place to the mountain of God **there were** perhaps **four thousand people**'

(66) *Itin. Eger*. 4,4: *in eo ergo loco, licet et tectum non sit, tamen* ***petra*** *ingens est per girum* ***habens planitiem supra se****, in qua stetisse dicuntur ipsi sancti; nam et in medio ibi quasi* ***altarium*** *de lapidibus factum* ***habet***
'In that place then, despite the fact that there is no protection, nevertheless there is an immense circular **rock being flat on the upper part**, on which the very saints are said to have stood; and in the middle **there is** a kind of **altar** made of stone'

In all these passages, *habeo* shows an existential function, but while in (64) an explicit (logical) subject role could still be assigned, perhaps to *Batanis, quae ciuitas* … (*ecclesia cum episcopo habet*), a subject is apparently missing in (65) and the syntactic valency of the verb seems analogous to Romance existential constructions.[39] Note that a passage such as (64), with an

39. Cf. also *Itin. Eger.* 23,2.

explicit subject, is similar to classical examples where the possessive verb expresses a part–whole or a more generic associative relation (such as Caes. *Gall.* 1,10,2: *intellegebat magno cum periculo prouinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos … finitimos haberet*; Cic. *epist.* 14,18,2: *domus ut propugnacula et praesidium habeat*; Petron. 45,3: *non mehercules patria melior dici potest, si homines haberet*). The sequence in (66) might thus provide a diachronic explanation: an explicit subject like *petra ingens*, which clearly retains its syntactic role within the first sentence (*habens planitiem supra se*) is omitted in the second sentence, where the subject of *habet* (*altarium*) is simply taken for granted. This kind of textual environment, associated with generic place names (like *locus, ciuitas*, etc.) which, given the appropriate context, might be easily omitted, could have ended up in occurrences of *habeo* (expressing part–whole or the like) where a syntactic subject is no longer recognizable, so that they could be successively reanalyzed as purely presentative-existential forms.

If we try to summarize the varied data discussed so far, we see that within this series of occurrences *habeo* fulfills mainly a grammatical function. Relics of the original telic character of the verb (i.e., the meaning 'take') still occur, mostly in the imperative, but they are residual. A few examples of a fully lexical, agentive meaning do occur, and they are strongly characterized as resultatives. That is, these instances of *habeo* express a durative, resultative activity, which is coherent diachronically with the original, telic value ('take') and synchronically with the general status of this verb as stative. They represent a very common semantic shift that can be described in terms of structural semantics as [+agentive], [+telic], [−durative] ('take') 〉 [+agentive], [−telic], [+durative] ('keep'). As far as possession is concerned, the relevant factor is that, in some of its early occurences, *habeo* displays a full lexical meaning such as 'keep' (not necessarily in a physical sense). Consequently, especially in the archaic authors, *habeo* can still express control *in acto* in some contexts. In *mihi est x*, on the other hand, any attribution of control to the possessor simply represents an inference from the referential level, and it never seems to belong to the semantic core of the form. Therefore, a differentiating feature between the two constructions is, initially, the possibility of *habeo* lexically expressing features such as [control], and the established nature of the possessive relation that appear to be relevant at the referential level, mostly where prototypical instances of possession are concerned. In a

purely diachronic perspective, such a possibility can be regarded as one of the reasons why this verbal form began to be employed to express possession, although the lexical characters originally displayed by *habeo* seem to be consistently bleached out by the time of Plautus.

Processes of semantic change have also gone further, toward more grammaticalized functions that imply stronger semantic bleachings (e.g., *habeo* + passive perfect participles). By the time of its earliest attestations, *habeo* has turned into a partly opaque verbal form that seems to proceed in two main functional directions:

(a) a "light" verbal form, with a limited number of examples, that seems to be based on the maintenance of a certain degree of involvement with agency. Indeed, one of the characteristics of these sentences is to point at the subject of the verb as the agent of the action expressed by the whole Verb + Verbal Noun unit.

(b) a plain stative verb, with a range of functions that go from the simple locative verb, to the existential, to a "quasi-copular status" verbal form whose function is strongly related to intransitive predication and is more grammatically oriented. It represents a further step along the path of losing specific, semantic qualities, since the only relevant feature that seems to be retained is [+durative].

These developments with *habeo* are not rare at all within the range of possessive forms, and examples can be provided from various languages (cf. Eng. *to have* as a light verb; Sp. *hay*, Fr. *il y a* as instances of purely existential meaning). We note, however, that Archaic Latin displays a number of these phenomena together, as if a reflex of a creative and dynamic period that must had been characterized by a high degree of productivity of processes related to the development of possessive verbs.

2.1.3 Prototypical possession

Instances of prototypical possession are very well represented by both the *habeo x* and *mihi est x* sentence types in the Archaic period, especially in comedy (see Table 6).[40] In Plautus we counted 69 instances of a prototypical possession out of the 390 occurrences of *mihi est x*, and 240 instances out of

40. We counted as instances of prototypical possession all those occurrences in which the

the 619 attestations of *habeo x*. The most common case is prototypical possession that does not necessarily imply physical contact between possessor and *possessum*. *Mihi est x* expresses merely physical contact between possessor and *possessum* in only 4 occurrences (of 69), which display a locative phrase such as *in manu* in 3 cases, thus suggesting that the dative construction is not typically employed to express physical possession. Rather differently, *habeo x* points to physical possession in 64 cases (of 240). These numbers by themselves constitute a meaningful datum. One sixth of the occurrences of *mihi est x* is employed to express prototypical possession (precisely 17 %); more than a third (38 %) of the occurrences of *habeo x* also have this specific function. Thus, *habeo x* is clearly more commonly employed to express prototypical possession even at the time of Plautus. While the comedies of Terence do not present a very different scenario, the percentages from Cato are clearly not significant at all in their pure numerical ratio, as the occurrences of *mihi est x* are scant. The situation in Cato, however, simply anticipates what appears to be the norm in the Classical stage: in Caesar and in Cicero's letters, prototypical possession is statistically well represented within the overall occurrences of the *mihi est x* construction but, in absolute terms, is much more frequently expressed by *habeo*, as the dative construction is reduced dramatically in its number of occurrences compared to *habeo*. Judging fom these authors, the preponderance of the possessive verb by this period is close to 10 to 1. The statistics in Table 6 on prototypical possession with both constructions are suggestive of the long-term diachronic trend. In these kinds of occurrences, the subject of the *mihi est x* sentences and the object of the *habeo x* sentences, namely the *possessum*, is usually a noun like *argentum*, *minae*, *nummus*; a real estate commodity like *aedes*, *ager*; or any kind of regularly possessed items: *capra*, *cistula*, *gladium* or, generically, *bona*, etc. The nature of all these *possessa* simply does not change according to the construction used. Cf. (67)–(70):

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possessum, although not necessarily held physically by the possessor, is available to him, is at his disposal, and can be used according to the possessor's will. Cases of physical possession (i.e., those in which the *possessum* is a prototypical *possessum*, like a piece of clothing, or a tool like a sword, and is in physical contact with the possessor) are regarded as a subgroup of prototypical possession, because the two profiles do not exclude each other and often co-occur.

(67) a. Plaut. *Asin*. 364: *Argyrippo essent uiginti argenti minae*
'Argyrippus had twenty minas of silver'
b. Plaut. *Epid*. 366: *pro fidicina argenti minas se habere quinquaginta*
'for the flute-player he has fifty minas of silver'

Table 6. Percentage of instances of prototypical possession

	habeo x		*mihi est x*	
Plaut.	38 %	(240 of 619; −phys. 176, +phys. 64)	17 %	(69 of 390; −phys. 65; +phys. 4)
Ter.	17 %	(28 of 164; −phys. 22, +phys. 6)	11 %	(8 of 73; −phys. 8, +phys. 0)
Cato *agr.*	25 %	(18 of 71; −phys. 17, +phys. 1)	33 %	(1 of 3; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)
Caes. *Gall.*	15 %	(23 of 149; −phys. 22, +phys. 1)	9 %	(1 of 11; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)
Cic. *epist.*	10 %	(7 of 68; −phys. 6, +phys. 1)	25 %	(2 of 8; −phys. 2, +phys. 0)
Verg. *Aen.*	50 %	(1 of 2; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)	0 %	(0 of 1)
Liv. 1	21 %	(6 of 29; −phys. 3, +phys. 3)	0 %	(0 of 4)
Sen. *epist.* 1	18 %	(8 of 45; −phys. 7, +phys. 1)	0 %	(0 of 5)
Plin. *epist.* 1	7 %	(1 of 15; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)	12 %	(1 of 8; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)
Tac. *Agr.*	0 %	(0 of 7)	33 %	(1 of 3; −phys. 1, +phys. 0)
Petron.	27 %	(38 of 140; −phys. 30, +phys. 8)	0 %	(0 of 3)
Apic.	8 %	(1 of 12; −phys. 1; −phys. 0)	0 %	
Itin. Eger.	16 %	(8 of 51; −phys. 8, +phys. 0)	0 %	(0 of 4)

(68) a. Plaut. *Capt*. 580: *neque praeter se umquam ei seruos fuit*
'nor did he ever have a servant besides himself'
b. Plaut. *Epid*. 410: *ne tu habes seruom graphicum*
'don't you really have an elegant servant'

(69) a. Plaut. *Cas*. 533: *liberae aedes ut sibi essent*
'so that he had a house all for himself'
b. Plaut. *Truc*. 177: *siquidem habes fundum atque aedis*
'if you really have land and a house'

(70) a. Ter. *Hec*. 811–812: *cognosse anulum illum Myrrinam / gnatae suae fuisse*
'Myrrina knows that her daughter had that ring'
b. Ter. *Haut*. 653–654: *is hic est anulus. /* :: *Vnde habes?*
'this here is the ring. :: Where do you have (it) from?'

Given the cultural context, we generally regarded *possessa* like *servus* or *ancilla* (which are rather frequent, especially in archaic comedy) as instances of prototypical possession. Even for this kind of relation (i.e., prototypical possession + a [+human] *possessum*), both types are employed equally, with no apparent difference. All in all, the kinds of possessor, *possessum*, and relationship between them seem to be the same with both constructions. Thus, especially in the archaic period (when the *mihi est x* type is still extensively employed), the two constructions show a considerable degree of semantic overlap, even for the expression of prototypical possession.

The further we go in time, the less frequently we come across occurrences of the *mihi est x* type, regardless of its meaning. This development is reflected proportionally in the number of occurrences expressing prototypical possession, which become extremely rare in the later period, when such a relation is normally designated by *habeo*:

(71) Caes. *Gall.* 1,11,5: *Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum uicos possessionesque habebant*
'the Allobroges, who had their villages and goods beyond the Rhone'

(72) Caes. *Gall.* 4,1,10: *neque uestitus praeter pellis haberent*
'they did not have clothes, but animal skins'

(73) Cic. *epist.* 16,21,7: *emisse te praedium uehementer gaudeo. … Habes. Deponendae tibi sunt urbanitates*
'I am very happy that you have bought a piece of rural land. Now you have it; you must give up your urban ways'

(74) Petron. 26,9: *Trimalchio … horologium in triclinio … habet*
'Trimalchio has a clock in the dining room'

(75) *Itin. Eger.* 19,19: *et licet in patria exemplaria ipsarum haberem*
'and although I had copies of those (letters) at home'

In general terms, *habeo x* and *mihi est x* express prototypical possession in exactly the same way. However, physical possession is expressed by both constructions only in Plautus, while in Terence such a relation is expressed only by *habeo x*.[41] In Caesar and Cicero, the few cases of *mihi est x* expressing prototypical possession do not involve physical contact.[42] In spite of the apparently high degree of semantic overlap between *habeo x* and *mihi est x*, especially in archaic comedy, where the high number of occurrences for both constructions allows a more detailed comparison, a certain semantic gradient between the two expressions can be observed. It often happens that the possessive sentence presents an additional element to specify the exact sphere of possession within which the *possessum* is to be individuated. This function is performed by expressions such as *in manu*. In Plautus, we counted 13 instances of this expression co-occurring with *mihi est x*, which points to physical possession in three cases and to prototypical possession in three other cases. Cf. examples like (76)–(77):

(76) Plaut. *Amph.* 406: *non mihist lanterna in manu?*
'Don't I have a lamp in my hand?'

41. Cf. Plaut. *Cas.* 751: *gladium Casinam intus habere ait, / qui me atque te interimat* 'they say that Casina is inside and has a sword to kill me and you'; *Amph.* 143–145 (= (132)): *ego has habebo usque in petaso pinnulas / tum meo patri autem tor[r]ulus inerit aureus / sub petaso; id signum Amphitruoni non erit* 'I will have these fins up on my hat, while my father will have a golden ribbon under his hat; this sign, Amphitryon won't have'; Ter. *Eun.* 684, 695.

42. Cf. Cic. *epist.* 5,6,2 (= (106)): *nec putant ei nummos deesse posse qui, ex obsidione foeneratores exemerit. Omnino semissibus magna copia est* 'they do not think someone who helped moneylenders can run out of money. The truth of the matter is that only six-percent lenders have an abundance (of money)'.

(77) Plaut. *Asin*. 85–86: *dotalem seruom Sauream uxor tua / adduxit, quoi plus in manu sit quam tibi*
'your wife brought along the slave Saurea as a dowry, who has in his hands more [money] than yourself'[43]

We have only one example with *habeo x* which is clearly an instance of physical possession.[44] Unsurprisingly, the possessive meaning expressed by both constructions, even in cases of prototypical possession, is rather wide and may need further contextual specification.[45] But it is with *mihi est x* that the need for contextualization appears much stronger, and it is this construction which shows a greater semantic distance from prototypical and physical possession (thirteen cases with *in manu* vs. one with *habeo x* in Plautus!). Since the earliest attestations, *habeo x* appears as the construction semantically closer to the specific relationship of prototypical possession, especially when it implies physical contact, which is normally expressed by *habeo* at all periods, with or without a complementary locative phrase.[46] Such a tendency, recognizable mostly in the early texts, where the two constructions abound, tends to become undetectable in Classical Latin simply because the number of occurrences of the dative construction is too small to make any consistent comparison with *habeo*.

Some of the tendencies which we recognized within the chronological stages of the evolution of *habeo* and dative constructions are partly mirrored

43. Note that, if (76) is an instance of physical possession, in (77) the expression is purely metaphorical and the whole sentence simply refers to the prototypical possession of the money owned by the slave Saurea.
44. Plaut. *Asin*. 462–464: *da, quaeso, ac ne formida / saluom hercle erit.* :: *credam fore, dum quidem ipse in manu habebo* 'give (the money) to him, please, and do not fear. I swear it will be safe. :: I believe that it will be, as long as I have it in my hands'.
45. Similarly, the expression *domi* performs the function of specifying that a certain *possessum* is to be individuated within someone's regular possessions, which are, as is normal, to be found at his home. In Plautus, we counted 9 occurrences of this kind with *mihi est x* and 8 with *habeo x*. Cf. Plaut. *Aul*. 266: *mihi esse thensaurum domi* 'I have a treasure at home'; *Pseud*. 211: *oliui dynamin domi habent maxumam* 'he has a great quantity of olive oil at home'.
46. Cf. Petron. 67,5: *tunc sudario manus tergens, quod in collo habebat* 'then wiping her hands on a cloth which she had around her neck'; 102,13: *Eumolpus atramentum habet* 'Eumolpus has some ink'.

in the development of the verb *teneo* as a possessive construction. Of course, the original meaning 'keep', often in a physical sense, is the major one among the earliest occurrences and is never given up in later stages of the language, and it remains so in Portuguese, Spanish, and southern Italian dialects. Cf. examples like (78)–(79):

(78) Ter. *Phorm*. 506: *immo, id quod aiunt, auribu' teneo lupum*
'no indeed, as they say, I have a wolf by the ears'

(79) *Itin. Eger*. 31,3: *infantes … in collo illos parentes sui tenent*
'babies hold onto their parents by the neck'

However, Terence already offers one occurrence (of 16 of *teneo*) where *habeo* and *teneo* clearly are hypothetically interchangeable, as they meet on the expression of mental activity which, as we have seen (see Section 2.1.1.3), is rather frequent for *habeo* from this period:

(80) Ter. *Andr*. 498: *teneo quid erret et quid agam habeo*[47]
'I see how he has erred, and I understand what I should do'

Teneo is frequently employed in Caesar (51 occurrences in the *Gall.*), where most of the examples refer to a control that is no longer simply physical.[48] In some cases, the meaning 'keep, control' overlaps contextually with a relation of prototypical possession, as in (81)–(82):

47. Both verbs refer here to the mental capacity to conceive certain notions (i.e., how someone has erred; what someone has to do), and they can be translated as 'know, understand'. An expression like *quid agam habeo* can be compared to a parallel one with *teneo*, as in Ter. *Haut.* 700: *nam quo ore appellabo patrem? tenes quid dicam*? Plautus, however, already offered an example of how *teneo* and *mihi est x* overlapped in the expression of the experiencer, in *Capt*. 620–621: *me insaniam / neque tenere neque mi esse ullum morbum*.

48. Cf. Caes. *Gall.* 1,22,1: *cum summus mons a Labieno teneretur* 'when the summit of the mountain was held by Labienus'; 4,26,5: *equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant* 'the cavalry had not been able to hold their course and take the island'.

(81) Caes. *Gall.* 3,8,1: *naues habent Veneti plurimas … et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent uectigales*
'the Veneti have numerous ships and in the great and open violence of the sea, with only a few harbors spread about which they hold themselves, they have as contributing taxpayers almost all those whose custom it is to sail that sea'

(82) Caes. *Gall.* 4,7,4: *uel sibi agros attribuant uel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint*
'let the Romans grant them lands or allow them to hold those which they had acquired by arms'

In Petronius, *habeo* and *teneo* are almost synonyms as for the expression of physical possession:

(83) Petron. 27,3: *sed follem plenum **habebat** seruus sufficiebatque ludentibus. Notauimus etiam res nouas: nam duo spadones in diuersa parte circuli stabant, quorum alter matellam **tenebat** argenteam, alter numerabat pilas*
'but a slave **had** a full leather bag and supplied balls to the players. We also observed some new things: two eunuchs were standing in different parts of the circle, one of whom was **holding** a silver pot, the other of whom was counting balls'

It is rather significant, then, that the expression of prototypical possession and of the passive role of the experiencer, which in earlier times was more typically fulfilled by *habeo x* and *mihi est x* respectively, in the *Satyricon* is shared by *habeo* and *teneo* in such a way that it is the former that points to the experiencer and the latter that designates prototypical possession:

(84) Petron. 84,1: *si quis uitiorum omnium inimicus rectum iter uitae coepit insistere, primum propter morum differentiam **odium habet**: quis enim potest probare diuersa? Deinde qui solas exstruere diuitias curant, nihil uolunt inter homines melius credi, quam quod ipsi **tenent***
'if someone who is disdainful of all vices and begins to follow a straight path in life, **he has the hate** (of others) first because of his

different character: for who is able to approve of differences? Furthermore, those who only care to heap up riches do not want anything to be considered better among men than what they themselves **have**'

In later times *teneo* appears to have taken up many of the functions previously performed only by *habeo*[49] and the dative construction, as the expression of relations that no longer imply control and are to be classified simply as a generic relation of *sphère personnelle*, as in (85):

(85) *Itin. Eger*. 10,7: *id enim nobis semper consuetudinis erat, ut ubicumque ad loca desiderata accedere uolebamus, primum ibi fieret oratio, deinde legeretur lectio ipsa de codice, diceretur etiam psalmus unus pertinens ad rem et iterato fieret ibi oratio. Hanc ergo consuetudinem iubente Deo semper* ***tenuimus****, ubicumque ad loca desiderata potuimus peruenire*
'for it was always our custom, that whatever desired places we wished to go to, first we would make a prayer, then we would read a particular passage from the book, then we would recite one psalm appropriate to the circumstances and then make another prayer. For we always **maintained** this custom, through the will of God, whenever we were able to arrive at the places which we desired'

In conclusion, given the status of transitive verb equally shared by *habeo* and *teneo*, no syntactic or pragmatic phenomenon can be invoked to explain the progressive intrusion of *teneo* into the domain of possession; the reasons are semantic. These appear to be partly the same one previously recognised in

49. As already pointed out by H. B. Rosén (1992: 117), *Itin. Eger.* 25,12 also provides an instance where *teneo* fulfills an existential function, and the subject of the verb (which, however, can theoretically be seen in a generic 3rd pers. pl.) appears to be no longer recognizable and is effectively pragmatically null: *nam ex illa hora, qua omnes nocte in Ierusolima reuertuntur cum episcopo, tunc loci ipsius monachi, quicumque sunt, usque ad lucem in ecclesia in Bethleem peruigilant ymnos seu antiphonas dicentes, quia episcopum necesse est hos dies semper in Ierusolima tenere* 'from the hour at which everyone returns at night to Jerusalem with the bishop, then the monks from the place, however many there are, keep watch until daylight in the church in Bethlehem, reciting hymns and antiphons, for it is necessary that the bishop hold these days always in Jerusalem'.

the comparison between *habeo x* and *mihi est x*: the more recent construction (in terms of functional acquisition) is more strictly connected with agentivity and control, and the first cases where a construction begins to show a possessive relation are to be hypothesized as instances of physical possession. The more a possessive construction expands its semantic domain (a phenomenon clearly displayed by *habeo* in Classical Latin, when *mihi est x* begins to be obsolete), the stronger the need to have another construction that more expressively and unequivocally denotes physical control and prototypical possession. The fact that *teneo* did not stop at this stage, but proceeded further, eventually to display an existential function (see n. 49), implies that these two verbs were not simply in a relation of substitution. Rather, there must have been a long period of merging phenomena within Imperial and, especially, Late Latin, in which *habeo* and *teneo* developed their possessive potentials side by side. Finally, *habeo* and *teneo* settled their specific features and functions differently, according to the several traditions and the many geographical partitions of the Romance world, where these two verbs acquired a varied, and often overlapping, status.[50]

2.1.4 Habeo x *and* mihi est x *within the discourse*

Despite the high degree of semantic and functional overlap between *habeo x* and *mihi est x*, the two constructions display a clear functional differentiation if we observe how they actually work *in vivo*. Archaic comedy, which, as we have seen, provides a rich harvest of synchronic data for both constructions, offers several cases where the two apparently equivalent options occur together, showing textual contiguity. In Plautus, we counted 22 passages of this kind,[51] and more than two cases out of three show a preferential order for the *mihi est x* construction to appear before the *habeo x* sentence (15 cases, vs. 7 where the order is *habeo x – mihi est x*). Cf. for example (86)–(88):

50. It is interesting, for example, that *teneo* never developed auxiliary functions. See Baldi and Cuzzolin (2005).
51. The comedies of Terence do not provide many instances of this type. The few examples attested are not particularly significant with respect to a semantic and functional gradient between the two constructions. Cf., at any rate, *Hec*. 745–746, *Phorm*. 826–827.

(86) Plaut. *Cas*. 197–200: *unde* ***ea tibist?*** */ Nam* ***peculi probam nihil habere*** *addecet / clam uirum, et* ***quae habet,*** *partum ei haud commodest*
'where do **you have her** (a slave) from? Actually, **no honest woman possesses any money** unknown to her husband, and if **she has** it she surely hasn't gotten it honestly'

(87) Plaut. *Cas*. 356: ***plus artificumst mi*** *quam rebar: hariolum hunc* ***habeo*** *domi*
'**I have at my disposal more craftsmen** than I thought: **I** even **have** this fortune teller at home'

(88) Plaut. *Cist*. 64–66: *at mihi cordoliumst. :: Quid? Und**est tibi cor**? Commemora opsecro; / quod* ***neque ego habeo*** *neque quisquam alia mulier, ut perhibent uiri*
'oh, I have such a heartache. :: What? Since when do **you have a heart**? Tell me, please. Because **I don't have** one, nor does any other woman, as men say'

In (86), a certain difference might be claimed to exist between possessing a slave and possessing money, but no such claim can be made for the other cases, where the two expressions always refer to the very same *possessum*: craftsmen, a heart. In all these passages, the dative sentence introduces an argument into the discourse (although formerly mentioned in previous conversation) about which only a general statement of involvement with the participant/possessor is made. The possession of the slave by the woman has just been questioned, and the one who asks is not even sure whether it is a possession relation or not. Once the "possible" prototypical *possessum* is introduced into the discourse, the following reference to the possessed *peculium* (which makes possession of a slave "technically" possible, i.e., by means of purchase) is described by *habeo x*, which leaves no room for semantic ambiguity concerning the relation between the woman and the *ancilla*. Likewise, once topics such as *artifices* or *cor* are introduced, the kind of relationship is semantically restricted and specified in the following sentence, always by means of the verb *habeo*. When the two constructions "clash", *mihi est x* displays a broader semantic content, which is no doubt connected with its status

as an existential sentence, whereas *habeo x* seems to be characterised by a narrower meaning.[52]

In (89), the double meaning of *umbra* as 'shade' and as 'girl from Umbria' is even more indicative of such a difference:

(89) Plaut. *Most*. 769–770: ***nec mi umbra hic usquamst,*** *nisi si in puteo / quaepiamst.* :: *Quid? Sarsinatis ecquast,* ***si Umbram non habes****?*
'**I have no shade here anywhere**, except maybe in the well. :: What? Is there a girl from Sarsina at least, **if you don't have one from Umbria**?'

Expressing the relation with *umbra* through *mihi est x* leaves the interpretation open to a sort of *sphère personnelle* meaning: 'I don't have any *umbra* (= shade / girl from Umbria), unless she's in the well'. The following sentence disambiguates the relation, which in turn becomes strictly possession (of a girl who is considered simply a legal property). Consider (90):

(90) Plaut. *Epid*. 329–331: *quid illum ferre uis, qui,* ***tibi quoi diuitiae domi maxumae sunt, / is nummum nullum habes*** *nec sodali tuo in te copiast. /* :: ***Si hercle habeam****, pollicear lubens ...*
'what do you want him to bring? You, who, although **you have many riches at home, don't have a single penny** and have nothing to help your friend. :: But I swear, if I had it, I would freely promise (to give it)'

The initial *mihi est x* construction simply points to a possessive relation of goods that is basically *in absentia*, and it can even be denied by the following

52. The same semantic rationale can be recognized in an example from the opposite discourse sequence *habeo x – mihi est x*, such as Plaut. *Rud*. 1411–1414: *quam mox mi argentum ergo redditur? /* :: *Res solutast, Gripe.* ***Ego habeo****. /* :: *At ego me hercle mavolo. /* :: ***Nihil hercle hic tibi est,*** *ne tu speres* 'So, how much money will be given back to me? :: The thing is set. I have it. :: But I prefer to have it. :: There is nothing at all here for you. No use in hoping'. The first sentence is uttered by the old Daemones because he wants the fisherman Gripus to acknowledge that he is actually in charge and in control of all the money: 'I have it'. Once Gripus asserts his objections, a greater strength is given to the statement of Daemones using a *mihi est x* construction that, with its broader semantic profile, expands the dimension (and the strength) of the rejection: 'there is nothing at all here for you'.

habeo x sentences, where it is stated that the young Chaeribulus actually does not have a single penny. What is denied is not the physical possession of money, but the fact that Chaeribulus does not have it at his own disposal.

Thus, the semantic difference between *mihi est x* and *habeo x* seems also to be context-dependent. The frequency of the *mihi est x* – *habeo x* sequence within the discourse flow depends on the wider semantic content of *mihi est x*, which, when it appears next to instances of *habeo x*, displays a more generic meaning, as well as a presentative function. *Habeo x*, on the other hand, narrows the semantic terms of the relationship and points to the specific features of a prototypical instance of possession *in acto*. As we have seen in Section 2.1.2, in the archaic texts *habeo* still displays features that characterize its semantic content as connected with the expression of a certain degree of agentivity. As we noted, such a phenomenon can receive an explanation in diachronic terms as it is connected with the original meaning of the verb. Apparently, the expression of a feature like [control] *in acto* remains pertinent every time it is recoverable by inference from the referential plane as an intrinsic feature of the relationship expressed. As a side remark, we note that, regardless of the etymological meaning of the form, another relevant factor that might have come into play in these "contrastive" contexts is the formally transitive character of the verb, which might have constituted by itself a synchronic stimulus to assign to *habeo* the expression of some degree of agentivity.[53]

If such an interpretation is correct, the data presented in this discussion permit a better understanding of the double coding of possessive sen-

53. Much of the debate concerning the verb *habeo* has centered around its degree of transitivity. *Habeo* is generally seen as a pseudo-transitive verb, and its transitivity is essentially denied by some linguists (Benveniste 1960; Pinkster 1990). Quite a different view is offered by García-Hernández (1992, 1993, 1995), who considers transitivity as the basic feature of a form expressing a possessive relation, which, therefore, would only be expressed by *habeo* and not by the *mihi est* construction. While we have not focused our discussion around this debate, we tend to see the transitive character of this verb as simply a matter of diachrony "in progress", i.e., a characteristic that, from a prototypical status with full semantic implications, becomes limited to more formal and syntactically marked uses. Such a process does not display an even evolution but presents different phenomena according to different contexts and functions, as it follows the heterogeneous nature of the entire constellation of possession.

tences, which allows semantic differences to emerge (or be maintained) when both constructions occur within the same, contrastive, context. This particular characteristic is bound to fade progressively, as the functions performed by *habeo* shift toward a more grammatically rather than lexically oriented range and, of course, the relevance of the *mihi est x* construction in purely numerical terms grows thinner (cf. Ramos Guerreira 1998). These data also substantiate the hypothesis that *habeo* developed its possessive function in contexts where a semantic specification was needed for the expression of specific aspects of possession (namely, the degree of control performed by the possessor on the *possessum*). The consistency of the feature [control] for *habeo* or, in a broader sense, the transitive status of this verb is not the main factor that makes *habeo x* a possessive construction, just as *mihi est x* maintains its possessive status in spite of the absence of these features. As we have seen, instances of the two constructions in non-contiguous portions of text show the equality of their possessive meaning.[54] But the relevance of the feature [control] in *habeo* and its transitive character are to be hypothesized as features that triggered such a function to appear and develop at the outset, and traces are evident in the archaic period.

2.1.5 Topic continuity and discourse structure; functional overload of the dative case

In the previous section, we attempted to evaluate possible differences between the *mihi est x* and *habeo x* types, primarily with regard to semantic and discourse factors. If we look for differentiating features that might have conditioned the use of the latter construction, however, textual analysis clearly shows that pragmatic phenomena are also at work. A relevant factor is the capacity of a transitive verb like *habeo* to fulfill a topic-continuity function in a way which is quite different from a dative construction. Given the frequent agentive character of the main animate topic, which is, therefore, likely to appear as the subject of a series of transitive, agentive verbal forms, the codification of a predication of possession by means of a transitive verb brings about a considerable degree of textual agreement and structural harmony with

54. See for the opposing view García-Hernández (1992, 1995), according to whom *mihi est x* would not be properly possessive.

the other surrounding parts of the texts (e.g., other verbs). Consider, for instance, (91):

(91) Plaut. *Curc*. 546–548: *quos tu mihi luscos libertos, quos Summanos somnias? / **Nec mihi quidem libertus ullust.*** :: *Facis sapientius / quam **pars lenonum, libertos qui habent** et eos deserunt*
'what one-eyed freedmen of mine are you dreaming of, what Summanuses? **I have no freedman at all**. :: You know better **than some of those pimps, who have freedmen** and abandon them'

The first possessive construction has the basic function of stating the total absence of *liberti* within the range of possessions held by the speaker. Therefore, the possessor is the topic and the dative prepositional phrase is placed at the beginning of the sentence, as is usual for a sentence topic. The *possessum*/subject, which is the comment, is naturally placed at the end. In this instance the following possessive sentence shifts to the *habeo x* type apparently because of the persistence of *pars lenonum* as the continuous topic, since it is the agentive subject of the following transitive verbal form *deserunt*. The *habeo x* option allows the whole string to be built on two contiguous transitive verbs sharing the same subject, *qui*, which in turn bears a topic-continuity function in a string that had its starting point in *pars lenonum*. A similar textual sequence can be seen even in examples of *habeo* constructions with no contrastive presence of *mihi est x*. Cf. for example (92)–(94):[55]

(92) Plaut. *Asin*. 621–622: *patronus qui uobis fuit futurus, perdidistis /* :: *Equidem hercle nullum **perdidi**, ideo quia numquam ullum **habui***
'you lost the master who was about to be yours. :: By Hercules, **I lost** no one, because **I** never **had** one'

55. Examples are numerous; cf. Plaut. *Pseud*. 1105–1107: *nam qui liberos esse ilico se arbitrantur / ex conspectu eri si sui **se abdiderunt, / luxantur, lustrantur, comedunt** quod **habent*** 'indeed, those who consider themselves free as soon as **they have removed themselves** from their master's sight, **they turn to lust, luxury and eat up everything they have**'; *Pseud*. 355–356: ***ego** scelestus nunc argentum promere possum domo; / **tu qui piu's**, istoc **es** genere gnatus, nummum non **habes*** 'rascal that **I** am, I can take away money from the house; **You, who are pious**, who are of the same blood, **you don't have** a single penny'; *Pseud*. 1125: *quia praeda haec meast; / scortum **quaerit, habet** argentum* 'this prey is mine. He **wants** the girl, he **has** the money' [a pimp is speaking].

(93) Plaut. *Men.* 509–510: *neque hercle* ***ego*** *uxorem* ***habeo****, neque ego Erotio /* ***dedi*** *nec pallam* ***surrupui***
'by Hercules, **I have** no wife, **I didn't give** Erotium [anything] and **I didn't steal** the mantle'

(94) Plaut. *Mil.* 1099–1100: *aurum atque uestem muliebrem omnem habeat sibi, / quae illi instruxisti*; **sumat, habeat, auferat**
'she can have for herself all the gold and clothes that you gave her; **she can take** them, **have** them and **carry** them **away**'

Analogous examples are of course extremely common and they can be found in authors from every period, as this phenomenon depends on general discourse factors. Cf. for example (95)–(98):[56]

(95) Ter. *Eun.* 1078: *principio et* ***habet*** *quod* ***det*** *et* ***dat*** *nemo largius*
'first, because **he has** the resources so that **he might give**, and nobody **gives** more generously'

(96) Cato *agr.* 67,1: ***qui*** *in torculario* ***erunt*** *uasa pura* ***habeant curent*** *que uti olea ...*
'**those who** will be in the pressing room **will have** clean jars and **will make sure** that the oil ... '

(97) Caes. *Gall.* 1,44,3: *non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum* ***intulisse****: omnes Galliae ciuitates ad se oppugnandum* ***uenisse*** *ac contra se castra* ***habuisse***
'**he had not made** war on the Gauls, but they on him; all the Gaulish states had come to attack him and **had placed** their camp against him'

56. Cf. also the following archaic examples: Ter. *Eun.* 237: *quoniam* ***miser*** *quod* ***habui perdidi*** 'because, **poor me**, what **I had**, *I lost*'; Cato *agr.* 38,4: *si ligna et uirgas non* ***poteris*** *uendere neque lapidem* ***habebis*** *unde calcem* ***coquas*** 'if you **won't be able** to sell wood and shrubs and **you won't have** stone so that **you make** lime'; Caes. *Gall.* 4,4,2: *quas regiones Menapii* ***incolebant****. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia uicosque* ***habebant*** 'the Menapii **inhabited** those lands. **They held** fields, buildings and villages on both sides of the river'. Cf. also Ter. *Andr.* 889, 918, *Haut.* 104, 710, *Eun.* 119–120, 475, 1064; Cato *agr.* 2,7; 111,1; 135,3; 157,1.

(98) Caes. *Gall*. 4,22,2: *Caesar … neque post tergum hostem relinquere* ***uolebat*** *neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem* ***habebat*** *neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas* ***iudicabat***
'Caesar **did not wish** to leave an enemy behind his back and he **did not have** an opportunity to carry out a campaign because of the time of year, nor **did he think** that the settlement of such trivialities should take precedence over the question of Britain'

Another discourse-related factor that should not be underrated is the obviously large number of dative constituents that do not belong to a *mihi est x* sentence and which, potentially, can interfere with the dative element of the possessive construction. Given the extremely common and varied use of the dative, this possibility necessarily exists in every kind of text; and Archaic Latin, due to the higher number of *mihi est x* occurrences within this period, provides eloquent examples:[57]

(99) Ter. *Haut.* 384: *nam mihi quale ingenium haberes fuit indicio oratio*
'indeed, the speech was a clear hint to me of what your inclination was'

(100) Cato *agr*. 6,3: *ulmos serito et partim populos, uti frondem ouibus et bubus habeas*
'plant elm trees and some poplars, so that you may have leaves for the sheep and the cattle'

(101) Ter. *Haut.* 1002: *seni nostri fidei nil habeo*
'I have no trust in our old master'

(102) Ter. *Andr*. 703–704: *hoc ego tibi profecto effectum reddam.* / :: *Iam hoc opus est.* :: *Quin iam habeo*. :: *Quid est?* :: *Huic, non tibi habeo, ne erres*
'I will certainly do this for you. / :: Already now it has to be done. :: I already have (done it). :: What is it? :: For him, not for you have I (done it), don't be mistaken'

57. Cf. also Ter. *Eun*. 197, *Haut.* 1039; Cato *agr*. 30,1; 153,1.

No matter what kind of function the dative constituent fulfills, a hypothetical *mihi est x* sentence in the previous passages would cause a considerable degree of ambiguity: in *Haut.* 384, a sentence like **nam mihi quale ingenium esset tibi fuit indicio oratio* might have only sounded rather awkward; and in (100) the problems caused by **uti frondis ouibus et bubus sit tibi* might not have been insuperable, given the clarity of the context. But in (101), **seni nostri fidei nil est mihi* would certainly have been ambiguous as to who is doing the trusting and who is being trusted. And, in (102) (leaving aside the special meaning expressed by *habeo* in this rather colloquial exchange of witty remarks), an answer like **huic, non tibi mihi est* would most likely have been comically incomprehensible.

Thus, from a diachronic point of view, the way *habeo* can fulfill a topic-continuity function in harmony with the Latin discourse structure and the functional overload of the dative has to be regarded in connection with other factors which, over time, contributed to the gradual spreading of the *habeo x* type.

2.1.6 Existential constructions and definiteness of possessum

The syntactic structure of *mihi est x* appears to be strongly connected with the informational-pragmatic structure of the sentence. While the possessor is firmly characterized as [+def] and topical, with very few exceptions,[58] the *possessum* has most generally a [−def] and rhematic status. Therefore, the attribution of a presentative-existential function to the verbal form in this construction is quite straightforward.[59] Consequently *mihi est x* can be thought of as being based on the presence of a nominal/pronominal phrase, that is, a constituent in the dative, which differentiates this construction from a simpler, presentative-existential sentence: *est argentum* 'there is silver' as opposed to *mihi est argentum* 'I have silver'. Given the cognitive and semantic saliency of the human participant, which almost invariably coincides with the constituent in the dative, we expect it to be the topic. As is well known, this

58. Terence, for example, shows only one clear case of a rhematic possessor out of 73 occurrences, in *Andr*. 206, a highly atypical sentence with an inanimate, nonspecific possessor: *enimvero, Dave, nil locist segnitiae neque socordiae*.

59. See Bolkestein (1983), Bortolussi (1998: 72).

is a typical feature of possessive sentences, where the possessor is human, topical, etc., vs. the inanimate, rhematic *possessum*. As the topic tends to be placed early in the sentence (at least, in a main, declarative, unmarked Latin sentence), we should expect the element in the dative to be placed before the subject of *esse*.

Notwithstanding the reasonable doubts that can be cast against this expectation (as in Bauer 1996: 246), the sequence of constituents of *mihi est x* is such as to give sufficient ground for a clear rationale.[60] Consider the data in Table 7B, summing up the order of the elements of all *mihi est x* instances in Terence. The 69 occurrences of a *mihi est x* construction with a prototypical possessive meaning in Plautus show an analogous distribution (Table 7A). Classical prose authors, in whose works the occurrence of the *mihi est x* type is somewhat limited (11 in the *Gall.*, Table 7C; 8 in the 61 letters of Cicero we examined, Table 7D), do not display a different scenario.

The V-first sequence, clearly a minority pattern, is apparently due to the tendency to place the verb *sum* at the beginning of the sentence when it has a presentative-existential function.[61] Archaic authors, however, seem to favor D or S in the first position. Phenomena of focalization and of theme and argument continuity within the discourse can, of course, be reflected in a varied range of sequences and sentence structures.[62] But the plain, declarative sen-

60. So too Bortolussi. Despite the fact that his account of the data is rather different from ours, his interpretation does not differ, at least along general lines: the constituent in the dative is the less informative element. See Bortolussi (1998: 72): “Dans la prédication de possession, le possesseur se trouve très fréquemment en seconde position (plus de 50% des occurrences chez Plaute et Terence), position que l’on considère comme ‘faible’, ou, dans notre perspective, se rencontrent les éléments non informatifs de l’énoncé”.

61. See Bortolussi (1998: 73). A possible argument (based on the fact that the dative type is built around an existential sentence) claiming that the verb should always, or predominantly, occupy the first position is ruled out, in our opinion, by the fact that once the dative element is introduced, we are no longer facing a purely existential sentence, but a possessive one.

62. See, for example, a case like Ter. *Ad.* 529 (=8): *cluens amicus hospes nemost vobis?* ‘someone renowned, a friend, a guest, don’t you have anyone?’. Often, the initial position of the subject is simply due to trivial pragmatic phenomena, like focusing stress. E.g., Plaut. *Curc.* 600: *nullast mihi. Nam quam habui absumpsi celeriter* ‘I have nothing. For what I possessed, I wasted quickly’; *Rud.* 1414: *nil hercle hic tibist, ne tu speres*, ‘by Hercules there is nothing here for you, and there is no use in hoping’; Ter. *Ad.* 419–420:

Table 7. Constituent order of *mihi x est*[a]

A. Plautus[b]	D V S = 14	D S V = 25
	S D V = 14	S V D = 5
	V D S = 7	V S D = 4
B. Terence	D V S = 12	D S V = 26
	S D V = 18	S V D = 13
	V D S = 3	V S D = 0
C. Caes. *Gall.*	D V S = 3	D S V = 5
	S D V = 0	S V D = 2
	V D S = 1	V S D = 0
D. Cic. *epist.*	D V S = 0	D S V = 6
	S D V = 1	S V D = 0
	V D S = 1	V S D = 0

a D = constituent in the dative, S = subject, V = verb
b Survey limited to the 69 occurrences expressing prototypical possession; see Table 6.

tence seems to be the prerogative of an initial dative structure, as expected:[63]

non hercle otiumst / nunc mi auscultandi 'by Hercules, I now have no time for listening'. Alternatively, there may be a topic-continuity function clearly carried by the subject, as with the anaphoric pronoun in the following instances: Plaut. *Amph.* 144–145: *tum meo patri autem* ***torulus*** *inerit aureus / sub petaso;* ***id*** *signum Amphitruoni non erit* 'while my father will have a golden ribbon under his hat; this sign, Amphitryon won't have'; Plaut. *Amph.* 563–565: ***malum*** *quod tibi di dabunt, atque ego hodie / dabo* :: ***Istuc*** *tibist in manu; nam tuos sum* '[the master]: the harm that the gods will inflict on you, I will cause today. :: [the slave]: that's in your hands, as I belong to you'; Plaut. *Merc.* 628: *quia tibi in manust quod credas, ego* ***quod*** *dicam* ***id*** *mihi [ea] in manust* 'because it's up to you to believe what you want; as for me, what I can say, that's in my hands'.

63. Examples are, in fact, extremely common: cf. also Plaut. *Aul.* 266: *mihi esse thensaurum domi* 'I have a treasure at home'; *Asin.* 364 (= (67a)): *Argyrippo esse uiginti argenti minae* 'Argyrippus has twenty minas of silver'; *Persa* 119: *mihi non esse quod darem* 'I don't have [money] to give'; Ter. *Eun.* 260: *ille ubi miser famelicus uidet mi esse tanto honore* 'when, poor and hungry, he sees that I have such a gratification'; Caes. *Gall.* 1,7,3: *qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per prouinciam facere* 'who were to say that they were to make a march through the province without any mischief'; Cic. *epist.* 1,9,21: *ego, cum mihi cum illo magna iam gratia esset* 'I then had very agreeable terms with him'.

(103) = (1) Plaut. *Curc*. 43: *ei ancillula est*
'he has a wench'

(104) Ter. *Haut.* 571: *at mihi fides apud hunc est*
'but this one trusts me'

(105) Caes. *Gall.* 4,2,1: *mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus uendant habeant*
'there is access to traders mostly so that they might have those to whom they might sell those things they have taken in war'

(106) Cic. *epist.* 5,6,2: *omnino semissibus magna copia est*
'all in all, there is a great deal of money at six percent'

In a language like Latin, it would be quite unrealistic to expect a fixed word order in a dative possessive sentence. As we have repeatedly seen, the wide scope of semantic and pragmatic variation represented in the elements forming a predication of possession brings about a varied range of syntactic configurations and textual embeddings. This trivial fact, nonetheless, does not invalidate the presence of an ideal pattern; and deviations from the norm provide a confirmation of the general setting: the dative-first sentence structure can simply be considered the most likely to occur in the basic (i.e., the main, declarative, unmarked) form of the *mihi est x* type. This type is to be interpreted as a sentence patterned onto the structure of a presentative-existential predication (introducing a rhematic, new piece of information, i.e., a typical *possessum*), which achieves possessive status when it is completed by a (more typically preceding) dative noun phrase specifying the topic possessor.

Let us consider more fully the feature of definiteness of the *possessum*. In general terms, a [+def] *possessum* (although, in principle, less typical than a [−def] *possessum*) does occur extensively in possessive sentences (e.g., Eng. *I have* the *car,* It. *io ho* la *macchina*), and Latin provides no exception here: instances with a [+def] *possessum* do occur.[64] But, in fact, a [+def]

64. For a detailed treatment of the problems related to the notion of definiteness, see Lyons (1999). As a rule of thumb, we have decided to rely mainly on the parameter of uniqueness of individuation, and we considered instances of nonspecific *possessum* (e.g., Cato *agr*. 96,2: *si aquam marinam non habebis*) within the set of [−def] *possessum*. See Section 2.2.2 for an in-depth analysis of atypical instances of *mihi est x*, such as those with a [+def] *possessum* and [+def] possessor (Plaut. *Aul*. 266, also (132), (133)), or with a [+def] *possessum* & [−def] possessor (Ter. *Hec*. 509).

Table 8. Occurrences of [+def] *possessum*

	habeo x			*mihi est x*	
	[−def] *possessum*	[+def] *possessum*		[−def] *possessum*	[+def] *possessum*
Plaut.	404	215	vs.	345	45
Ter.	105	59	vs.	63	10
Cato *agr.*	64	7	vs.	3	0
Caes. *Gall.*	113	36	vs.	11	0
Cic. *epist.*	48	20	vs.	7	1
Verg. *Aen.* 1	0	2	vs.	1	0
Liv. 1	19	10	vs.	2	2
Sen. *epist.* 1	32	13	vs.	4	1
Plin. *epist.* 1	10	5	vs.	8	0
Tac. *Agr.*	4	3	vs.	3	0
Petron.	121	19	vs.	2	1
Apic.	12	0	vs.	0	0
Itin. Eger.	44	7	vs.	4	0

possessum is typically rare with *mihi est x* sentences (Table 8). If we look in depth at the 10 instances from Terence with a [+def] *possessum*, we see that they are often characterized by marked features, such as a relative clause (107), an indirect interrogative clause (108), or a focus structure (109):

(107) Ter. *Phorm*. 468: *quae nunc tibi domist*
‘(the woman) who you now have at home’

(108) Ter. *Eun*. 12: *unde is sit thensaurus sibi*
‘where he got this treasure from’

(109) Ter. *Hec*. 493: *tibi id in manust ne fiat*
‘it (the responsibility) is on you that it won’t happen’

(110) Ter. *Phorm*. 508: *ipsum istuc mihi in hoc est*
‘the very same thing happens to me in this business’

Moreover, these passages share the presence of a locative phrase (*unde, in manu, domi, in hoc*), which eliminates them as instances of simple, “pure” possessive sentences and where, consequently, a [+def] subject is more than

likely to occur. Note, at any rate, that a prototypical possession interpretation is not ruled out by a [+def] *possessum* (cf. (108)). The only instance of [+def] *possessum* from Petronius is a rather colloquial expression referring to someone's vital spirit (to be regarded as intrinsically individuated) and which, at any rate, also contains a locative phrase:[65]

(111) Petron. 62,6: *mihi anima in naso esse*
'my heart was in my nose'

Predications of possession with a [+def] *possessum* are much more likely to occur with the *habeo x* type. In Terence this happens in 59 attestations of 164; and if we focus on cases expressing prototypical possession, this happens in 13 occurrences of 23. Cf. (112):

(112) Ter. *Haut.* 658: (*hic anulus…*) *quaeras unde hunc habuerit*
'this ring, you might ask her where she got it from'

The [+given] and [+def] character of the *possessum* recurs regularly in authors from every period:

(113) Petron. 108,12: *sciebat se illam habere nouaculam, qua iam sibi ceruicem praeciderat*
'he knew that he was holding the very razor with which she had already cut his neck'

(114) *Itin. Eger.* 19,18: *duxit etiam nos et ad illum palatium superiorem, quod habuerat primitus rex Aggarus*
'he also led us to the upper palace, which king Aggarus had already occupied'

Note that the object of *habeo* can even be omitted.[66] Cf. (115)–(116):

65. If we look at the only example from Cicero in our corpus, we also find a very idiomatic expression, *alicui esse mea salus*, of which we have not found other occurrences: Cic. *epist.* 1,9,22 (= (32)): *sed, quocumque tempore mihi potestas praesentis tui fuerit, tu eris omnium moderator consiliorum meorum, tibi erit eidem, cui salus mea fuit, etiam dignitas curae*.

66. The different status of the elements specifying the possessor and the *possessum* constitutes a major distinction between the two types, which is observable not only in terms of

(115) Ter. *Andr.* 647–649: *non satis tibi esse hoc solidum uisumst gaudium, / ni me lactasses amantem et falsa spe produceres? / Habeas.* :: *Habeam?*
'does it appear to you that your joy is incomplete unless you have deceived me as a lover and brought about false hope? You can have (her). :: I can have (her)?'

(116) = (73) Cic. *epist.* 16,21,7: *emisse te praedium uehementer gaudeo . . . Habes*
'I am very happy that you have bought a rural piece of land. Now you have it'

Thus, the use of the dative construction tends to be limited to a [−def] *possessum*, while the possibility of a [+def] *possessum*, although not ruled out, seems consistently rare. In principle, nothing prevents *mihi est x* constructions with a [+def] *possessum* from occurring; and indeed, this possibility should be ascribed to earlier, non-attested stages, if we regard the dative construction as the only basic predicative type of common Indo-European. In fact, as far as Latin is concerned, it is only a minority profile. Although a [−def] *possessum*-oriented dative construction reflects the most typical profile of a possessive predication, *habeo x* (which normally presents [+def] as well as [−def] *possessa*) can operate more effectively in a larger number of contexts and in the expression of a wider semantic range of relations. If we consider the data from archaic comedy, where the dative construction is still robust, nonetheless there are very few cases of *mihi est x* constructions with a [+def]

[±definiteness] of the *possessum*, but also in terms of presence/absence of independent constituents referring to the possessor and the *possessum*. The nominal/pronominal dative phrase is necessary for the *mihi est x* type to achieve a possessive meaning. Without it, there is no possessive sentence. The possessor of *habeo x* can of course be specified by an explicit (usually preceding) noun or pronoun, but this is frequently omitted (as a quick look at the passages quoted so far can confirm) just because the possessor/subject is often coreferential with one of the human topics of the discourse. And the omission is allowed, of course, because the possessor is always recoverable from the verbal ending. In the *mihi est x* type the *possessum*, like the possessor, is generally made explicit, with very few exceptions (in which the omission of the subject generally corresponds to its rather atypical status as sentence topic). The object in *habeo x* is free from such limitations and can normally be omitted when it is recoverable from previous parts of the discourse.

possessum, and we can argue that, since [+def] *possessum* predications can be viewed as functionally marginal with respect to possession, the *mihi est x* type has begun to lose its functional status in such peripheral territory.

The effectiveness of the dative construction as a predication of possession is limited, as it is stiffly anchored to the applicability of its main constitutive pattern, a presentative-existential clause. Quite differently, the lexical idiosyncrasy of a specific verbal form like *habeo* and the pattern of its transitive syntax grant a higher degree of variation. Metaphorically speaking, with *habeo x* the elastic is more flexible. Therefore, the occurrences of *mihi est x* and *habeo x* are severely conditioned by the general features that are typical of the two syntactic structures on which the two constructions are built, the presentative-existential sentence and the basic, transitive clause. Such a different profile toward discourse-pragmatic factors leads also to an additional interpretation of the textual phenomenon we noted previously: the *mihi est x* type is more likely to appear first within a series of possessive sentences, because its structure is set to mark and specify the main topic (i.e., the possessor of a possession event to be mentioned in the discourse) by means of a syntactically independent dative phrase, and to introduce a new constituent, the *possessum*, into the field of discourse. Once these constituents are well established in the argument framework, subsequent predications can take a different syntactic form (e.g., *habeo*), which can only be triggered by purely semantic factors. Therefore, the use of *mihi est x* and *habeo x* seems also to be functionally differentiated according to the syntactic and textual contexts in which they occur and brings about some sort of a "division of labor" that is hardly observable from a merely semantic or sentence-oriented perspective.

2.1.7 Mihi est x *and* habeo x: *Conclusions*

Generally speaking, *mihi est x* and *habeo x* show a considerable degree of semantic overlap. Both types typically express relationships such as those involving body parts, kinship, prototypical possession, etc., and no major semantic difference can be singled out according to features like the concrete/abstract nature of the *possessum*, the momentary/permanent character of the relation, etc. This allows us to partly subscribe to the opinion already stated by Bennett (1914: 164–165):

> Schmalz, *Synt. u. stil.* p. 372 (top), p. 373, § 85, states that the Dative of Possession denotes "das okkasionelle Haben und nicht das dem Subjekt eigentümliche (was der Gen. ausdrückt)." But exceptions are so numerous as to cast doubt upon the real significance of this observation. . . . An examination of the material falling under the head of the Dative of Possession inclines me to believe that while there may be a preponderance of evanescent possessions used as subject in the Dative of Possession, yet this should not be regarded as a distinctive characteristic of the construction. The fact is: *most* of our possessions are not permanent. What we have is only for a time. Hence it is but natural that the majority of things found as subject in the Dative of Possession do not denote permanent possessions. But much the same is true of *habeo*.

Indeed, if we look at both syntactic types per se, no effective semantic difference emerges and, in principle, they can occur in more or less the same contexts, a factor that can lead to the partially accurate impression that the constructions are synonymous when examined by means of a purely synchronic, and not a discourse-related, point of view.

As far as the Archaic period is concerned, however, a semantic opposition between *mihi est x* and *habeo x* can be recognized at the discourse level and, broadly speaking, it can be characterized as context-related. While the meaning of *mihi est x* is broader (possibly, and in prototypical terms, the relationship of inclusion within the *sphère personnelle* of a human participant), *habeo x* is more strongly centered around the expression of prototypical possession and seems to convey, in a context-dependent manner, more agentive features related to possession, such as [control]. This differentiation tends to fade throughout time, as *habeo x* becomes the main possessive predicative type and it consequently acquires all of the features once shared by two constructions. Such differentiation, however, tends to be echoed within the dynamics that characterize *habeo* and *teneo* in Imperial and Late Latin, where the tendency to express more typical relations of physical and prototypical possession seems a peculiarity of *teneo*, as the reflex of a later acquisition of possessive functions.

The origin and spread of *habeo x* as a possessive construction is the result of a convergence of semantic and discourse-pragmatic factors. The textual phenomena examined suggest that extensive use of *habeo* instead of the dative construction was, if not required, at least strongly favored in many syntactic and textual constraints which quite naturally depend on general features

of Latin discourse structure: first of all, *habeo* sentences more appropriately meet the requirements of topic continuity at the discourse level. Second, the use of dative sentences appears to be consistently limited on account of the functional overload of the dative case, whose slot in a sentence might necessarily be filled by a noun phrase with a nonpossessive function. Third, the use of the dative construction tends to be restricted to a [−def] *possessum*.

The outcome of this interaction is two constructions that perform a different function in terms of textual valency. While one of the first causes that triggered the use of *habeo* as a possessive construction might have been purely semantics (i.e., a more expressive means with regard to features like agentivity, control, physical and prototypical possession), factors like a higher capacity to fulfill a topic-continuity function, the absence of risks of case-overlap with other constituents within the sentence, and the tendency to be free from limitations as far as the definiteness of the *possessum* is concerned might have played a considerable role in the process that led *habeo* to become the major possessive construction in Latin.

The *mihi est x* type fits well with the Reference Point model, which seems to be a good explicative model for possession, as long as discussion is confined to the cognitive level. On a more strictly linguistic level, the Reference Point model is not able, by itself, to define possession. At the same time, the rise of *habeo x* as a possessive construction results in some senses from the importance of a semantic (i.e., strictly linguistic) category that we have called the relationship of prototypical possession, and from the semantic features related to it. If we can conceive of possession as a domain set between the two landmarks of the Reference Point model and of the prototypical relationship of possession, Latin seems to have developed a binary system where two different constructions not only share the same functional domain (possession), but shape themselves into two distinct functional profiles according to different textual needs. These two different configurations seem to be set on the two aforementioned landmarks.

The temporal stage reflected in the archaic authors shows a complex situation where *mihi est x* and *habeo x* display a considerable degree of functional overlap and, at the same time, show evidence of a “division of labor” that mainly involves textual and discourse-related factors. Numerical data, however, show that the verb *habeo* is more frequently employed to predicate possession, especially in its prototypical instances, in the archaic pe-

riod. By the classical period, the *habeo x* construction dominates even more strongly.[67] The dramatic increase of [–human] subjects in the occurrences of *habeo x* from the Late Latin texts (e.g., Apicius 50 %, *Itin. Eger.* 59 %; see Table 2) clearly shows that by this stage *habeo* has fully reached the status of a generic possessive verb expressing a whole range of relationships and displaying a very broad semantic profile. Therefore, as far as an opposition "be- versus have-" possessive contructions is concerned, Latin should be most accurately described as a mixed type, with a notable preference for a transitive verb construction.

2.2 The genitive construction

2.2.1 The Marci/meus est x *type: A general framework*

Scholarly attention has periodically been devoted to the comparison of the possessive sentence types *mihi est x* and *Marci est x* (where *Marci* stands for any nominal/pronominal constituent).[68] An example of the latter is (117):

(117) Plaut. *Amph.* 480,483: *hodie illa pariet filios geminos duos. … Eorum Amphitruonis alter est, alter Iouis*
'today she will give birth to two twins. Of them, one is Amphitryon's, the other is Jupiter's'

The obvious formal distinction between these two constructions involves the different coding of the possessor: dative versus genitive case. While the dative construction displays signs of obsolescence by the classical period, the genitive construction occurs robustly in every stage of Latin and its final decline

67. See Ramos Guerreira (1998: 682), who makes similar claims that *mihi est x* is already in decline in the time span between Plautus and Cicero.
68. For emphasis on the different semantic contents expressed by each construction according to the case-form which is used, see Watkins (1967), Bolkestein (1983). Bortolussi (1998), however, has recently drawn attention to syntactic factors. Again, if we look at the actual situation of the two constructions *in vivo*, they indeed show a different status that involves many functional factors; syntax and semantics tell only part of the story (see Nuti 2005c).

is simply concomitant with the loss of the case system and with the development of morphosyntactic structures based on prepositions in Romance.[69]

In order to find a functional differentiation in these two sentence types, one relevant point to be considered is that, compared with other possessive constructions, occurrences of the *Marci est x* type are remarkably less frequent. Even more so are 1st and 2nd person pronouns. Indeed, no archaic author in our corpus provides a single example in which the predicative core of a genitive construction is *mei* or *tui*. We found only 30 occurrences of this sentence type in Plautus and 8 in Terence. If we compare genitive and dative constructions numerically, we find that later authors display a higher ratio of genitives, but simply because the occurrence of the *mihi est x* type has considerably decreased and, as we have seen, the role of the basic possessive construction is played mostly by *habeo x*. Thus, in most authors, the genitive construction displays a low percentage when compared to the occurrence of *mihi est x* + *habeo x* considered all together (Table 9).[70] In our corpus, the relatively few occurrences of *Marci est x* are matched by a higher number of occurrences of a construction that is identical but for the presence of a possessive pronoun instead of the constituent in the genitive: a sentence type *meus est x* (where *meus* stands also for other possessive pronouns: 2nd or 3rd person, singular or plural). Examples are (118)–(119):

(118) Plaut. *Men.* 903–904: *quem ego hominem, si quidem uiuo, uita euoluam sua. / Sed ego stultus sum, qui illius esse dico quae meas[i]t*
'that man, if I stay alive, I'll deprive of his life. But I am so stupid, as I am saying that it is "his" which is now in my power'

(119) Cic. *epist.* 14,3,1: *culpa mea propria est*
'the blame is entirely mine'

69. The genitive construction is already common in inscriptional material from Archaic Latin, especially in the "talking inscriptions" (*tituli loquentes)*, which by their very nature assert the ownership of the inscribed object. See Agostiniani (1982), esp. p. 240.

70. This is apparently the reason for which the analysis of Cabrillana (2003: 86), based exclusively on Livy, presents a higher ratio for the genitive construction: 200 occurrences vs. 185 of the dative construction.

Table 9. Genitive versus other constructions

	Marci est x	*meus est x*	*mihi est x*	*habeo x*
Plaut.	30	62	390	619
Ter.	8	16	73	164
Cato *agr.*	3	0	3	68
Caes. *Gall.*	11	0	11	149
Cic. *epist.*	11	1	8	68
Verg. *Aen.* 1	2	1	1	2
Liv. 1	5	1	4	29
Sen. *epist.* 1	13	5	5	45
Plin. *epist.* 1	6	5	8	15
Tac. *Agr.*	0	0	3	7
Petron.	8	2	3	140
Apic.	0	0	0	12
Itin. Eger.	5	0	4	51

It is noteworthy that many instances of the *Marci est x* construction, especially when the possessor is [–hum], have nothing to do with possession. Rather, they simply occur in more or less idiomatic expressions such as (120):

(120) Ter. *Haut.* 387: *et uos esse istius modi et nos non esse haud mirabilest*
'and it is no wonder that you are of that nature and we are not'

Sometimes, the construction clearly expresses a part–whole (partitive) or material relation:

(121) Plaut. *Mil.* 1016: *cedo signum, si harunc Baccharum es*
'give me the password, if you belong to the Bacchic rites'

(122) *Itin. Eger.* 6,1: *uia enim illic penitus non est, sed totum heremi sunt arenosae*
'in fact there is barely a road there, rather they are entirely deserts of sand'

When the constituent in the genitive is [+hum], the construction often expresses a kinship or a possessive relation, specifically ownership:

(123) Ter. *Ad.* 616, 625: *Sostrata credit mihi me psaltriam hanc emisse / ... nunc quid faciam? Dicam fratris esse hanc?*
'Sostrata believes that I have bought the female flute player for myself. Now what shall I do? Shall I reveal that this one (Bacchis) belongs to (my) brother?'

(124) Cato *agr.* 146,2: *ne quid eorum de fundo deportato: si quid deportauerit, domini esto*
'none of those (tools) shall (the contractor) remove from the estate: if he does remove something, it shall (automatically) belong to the landowner'

(125) Caes. *Gall.* 5,34,1: *nam duces eorum tota acie pronuntiare iusserunt, ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum esse praedam atque illis reseruari quaecumque Romani reliquissent*
'for their leaders ordered the command to be given along the whole of the battle line that no one should leave his place: that the booty was theirs and whatever the Romans had abandoned would be reserved for them'

(126) Petron. 53,2: *in praedio Cumano, quod est Trimalchionis*
'on the estate at Cumae, that is the one belonging to Trimalchio'

As far as the *meus est x* type is concerned, a [+hum] possessor is the norm.[71] This implies that idiomatic expressions do not play a considerable role with this construction, which usually expresses ownership.

Therefore, consistent with its limited use, the semantic content of *Marci est x* does not display the wide series of different relations found in *mihi est x* and *habeo x*. Rather, the semantic rationale behind the *Marci est x* type appears to be quite straightforward: in general terms, this construction reflects the rather opaque semantic profile expressed by the genitive case in the domain of NP (see below). More typically, the genitive construction designates an inherent relation, a relation given by nature (e.g., (120)), or, to be more

71. In comedy, the *possessum* is often human: 31 cases out of 62 in Plautus, 9 out of 16 in Terence. As we already noted, in these texts human beings such as slaves are often regarded as legal *possessa*, therefore involving ownership and prototypical possession. Many of these cases, however, simply involve kinship relations.

precise, a relation such that the entity coded as the possessor represents an intrinsic attribute or feature of the *possessum*. As far as [+hum] possessors are concerned, the genitive construction designates a relation between a possessor and a property or a characteristic intrinsically related to the possessor.[72]

As we have seen, the *Marci est x* construction often expresses a relation which is strongly involved with prototypical possession and whose semantic features are mainly culture-related, namely ownership (e.g., (123), (124)), a notion that was highly developed within Latin culture, as it is in most others.[73] Ownership involves a relation of established possession, that is, one between a possessor and a nonrelational *possessum*, the typical entities involved in predicative possession. The set of *possessa* more typically related to ownership is indeed the same as the one found in *mihi est x* constructions when they express prototypical possession: *argentum*, a *thesaurus*, slaves. But what is peculiar to ownership is that it does not necessarily involve any physical contact, nor any degree of control, disposal or use by the possessor. Indeed, ownership holds even if the possessor is far from the *possessum*, or if has no control on it, and even if he is deprived of it. Even the parameter of temporality seems irrelevant: although ownership usually covers a long span of time, time is not a required feature, as the relationship is established according to parameters that are legal and/or cultural and a relation of ownership obtains as such even if it is short–lived. Ownership is intrinsically a relationship *in absentia*, which connects a possessor and a *possessum* on a level that is eminently cultural and which links these two entities in such an intimate and exclusive way that the possessor represents one of the intrinsic and defining features of the *possessum*.

Another factor clearly differentiates the *Marci est x* type from the *mihi est x* type: in the former the pragmatic profile of the constituents is "simpler"

72. Cf. again (118). Examples of this kind can be found in every period. Cf. Cic. *epist.* 1,9,26: *tibi tamen sum auctor, ut, si quibus rebus possis, eum tibi ordinem aut reconcilies aut mitiges: id etsi difficile est, tamen mihi uidetur esse prudentiae tuae* 'nevertheless, I support the idea that, if you are able in these matters, you will reconcile or modify that feeling toward you: granted that it is difficult, nevertheless it seems to me to be a mark of your wisdom'.

73. Interestingly, neither Latin nor its Italic relatives continues the only IE root which may plausibly be reconstructed with the meaning 'own, possess as one's own', namely **Hei̯k̂-* (Rix 2001, 223).

in the sense that they show a minimum variation in terms of definiteness and topicality. Although nothing in principle seems to exclude an indefinite possessor, in our corpus of occurrences it is always definite.[74] The same holds for the *possessum*, which is always definite. The pragmatic-informational status of the constituents is even stricter: the possessor is always the informational core of the predication and is never the topic; the *possessum* is always the topic and, as such, it can often be omitted. In fact, in Plautus this happens in 11 occurrences out of 30. Cf. (127):

(127) Plaut. *Trin.* 533–534, 536–537: *neque usquam quisquamst, quoius ille ager fuit / quin pessume ei res uorterit … Em nunc hic quoius est / ut ad incitas redactust*
'and there is never no one, whose field that was, who had no problems. Here is that one now that it belongs to, who is in such a state'

As can be seen in most of the examples, the *possessum* of *Marci est x* sentences is generally an entity that has been previously mentioned within the discourse. Consider also that the subject, when mentioned, is often a deictic, definite pronoun (3 cases in Plautus, 2 in Terence; cf. (123)). The omission of the subject, on the contrary, seldom occurs with *mihi est x* sentences.

The general profile of the *meus est x* type is basically the same as in the genitive construction: the possessor is almost invariably [+def] (only 1 exception in Plautus) and [+given] (only 1 exception in Terence), the *possessum* is always [+def] (or, rarely, nonspecific), [+given], and topical. If we confine our analysis to cases expressing ownership, this phenomenon is even stricter: both the possessor and the *possessum* are [+def] and [+given]; the *possessum* is always topical. The tendency to omit the subject (the *possessum*) is stronger than in *Marci est x*: Plautus shows 31 cases out of 62 with no explicitly expressed *possessum*, though it is clearly recoverable from the previous context.

74. Or non-specific, like *pluris preti*, e.g., Plaut. *Bacch.* 630. If we consider only the occurrences that are not idiomatic expressions, where nonspecific possessors occur, the possessor is invariably definite. For an opposing view see Bolkestein (1983: 57). Although no specific data seem to speak against the possibility of a [−def] possessor in the *Marci est x* type, this is not much more than a mere theoretical possibility.

Despite all the above similarities, the two functionally equivalent constructions present an important differentiating factor: the instances of *Marci est x* regularly show a 3rd person possessor.[75] In this respect the *meus est x* type is more balanced and all persons are attested, although 1st and 2nd singular predominate.[76] Given also the high degree of functional and formal coincidence between possessive pronouns and genitive forms of personal pronouns,[77] it is evident that the two constructions are complementary: with very few exceptions, a 1st or 2nd person possessor triggers a construction in which the possessor is expressed by a possessive pronoun (*meus, tuus*). A 3rd person possessor triggers a genitive construction, which displays a wide series of constituents, from nouns, the most common (e.g. *Amphitruonis, operae, pretii*), to relative pronouns (such as the archaic form *quoius* in comedy), to demonstratives (such as *huius* and *illius*).

A brief analysis of word order brings other factors to light. First, the linear structure of the genitive construction cannot be "modulated", as it does not allow insertion of other constituents, such as a locative specification, which is common in occurrences of *mihi est x*. In other words, we do not have examples of **Marci est x in z* (cf., on the other hand, examples like *mihi est x domi / in manu*, which constitute only a small sample of this type of sentence). Second, in the *Marci est x* type the frequency of the genitive-first sequence tends to be higher than others.[78] It is noteworthy that the limited number of oc-

75. As far as this feature is concerned, a specific survey of the archaic authors in our corpus invariably shows a 3rd pers. sg. In Plautus the genitive possessor occurs more often as a noun (17 occurrences), less often as a relative pronoun (11) or a personal pronoun (2); Terence shows only nouns (6); Cato's *de agricultura* shows a noun (1), a relative pronoun (1), and a personal pronoun (1).
76. Data from archaic authors display the following scenario: Plautus (62 occurrences; 1st = 30, 2nd = 26, 3rd = 6); Terence (16 occurrences; 1st = 6, 2nd = 7, 3rd = 3); Cato (ø).
77. See Section 3, on attributive possession.
78. Setting aside occurrences of constructions where the constituents referring to possessor or *possessum* are in a relative form (that is, those which imply a specific set of pragmatic and semantic constraints that idiosyncratically characterize the structure of the sentence), the Plautine corpus shows 19 occurrences of the *Marci est x* type. As already mentioned, the majority (10 occurrences) feature omission of the subject and, consequently, a word sequence such as genitive V. The other 9 occurrences present a genitive-first sequence twice, while the constituent in the genitive is preceded by the subject 7 times. If all the genitive-first cases (with or without omission of *possessum*) are clearly related to the

currences with syntactically unmarked structure (e.g., with no relative forms) and showing a pure ownership relation presents a genitive-verb sequence, with *possessum* omission, in 4 of 5 cases.[79] This tendency is considerably strengthened in the *meus est x* constructions, where the majority of occurrences are clearly oriented to place the constituent referring to the possessor in initial position. Again, if we narrow our scope to the cases where the construction *meus est x* purely expresses ownership, the percentage of a genitive-first sequence is higher.[80] Thus, although exceptions to this orientation are certainly possible (as is natural in the actual realizations of a schematic syntactic pattern), this tendency is numerically predominant and must be considered the typical profile of the *meus est x / Marci est x* constructions.[81] While there is a recognizable tendency in the *mihi est x* type to place the constituent referring to the possessor at the beginning, in the *meus est x / Marci est x* constructions this trend is stronger and must be causally connected with the almost invariably rhematic character of the possessor, which is the only informational focus of the predication. Indeed, several occurrences of *Marci est x* and, especially, *meus est x* sentences clearly express a contrastive focus on the constituent in the genitive and on the possessive pronoun. See again (118), or (128):[82]

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highly rhematic character of the possessor, in the other 7 cases the different sequence is often due to textual, pragmatic factors, such as a topic-continuity function. See for example Plaut. *Rud.* 821–822: *[e]heu hercle, ne istic fana mutantur cito: / iam hoc Herculi est, Veneris fanum quod fuit.* ‘by Hercules, don’t these temples change quickly: now this one is Hercules’, which once was Venus’s temple’.

79. The only exception is due to the presence of an accusative + infinitive construction. Cf. Plaut. *Men.* 1071.

80. The *meus est x* type in Plautus is diagnostic: apart from 8 cases of relative sentences, the remaining 54 occurrences display omission of the subject 30 times and, invariably, the sequence *meus est*. Among the 24 sentences with subject expressed, 9 present the possessive pronoun in absolute first position. Thus, even in this construction, the majority of occurrences (30+9 = 39/54) show the possessor in initial position. In cases where the construction expresses pure ownership, the percentage of a genitive-first sequence is higher: 27/36 cases.

81. See Bortolussi (1998: 72), whose data appear to be even more straightforward: “Dans la prédication d’appartenence, le NP génitif précède la copule dans une proportion de 4 pour 1”.

82. Cf. other examples in Plaut. *Mil.* 1218–1219, *Persa* 472, *Poen.* 391.

(128) Plaut. *Epid.* 587: *tua istaec culpast, non mea*
'it's your fault, not mine'

In these examples, the contrastive focus on the possessor is perfectly consistent with the initial position of the genitive constituent or the possessive pronoun. Therefore, *Marci est x* and *meus est x* are sentences whose syntactic structure highlights the rhematic (and, sometimes, even contrastive) focus of the constituent referring to the possessor. The pragmatic stress finds its opposite pole in the highly topical character of the subject which is, as we have said, often simply omitted.

The *meus est x* type, which is clearly a copular sentence (i.e., *meus est x* = y *est* x), is overtly and unambiguously an identificatory sentence. The *Marci est x* type also displays an identificatory character. As was convincingly argued by Bolkestein (1983: 78), in *Marci est x* the verb *sum* is purely "supportive"; that is, it has a merely predicative function. In other words, it fully expresses the function of a copula, whose predicate is the constituent in the genitive. Thus, both *meus est x* and *Marci est x* are copular sentences, as is also confirmed by the absence of additional locative phrases (like **Marci / meus est x domi*), implying a situative reading of *esse*, which would be incompatible with the copular function. Moreover, these constructions are to be interpreted as instances of the well-known sentence type called the *belong*-construction, which in the literature on predicative possession seems to have been granted a place of its own beside the standard, somewhat more basic *have*-constructions such as *mihi est x* and *habeo x*.

2.2.2 Marci/meus est x *versus* mihi est x*: A contrastive analysis*

The expression of ownership is not exclusive to *Marci est x* constructions, as it can be indicated also by a *mihi est x* sentence (i.e., *mihi est domus* can, in the appropriate context, stand for 'I own a house').[83] But, as far as this specific relation is concerned, the differentiating feature between the two constructions is that in a *mihi est x* sentence the reference to ownership is simply a contextual meaning. Cf. (129)–(130):

83. Cf. (67a), (68a), etc.; see Section 2.1.3.

(129) Plaut. *Amph*. 381: *quis tibi erust?* :: *Quem tu uoles*
'which master do you have? :: Whichever one you want'

(130) Plaut. *Cas*. 531–533: *hoc erat ecastor [id], quod me uir tanto opere orabat meus / ut properarem arcessere hanc ad me uicinam meam / liberae aedes ut sibi essent, Casinam quo deducerent*
'that's the reason, by Castor, that my man insisted so much that I invite my lady-neighbor here directly, so that he would have the house all for himself where they could bring Casina'

The relation expressed in (129) is not, of course, prototypical possession, since a slave cannot possess his master; consequently, neither can he hold ownership over him. But even in a passage like (130), which presents entities involving prototypical possession (a human being as possessor and a house as *possessum*), the *mihi est x* sentence does not express ownership at all, as the house does not belong to the husband of Cleustrata, the woman who is speaking, but to their neighbors.[84]

It is noteworthy, moreover, that the semantic content expressed by *mihi est x*, even within the limited boundaries of prototypical possession, is highly context-related. Consider (131):

(131) Ter. *Phorm*. 35–38: *amicus summus meus et popularis Geta / heri ad me uenit. Erat ei de ratiuncula / iampridem apud me relicuom pauxillulum / nummorum*
'my great friend and countryman Geta came to me yesterday. According to an old story, I still had a little bit of money that belonged to him'

84. The same, of course, holds for *habeo x,* which, even when it expresses prototypical possession, does not necessarily imply ownership. Cf. Ter. *Hec*. 845–846: *sic te dixisse opinor, inuenisse Myrrinam / Bacchidem anulum suom habere.* :: *Factum.* :: *Eum quem olim ei dedi* 'so, I think, Myrrina told you that she found out that / Bacchis has a ring of her own. :: Indeed. :: The one I once gave to her'. Myrrina has discovered that a ring she once gave to her daughter (and which the daughter's husband, Pamphilus, has given to Bacchis) is now in the possession of the prostitute. While *habeo* expresses the simple possession of the ring by Bacchis, who has it but does not own it, the possessive adjective *suus* clearly expresses a different kind of possessive relationship, i.e., ownership, and points to the fact that the ring actually belongs to Myrrina.

Here the context presents a very specific and idiosyncratic situation where there are two possessors, the owner and the actual possessor of a sum of money that was borrowed from the owner. The slave Davus is a highly atypical possessor: one who has the money at his disposal (physically and effectively) but who does not own it. Such a kind of (temporary?) possession has of course relevance more in legal than in purely temporal terms, and it has to be marked specifically. Such marking is accomplished by means of the locative expression *apud*, which is sporadically used to express a possession that is merely physical.[85] The incidental and temporary character of physical possession is thus opposed to the regular, possessive construction, *mihi est x*, which, in this particular case, expresses only ownership. *Apud* as a marker of physical possession represents, then, the minor degree of a possessive relation in terms of intimacy and cultural connections between possessor and *possessum*, the parameters which are relevant when, as here, the matter of ownership is in question. Consequently, this particular context determines a sort of scalarity between the two expressions *apud me est x* and *mihi est x*, where the former points to the loosest relation in legal terms and the stronger relation in terms of effective control, while the latter expresses the opposite pole and exceptionally denotes what is usually only a contextual meaning: ownership.[86] Apparently, in this passage ownership is not expressed by the construction that more regularly designates it, *Marci est x* (hypothetically: **erat eius de ratiuncula / iampridem apud me relicuom pauxillulum / nummorum*), because the need of a presentative-existential sentence (required by textual constraints, i.e. the [+new] and [−def] character of the *possessum*) automatically selects a dative construction, in spite of its semantic content.

85. Cf. Plaut. *Aul.* 83.

86. Among numerous Indo-European languages displaying this "procedure", there is a striking parallel in Modern Irish, a normal "*be*-language". Modern Irish shows locative-possessive constructions, where the standard possessive sentence employs the preposition *ag* ('at'), while the predication of ownership uses the preposition *le* ('with'). Despite such a clear division of labor, in a sentence like *tá airgead agat orm*, lit. 'there is (*tá*) money at (*ag*)-you-on (*ar*)-me = 'I owe you money', *ag*, quite atypically, expresses ownership, whereas another locative preposition, *ar* ('on'), which normally has nothing to do with (prototypical) possession, is the one contextually licensed to expresses momentary possession. Apparently, there are recurring, interlinguistic patterns at work when possession clashes contextually with the expression of a specific category like ownership.

It therefore seems that the expression of a semantic category such as ownership is not a sufficient feature to trigger a *Marci est x* construction, and that pragmatic restrictions operate on the genitive type.

Although the regular profile for the *mihi est x* type is that of an existential sentence, where the rhematic constituent is, generally, the [−def] *possessum*, counterexamples to such a prototypical instance do occur. Consider (132)–(133):

(132) Plaut. *Amph.* 143–145: *ego has habebo usque in petaso pinnulas / tum meo patri autem torulus inerit aureus / sub petaso; id signum Amphitruoni non erit*
'I will have these fins up on my hat, while my father will have a golden ribbon under his hat; this sign, Amphitryon won't have'

(133) Plaut. *Amph.* 402: *hic homo sanus non est.* :: *Quod mihi praedicas uitium, id tibist*
'this man is not sane. :: The fault you are attributing to me, it is yours'

In the first example, neither the *possessum* nor the possessor represents the predicative nucleus, and the rhematic focus is concentrated on the verbal constituent and the negative particle. This is because the core of the information is expressly the absence of the *signum* on the person of Amphitryon.[87] In (133), it is the *tibi* that clearly bears the informational core of the sentence. Thus, the [+def] feature of the *possessum* in both cases, as well as the contrastive focus on the possessor in (133), apparently justifies the use of a

87. Of course, the predication makes sense because the presuppositional state of affairs that constitutes the informational background is the presence of that *signum* on Jupiter's hat. Note, at any rate, that a hypothetical rhematic character for *id signum* seems absolutely excluded, both by its obvious topical status and by the fact that no other *signum* appears in the discourse ground. Thus, an interpretation such as '*this sign* won't be at Amphitryon (but that other one will)' is untenable. See Bortolussi (1998: 71–72), according to whom the predication in (132), once turned ("adapté") into a positive statement **id signum Amphitruoni est*, would respond to a test question *Quid signum Amphituoni est?* This seems to imply a different interpretation, in which the comment would be the *possessum*. While this interpretation appears consistent within a contrastive analysis such as the one performed by Bortolussi, a hypothetical rhematic *possessum signum* seems to us rather incompatible with the actual passage in (132).

genitive construction that normally meets these pragmatic profiles. But two hypothetical *Marci/meus est x* constructions (**id signum Amphitruonis non erit; *quod uitium, id tuum est*) would imply a copular interpretation of the verbal form, which would place the sentence outside the scope of the predication. In (132), a genitive possessor would require the default, prototypical reading of the genitive construction: that is, an intrinsic, inherent relation between Amphitryon and his *signum,* so that such a sentence would mean 'that sign won't belong to Amphitryon', while the actual meaning clearly refers to physical and momentary possession. In (133), Sosia, with his harsh answer to Mercurius, is not making a statement such as 'insanity is your proper and permanent condition', but is simply pointing out the fact, based completely on the *hic et nunc* circumstances, that Mercurius is the one afflicted by foolishness as long as he (Mercurius) is claiming to be himself (Sosia).[88] In both cases we are facing two "stage-level" predicates, denoting two instances of an established, accidental, and momentary relation between possessor and *possessum*, that could not be expressed by a genitive construction, which would call for an "individual-level" interpretation.[89] Therefore, these particular passages suggest that sometimes the choice of a *mihi est x* construction can be motivated entirely by semantic factors and that the occurrence of the genitive construction is conditioned by its narrow semantic profile, which is strictly correlated to the "stage-level" interpretation of the predication and is based on the copular reading of the verbal form. Thus, we can conclude that not even the specific informational structure possessor [+def] & *possessum* [+def] is

88. Moreover, the semantic content of Sosia's statement clearly belongs to the semantic sphere of experiencer, which, as we have already seen, is normally expressed by either a *x est y mihi* construction or, alternatively (as in this passage), by the *mihi est x* type (cf. (18): *mi esse ullum morbum*, (24): *ei esset febris*). Despite the fact that a predication of experiencer can theoretically be an "individual level" predicate (and express, therefore, a permanent state), it usually refers to an episodic phenomenon, and this is the normal, unmarked reading of a *mihi est x* sentence expressing experiencer, which also applies in (133).
89. We refer here to the predicate classes known as "stage-level" and "individual-level" (for which see Kratzer 1989). See also Kleiber (1981), whose subdivision of predicates into *spécifiants* and *non spécifiants* seems in some respects more subtle; further Rouveret (1998: 30).

a sufficient condition to trigger a *Marci est x* construction, and that semantic restrictions also operate on the genitive type.[90]

2.2.3 Conclusions

While the function of the *mihi est x* construction is to predicate the existence of a relation (prototypically, an established relation) between a possessor and a *possessum*, this represents only its most typical use, which emerges straightforwardly only in unmarked declarative sentences expressing prototypical possession. In fact, the general profile of the construction is quite loose and "multifunctional". The function of *Marci est x* / *meus est x* constructions is quite strict: to assert the involvement of a certain entity (the possessor) with respect to another entity (the *possessum*) whose relation to the former is already taken for granted, and whose existence is not the informational core of the predication. In other words, the function of the predication is the identification of the possessor or, if we want, of an entity bearing some Reference Point status that is semantically specified according to the context. Therefore, we can draw two different, functional profiles.

The *mihi est x* construction is very common, since it is a basic possessive sentence built on a presentative-existential structure. As such, it displays a complex functional and semantic profile, and it answers to more than a single kind of requirement. Nonetheless, *mihi est x* can be triggered by only one constraint at the time, which can be either:

(a) pragmatic = as a presentative-existential sentence, it introduces a new, [−def] noun into the discourse ground and it predicates a possessive relation between a topical possessor and a rhematic *possessum*.

90. Although Bolkestein's (1983: 58) claim about *mihi est x* and *Marci est x* types that "there is no one-to-one correlation between the case form of the possessor and a particular pragmatic function distribution" is, *stricto sensu*, correct, it should nonetheless be remembered that occurrences of *mihi est x* such as those in (133), (110), or (131) are in all respects highly atypical: examples of *mihi est x* showing a rhematic or [−def] possessor (as well as a [+def] or topical *possessum*) are very rare, and instances where the informational core of the predication is a [−def], rhematic *possessum* are the dominant majority. Rather, a number of heterogeneous factors seems to be at work which not only determine different informational functions for the two constructions, but which also bring about a different syntactic and pragmatic rigidity for each of the two sentence types.

(b) semantic = as a "stage-level predicate", it predicates an established relation.

The majority of occurrences meet both of these requirements and they appear as presentative-existential constructions, introducing a new and [−def] *possessum*, connected to a topical and a [+def] possessor by an established relation (= both (a) and (b)). However, we have seen that several occurrences express a relation that is not established at all (body–part, kinship, intrinsic properties).[91] Indeed, the semantic content does not appear as the only relevant feature in this construction. Given the very broad semantic profile of possession, this is not surprising; and, as we have repeatedly observed, the semantic interpretation of the predication rests heavily on the context. In these cases, the construction instantiates only the pragmatic profile of an existential sentence (= only (a), as in (131)). As a confirmation that profiles (a) and (b) do not necessarily occur together, there are cases displaying only the second function: those few occurrences with a [+def] *possessum* and an atypically rhematic possessor which appear to be motivated only by semantic constraints and are lacking either a presentative-existential character and a rhematic *possessum* (only (b); as in (132) and (133)).

The *Marci est x* / *meus est x* construction, quite differently, depends on the co-occurrence of a cluster of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic constraints: the almost invariably [+def] and [+given] possessor and *possessum* and, correspondingly, a copular status of the verb *sum*; a rhematic focus on the possessor; and a relation where the possessor is an intrinsic attribute of the *possessum*. These requirements fulfill, respectively, a semantic function and a pragmatic/communicative function, namely:

(a) the expression of an inherent (or "described as inherent", as in the case of ownership) relation;

(b) the specification of a [+given] possessor.

In other words, the *Marci est x* construction is typically employed when the need to identify the specific and exclusive possessor of a [+given] *possessum* co-occurs with the expression of an inherent relation. The overlap of these two factors is by no means accidental and is due to pragmatic and referential phenomena. Basic predications of possession (i.e., *have*-constructions) typi-

91. See Section 2.1.1.

cally involve [+def] [+given] [+hum] possessors and the informational focus is on the *possessum* or, especially in the minority cases with [+def] *possessum*, on the relation itself. In *belong*-constructions, like *Marci/meus est x*, the informational function is the identity of the possessor that, given its cognitive salience, is the entity whose individuation is more likely to be debated. Although in principle a predication specifying the identity of the possessor can involve any possessive relation (indeed, we have a few examples: cf. (133)), this informational requirement actually occurs more often with inherent relations, because established relations usually display a series of features on the referential plane (such as physical contact, disposal, or control) which make the identity of the possessor more evident. The specification of the identity of a possessor is most likely to occur when the inherent relation between possessor and *possessum* is not overtly evident and is not characterized by physical contact, manifest control, or any other immediately perceivable interaction between the two entities involved. This is naturally the case with abstract (inherent) relations that do not involve either a strictly physical character, or inalienable and relational entities (e.g., body–part relations, which do not occur in *Marci est x* / *meus est x* sentences) and are simply *in absentia* (so that doubts can be cast on the identity of the possessor). A typical case is kinship. For the reasons specified in Section 2.2.1, (legal) ownership is just as typical as well.

Given the aforementioned phenomena, namely the informational need to focus on the possessor's identity, it appears that a predication of ownership like *Marci est x* (and, perhaps, more generally any *belong*-construction) inherently displays a pragmatically marked function, at least in its prototypical instantiation. Pragmatic markedness also accounts for the relatively rare occurrence of *Marci est x* in comparison with other possessive constructions (*mihi est x*, *habeo x*).

Is is noteworthy, then, that another rather common device to predicate the fact that a [+given] *possessum* belongs to a specific possessor is an identificatory, "possessive" copular sentence. In such a sentence the predicative core is not given by a constituent in the genitive case alone (or, alternatively, by a possessive pronoun), but by a twofold noun phrase explicitly marking both possessor and *possessum*, such as *Marci liber*. The relatively rare occurrence of the possessive type *meus /Marci* (pred.) *est* (cop.) *x* (subj.) is thus balanced by the high occurrence of an identificatory, copular construction like *meus*

liber / Marci liber (pred.) *est* (cop.) *x* (subj.).[92] Instances of this construction are numerous in every period of the language and in almost every text:

(134) Ter. *Eun*. 962: *dico edico uobis nostrum esse illum erilem filium*
'I tell you, I swear to you that he is our master's son'

(135) Caes. *Gall.* 6,32,4: *tum copiis in tres partes distributis impedimenta omnium legionum Aduatucam contulit. Id castelli nomen est*
'then, with his forces divided into three parts, he sent the belongings of all the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of the fort'

(136) Cic. *epist*. 5,2,9: *ut senatus consulto meus inimicus, quia tuus frater erat, subleuaretur*
'so that by a decree of the senate my enemy, because he was your brother, was relieved'

(137) Petron. 9,9: *nocturne percussor ... cuius eadem ratione in uiridario frater fui*
'you nocturnal prizefighter whose brother I was in the same manner in the garden'

The function of this copular sentence is, thus, that of a possessive predication which is semantically related to the expression of ownership. Compared to the genitive construction, this kind of copular-possessive sentence is apparently less marked pragmatically, as the rhematic part of the sentence is not confined to the genitive constituent alone but rather involves the whole genitive/possessive adjective noun phrase presenting both possessor and *possessum* in the same syntactic and pragmatic unit.

Given that in Latin the same verbal form *sum* can express either the function of copula or a presentative-existential verb, in many cases the interpretation of the sentence type can be relatively ambiguous:

(138) Caes. *Gall.* 6,17,1: *deum maxime Mercurium colunt. Huius sunt plurima simulacra*
'of the gods they worship Mercury the most. Of him there are numerous images / Most of the images are his'

92. Cf. Eng. *this book is John's / mine* vs. *this is John's book / my book.*

(139) Petron. 55,4: *ab hoc epigrammate coepit poetarum esse mentio*
'from this epigram there began a discussion of the poets / from this epigram the discussion of the poets began'

The syntatic interpretation of (138) presents two options: *sunt* (= presentative-existential verb) – *plurima simulacra huius* (subject, [−def]); or alternatively *huius* (predicate of a genitive construction, with topic continuity) – *sunt* (copular verb) – *plurima simulacra* (subject, [+def]).[93] Of course, the multifunctional status of *sum* interacts with another feature of Latin: the lack of definite markers and markers of topic/comment status. In fact, it is noteworthy that, in principle, the possibility of ambiguity holds even if a presentative-existential value of *sum* is excluded: in a clearly copular sentence like *nostrum esse illum erilem filium* the predicate of the copula can be either *nostrum* (the subject being *illum erilem filium*) or, as seems more consistent in the specific context of (134), *nostrum erilem filium* (the subject being *illum*). The obvious conclusion is that there is no effective consequence at the comunicative level, since the rhematic status of the parts of the sentence is generally provided by contextual factors and by mutually shared knowledge among speakers.

3. Attributive possession

3.1 A general frame of morphological features and formal structures

Latin nouns are autonomous with regard to possessive markers, as they can stand freely in the sentence without an obligatory pronominal Modifier.[94] Latin is a typical dependent-marking language – that is, the nominal possessive noun phrase is characterized by an inflectional marker on the possessor and no marker on the *possessum*. Head-marking and double-marking are apparently excluded in every stage of the language.[95] The inflectional marker is, basically, the genitive suffix, whose forms vary according to the noun class:

93. Cf. also Caes. *Gall.* 6,25,5
94. Obligatory possessive markers are attested in many languages, e.g., Aztecan (see Launey 1979: 93).
95. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001).

the traditional five declensions show five different genitive suffixes (plus other forms that are relics of earlier stages, e.g. *pater familiās*), some of which are homophonous with other inflectional endings.[96] This homophony is partly reduced by the fact that, in most cases, the genitive singular is identical to the nominative plural (cf. I declension = *rosae*, II = *puerī*, IV = *fructūs*): the combination of the two oppositions, namely singular versus plural and oblique versus direct cases, is such that genitive singular and nominative plural are very likely to appear in clearly differentiated syntactic environments, where the two morphosyntactic roles of the noun are immediately recognized and not easily confused.[97]

In Latin, as well as in other ancient Indo-European languages (though never in Hittite), the genitive marker can also be used outside the domain of the noun phrase, with nonnominal heads, to express the object in finite clauses.[98] Examples of this kind are limited (e.g., in constructions like *potiri rerum*) and they represent an inherited feature.

Interlinguistic comparison shows that Indo-European possessive pronouns derive from the oblique stems of personal pronouns. This can be seen even in Latin, where, for example, possessive pronoun 1st singular *meus* shares its stem with accusative singular *me* (vs. *ego*, nominative singular).[99] The forms for 2nd singular, 1st plural, and 2nd plural are distinct and declin-

96. Baldi (1994: 2054).
97. The same rationale holds for other instances of genitive. The genitive plural ending of the III and IV declension (N.B. IV declension genitive plural *fructuum* vs. accusative singular *fructum*), although diverging from the accusative singular of the II and IV declensions only in the vowel length, is differentiated by number opposition as well as by belonging to different lexical classes. The other genitive plural ending *-ārum* (I decl.) / *-ōrum* (II) / *-ērum* (V) is completely idiosyncratic. Homophony between nominative and genitive singular in the III declension (normally behaving like *rex* vs. *regis*) is limited to some lexical stems (mainly *-i-* stems, e.g., nominative singular *turris* vs. genitive singular *turris*). The homophony of genitive and dative singular in the I (*rosae*) and V (*diei*) declensions is, however, noteworthy. Needless to say, problems of merger arise along with the increasing loss of the vowel length distinction (see Baldi 1997).
98. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2003b: 679).
99. See Lehmann (2005), Ernout & Meillet (1967), s.v. *me:* “L’ancien adjectif possessif était de la forme **mo-*, à en juger par skr. *má*, av. *ma-*, gr. ἐμός (avec prothèse), arm. *im* (gén. *imoy*, aussi avec prothèse). Le type lat. *meus* est secondaire, comme skr. class. *madīyaḥ*, got. *meins*, tokh. A *ñi*, lit. *manas* etc.”.

Table 10. Personal pronouns

	Singular	Plural
1st	*meus*	*noster*
2nd	*tuus*	*uester*
3rd	*suus / eius, illius*, etc.	*suus / eorum, illorum*, etc.

able (Table 10). These pronominal forms are often used as adjectives and, as such, they accord with the *possessum* as to number, case, and gender. Thus, they can be defined as "relatedness indicators" or "indexers", as their function is to indicate, within the pronominal sphere, the specific possessor to which the *possessum* is to be related.[100]

For the 3rd singular and 3rd plural the same form is available, namely, *suus*, and it shares its stem with the reflexive pronoun *se*.[101] Latin alternates between the use of this reflexive pronoun and the genitive of demonstratives. This alternation is conditioned by a complex series of factors which we cannot evaluate in detail here in that they partly relate to logophoric and switch-reference functions.[102] The rationale triggering the employment of one form or the other is essentially semantic and sentence/discourse-related: in general terms, *suus* indicates that the possessor is coreferential with a sentence/discourse pivot,[103] that is, the main, animate topic that is most immediately recoverable within the same portion of text on account of its semantic/pragmatic and textual saliency. This holds regardless of whether it is grammatically/syntactically marked as such (i.e., as the subject of the main verb), while genitives of pronominal forms like *eius* point to another participant.[104]

100. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001: 962).
101. See Lehmann (2005).
102. See Hagège (1974: 289); Stirling (1992); Swiggers (1995).
103. See Stirling (1992: 58, 76).
104. If the pronominal noun phrase occurs in a sentence built around a verbal form and the possessor of the noun phrase is coreferential with the participant that is the subject of the verb, *suus* is employed (e.g., Caes. *Gall.* 1,22,3: *Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit* 'Caesar withdrew his troops to the nearest hill'), while any additional occurrence of a genitive pronominal form, like *eius*, points to another participant (e.g., Caes. *Gall.* 1,20,5: *uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius uoluntati ac precibus condonet* '(Caesar) would forget the offence against the republic and his own grief, because

Genitive forms of personal or reflexive pronouns (*mei, tui, sui, nostri, uestri*) occur in every stage of the language, and their use would hypothetically overlap with that of possessive pronouns to form possessive noun phrases. An ancient Indo-European language like Greek has generalized this duality of pronominal possessor coding, so that both means are alternatively employed. In Latin the use of the genitive forms of personal pronouns is limited to pragmatically or stylistically marked instances of possessive noun phrases, when a particular stress is on the possessor (e.g., Prop. 4,3,56: *tui... partem*, 'YOUR part'). The only clear case of a structural distribution between the two expressions is in the marking of valency roles: while the possessive pronoun, like a nominal genitive, can express either the agent (*genitivus subiectivus*) or, alternatively, the patient (*genitivus obiectivus*) of an action designated by a verbal noun, when both roles are expressed within the same sentence the possessive pronoun usually indicates the agent and the genitive of the personal pronoun indicates the patient, as in (144):[105]

(140) Cic. *Att.* 13,1,3: *tua sui memoria delectatur*
'he is happy about your memory of him'

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of his [Divitiacus's] good will and prayers'). The occurrence of *eius* in the possessive noun phrase simply points straight to a possessor that is not coreferential with the subject of the verb: Caes. *Gall.* 1,20,5 (= (155)): *Caesar eius dextram prendit* 'Caesar takes his right hand'. The relationship of coreferentiality holds beyond the simple sentence and in a subordinate clause *suus* can refer to the subject of the main clause, even beside another instance of *suus* referring to the subject of the subordinate: Nep. *Hann.* 12,2: *patres conscripti ... legatos in Bithyniam miserunt ... qui ab rege peterent, ne inimicissimum suum secum haberet* 'the senators sent envoys to Bithynia to ask the king that he not have their most bitter enemy with him' (see Touratier 1994: 36). The employment of *suus* does not appear to be strictly conditioned only by grammatical factors, and it can be triggered by textual and pragmatic forces (see Stirling 1992: 66, Huang 2002) like an initial theme, or simply by a close animate participant whose textual contiguity and semantic features rule out any possibility of ambiguity (see Touratier 1994: 39, Swiggers 1995: 273); e.g., Plaut. *Poen.* 848: *erus nequ⟨i⟩uit propitiare Venerem suo festo die* 'the master was unable to appease Venus on her own festival day'; Cic. *Att.* 1,16,8: *senatum ad pristinam suam seueritatem reuocaui* 'I recalled the senate to its earlier strict temper'.

105. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 180); Touratier (1994: 27). For a detailed analysis of agentive and passive roles expressed by possessive pronouns and genitive personal pronouns, see Orlandini (1989: 179).

Note that this function can be fulfilled by a pronominal genitive even when it stands on its own:

(141) Caes. *Gall.* 1,19,2: *eius supplicio*
'by his torture' (as a victim, not as the agent)

Such a phenomenon is paralleled in other languages, such as English, where an ambiguous interpretation of the possessive pronoun can be disambiguated by a pronominal prepositional phrase that unequivocally expresses a passive role: *your picture* versus *a picture of you*. Notice that this distinction remains opaque with nominal genitives and the exact reading has to be drawn from the context, or the hearer's knowledge, as in (142):

(142) Caes. *Gall.* 1,30,1: *pro ueteribus Heluetiorum iniuriis populi Romani*
'because of old wrongs by the Helvetians against the Roman people'

Apart from this very specific disambiguating function, the genitive of personal pronouns is a marginal means of creating possessive noun phrases and it can be considered a relic of an earlier Indo-European stage that survives in Latin mainly as a pragmatically or stylistically marked variant.

Latin does not display a series of possessive affixes.[106] There are, however, occurrences of a reduced form of the 1st singular possessive pronoun *mi* (which might derive from the dative singular form **moi*, or it might simply be the monosyllabic form of the standard dative form *mihi*)[107] that is often used as the vocative of *meus* and, as such, it can prefixed or affixed to a noun. Examples are common only in archaic poetry:

(143) Plaut. *Amph.* 502: *quid istuc est, mi uir, negoti?*
'what's the matter here, my man?'

(144) Ter. *Eun.* 86: *ehem tun' hic eras, mi Phaedria?*
'are you here, then, my Phaedria?'

106. By possessive affixes we mean syntactically bound (i.e., non-independent) possessive indexers, which generally present a phonologically reduced form that often coincides with personal verbal inflectional markers.

107. Leumann (1977: 463).

The relevance of this reduced (clitic) form is minimal within the system of Latin.

Among the structural characteristics of the NP we should note the possibility of insertion of other constituents. While possible, it should be pointed out that such insertions constitute a general feature of Latin syntax, at least in its written manifestations, as in (145):

(145) Caes. *Gall.* 1,43,4: *sua senatusque in eum beneficia*
'his own good deeds (done by Caesar) and the senate for him (Ariovistus)'

Such a device, of course, can often reflect phenomena of pragmatic dislocation.

Another feature (possibly specific to the written language) is the formation of an elliptical phrase referring to the omitted *possessum* by means of the possessor alone, as in (146):

(146) Caes. *Gall.* 1,21,4: *in exercitu L. Sullae et postea in M. Crassi fuerat*
'he had been in the army of Lucius Sulla and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus'

The required condition for such a construction is a given and topical *possessum* previously mentioned within the discourse (or, in principle, even within the general frames of knowledge shared by the speakers). This syntactic device represents a functional equivalent of the possessive pronoun, but its frequency is incomparably smaller and its relevance in the language is therefore very limited.

A feature apparently shared by several languages is the possibility of accumulating a series of different possessors whether they express the same semantic relation or not:

(147) Caes. *Gall.* 1,12,7: *eius soceri L. Pisonis auum*
'his father-in-law Piso's grandfather'

(148) Plaut. *Amph.* 1135: *Alcumenae usuram corporis*
'the enjoyment of Alcmena's body'

In these cases, uncertainty in the semantic interpretation can arise, which must be disambiguated by the context (cf. (142)). The accumulation of more than two possessors, however, is rare.

3.2 Function and semantics of the possessive noun phrase

3.2.1 Semantic and informational functions

The semantic content of a possessive relation is particularly difficult to grasp within the domain of attributive possession. What has been said about possession in general is more evident in attributive constructions. The relationship expressed by a possessive noun phrase has to be defined as semantically opaque, as it depends on the context and on the specific semantics of the nominals involved. Indeed, the so-called "zero intention" appears to affect attributive more strongly than predicative possession. In predicative constructions, the relation is a part of the predication, which implies a stronger tendency to express explicitly the modalities of the relation itself.[108] As a consequence, the occurrence of semantically non-opaque means to predicate possession is rather common, as can be seen in many languages, such as Eng. *I have / I own*; Lat. *habeo, possideo*. In attributive constructions, there is a stronger tendency for the relation to be taken for granted, and the nominals involved form a tighter unit at the informational level. While in prototypical predicative constructions possessor and *possessum* are the topic and the comment of the sentence respectively, in attributive constructions possessor and *possessum* normally share the same status of topic or, alternatively, of comment.

Nonetheless, the semantic content of possessive noun phrases should not be considered totally empty,[109] as it shows a prototypical profile which shares some very general features with predicative possession:

108. See Heine (1997: 183).

109. See Heine (1997: 156). See Nikiforidou (1991) for an attempt to show that a genitive noun phrase has an internal semantic structure. See Seiler (1977: 224–225) for statements about the semantic constraints of a genitive noun phrase like Germ. *Karls Haus*, which would not accept "a semantic element NEGATIVE" reading such as 'the house that Karl hates', or 'the house that Karl did not buy'. Indeed, these readings seem to us rather atypical but nonetheless acceptable given an appropriate context. What seems to be excluded, however, is a purely generic negative reading, i.e. *Karls Haus* → *'the house that Karl does not have'. Given that the basic semantic foundation of a possessive noun phrase is the existence of relation between possessor and *possessum*, any interpretation denying the existence of the relation is simply absurd or, at best, so atypical that it does not have to be considered in a linguistic examination. But within the appropriate context

(a) Like predicative possession, prototypical attributive possession is characterized by the expression of a limited set of more typical, semantically specific relationships, whose frequent occurrence across languages is due to their importance at the cultural and referential level: kinship, body–part, part–whole, etc.
(b) As with predicative possession, the relation expressed by prototypical attributive possession can be defined as asymmetric, in the sense that the possessor is the more salient element of the pair, as specified in Section 1.1.

In some languages, the possessive noun phrase presents different formal encodings according to the semantics of the relations.[110] As we will see, Latin behaves like those languages only to a very limited extent. In Latin, the morphological frame of nominal attributive possession is the genitive case, which is functionally and semantically equivalent to the pronominal possessive NP:

(149) Caes. *Gall.* 1,19,1: *iniussu suo et ciuitatis*
'without his own orders and those of the state'

(150) Cic. *off.* 1,39,139: *habenda ratio non sua solum, sed etiam aliorum*
'one must have regard not only for himself, but also for others'

(151) Cic. *Catil.* 4,24: *de summa salute uestra populique Romani*
'concerning your own utmost safety and that of the Roman people'

If we take a look at the relations expressed by the genitive noun phrase, the degree of semantic variation is impressive. A quick glimpse at the examples given in Section 1.1 will suffice. An outline of statistical data can provide hints on this semantic constellation (Table 11). Different authors in different times do not differ with respect to the animacy parameter.[111] Unlike predicative possession, where a human possessor represents the overwhelming

a less generic reading such as 'the house that Karl has not bought' or 'the house that Karl does not have any more' could be accepted.

110. See Mithun (1999: 251) for a detailed sample.

111. In Plautus's *Amphitruo*, the 64 occurrences of a genitive noun phrase show a human possessor in the majority of cases (54/64), a human *possessum* in the minority (22/64); in the first 30 chapters of Cato's *de agricultura* the 41 occurrences of a genitive noun phrase show a human possessor in 11 cases, a human *possessum* in 6 cases; in the first 30 chapters of Caesar's *de bello Gallico* the 181 occurrences of a genitive noun phrase

majority, in attributive possession a human possessor is just as common as an inanimate one. With a human possessor, both human and inanimate *possessa* occur. Among the relations most frequently expressed by a noun phrase involving a human possessor we find, as expected, kinship, body–part, and ownership:

(152) Plaut. *Amph.* 99: *Alcumena … Electri filia*
'Alcmena the daughter of Electrus'

(153) Caes. *Gall.* 1,9,3: *Orgetorigis filiam*
'the daughter of Orgetorix'

(154) = (148) Plaut. *Amph.* 1135: *Alcumenae … corporis*
'of Alcmena's body'

(155) Caes. *Gall.* 1,20,5: *Caesar eius dextram prendit*
'Caesar takes his right hand'

(156) Caes. *Gall.* 1,25,3: *pluribus eorum scutis … transfixis et conligatis*
'with many of their shields pierced and fastened together'

(157) Petron. 16,3: *ego sum ancilla Quartillae*
'I am Quartilla's maid'

(158) Petron. 78,7: *uigiles … rati ardere Trimalchionis domus*
'the fire brigade, having thought that Trimalchio's house was on fire'

(159) Petron. 5,4: *sed siue armigerae rident Tritonidis arces … Sirenum domus*
'whether the armed rock of Triton and the house of the Mermaids smile'

(160) Plaut. *Amph.* 362: *Haec[c]ine tua domust?* :: *Ita inquam*
'is this your house? :: 'I say so'

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show a human possessor in 132 cases, a human *possessum* in 35 cases; in the first 20 chapters of Petronius's *Satyricon*, the 56 occurrences of a genitive noun phrase show a human possessor in 27 cases, a human *possessum* in 8 cases; in the first 10 chapters of *Itin. Eger.*, the 121 occurrences of a genitive NP show a human possessor in 65 cases, a human *possessum* in 18 cases (see Table 11). The predominance of inanimate possessors in Cato is clearly due to the highly technical character of the text, which is not to say that human possessor is the rule (as can be seen from the other texts examined), but that it is very common, although not as common as in predicative constructions.

Table 11. Genitive noun phrase relations expressed according to the [±hum] parameter

	Possessor	*Possessum*	No. of occurrences
A. Plaut. *Amph.*	[+hum]	[+hum]	22
	[+hum]	[−hum]	32
	[−hum]	[−hum]	10
	[−hum]	[+hum]	0
B. Cato *agr.* 1–30	[+hum]	[+hum]	6
	[+hum]	[−hum]	5
	[−hum]	[−hum]	30
	[−hum]	[+hum]	0
C. Caes. *Gall.* 1.1–30	[+hum]	[+hum]	29
	[+hum]	[−hum]	103
	[−hum]	[−hum]	43
	[−hum]	[+hum]	6
D. Petron. 1–20	[+hum]	[+hum]	4
	[+hum]	[−hum]	23
	[−hum]	[−hum]	25
	[−hum] 4	[+hum]	4
E. *Itin. Eger.* 1–10	[+hum]	[+hum]	17
	[+hum]	[−hum]	48
	[−hum]	[−hum]	55
	[−hum]	[+hum]	1

The relevance of the contextual frame and of the semantic features of the constituents have to be recalled also to account for the cultural category of (legal) ownership, which a genitive NP designates only when the features of the *possessum* allow such an inference. Such is the case with (158), where *Trimalchio* = possessor and *domus* = *possessum*. This is not the case with (160) and (156), as the house is not owned by the slave Sosia and the shields might not be strictly owned by the soldiers. It has repeatedly been argued that genitive noun phrases like *eorum scuta*, *Sirenum domus,* or *Catulli liber* can in principle express a large number of different relations, such as ‘the shields made by them’, ‘the house haunted by the Sirens’, ‘the book written

by Catullus', etc.[112] However, we should note that a noun phrase like *Catulli liber* offers a rather wide number of possible interpretations on account of the referential features of *liber* (an intellectual product, a tool for study, etc.); but, in normal contexts, noun phrases like *Catulli domus* or *Catulli servus* have only one reading, prototypical possession – or, according to the specific cultural features of the relation between a human possessor and *possessa* like *domus* and *servus* – ownership.

While the human character of the possessor does not hold any implication for the animacy of the *possessum*, a nonhuman possessor statistically constitutes an expectation for an equally inanimate *possessum*. Although no absolute constraint is in place, inanimate possessor & human *possessum* is clearly the atypical case, just as it is in predicative possession, and an inanimate possessor generally co-occurs with an inanimate *possessum* as well. If we take a closer look at the relations expressed by noun phrases involving two inanimates, there are recurring kinds of relationships, such as a partitive relation (161), an intrinsic property of a concrete object (162), or an intrinsic relation in a looser sense (163):

(161) Caes. *Gall.* 1,12,2: *tres … partes copiarum*
'three quarters of the forces'

(162) Caes. *Gall.* 1,8,4: *altitudo fluminis*
'the depth of the river'

(163) Plaut. *Amph.* 51: *argumentum … huius tragoediae*
'the argument of this tragedy'

As we can see, Latin shows a widespread use of the "nondeterminer" genitives,[113] genitives expressing nonanchoring relations[114] such as a mass/material relation:

112. See Serbat (1996: 259): "Selon que *Hecaton* est connu comme *discipulus* ou comme *magister*, *Hecatonis liber* s'interpretéra par 'le livre qui appartient à H., dans lequel il étudie', ou par 'le livre dont H. est l'auteur' Cic. *Off.* III 89". Needless to say, these readings depend on the referential features of a *possessum* like *liber*.

113. See Lyons (1986).

114. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2003a: 552). See further the discussion (ibid.) in which a general definition of "inserted genitives" is advanced (esp. 526, 537).

(164) Plaut. *Amph.* 429: *cadus erat uini*
'there was a casket of wine'

(165) Cato *agr.* 10,2: *operculum aheni*
'a top of copper'

None of these relations is of course confined to inanimate participants (e.g. Plaut. *Amph.* 27: *uostrum quiuis* = partitive relation). However, a few core semantic notions can be safely singled out. Most of the meanings expressed can ultimately be connected to two main semantic fields: an intrinsic relation and the human personal sphere.[115] In fact, the possessor is most commonly a human being or, alternatively, an inanimate object intrinsically related to the *possessum*, like a whole to its part, a source to its offshot, a cause to its effect, a material to an object made of it, etc. Of course, other kinds of relation occur, and the Latin possessive noun phrase also covers the expression of valency roles, activities, etc. (e.g., Caes. *Gall.* 1,1,7: *inter occasum solis*; 1,13,7 *internecione exercitus*; cf. Eng. *the rising of the moon, the destruction of the enemy*), but the majority of occurrences seem wrapped around those two semantic primes.

One of the main features of predicative possession is that it prototypically involves an established instead of an inherent relationship. Attributive possession does not behave in a special way, since it is not typically centered simply around an inherent relationship but can equally involve inherent or established (*sphère personnelle*) relations. In fact, relations involving a human possessor belong, by definition, to the *sphère personnelle,* which necessarily implies inherent relations (e.g., body–part), as well as established relations, like those between a human possessor and his personal clothes, belongings, or objects that he uses everyday. That is to say that, in English as in Latin, *my hand* is an example of possessive noun phrase as typical as *my wife, my car, my hat, my cat*.[116] Thus, in attributive possession the prototypical set

115. A complex radial network of the relations more typically expressed by a possessive noun phrase has been presented by Nikiforidou (1991), who attributes a fundamental role to human possessor and part–whole relations in the evolution of the semantics of possessive noun phrases.

116. The degree of typicality is probably more stable when a *sphère personnelle* relation overlaps with an intrinsic relation, so that the prototypical character of a possessive noun

of *possessa* is formed by nouns that are "relational" in two senses: they are relational *intrinsically*, because of their own nature and their structural, inherent, connection with the possessor (e.g., part–whole, body–part, etc.), or they are relational *culturally*, because they are presupposed to be connected with a specific possessor, more typically a human being. Indeed, the semantic profile of the prototypical possessive noun phrase seems better defined as the expression of relations of a *possessum* that is *inherently* or *conventionally* relational to a possessor. In both cases, although for different reasons, the prototypical possessive noun phrase meets the general expectation of an existing relation between possessor and *possessum*.

In Latin, as in many other languages, a possessive noun phrase often expresses a relation that does not belong to the prototypical set of relations described above. See for example (166)–(169):

(166) Plaut. *Amph.* 1053: *spes atque opes uitae meae*
'the hopes and resources of my life'

(167) Caes. *Gall.* 1,2,1: *coniurationem nobilitatis fecit*
'he formed a conspiracy of the nobility'

(168) Caes. *Gall.* 1,16,5: *uitae necisque habet potestatem*
'he has the power of life and death'

(169) Petron. 8,2: *cum errarem – inquit – per totam ciuitatem nec inuenirem quo loco stabulum reliquissem, accessit ad me pater familiae et ducem se itineris humanissime promisit*
'when – he said – I was wandering through the town and was not able to find where I had left my lodgings, a senior person approached me and very kindly offered himself as the leader of the way'

A heterogeneous set of relations such as 'the hope and resources of my life', 'a conspiracy of the nobility', 'power of life and death', 'director of the way' cannot easily be reduced to inherent or *sphère personnelle* relationships. If

phrase regarding body parts or kinship is likely to have a more general validity in most languages and cultures. The prototypical character of established relations involving a human possessor is, however, relative. In ancient Roman society, possessive NPs like *my master* or *my slave* have to be considered just as typical as *my hand*, even if they involve established relationships.

we take the last example, a way, or the act of faring, does not typically belong to someone's *sphère personnelle*, nor is there anything inherent in the relation involved. As has been highlighted by Lehmann (1998a), zero intension is intrisic to the domain of possession. Therefore, a possessive noun phrase always tends to expand centrifugally and cover the expressions of simply *any* kind of relation, with no constraint as to its semantic content. This phenomenon characterizes Latin all through its history. It can be observed that, while in an intrinsic or a *sphère personnelle* relation the possessor displays a major saliency on account of cultural conventions or its inherent features, in an instance like (169): *ducem... itineris* what causes *iter* to be coded as the Modifier is simply its informative role within the frame of the text. In general, an instance like *iter ducis* ('the way of the leader') would be perfectly acceptable.[117] But within this particular context, given Encolpius' preceding statement about being lost, *iter* constitutes the backgrounded information and is therefore used to narrow the semantic scope of the newly introduced term *dux*, in order to assign this element its appropriate sense: the *pater familiae* defines himself as the leader to the right way, by means of an equative clause or the like: *promisit se (esse) ducem*.

Thus, beside its rather opaque semantic profile, a more clear-cut characterization of the function of the possessive noun phrase obtains at the informational level: its function is to characterize a nominal by means of another

117. It is notheworthy that, under certain circumstances, when the basic semantic features of possessor and *possessum* meet specific textual and informative constraints, a reversal of the roles is possible, and it does not imply any change at the intentional level. A possessive noun phrase like Cato *agr.* 6,1: *hoc genus oleae*, 'this kind of olive', could be safely reversed into *olea huius generis*, 'an olive of this kind', without essentially modifying the semantic and informational structure of the text. What seems to be implied here is the cancellation of the asymmetry in the relation, which is probably due to the high degree of coreferentiality between the two entities involved that form a tight noetic unity at the semantic and, consequently, informative level (see the discussion of genitive NPs related to this matter in Serbat 1996). Given the non-individuated character of the possessor, a phenomenon of this kind is rather peripheral for the general frame of possessive noun phrase and is not examined in detail here. However, the comparison with instances of prototypical attributive possession, that is, with a human, individuated possessor, where the reversal of the roles is generally excluded, immediately suggests the huge range of different features and functions that characterize the Latin possessive noun phrase and basically share a single coding.

nominal which displays a higher degree of saliency and individuation, on account on its intrinsic qualities, established cultural conventions, or even its informational status, which may simply depend on specific textual conditions.

3.2.2 Some remarks on definiteness

In the Latin possessive noun phrase, the high degree of individuation of the possessor is clearly reflected in its definite character, which is the norm. Examples of a [−def] genitive constituent occur, but they basically refer to nonspecific[118] entities whose function is simply to characterize the *possessum* as to one of its properties, like the material it is made of (*ahenum*) in (165) or the whole it belongs to (*mons*), as in (170):

(170) Cato *agr.* 1,3: *sub radice montis siet*
'it should be at the foot of a mountain'

where *ahenum* and *mons* have to be interpreted as generic entities whose function is simply to classify an equally [−def] Head as belonging to a certain category. A [−def] Head is more frequent that a [−def] genitive constituent but, again, it often occurs when the Modifier simply designates a nonspecific entity, or when the Head is an indefinite pronoun, as in (171)–(172):

(171) Cato *agr.* 6,3: *ibi cacumina populorum serito*
'there you'll plant shoots of poplars'

(172) Plaut. *Amph.* 186: *quod numquam opinatus fui neque alius quisquam ciuium …*
'I never thought, nor did any other of the citizens, (that) … '

Outside the specific cases of mass nouns and nonspecific classifiers or indefinite pronouns (e.g., *quisque*), a [−def] possessor very seldom occurs in

118. With "nonspecific" we generically refer to [−def] nouns characterized by features like "generic" or "nonreferential" (which therefore do not coincide with prototypical [−def] nouns like the object in Eng. *I see a man*), and whose function is eminently classificatory. For the use of expressions like "nonspecific" or "generic" with respect to the definiteness parameter, see Chesterman (1991, esp. 12, 187), Givón (1978). See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2003a, esp. 538) about what she calls "qualitative genitives" and "classifying genitives".

possessive noun phrases, where, more typically, the possessor is an individual name, a personal noun, or a personal pronoun.

As far as the *possessum* is concerned, definiteness is a more complex issue. Archaic and Classical Latin do not have obligatory [+def]/[−def] markers, and the individuation of the definiteness of a noun can be sometimes difficult, as in the following noun phrase:

(173) Caes. *Gall.* 1,19,1: *a magistratu Haeduorum accusaretur*
'he was accused by a/the magistrate of the Aedui'

This could be interpreted as 'one of the magistrates in charge among the Aedui', as well as 'the only (i.e., individuated) magistrate in charge among the Aedui'. More often, however, the [−def] character of the *possessum* can be inferred by the context, as in (174)–(175):

(174) Plaut. *Amph.* 359: … *me esse huius familiai familiarem…*
'… that I am a member of this household …'

(175) Caes. *Gall.* 1,23,2: *ea res per fugitiuos L. Aemili … hostibus nuntiatur*
'that charge is reported to the enemy by deserters from L. Aemilius'

It is noteworthy that these *possessa* often do not express any relation of the prototypical set (kinship, body-parts, or ownership), where the *possessum* is generally an individuated entity. These cases of [−def] *possessum*, however, are numerically limited: in the texts examined [+def] *possessa* are clearly the majority,[119] and the normal interpretation of a possessive noun phrase requires a [+def] *possessum*, as can be seen in many examples:

(176) = (152) Plaut. *Amph.* 99: *Alcumena … Electri filia*
'Alcmena the daughter of Electrus'

119. We have not done statistically exhaustive and detailed research on the definite parameter, but a brief survey of a portion of the texts has given the following results, which must be taken as purely suggestive: Plaut. *Amph.* possessor [−def] 0/64, *possessum* [−def] 9/65; Cato *agr.* possessor [−def] 1/41, *possessum* [−def] 8/41; Caes. *Gall.* 1–30 possessor [−def] 0/181, *possessum* [−def] 6/181. We have not considered cases of nonspecific entities, like the possessor in Plaut. *Amph.* 429: *cadus erat uini*.

(177) Plaut. *Amph.* 950: *in mea naui*
'on my ship'

(178) Caes. *Gall.* 1,13,2: *qui … dux Heluetiorum fuerat*
'who had been the commander of the Helvetii'

(179) Cic. *epist.* 5,6,3: *domum tuam … perspexi*
'I looked at your house'

The obligatory [+def] status of possessive noun phrases in some languages has led Lyons (1986, 1999) to a typological distinction between Determiner-Genitive and Adjectival-Genitive languages. In the former, a possessive Modifier always implies a definite interpretation of the Head, and consequently the possessive noun phrase is not compatible with other [+def] determiners (e.g., articles). In the latter the [+def] status of the Head is not implied, and the possessive noun phrase can thus combine with [+def] determiners. Clear examples of Determiner-Genitive are English (*my hat, the man's hat* vs. **the my hat, the man's the hat*), or Irish (*mo hata*, *hata an fhir* 'id.' vs. **an mo hata, an hata an fhir*). A good example of Adjectival-Genitive is Italian (*il mio libro* 'my book', *il libro di Giovanni* 'John's book' = [+def]; *un mio libro* 'a book of mine', *un libro di Giovanni* 'a book of John's' = [−def]; vs. **mio libro*). Determiner-Genitive languages are then forced to express [−def] possessive noun phrases by the means of specific, differently encoded noun phrases, among which the most common device would be the prepositional construction (Eng. *a friend of mine,* Ir. *cara liom* 'id.').[120] Nonetheless, Lyons's conclusion is rather open, as he acknowledges that "there are also mixed languages – in fact a great many languages combine elements of both patterns. It is therefore constructions, not languages, that are Determiner-Genitive or Adjectival-Genitive. Spanish has both Determiner-Genitive possessives (*mi casa*, 'my house', [+def]) and Adjectival-Genitive possessives (*la casa mía*, 'my house', *una casa mía*, 'a house of mine')".[121]

Apparently, the generalization of a [+def] reading for possessive noun phrases would lead us to classify Latin as a Determiner-Genitive language.

120. See Lyons (1986: 139, 1999: 24, 130).
121. Lyons (1986: 133).

However, as we have seen, the basic possessive noun phrase does not exclude a [−def] reading for the *possessum*, though the occurrences represent a minority. Moreover, whenever it is important to stress the nonindividuated character of the *possessum*, the [−def] marker *quidam* can occur as Modifier of both nominal and pronominal possessive noun phrases:[122]

(180) Plaut. *Mil.* 383–384: *mea soror ... / uenisse Athenis in Ephesum cum suo amatore quodam*
'my sister came from Athens to Ephesus with a certain lover of hers'

(181) Cic. *Verr.* II 1,38: *ei... bona quaedam proscriptorum in agro Beneuentano diripienda concessit*
'he let him have some of the properties of the proscribed people in the territory of Beneventum to plunder'

(182) Petron. 111,1: *matrona quaedam Ephesi tam notae erat pudicitiae*
'a certain lady of Ephesus was so renowned for her chastity'

Things do not change when, in later periods, a singular numeral begins to develop an article-like function:

(183) Petron. 26,8: *unus seruus Agamemnonis interpellauit trepidantes et "Quid? Vos – inquit ... "*
'a servant of Agamemnon addressed us, though we were anxious, and said: "What? You ..." '

Furthermore, possessive noun phrases are compatible with [+def] markers:

(184) Plaut. *Amph.* 46: *illi ... patri meo*
'to that father of mine'

(185) Plaut. *Amph.* 116: *ne hunc ornatum uos meum admiremini*
'don't you be wondering at this costume of mine'

122. Examples are numerous. Cf. Plaut. *Cas.* 566–567: *contriui diem / dum asto aduocatus quoidam cognato meo* 'I wasted the day ... acting as a counselor for a certain relative of mine'; Cic. *Verr.* II 2,173: *dat amico suo cuidam negotium* 'he assigned the matter to a friend of his (to make sure that no records would be left in the archive)'; Caes. *Gall.* 1,42,6: *quidam ex militibus decimae legionis dixit...* 'one of the soldiers from the tenth legion said ...'; Hirt. *Gall.* 8,26,1: *cum pars quaedam ciuitatis eius defecisset* 'while a certain part of his community had withdrawn' (cf. Serbat 1984).

(186) Cic. *epist.* 5,2,6: *animum ... istum tuum*
'that feeling of yours'

(187) Apul. *met.* 5,28: *ergo iam ille bonus filius meus habet amicam aliquam?*
'so, that good son of mine now has some girlfriend?'

In fact, the position of Latin does not seem to be adequately characterized by the Determiner-Genitive /Adjectival-Genitive classification. Such a division appears, indeed, to be strongly connected with the presence of articles in a given language, as Lyons acknowledges, according to which "the AG type is not limited to languages that have articles (though the Determiner-Genitive type probably is)".[123] Possibly, Latin behaves more like Mandarin Chinese, whose lack of articles is said to leave possessive noun phrases ambiguous as to their definite status.[124] A profitable comparison is possible with Spanish, which seems to be characterized by a basic, unmarked possessive noun phrase displaying a generally acknowledged [+def] status with no need of an explicit marking; and other, more marked constructions whose definiteness can be reinforced by a [+def] article with emphatic function or, alternatively, negated by [−def] article. It is noteworthy that a Determiner-Genitive kind of construction is attested also in Italian, in a limited set of kin terms, including *mia madre, mio fratello*, on account of the fact that in such cases there is only one referent or possible referents are limited to a small number of individuals.[125] As regards this set, Italian does not seem to have changed the Latin structure, just like Spanish.

Thus, as far as the matter of definiteness is concerned, Latin does not display any restriction about the definite character of the possessive noun phrase, which can be either [+def] or [−def], nor about the possibility of additional [+def] and [−def] markers. In this respect, it is a language that behaves quite freely. Nonetheless, the bare possessive noun phrase, with no

123. Lyons (1986: 132); see Plank (1992) for a detailed discussion of the subdivision between Determiner-Genitive and Adjectival-Genitive languages.
124. See Lyons (1999: 132). Indeed, as Mandarin Chinese seems to have begun to develop article-like forms out of demonstratives and numerals, a detailed comparison with Latin might reveal further analogies. See Chen (2004).
125. See Lyons (1999: 26, 128–129).

additional [+def]/[−def] modifiers, is clearly characterized by a "default interpretation" that generalizes the [+def] reading of the *possessum*. This phenomenon simply reflects a basic feature of the possessive noun phrase: to individuate or characterize a nominal by making reference to another nominal whose position is higher on the scale of saliency, empathy, and individuation.

3.2.3 Conclusion

In general terms, the Latin possessive noun phrase can be characterized as semantically weak but informationally strong. Prototypically, it expresses a limited set of relations, but no semantic principle can be invoked to cover all of its uses. Furthermore, the wide scope of the Latin possessive noun phrase embraces various kinds of inherent and *sphère personnelle* relations, as well as others (e.g., valency roles). The semantic content, however, always depends on the lexical items involved and the situational context. A general principle of asymmetry can be said to stand between the possessor and the *possessum*, but it cannot be explained by semantics alone: the function of the noun phrase is to characterize and define a nominal by reference to another nominal that holds, inherently or contextually, a more highly individuated status on the cognitive and informational level. Thus, the Latin possessive noun phrase reflects the general characteristic of attributive possession: it fits into the cognitive Reference Point model and, in Heine's words, it "presents typically presupposed rather than asserted information".[126]

With regard to functional differences between predicative possession and attributive possession, their prototypical profiles not only reflect the opposition of "presupposed versus asserted information", but they also show a different attitude toward the inherent/established poles: while predicative possession is centered around the predication of an established relationship, the possessive noun phrase is not affected by a special limitation regarding inherent relationships. As far as the animacy parameter is concerned, the prototypical human character of the possessor of predicative constructions is not matched in attributive constructions, which, even in this respect, show a wider semantic characterization.

126. Heine (1997: 143).

3.3 Variation in form and function

3.3.1 Dative marking

Some languages display a different marking for inherent and established possession but, as is widely known, the criterion for which a certain *possessum* falls into the range of the alienability or inalienability categories is highly culturally oriented. In general terms, Latin has only one possessive noun phrase marking, which is therefore undifferentiated as regards its semantic content. There are, however, exceptions. Beside a generalized employment of the genitive case, we find, especially in archaic texts, a certain number of instances where the possessor displays a dative marking. Examples occur in Plautus and, very often, in Cato, but also in classical authors:[127]

(188) Plaut. *Mil.* 271: *Philocomasio custos*
'Philocomasium's guard'

(189) Plaut. *Mil.* 1431: *Philocomasio amator*
'Philocomasium's lover'

(190) = (124) Cato *agr.* 146,2: *dies argento*
'the day of payment'

(191) Cato *agr.* 70,1: *bubus medicamentum*
'remedy for oxen'

Most of these noun phrases show that the dative and the genitive markings alternate even inside the same text, and a certain degree of variation is indisputable. Cf. Plaut. *Men.* 128: *amatores mariti* 'The lovers of the husband', 268: *amator mulierum* 'the lover of the women'; *Pseud.* 210: *quoius amatores* 'whose lovers'; *Asin.* 297: *custos carceris* 'the guard of the prison'; *Mil.* 153: *custodi mulieris* 'to the guard of the woman'; *Trin.* 252: *auri custos* 'the guard of the gold'; Cato *agr.* 11,1: *opercula doliorum et tectaria priua* 'the individual covers for the pots'. Instances like Cato *agr.*10,4 and 11,1 (where the same relation is expressed by both genitive and dative within the same text) clearly

127. Cf. other examples in Cato *agr.*10,4: *opercula doliis seriis priua* 'several covers for jars and pots'; 159,1: *intertrigini remedium* 'a remedy for chafing'.

show that dative marking is highly irregular. In general, genitive modifiers of heads like *medicamentum*, *remedium*, and *tegumentum* can indicate both the illness or the problem against which the cure or the shelter is employed, and the beneficiary of such a cure or shelter (cf. Plin. *nat.* 16,110: *semen salicis mulieri sterilitatis medicamentum esse constat* 'it is agreed that the seed of a willow as a drug is a source of sterility in a woman', 32,24: *oculorum medicamentis* 'with salves for the eyes'). Cato's use of the dative to mark either the illness or the beneficiary shows an equal inconsistency. The dative continues to be employed to mark beneficiary and purpose relations in every period, but it often is a purely stylistic feature and its relevance in the form of the possessive noun phrase is slight (cf. Tac. *ann.* 15,49,1: *initium coniurationi* 'the beginning of the conspiracy', *hist.* 4,19,1: *causam seditioni* 'a reason for the revolt'[128]. We note, however, that dative marking tends to occur in other, classical authors especially when the possessor indicates the human (or human-related, like a body part) beneficiary, in order to differentiate a semantically more specific relation (i.e., strictly connected with a human possessor) from the rather opaque profile of the genitive marking (cf. Cic. *Cluent.* 67: *acrioribus saluti suae remediis subueniendum putauit* 'he thought that more drastic remedies were needed for his own safety'; Liv. 1,20,4: *pectori tegumen* 'a covering for the breast', 9,19,7: *scutum, maius corpori tegumentum* 'a shield, more protection for the body'; Tac. *ann.* 2,21,2: *detraxerat tegimen capiti* 'he had torn away the covering for his head'). In the classical period, a genitive marking seems more frequent when a human beneficiary is not involved, that is, when the possessor indicates a material relation (i.e., coreferentiality between possessor and *possessum*), a [−hum] beneficiary, and other relations: Tac. *ann.* 3,43,2: *continuum ferri tegimen* 'a continuous covering of iron'; *CIL* 6.38425 *hic ego nunc iaceo … sub tegmine terrae* 'I now lie here […] under the cover of the earth'; Plin. *nat.* 22,30: *quaedam animalium remediis nascuntur* 'certain (plants) are created as remedies for the diseases of animals'; Tac. *hist.* 4,81,1: *remedium caecitatis* 'a remedy for blindness'.

An explanation for such variation can be found in the specific semantic features of the designated relation, which appears as somewhat atypical with respect to the basic meaning generally expressed by a genitive noun phrase. A

128. See Lavency (1997: 162).

possessive noun phrase involving [+hum] possessor and [+hum] *possessum* typically indicates a kinship relation (e.g., *Philocomasi filius, mater*, etc.), which therefore implies relational terms and displays an inherent character. The personal relations between Philocomasius and her warder, or her lover, do not refer to the prototypical personal relation usually expressed, but they are idiosyncratic, momentary relations displaying an established character.[129] The correlation between such an atypical profile of a personal relation and the dative marking shows up occasionally in other texts from the classical period; e.g. Tac. *hist*. 1,22,2: *Othoni in Hispania comes* 'Othon's fellow in Spain', and it has been labeled a feature of the spoken language.[130]

Other instances of dative marking, like (190), may call for a different explanation. The genitive of a mass noun like *argentum* implies a default interpretation of the possessive noun phrase as a material relation (cf. Plaut. *Truc*. 952: *em tibi talentum argenti*), which, referring to an intrinsic feature of an entity, involves inherent relationship. A hypothetical **dies argenti* 'day of silver' would then imply the coreferentiality of possessor and *possessum* and fail to express the purpose relation (generally expressed by means of the dative) that is required by the context of (190).

The formal structure of the possessive noun phrase displays indisputably only one basic shape and sporadic, formal variations cannot be explained simply by reference to semantic categories like alienability versus inalienability, from which Latin is immune. Thus, our conclusion is simply that in some contexts, atypical semantic features may correspond to an atypical formal marking like the dative case, which also occurs in one of the main predicative possessive constructions (*mihi est x*). The penetration of formal features belonging to predicative structures into attributive constructions is by no means exceptional and has often been said to be related to [+hum] possessors.[131] Latin partly confirms such a view. It has to be remarked, however, that, if semantic features like "[+hum] possessor" and "[+established relation]" may

129. Exactly the same phenomenon occurs in English, e.g., *A friend to all (is a friend to none)*, *He's been a good friend to me*; cf. also Fr. *le livre est à moi*. Dative markings often occur, in fact, in noun phrases where the *possessum* is *amicus*, e.g., Ter. *Andr*. 970, Tac. *hist*. 3,43,1. Genitive marking also occurs, e.g., Caes. *civ.* 3,101,7, Cic. *Phil*. 5,44.

130. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 73–74).

131. Cf. cases like Ger. *dem Bürgermeister seine Briefmarken* in Heine (1997: 183).

play a triggering role and account for some instances, the factors that trigger a dative noun phrase are of a different nature. Dative marking is occasionally required to highlight marked semantic profiles that differ from the default, more typical interpretations of the genitive noun phrase (kinship, material, etc.).

In strictly syntactic terms, there is no single origin which can necessarily be assigned to these constructions. At the least, cases like *Philocomasio amator, Philocomasio custos* are likely to derive from *x est y mihi* predicative constructions (cf. Section 2.1), judging from instances like Plaut. *Persa* 770: *tu hic eris dictatrix nobis*. A nominal predicate like *dictatrix* might easily have become associated to a syntagmatically attached dative Modifier like *nobis*, thus forming a noun phrase such as *dictatrix nobis*, from which other noun phrases may have been remodeled.[132]

These early attestations of dative marking are, however, noteworthy, as they can be connected with later occurrences of prepositional phrases with a typical possessive function, as in *CIL* 13.2483 (VI century): *hic requiescunt membra ad duus fratres, Gallo et Fidencio*.[133] This phenomenon of course has a natural outcome in Romance, where exactly the same phrase expressing a possessive function is fairly well attested, as in Old French *la chambre a la pucele*, 'the maiden's bedroom'.[134] Prepositional marking with *de,* 'from', appears quite commonly even in archaic texts, but it is limited to the expression of material or source:

(192) Cato *agr*. 17,1: *id semen de cupresso*
'that seed from the cyprus'

(193) Cato *agr*. 18,7: *de testa arida pauimentum struito*
'lay a pavement of dry potsherds'

132. See Bennett (1914: 134). As regards the spreading of the dative case at the expense of the genitive in more general terms, see the discussion (ibid. 144) that highlights the leading role played by 1st and 2nd person dative personal pronouns.

133. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 73).

134. See Hawkins (1981: 266–267); Heine (1997: 150).

The preposition *de* continues to express partitive relations and finally comes to alternate with genitive marking:[135]

(194) *Itin. Eger.* 14,2: *fundamenta … sunt de palatio regis M.*
'foundations are from the palace of the king M.'

(195) *Itin. Eger.* 12,7: *episcopus loci ipsius id est de Segor*
'the bishop of that very place, that is, from Segor'

Thus, dative noun phrases alternating with the genitive in archaic texts might be considered an early trace of the penetration of different formal structures that slowly make their way into the domain of possession, but only prepositional markings finally come to express core relations, like body–part and prototypical possession, in a much later period. Therefore, the lack of a consistent spread of dative marking in the Latin system of attributive possession implies a high degree of formal stability for the genitive noun phrase. Such stability, however, decreases in time and finally withdraws to old prepositional structures newly refunctionalized, which prove to be more successful substitutes than the dative case, along with the ongoing process of weakening of the case system.

3.3.2 Zero-marking and implicit possessors

In their discussion of inalienability, Chappel and MacGregor (1996: 4) describe alienable *possessa* as an open and rather loose set versus inalienable *possessa*, which appear to be a more restricted and better defined set centered around relational nouns and inherent relationships. Although no universal hierarchy can be said to attain between body–part, part–whole, and kin terms,[136] these appear to be the core of what has commonly been defined as the domain of inalienable possession. In Latin, as we have noted, no specific

135. The common grammaticalization process that gives birth to an opposition between older constructions marking inalienable possession and innovative constructions marking alienable possession, as noted by Koptjevskaja-Tamm (1996) and Heine (1997), may partly apply to an alternative marking like the dative; but it does not seem to apply to prepositional markings, which, in the beginning, are more often confined to cases of inherent, or inalienable, relations.

136. Nichols (1992).

morphological structure marks semantic differences like inherent versus established relationship, or alienable versus inalienable possession: *Lucili pater* or *manus nostra* present the same shape as *Catulli liber*, *pecunia mea*. However, according to Haiman (1985: 130), languages tend to reflect iconically the smaller conceptual distance between a possessor and an inalienable *possessum*. Typically, inalienable *possessa* are characterized either by *signe-zéro* (thus involving no marking on the noun phrase but mere juxtaposition) or, alternatively, by obligatory occurrence in possessive noun phrases.[137] The latter possibility, as we have noted, is excluded in Latin, where there is no such thing as an obligatory possessive marking. Mere juxtaposition is excluded too, but zero-marking, although not obligatory, is indeed very common for prototypical inalienable *possessa* like body parts and kin terms, which can appear in noun phrases that simply are not characterized by any explicit possessive marker (i.e., they are not possessive noun phrases). Examples are numerous in archaic comedy, but occurrences are attested in every phase of the language.[138] In (196)–(202) the identity of the possessor is always recoverable from the context:

(196) Plaut. *Amph.* 991–992: *pater uocat me, eum sequor, eius dicto imperio sum / audiens*
‘(my) father calls me, I follow him and am obedient to his word and command’

(197) Plaut. *Amph.* 1076–1077: *interii / :: Cedo manum*
‘I am dead. :: Give me (your) hand’

137. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001: 965–966).

138. In Plautus’s *Amphitruo*, beside 44 occurrences of kin terms and 13 occurrences of body parts in genitive or (more frequently) in possessive adjective noun phrases, we find 8 attestations of kin terms and 9 of body parts with no overt possessor within the same noun phrase. The phenomenon is also regularly attested in prose texts of every period: Caes. *Gall.* 1–20 provides 3 instances of kin terms with no overt possessor (vs. 10 instances in genitive noun phrases); Petron. 1–20 has 3 instances of body parts with no overt possessor (vs. 4 instances in genitive noun phrases and 4 in pronominal possessive noun phrases); *Itin. Eger.* 1–30 provides cases of the same kind, with 2 instances of kin terms and 2 of body parts.

(198) Plaut. *Amph.* 1058–1059: *corrupta sum atque absumpta sum. / Caput dolet*
'I am broken and wasted. (My) head hurts'

(199) Plaut. *Amph.* 529–530: *tace / ne corrumpe oculos*
'hush; don't spoil (your) eyes'

(200) Plaut. *Amph.* 316: *alia forma esse oportet quem tu pugno legeris*
'a man's shape is bound to change if you pick him off with (your) fist'

(201) Petron. 17,9: *protendo ad genua uestra supinas manus*
'I stretch out (my) upturned hands to your knees'

(202) *Itin. Eger.* 19,15: *cuius archiotipa uides iuxta patre posita*
'whose statue you see placed near that of (his) father'

Zero-marking on the possessor has been recognized as a common feature of kin terms in Dahl and Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001), who label such a possessor as the "anchor" and provide examples of "implicit anchors" in many languages, from Swedish to English. Latin extends the possibility of such an implicit anchor to body parts as well. As we can see, kin terms and body parts with no overt possessor are not conditioned by syntactic constraints, as they can stand as subjects, objects, or oblique phrases within the sentence (*pater uocat me; cedo manum; tu pugno legeris*). The person of the verbal form is often coreferential with the implicit possessor (*cedo manum; ne corrumpe oculos*), but this is not a necessary syntactic requirement (*caput dolet*), as the context always plays a disambiguating role. Bare kin terms or body parts can equally refer to a 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person anchor; that is, zero-marking is not limited to "egocentric implicit anchors".[139] However, the higher degree of the *ego* on the empathy scale seems to apply in neutral contexts, and an utterance like (198) is clearly understood as referring to the speaker.

Zero-marking on the possessor is, as we have said, not obligatory, and examples with overt possessors are in fact even more common. As a rule of thumb, possessors of kin terms and body parts tend to be omitted when they are recoverable from the context, whereas they tend to be explicit in

139. Dahl and Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001).

contexts where the plurality of participants is a source of ambiguity. Explicit possessors occur (either nominal or pronominal) even if their identification would be unequivocal, as they can express a range of different functions: their presence can be due to pragmatic needs, as well as to purely metrical and stylistic reasons.

Other nouns that are not inherently relational can behave in exactly the same way: even a noun like *domus* does not need to have an explicit possessive marker if the context is sufficiently clear as to the identity of the possessor:[140]

(203) Plaut. *Pseud.* 789: *erus eccum recipit se domum et ducit coquom*
'here is the master coming home and bringing a cook'

Of course, the grammatical marking of a possessive relation is only a possibility for common nouns, which may or may not occur in possessive noun phrases. Typical *possessa* like *domus* are more likely to occur in possessive noun phrases but, given that possessive markers are not obligatory, these nouns do not always need to have an explicitly marked possessor if it is recoverable from the context. Kin terms and body parts, which are inherently (and not only typically) relational, apply such a principle more extensively: the indication of the possessor is often felt as redundant and, as such, is committed to the context. Thus, in principle, Latin appears to treat inherently relational nouns like other nouns. In practical terms, the actual occurrence of implicit possessors will vary according to the different semantic features of the nouns involved as *possessa* and, of course, to the specific textual circumstances. All the same, kin terms often display proper name – like uses and status, and this is doubtless a strengthening factor that leads to their frequent occurrence as bare nouns.[141] But, as we have seen, this phenomenon is regular even with body parts.

As neither possessive nor [±def] markers are obligatory in Latin, possessive markers are not needed to fulfill the function of determiners (as they are in English), and they can be omitted when the identity of the possessor is unambiguous. Similarly, in Italian many common kin terms are still char-

140. Cf. Eng. *come on over (to) the house*, where the house is clearly that of the speaker.
141. See Dahl and Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001).

acterized by a frequent occurrence with implicit possessors, whenever the identification is unambiguous:[142]

(204) *Hai visto Giovanni?* :: *No, ma ho visto il figlio*
'Did you see Giovanni? :: No, but I saw his son (lit. *the* son)'

Apart from the presence of an obligatory [+def] marker, Italian has maintained (i.e., inherited) the high frequency of implicit possessors for kin terms.[143] The occurrence of kin terms as mere bare nouns (with no [+def] marker), as in Latin, is indeed attested in Italian and in other Romance languages but it is limited to a few, very specific terms, like *babbo* 'dad', *papà* 'id.', *mamma* 'mom', *nonno* 'grandfather', *nonna* 'grandmother/granny', which imply a unique and ascending referent, belong to informal speech and are regularly used in familiar contexts (e.g., *Babbo non viene*). This feature is, of course, well represented among Romance and non-Romance languages (e.g., Eng. *Dad is not coming*) and is typical of this restricted set of kin terms that are strongly affected by proper name–like uses and status.

3.3.3 External possession

Latin displays the phenomenon of "external possession" (see Payne and Barshi 1999, König 2001). In fact, Latin makes an extensive use of sentences where the possessor is encoded by means of a dative phrase that is "external" to the phrase containing the *possessum*, so that, in these cases, a basic possessive noun phrase containing possessor and *possessum* together does not actually occur. External possession constructions are typically employed with human possessors and relational *possessa*, in particular kin terms, body-parts, and normally possessed items such as personal tools, belongings, or pieces of

142. The same phenomenon, of course, frequently characterizes typical *possessa*, e.g., *ho preso la macchina* 'I took the car = my car'.

143. In Romance, nouns must have a [±def] marker (e.g., Fr. *la/une plume*), or a possessive marker (e.g., Fr. *ma plume*) or, in languages where [±def] and possessive markers can co-occur, both (e.g., It. *la penna*, or *la mia penna*). In a case like (204), the possessor is implicit and a [+def] marker on the noun is, in some dialects, the unmarked and more common choice. A possessive marker (i.e., *ho visto suo figlio*) is current as well. It should be noted that the co-occurrence of [+def] and possessive markers, which is normal with other *possessa* (*il mio cane*), does not apply with this kind of kin term (**il suo figlio*).

clothing. As we can see, the range of lexical items involved coincides with the set characterized by the phenomenon of implicit possessors.

The possibility of choosing between an external possessor construction and a basic possessive noun phrase is apparently the norm in every period (cf. the occurrence of full possessive noun phrases in contexts where an external possessor construction could be expected, like Liv. 26,49,11: *flens ad pedes imperatoris procubuit,* Petron. 95,5: *in Eumolpi caput iaculatus est*), and it may be of PIE origin as it occurs also in Ancient Greek.[144] Neither type of construction seems to dominate,[145] and occasionally both structures can even appear within the same sentence, in a sort of redundant construction (e.g. Plaut. *Persa* 794: *tibi ego oculum excutiam tuom*).[146]

The use of dative external possessor in Latin has been described as more expressive and typical of the spoken language, but this is by no means exclusive and we find examples in every kind of text and from authors of every age. External possession is differently applied by the authors (e.g., more often in Caesar, less so in Cicero, who favors it in constructions with personal pronouns),[147] and it strengthens with time, judging from its relevance in modern Romance languages. Body parts are the *possessa* most frequently affected:

(205) Plaut. *Bacch.* 441: *puer paedagogo tabula disrumpit caput*
'the boy smashes the teacher's head with a writing tablet'

(206) Caes. *Gall.* 1,31,2: *sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt*
'they all threw themselves crying at Caesar's feet'

(207) Petron. 30,7: *seruus nobis procubuit ad pedes*
'a slave fell at our feet'

(208) Ter. *Ad.* 93: *in orest omni populo*
'it is on everybody's lips'

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144. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 73): "L'alternance est en tout cas ancienne: cf. Hom. *Od.* 12, 47; 12,117".

145. Numerical surveys from authors of the archaic age make it clear; see Bennett (1914: 138): "About half as frequently as the dative, we find either a possessive pronoun or a limiting genitive".

146. See Bennett (1914: 138, 141).

147. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 73); Serbat (1996: 567).

(209) *Itin. Eger.* 6,1: *ut subito fluctus animalibus pedes cedat*
'so that the waves lap swiftly at the animals' feet'

(210) Plaut. *Mil.* 25–26: *elephanto . . . / ei pugno praefregisti brachium*
'the elephant, you broke its arm with a punch'

In these kinds of sentences, *possessa* are more often encoded as objects (205) or in oblique phrases (206), according to the "syntactic relations hierarchy" discussed by Haspelmath (1999: 113). A syntactic constraint against the subject role does not seem to occur, but intransitive subjects, often expressing the experiencer, are clearly more common (cf. Plaut. *Curc.* 241 in n. 151). Semantically, we note that external possession is applied to collective nouns (208) and to animals (210), (209) as well. Occasionally, inanimate possessors occur, as in (211):

(211) Cato *agr.* 152,1: *scopis . . . eabus latera doliis intrinsecus usque bene perfricato*
'as for brooms, rub well the internal sides of the casks with these (brooms)'

Inanimate external possessors are thus attested from early Latin to modern Romance, as they are also found in Romance languages like Italian, e.g., *hanno forato le ruote alla macchina* 'They pierced the tires to (= of) the car', as long as a part–whole relation attains between possessor and *possessum*, just as in the Latin example (211).[148] We note that inanimate, external possessors can be considered metaphorical extensions of the prototypical case, the human *sphère personnelle*, based on an isomorphic principle: the relation between a human's *sphère personnelle* and its defining features is reanalyzed in terms of a whole and its parts.[149]

148. Examples from languages where inanimate external possessors regularly occur (e.g., Korean) suggest that the condition required for external possessor constructions to be extended to inanimate possessors is the part–whole relation. See König (2001: 976).

149. Cf. Plaut. *Pseud.* 951–952: *credo animo malest / aedibus* :: *Quid iam?* :: *Quia edepol ipsum lenonem euomunt* 'I think the house feels sick. :: How so? :: Because it's spewing out the pimp himself, by God'. The expression *animo male esse aedibus* is, however, clearly metaphorical, as it more regularly occurs with dative phrases referring to human beings (see *OLD*, s.v. *male*).

Like implicit possessor constructions, external possession constructions also occur in instances with normally possessed items, that is, *possessa* that are typically relational, like the words for ‘house’. In (212) the possessor of the *aedes* is coded by means of the *tibi* dative phrase:

(212) Plaut. *Persa* 570: *proin tu tibi iubeas concludi aedis foribus ferreis*
‘so you’ll have to order that your house be locked with iron doors’

Among the characterizing features of external possession we find not only a generic possessor role (or, in some cases, a part–whole relation) held by the dative constituent, but also a high degree of affection and empathy displayed by the possessor due to the relational character of the *possessum*. All instances of external possessors are in fact characterized by a “double experiencer”: they depict situations where, although the entity directly involved is a body part or an entity belonging to a specific human’s *sphère personnelle*, the relevant experiencer at the informational level is clearly that particular human being. This highly emphatic possessor is thus formally highlighted through a coding of its own, the dative phrase, which isolates it syntactically and marks its role, without giving a precise description of the event that requires specific mention of the *possessa* directly involved. Of course, the strong relation between external possessors and the set of kin terms, body-parts, and typical *sphère personnelle* items is naturally due to the special status of the human possessor in terms of empathy, saliency, and so on.[150]

As the function expressed by external possessor constructions is seemingly related to phenomena like focus structures and discourse strategies, the choice between an external possessor structure and a basic possessive noun

150. Thus, if we limit our survey to a basic type like the transitive sentence involving body parts as direct object, the most basic choices might be summarized as follows: (a) possessive noun phrase = object; (b) possessor/whole = object + phrase referring to the *possessum*; (c) *possessum*/part = object + phrase referring to the possessor = external possession (see König 2001: 973). Some languages, like English, have the choice between sentences (a) *X kicked Y’s head* and (b) *X kicked Y in the head*, whose difference in meaning would be that (a) expresses a more intimate affection and involves the *sphère personnelle* of Y (see Chappel and MacGregor 1996: 4). Structures like (b), which might be defined as “metonymic” *possessum*, do not regularly occur in Latin. Latin favors a structure like (c), which, apparently, seems more suitable to highlight the possessor as it appears pinned outside the nucleus of the sentence.

phrase is applied differently according to various textual circumstances and stylistic features.[151] External possessor constructions could thus be defined as a possibility of Latin grammar which can be triggered by human possessors and relational *possessa* and which the language applies quite freely. While external possession could hardly be considered an obligatory category in Classical Latin, we might note that some Romance languages seem to have developed restrictions related to the pronominal status of the external possessor, which seem to favor this construction, while nominal possessors are in some cases excluded.[152]

In general terms, the function displayed by a dative external possessor can be considered a hypercharacterization of the heterogeneous set of phenomena traditionally labeled *dativus sympatheticus*, whose semantic and syntactic characterizations would require a fine-grained analysis that exceeds the scope of this chapter. That the choice falls on the dative is indeed to be expected, given its wide range of semantic values, its multifunctional status at the syntactic level, and its highly animate orientation.[153] Note, in fact, that a dative phrase expressing an external possessor can also fulfill syntactic requirements depending on the argument structure of the verb, as in (213):

(213) Plaut. *Trin.* 902: *(epistulas) e manibus dedit mi ipse in manus*
'those letters from (his) hands he gave to me into (my) hands'

External possessor constructions appear to be strictly connected with the phenomenon of implicit possessors, as the two structures tend to co-occur in lan-

151. In most cases, the other available option, a basic possessive noun phrase, would fail to highlight the discrepancy between the directly involved entity (the *possessum*) and the relevant experiencer (the possessor). While, in fact, an initial (or final) dative phrase expressing external possessor and a pragmatic focus often co-occur (cf. Plaut. *Rud.* 264: *nunc tibi amplectimur nos genua*, *Curc.* 241: *dum intestina exputescunt tibi*; see Serbat 1996: 564), such a focusing structure would be quite uncommon for the genitive constituent of a possessive (genitive) phrase that generally implies a tighter syntactic and informative unity between its constituents.

152. See König (2001: 976). External possessor constructions, however, do not seem to follow the loss of a case system (see ibid. 973), and in Romance they continued to be applied, simply replacing the dative case with the newly settled allative prepositional phrase.

153. See Serbat (1996: 566), who points to the "complexité relationelle" and to the "capacités syntaxiques protéiformes du D[atif]".

guages.[154] Indeed, the two phenomena partly overlap at the functional level. As far as Latin is concerned, external dative possessors might be hypothesized to be a direct consequence of the non-obligatoriness of possessive noun phrases and of the possibility of having sentences with no overt possessor. The conditions required to have implicit possessors (i.e., [+hum] possessor and relational *possessum*) are in fact the same ones that can bring about the external possessor construction: namely, a highly relational *possessum* and a highly empathic possessor. The possibility of fulfilling the possessor slot within an (implicit possessor) sentence by the means of external possessor is, then, simply a variable feature that depends on the degree to which an explicit possessor is needed within the sentence.

The solidarity between these two types of construction is well maintained in Romance, and it can be regarded as having an ancient origin. External possessor has early attestations in Indo-European languages (cf. Hom. *Il.* 17,695–696: τὼ δέ οἱ ὄσσε / δακρυόφι πλῆσθεν; *Od.* 12,47; 117),[155] as do implicit possessors, which occur in ancient Indo-European languages like Greek (cf. Hom. *Od.* 1,13–15: τὸν δ'οἶον νόστου κεχρημένον ἠδὲ γυναικὸς / νύμφη πότνι' ἔρυκε Καλυψὼ δῖα θεάων / ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, λιλαιομένη πόσιν εἶναι) as well as in modern ones (e.g., Russ. *Ja prikusil jazyk*, lit. 'I bit [my] tongue').[156] External possessor and implicit possessor constructions, thus, can be hypothesized as an inherited Indo-European feature that has been transmitted down to Romance.

154. See König (2001: 973).
155. See Ernout & Thomas (1964: 73), Lehmann (2005).
156. See König (2001: 971), Lehmann (2005: 44), who says: "Un substantif sémantiquement relationnel du proto-indo-européen ne régit donc pas de dépendent possessif. La référence au possesseur est produite déictiquement ou anaphoriquement sur la base de la relation sémantique inhérente et du contexte. L'absence étendue du pronom possessif des substantifs relationnels en latin et dans d'autres langues indo-européennes n'est donc pas une affaire de brièveté ou de prégnance stylistique, mais un principe syntaxique hérité".

3.3.4 Adjectival marking

In every period, Latin employs a series of denominal adjectives[157] in constructions that seem to express a possessive relation: examples like *basia Catulliana, domus Rabiriana*, *naues Caesarianae*,[158] might apparently be considered equivalent to the corresponding genitive phrases *Catulli basia* 'kisses of (= given by) Catullus', *Rabiri domus* 'house of Rabirius', *Caesaris naves* 'Caesar's ships'. Such a phenomenon, however, mainly concerns adjectives derived from proper names (often divinities, e.g., *campus Martius*, or individuals of historical or public relevance, e.g., Cic. *Att.* 6,8,2: *terrores caesariani*), ethnonyms (*populus Romanus*), or nouns referring to a class of people, such as *lar familiaris* 'god of the household', *terra hostilis* 'territory controlled by the enemy'.

This kind of adjectival marking is certainly ancient, as it is well attested in Homer, where adjectives derived from personal names often express some sort of possessive relation, but they are avoided in patronymic expressions, which require the genitive.[159] These denominal adjectives are generally employed to describe properties characteristically referred to well-known heroes or mythical beings, a typical instance being *Il.* 2,658: βίη̣ Ἡρακληείη̣. There are, however, traces of a widespread use also with everyday items as *possessum*, like δόμος (*Od.* 18,353: Ὀδυσήϊον ... δόμον),[160] which lead to the traditional hypothesis that adjectival possessive expressions would be the reflex of an earlier stage, prior to the diffusion of genitive noun phrases.[161]

157. In more general terms, Wetzer (1996: 7, 176–179) reminds us that the overlap between adjectival and possessive constructions seems to be a peripheral phenomenon, at least as far as prototypical adjectivals (i.e., lexical items expressing "prototypical property concepts" such as age, dimension, physical property, human propensity, color, and value) are concerned.

158. Cf. Mart. 11,6,14: *da nunc basia, sed Catulliana* 'give me kisses now, but of the type characteristic of Catullus'; Cic. *Att.* 1,6,1: *domum Rabirianam Neapoli Font⟨e⟩ius emit* 'Fonteius has bought the Rabirius house in Naples'; *Bell. Afr.* 53.

159. See Delbrück (1893–1900, 1: 446); Bertagna (1999: 53). According to Bertagna (1999: 56), adjectives are also avoided with characters' names when these occur for the first time in the Homeric poems.

160. See Bertagna (1999: 54).

161. See Wackernagel (1908: 145); Schwyzer and Debrunner (1950: 119). Bertagna (1999: 61) sums up the matter by noting that two main scholarly trends of interpretation are at

As far as Latin is concerned, expressions with denominal adjectives and with genitives of personal names have been repeatedly and convincingly described as not semantically equivalent.[162] Cases of clear equivalence are indeed attested: cf. double instances like *urnam Veneris* (Plaut. *Rud*. 473) / *urna Veneria* (Plaut. *Rud*. 475), *sacerdos Veneris* (Plaut. *Rud*. 430) / *sacerdos Veneria* (Plaut. *Rud*. 329, 350, 644); but their occurrence is scant and confined to a limited set of terms; and, in all likelihood, it is mainly due to stylistic (and metrical) variation. All in all, we can subscribe to the opinion expressed by Ernout & Thomas, who also provide clarifying examples:

> L'adjectif ainsi employé mettait en relief la qualité; le génitif s'appliquait plutôt au possesseur lui-même: *campus Martius* 'le champ de Mars' (consacré à des exercices déterminés), par opposition à *aedes Martis* 'le temple de Mars'; cf. Cic. *Mi*. 34: *gloria (sc. Milonis) quae cottidie augebatur frangendis furoribus Clodianis, im Clodii morte cecidit* 'les fureurs clodiennes (bien connues par leur violence et leur répétition)…, la mort de Clodius (lui–même)'. Également: Prop. 4.4.21: *(Tarpeia) obstipuit regis facie et regalibus armis* '(Tarpeia) fut éblouie par le visage du roi (l'individu) et par les armes royales (la condition sociale)'. Mais cette répartition n'a rien d'absolu, et notamment chez Plaute la considération de la commodité métrique paraît intervenir.[163]

In fact, these adjectival constructions are most typically employed to describe entities that partake of properties which in some way paradigmatically characterize the nominal source of the adjective but nonetheless are not directly related to this nominal: *aedes Martis* is the house directly related to Mars, as is the place where he is supposed to dwell, while *campus Martius* is a field that is not related to Mars himself, but to activities belonging to the sphere of phenomena traditionally referred to this god. In other words, these construc-

issue, one regarding this duality of forms as the result of two different diachronic stages and the other highlighting two different semantic functions of adjectival and genitive noun phrases. See Rosén (1981: 69).

162. See E. Löfstedt (1942: 107); Benveniste (1960); Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 60).

163. Ernout & Thomas (1964: 45–46). Bertagna's (1999: 68) analysis of Sallust's *de bello Iugurthino* remarks on the way that adjectives like *humanus, hostilis, regius* are always linked to generic values, while the corresponding genitives refer to specific and individuated people.

tions do not refer to an individuated possessor.[164] Of course, this can happen when the semantic sphere of the nominal source displays a conceptual and ideological relevance that goes beyond the normal possessive relation, so that the nominal involved can ascend to a paradigmatic role in the process of classification of other entities. This phenomenon, thus, naturally involves nominals designating highly institutionalized figures, like *rex* (cf. Prop. 4,4,21 quoted by Ernout & Thomas), or *erus*, the 'housemaster', that clearly represent a paradigmatic role within Roman society and is particularly frequent in archaic comedy, or even *meretrix* 'harlot'. The function of this kind of formation is evident in the following passage, where the adjective *meretricius* is preceded by a genitive displaying a nonspecific value:

(214) Plaut. *Cas.* 585–586: *non matronarum officiumst, sed meretricium, / uiris alienis, mi uir, subblandirier*
'oh, my man, it is not the duty of ladies, but of prostitutes, to seduce other men'

The rise of some features to paradigmatic status is, in principle, a matter of social convention (i.e., a *fait de langue*), and this is clearly the case with names of god, ethnonyms, institutional figures like *rex*, *erus*, or classes of people like *hostis*, *familia*; but it can also be a matter of context and style: an instance like Cic. *Mil.* 34: *furoribus Clodianis* can be interpreted as a rhetorical means of stigmatizing the follies of Clodius. Consider also that, given the specific profile of these adjectival constructions, their employment even when the phrase apparently points to individuated participants can be either a stylistic device to highlight the prestige and importance of the individual involved, or simply a way to avoid a genitive noun phrase that might have a semantically narrower interpretation (e.g., *Bell. Afr.* 53,1: *naues caesarianas* = 'ships belonging to Caesar's side' vs. *naues Caesaris* = more typically 'ships belonging to Caesar').

These denominal adjectives appear, then, to be connected with possession only to a limited extent, as they mainly fulfill a qualifying or descriptive (rather than restrictive or determining) and classifying function. In these constructions, the nominal source of the adjective does not have the function of

164. See Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 60).

referring directly to an actual participant (i.e., the "possessor"), but it has, essentially, the function of providing a categorial frame. A basic possessive construction, on the other hand, straightforwardly points to an actual instance of possession and refers to the possessor as an individuated participant.

Such denominal adjectives could then be considered a subset of classificatory adjectives, like *ahenus*, *aureus*, etc. (cf. Cato *agr.* 11,2: *ahenum coculum* 'a copper pot'; Verg. *Aen.* 4,139: *aurea fibula*). Let us recall that material classification can also be expressed, alternatively, by means of a genitive noun phrase, as in Cato *agr.* 11,2: *operculum aheni* 'a top of copper'; Cic. *nat. deor.* 2,151: *auri argentique reconditae uenae* 'hidden veins of gold and silver'. Note that both constructions can co-occur within the same text. Genitive encoding of nouns indicating material can be regarded as a phenomenon unique to the denominal possessive adjectives: in both cases the domains of specification, prototypically displaying adjectival encoding, and of possession, characterized by genitive noun phrases, extend their meaning to the form that is more typical of the other domain. Given such a fluid state of affairs, it is not surprising that a very few cases of denominal adjectives, like *domus Rabiriana*, might be assumed to be essentially equivalent to the corresponding genitive noun phrase. Even this specific kind of instance, however, does not regularly display a meaning equivalent to a possessive noun phrase, as, according to the context, the denominal adjective does not necessarily refer to an individuated possessor but can broadly refer to the whole *gens* (which, of course, historically took its name from a personal name), the family to which the *domus* traditionally belongs.[165]

From the diachronic point of view, as we have remarked, "possessive" denominal adjectives have been hypothesized as the most archaic means of expressing possession in Indo-European languages. Such a hypothesis might be confirmed by the occurrence of denominal adjectives with a full possessive function (i.e., related to an individuated possessor) in the Slavic branch, where the construction is pervasive: Russ. *Petina golova* 'Peter's head'.[166]

165. Cf. Cic. *epist.* 7,20,1–2: *tu (Trebatius)... Papirianam domum ... tuam domum*; Cicero is writing of a house built by some member of the Gens Papiria, now in the possession of Trebatius.
166. See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001: 697).

The phenomenon is ancient, attested in Old Church Slavic.[167] Note also that the prototypical instance of Slavic possessive adjectives involves forms derived from proper names. One of the striking features of these possessive adjectives is morphosyntactic control on other constituents (e.g., relative pronouns) or attributive modifiers (e.g., possessive adjectives).[168] Compare the following example from Sorbian, discussed by Corbett (1995: 275–276): "Upper Sorbian *moj-eho muž-ow-a sotr-a* = my-GenSgMasc husband-Poss-NomSgFem sister-NomSgFem 'my husband's sister' ... The particularly interesting form is *mojeho*; this is masculine because *muž* 'husband', which 'underlies' *mužowa*, is masculine".[169] Such a strong form of gender-agreement control, however, is excluded in Latin:

(215) Plaut. *Mil.* 549: *meam esse erilem concubinam censui*
'I thought she was my master's concubine'

In spite of the masculine gender of the noun *erus*, from which *erilis* is derived, the possessive adjective is feminine, as it directly refers to the feminine noun *concubina*. A Ciceronian passage like the following might, at first sight, appear to display a more subtle kind of control phenomenon:

(216) Cic. *Cato* 10,34: *audire te arbitror, Scipio, hospes tuus auitus Masinissa quae faciat hodie nonaginta natus annos...*
'I think, Scipio, that the news reaches you of the daily activities of your grandfather's friend and host, Masinissa, now ninety years old...'[170]

Apparently, if we held that Masinissa, who was the *hospes* of Scipio's grandfather, could not at the same time be defined as Scipio's *hospes* (*tuus* ...

167. See Huntley (1984).
168. See Corbett (1995: 273).
169. See the many examples of control (mainly with relative pronouns), which abounds in Latin, in E. Löfsted (1942: 139). But examples of *constructio ad sensum* can hardly be claimed to be a proof that Latin presents a situation similar to that of Slavic. According to Corbett (1987: 327) there is no strict correlation between the presence and productivity of possessive adjectives and related phenomena of control.
170. Cf. the translation by Wuilleumier (ed. Belles Lettres): "Je pense que tu sais, Scipion, ce que fait Masinissa, hôte ancestral de ta famille".

hospes), we might advance the hypothesis that the possessive modifier refers to *auitus* and to its source noun *auus* (so that *hospes tuus auitus* = **hospes tui aui* 'guest of your grandfather'). This hypothesis, however, cannot be safely substained. The relation of hospitality was such that it held between two individuals even if it was established by an ancestor; and, for instance, someone could be a young person's *hospes* even if they have not met before, on account of a relationship established by the young person's father. A similar situation is clearly described by Plautus.[171] Another Plautinian passage shows that the possessive modifer refers directly to the noun *hospes*:

(217) Plaut. *Bacch.* 261–262: *continuo antiquom hospitem nostrum sibi / Mnesilochus aduocauit, Pelagonem senem*
'immediately Mnesilochus summoned an old guest of ours, the elderly Pelago'

The speaker, the servant Chrysalus, is talking to his master Nicobulus (who first instaured the hospitality with the old man Pelago) and he says that Nicobulus's son has reached Pelago. The possessive adjective *noster*, uttered by the servant, is evidently employed in a rather broad sense and it simply indicates that the relation of hospitality also involves the young master's son and the servant, even if none of them started the relation. In light of this, the possessive modifier *tuus* in the Ciceronian passage can also be considered as, simply, a modifier of *hospes*. And, ultimately, no consistent traces of control phenomena analogous to those occurring in Slavic can be found in Latin.

A similar conclusion can also be reached for instances from archaic comedy. Examples like (215) or Plaut. *Trin.* 602 (*nostrum erilem filium … despondisse* 'that our master's son promised') are thus discussed by Rosén 1981: 63.

171. Cf. Plaut. *Mil.* 130–136: *cepi tabellas, consignaui, clanculum/dedi mercatori quoidam, qui ad illum deferat / eum erum, qui Athenis fuerat qui hanc amauerat / ut is huc ueniret. Is non spreuit nuntium; / nam et uenit et is in proximo hic deuertitur / apud suom paternum hospitem, lepidum senem; / isque illi amanti suo hospiti morem gerit* 'I gave a certain merchant a confidential message to bring to my master, who was in Athens and loved her, so that he came here. He did oblige and he came and he dwells nearby, hosted by an ancient guest of his father, a nice old man. He is sympathetic to his guest in love'. Cf. also *Poen.* 685–686: *hospes hospitem / salutat*.

> Prima facie, the possessive adjective modifies *erus*, not the kinship term: the slave does not speak of his own son or his own mistress. However, such syntagms are not a free construction of three elements; the possessive is always of the first person and the adjective is derived of *erus*, a quasi nomen proprium in the mouth of slaves; with a member of the limited group *filius, filia, amica, concubina* they form close-knit locutions, a sort of a compound: "Master's son", "Master's mistress", which the possessive adjective may adjoin.

Even in these archaic instances, therefore, the possessive adjective is a modifier of the whole unit *(erilis) filius*. Rosén's comment is also significant for a general explanation: the semantic status of the source noun from which the adjective derives bears consequences on the value of the whole adjectival phrase.[172] A name like *erus* is such that, although in principle it refers to a class of people (as 'master'), it is often felt and used as having unique reference ('my master'). Most of its attestations, in fact, occur within sentences uttered by slaves; so that *erus* is to some extent another example of an implicit possessor: very often *erus* means 'my (individuated) master' and it can be rightly defined as a "quasi nomen proprium". In adjectives derived from nouns referring to highly individuated human beings and, at the same time, that can also refer to an institutionalized figure (like *erus*, *pater, rex*, etc.), a clear-cut distinction between the indication of a specific participant (corresponding to the nominal status) and, on the other hand, the categorial value (corresponding to the adjectival status) tends to fade and, in short, it can depend on the context.

An adjective like *erilis* (mainly archaic, and later attested mostly in poetry)[173] is emblematic of the function of denominal adjective constructions.[174] *Erilis* combines with very few nouns in Plautus, the most frequent being *filius*;[175] and, given the original meaning of *filius*, not so much 'son'

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172. See Rosén (1981: 69–70): "The nature of the satellite is also a decisive factor for the functioning of the derived adjective: with nouns of unique reference, distinctions existing elsewhere are neutralized: Plaut. *Rud.*: 1157–60: *mei nomen patris / … / matris* nomen… / quid nomen est *paternum*?".
173. See Ernout & Meillet (1967) s.v. *erus*.
174. See E. Löfstedt (1942: 116).
175. Cf. instances of other lexical heads, like Plaut. *Mil.* 481: *erile negotium*; *Most.* 3: *erilis permities*; *Persa* 193 *fides erilis*; *Poen.* 285: *erili et nostro questu*.

as '(nursed) child',[176] the original meaning of an expression like *erilis filius* is simply 'child belonging to the class of the masters' (vs. the class of the servants; cf. the expression *familiaris filius* in Plaut. *Capt*. 703), just like *erilis adulescens* (*Most*. 21) or, centuries later, *erilis puella* (= the daughter of the master, i.e., the young mistress) in Apuleius (*met*. 8,2). The style of Plautus makes it a source of funny expressions like *erilis concubina/amica* (*Mil.* 458, 414, etc.), which, of course, does not indicate a harlot belonging to the class of the master but the 'harlot related to, of the master'; or *erilis metus* (*Amph*. 1069) 'the worry related to, for my master' (note the instance of an implicit possessor). Some instances display an individuated value for the adjective, like *erile scelus* in (218), where the possessive adjective *eius* most likely refers specifically to the servant's master:

(218) Plaut. *Rud*. 198: *erile scelus me sollicitat, eius me impietas male habet*
'a wrong done by my master worries me, his misdemeanor causes me troubles'

Some other instances, however, clearly bear a generic and categorial interpretation, like *imperium erile* in the following generic statement about the duties of a good servant:

(219) Plaut. *Aul.* 588–589: *hoc est serui facinus frugi, facere quod ego persequor / ne morae molestiaeque imperium erile habeat sibi*
'this is the duty of a decent servant, to do what I do, so that a masterly command be not cause of annoyance or trouble for him [the servant]'

Even by the time of Plautus, thus, the individuated value for these denominal adjectives is not the rule and Ambrosini (1984: 92) is probably right when he claims that the many instances where a possessive adjective occurs as a second modifier (cf. Plaut. *Cas*. 1014: *nostro erili filio*; *Cist*. 550: *erilem nostram filiam*; 749: *mea haec erilis gestitauit filia*; *Epid*. 20: *erilis noster filius*; *Trin*. 602: *nostrum erilem filium*; *Truc*. 297: *erilis noster filius*) are a symptom that the original individuating function of these constructions is fading and it

176. See Ernout & Meillet (1967) s.v. *filius*.

has to be strenghtened by an additional modifier which helps to restrict the reference to a specific *erus*.

Compared to later texts, however, the Archaic Latin of Plautus's and Terence's plays displays a higher tendency to use possessive adjectives referring to individuated human participants, of which *erilis* is simply the most frequent. Cf. other examples like (220):

(220) Ter. *Phorm.* 128: *paternum amicum me assimulabo uirginis*
'I'll make believe I'm a friend of the girl's father'

Although, as we have seen, such a phenomenon is sporadically attested in later stages as well, it seems a characteristic of the archaic language of the comedy, where the influence of low sociolinguistic strata might have favored the mantainence of ancient expressions. Thus, the hypothesis that it is an feature inherited from Indo-European can not be disclaimed. There seems to be no proof, however, that the prehistoric Indo-European possessive noun phrase was based mainly, or esclusively, on adjectival modification, and the situation of Slavic as well as the few traces of the phenomenon in Latin might be independent developments. Note also that even in Archaic Latin, adjectives derived from proper names do not play a major part in this phenomenon, and the corresponding possessive noun phrases always require a genitive construction (apparently, as in Ancient Greek). A careful analysis of this problem should consider the possibility of common inheritance, but it should not take for granted that the most archaic stage is simply the one reflected in Slavic. Other factors should also be considered, such as the relation between possessive adjective constructions and features like definiteness, as well as number.[177]

As far as Latin is concerned, however, the grammatical structure of this language is such that the possessive noun phrase is strongly based on genitive constructions since its earliest attestations, and the typological scenario is substantially different from the features displayed by the possessive adjectives of Slavic.

Finally, it has to be remarked that Latin seems to extend adjectival constructions to the expression of a Part–Whole relation like the physical parts

177. See Trubeckoj (1939: 82); Brugmann (1911: 571).

of an entity, especially when geographical space is concerned:[178] Caes. *Gall.* 1,22,1: *cum summus mons a Labieno teneretur*, Catull. 2,3: *primum digitum dare appetenti*. The extent of such a phenomenon – clearly a pecularity of Latin – as well as its typological implications should receive an interpretation that takes into account the fact that this language also provides many examples of relational nouns referring to parts of space:

(221) Cato *agr.* 21,2: *in inferiorem partem cupae*
'onto the lower part of the bar'

(222) Caes. *Gall.* 3,2,5: *culmina Alpium occupare*
'to seize the peaks of the Alps'

(223) Liv. 21,35,4: *in iugum Alpium peruentum est*
'they arrived at the summit of the Alps'

(224) Verg. *Aen.* 8,233–234: *silex ... speluncae dorso insurgens*
'a rock of flint, rising above the ridge of the cavern'

(225) Vitr. 7,1,1: *paries, qui non exeat ad summum*
'a wall, which should not go all the way to the top'

All the same, we note that while some of these nouns are essentially generic (*pars*) or a substantivized adjective (*summum*), some others (*iugum*, *dorsum*; cf. *radix* in (170)) clearly have a metaphorical origin.

3.4 Tendencies in word order

As has been nicely put by Jules Marouzeau, "L'ordre des mots en latin est libre, il n'est pas indifférent".[179] That is to say that the syntactic position of a constituent depends on a complex series of factors that can be related to the phrase, sentence, or discourse frame; and the specific placement of a word

178. See Lehmann (1991: 226; 1998b).
179. Marouzeau (1949: 191) and Bauer (this work, vol. 1). Marouzeau notices that the semantics of the adjectives and their specific connotations, the high number of fixed expressions, and various other factors interfere with such a rule of thumb. While some adjectives are more inclined to be postposed and some others to be preposed (according to their semantic class), most of them can occur in both positions.

within the sentence, as well as within the noun phrase, cannot be predicted by a limited set of clear-cut rules but has to be continuously negotiated within the actual and specific textual circumstances. In fact, a Latin noun phrase, whether genitive-noun or adjective-noun, does not have a fixed order, and both sequences are allowed.

According to Marouzeau, the adjective + noun phrase follows the order Adj–N when the adjective bears a purely descriptive or qualifying function (i.e., *adjectif déterminatif*; e.g., *pulchra domus, bonus pater* 'a beautiful house', 'a good father'). The reverse order N–Adj is used especially when the adjective has a restrictive or determining function (e.g., *domus pulchra, pater bonus*).[180] As far as the pronominal possessive noun phrase is concerned, it is generally accepted that the possessive pronoun/adjective (PossPr) has a restrictive function, like the *adjectif déterminatif*, as it typically links the Head to a specific possessor. As such, it is normally postposed and the reverse order is generically connected with the *mise en relief* of the possessive pronoun/adjective. Statistics partly confirm such a view (Table 12). Apart from Cato, in all these texts the N–PossPr order represents the majority, as expected for the ummarked case,[181] but only in later authors is this predom-

180. See Pinkster (1990: 185).

181. Pronominal possessive noun phrase instances commonly appear to be sensitive to pragmatic or textual markedness: cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 409–410: *at cur non intro eo in nostram domum? / :: Quid, domum uostram?* 'why shouldn't I enter inside our own house? :: What? Your own house?'; Caes. *Gall.* 1,3,6: *ipse suae ciuitatis imperium obtenturus esset* 'he would have gotten control over his own tribe'; Cic. *epist.* 5,7,4: *et mea natura et nostra amicitia postulat* 'both my nature and our friendship require'. Some sort of functional opposition between the two sequences can be seen in the following passage from Cicero, where the PossPr–N order shows up in the first sentence, when a clear opposition between the two pronouns *meus* and *tuus* occurs, while in the second sentence two seemingly unmarked occurrences of the same noun phrase present the N–PossPr sequence: Cic. *epist.* 5,2,9 (= (136)): *pro mea parte adiuui, ut senati consulto meus inimicus, quia tuus frater erat, subleuaretur. Quare non ego oppugnaui fratrem tuum, sed fratri tuo repugnaui* 'as far as I was concerned, I helped my enemy, with a senatorial decree, because he was YOUR brother. Thus, I did not fight against your brother, but I opposed your brother'. Especially in poetry (but also in literary prose), a good deal of instances appear to be conditioned by purely stylistic factors, like the clearly alliterative sequences of an initial, topic personal pronoun and a following possessive pronoun, in Plaut. *Amph.* 1: *ut uos in uostris uoltis mercimoniis* 'just as you might wish in your transactions', or *Amph.* 529: *lacrumantem ex abitu concinnas tu tuam uxorem* 'you cause your wife to cry at

Table 12. Constituent order in possessive pronoun/adjective noun phrases

	PossPr/Adj–N	N–PossPr/Adj
Plaut. *Amph.*	50	82
Cato *agr.* 1–30	5	2
Caes. *Gall.* 1–30	20	23
Petron. 1–20	5	22
Itin. Eger. 1–10	2	17

inance significant. Even Marouzeau, however, warns against the probative value of statistics, as factors governing order inversion are numerous.[182] Indeed, even if N–PossPr is the regular, umarked order in authors like Petron. (22 N–PossPr vs. 5 PossPr–N) and in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (17 N–PossPr vs. 2 PossPr–N), clear examples of neutral PossPr–N occur from the earliest attestations and in classical prose.[183] If we consider a formal parameter, and we limit ourselves to *suus*,[184] the occurrences in Plautus and Caesar show that the two sequences are equally common (Plaut. *Amph.*: N *suus* = 16 vs. *suus* N = 9; Caes. *Gall.* 1,1–30: N *suus* = 20 vs. *suus* N = 18), and in both authors both sequences present unmarked instances, thus not showing any *mise en relief*; as in (226)–(227):

your departure'. Cf. also Cic. *epist.* 5,2,3: *me tua causa praetermisisse prouinciam* 'that I would have lost a province because of you'; *epist.* 5,2,11: *meus enim me sensus … admonet* 'for my feeling impels me'. Instances of this kind, of course, might also overlap with pragmatic stress in some cases.

182. Marouzeau (1953: 16).

183. Cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 112: *et meu pater nunc intus hic cum illa cubat*; Caes. *Gall.* 1,17,5: *ab iisdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari*; Cic. *Att.* 3,27,1: *ex tuis litteris et ex re ipsa nos funditos perisse uideo*.

184. Note that the originally different status of the personal pronouns and of the reflexive *suus* do not seem to affect the noun phrase with regard to word order; e.g., Plaut. *Amph.* 508: *ecastor te experior quanti facias uxorem tuam* 'by Castor, I'm learning how much you think of your wife'; Plaut. *Amph.* 515–516: *numquam edepol quemquam mortalem credo ego uxorem suam / sic ecflictim amare* 'I swear I don't believe there is another man who loves his wife so passionately'. In poetic instances metrics might be a leveling factor, but prose examples are widespread: Cic. *Att.* 4,1,6: ⟨*cum multitudo*⟩ … *plausum meo nomine* … *dedisset* 'the crowd would give applause at my name', 4,1,7: … *suo nomine locabunt* 'they will rent (the building) in their own name'.

(226) Caes. *Gall.* 1,6,3: *ut per suos fines eos ire paterentur*
'so that they (the Allobroges) would allow them (the Helvetii) to go through their territory'

(227) Caes. *Gall.* 1,9,4: *a Sequanis impetrat ut per fines suos Heluetios ire patiantur*
'he prevails on the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to go through their territory'

If we adopt a parameter more sensitive to the content of the noun phrase and we look at the instances of a specific pronominal possessive noun phrase in its actual use, such as 'my father' in the *Amphitruo*, we see that the *meus pater* sequence outnumbers the hypothetically unmarked order *pater meus* by 11 to 5, while none of these occurrences shows any particular pragmatic force (cf. again Plaut. *Amph.* 112 in n. 183).[185] Thus, the sequence N–PossPr does not effectively display an unmarked character in the archaic age and becomes clearly basic only as we go forward in time. Its numerical predominance increases significantly in an author like Petronius, and it is overwhelming in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*.

The substantival possessive noun phrase shows an even lesser degree of regularity and predictability. The survey of our sample of texts has given the results in Table 13. While a certain progression can easily be seen, its fluidity is only apparent: according to data shown by Adams (1976: 78), the G–N sequence represents the majority in some plays by Plautus, including the *Aul.* (49 G–N vs. 28 N–G), but it is the minority in others, such as the *Bacch.* (34 G–N vs. 52 N–G). The same kind of reversal affects classical prose: in Caesar, *Gall.* (books 1–3, chapter 32) and Tacitus, *ann.* 14, N–G predominates by 437 to 319 and 311 to 212 respectively; in the *Bell. Hisp.*, G–N predominates by 59 to 45.

The sequence N–G has repeatedly been recognized as the more likely candidate for the neutral order (Adams 1976: 78), but explanations for the preposing of the Modifier have been related to such a great number of heterogeneous factors (pragmatic, semantic, stylistic, and textual; cf. De Jong

185. Cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 20, 46, 104, 134, 277 for instances of *pater meus*; Plaut. *Amph.* 31, 44, 112, 120, 135, 144, 249, 289, 477, 997, 1004 for instances of the reverse order. There is no obvious pragmatic motivation in passages like Plaut. *Amph.* 112, 120, 135.

Table 13. Constituent order in genitive noun phrases

	G–N	N–G
Plaut. *Amph.*	41	23
Cato *agr.* 1–30	12	29
Caes. *Gall.* 1–30	78	100
Petron. 1–20	27	29
Itin. Eger. 1–10	6	114

a Three occurrences in Caes. *Gall.* 1–30 and one in *Itin. Eger.* 1–10 have not been considered as one element of the genitive noun phrase is elliptical.

1983) that to hold a looser view seems more consistent with the evidence. Although Adams's (1976) suggestion that the statistical approach be abandoned is surely sound, the numerical data, far from being meaningless, tell us that neither Archaic nor Classical Latin is characterized by a predominant sequence. Statistics do not allow us to substantiate any strong hypothesis about a clear-cut, general characterization of the two sequences as marked/unmarked. In fact, pragmatically or textually marked instances occur with both word orders,[186] and phenomena like noun phrases in poetic texts showing a fossilized sequence or a highly free variance are absolutely common,

186. Consider the neutral profile of the following noun phrases: Plaut. *Amph.* 403: *non sum ego seruos Amphitruonis Sosia*? 'am I not Amphitryon's servant, Sosia?'; Plaut. *Amph.* 470–471: *erroris ambo ego illos et dementiae / complebo atque omnem Amphitruonis familiam* 'I will fool them both and fill all of Amphitryon's household with insanity'; Plaut. *Amph.* 338: *mandata eri perierunt* 'my master's commands were frustrated'; Plaut. *Amph.* 622: *non soleo ego somniculose eri imperia persequi*, 'I am not accustomed to accomplishing my master's command while sleeping' Caes. *Gall.* 1,1,5: *eorum una pars … continetur Garunna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum* 'their part is limited by the river Garunna, the Ocean, the territory of the Belgians'; Caes. *Gall.* 1,6,3: *extremum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Heluetiorum finibus Genaua* 'Geneva is the furthest city of the Allobroges and it is close to the territory of the Helvetians'. A contrastive focus can stress the possessor either when it is preposed (e.g., Curt. 3,11,7: *Alexander non ducis magis quam militis munia exequebatur* 'Alexander performed the duties not more of a commander than of a soldier'; see De Jong 1983:133) or when it is postposed (Caes. *Gall.* 1,32,3: *esse miseriorem et grauiorem fortunam Sequanorum quam relinquorum* 'the destiny of the Sequani was more miserable and serious than that of the others').

as well as a widespread inconsistency due to stylistic factors.[187] Therefore, the matter of word order cannot be defined in a clear-cut way, but it is better described in terms of (possible) tendencies that are normally overriden within pragmatically marked contexts.

If variation of the sequence can depend on a heterogeneous set of factors (semantic, pragmatic, textual), as argued by many authors,[188] it is reasonable to hypothesize that all these factors variously affect the nominal possessive noun phrases according to their heterogeneous semantic and textual/pragmatic profiles. Such noun phrases present a greater degree of differentiation than the pronominal noun phrase, whose sequence reversals are seemingly due only to pragmatic phenomena. In other words, we should not expect all possessive noun phrases to behave in the same way, and we may tentatively suggest that semantically homogeneous instances might show a more regular picture even as to their word order. Patronymics seem to provide such a case: the whole corpus of Caesar's works contains 15 occurrences of a noun phrase formed by the genitive of a personal name + the noun *filius*, out of which only 2 instances present the N–G sequence. Personal names do not occur more often in first position, but the G–N sequence seems the basic option, especially in instances of prototypical possession (kinship, body parts, etc.) that are characterized by a highly individuated possessor. Plautus provides a massive set of examples:[189]

187. Ernout & Thomas (1964: 162).

188. Marouzeau (1953), De Jong (1983), among others. In Marouzeau's opinion, the *complément déterminatif* in the genitive is normally postposed (a classic example being *pater familias*) because it bears a restrictive function, which is therefore analogous to that of the *adjectif déterminatif*: to establish the status of the Head as belonging to a specific category (Marouzeau 1953: 28). While the first place would be the favored position for the focus, Marouzeau also recognizes semantic factors influencing the sequence: the Head tends to be postposed if it expresses a basic notion (e.g., *solis occasus*) or if the Modifier implies some kind of semantic opposition (e.g., *animi morbus* vs. *corporis*...; *senatus consultum* vs. *plebis*...; Marouzeau 1953: 31). Counterexamples, however, seem to occur rather often: e.g., Caes. *Gall.* 1,1,7: *inter occasum solis*.

189. Note that one of the two instances of the N–G sequence in Plaut. *Amph.* 411: *equidem Sosia Amphitruonis sum* 'I am Amphitryon's Sosia, indeed', is characterized by a strong restrictive function, as the speaker means to identify himself as that particular Sosia who is Amphitryon's servant and no one else. Cato's *de agricultura* abounds in N–G sequences because of its technical character, as the modifier often refers to a

(228) Plaut. *Amph.* 99: *Alcumena ... Electri filia*
'Alcmena the daughter of Electrus'

(229) Plaut. *Amph.* 384: *Amphitruonis socium ne me esse uolui dicere*
'I really meant to say that I was the associate of Amphitryon'

(230) = (154) (148) Plaut. *Amph.* 1135: *Alcumenae usuram corporis*
'the enjoyment of Alcmena's body'[190]

An even clearer case of the relevance of the individuation parameter is the occurrences with a highly topical possessor like the masc. personal pronoun *eius*, where the G–N sequence presents a clear predominance in Plautus and Caesar (Table 14). Therefore, both Archaic and Classical Latin seem to attest a tendency to prepose the possessor when it is highly individuated. This appears to be in conformity with general remarks repeatedly made in the scholarly literature, according to which a preposed genitive formed a close compound with its Head and would form a noetic unit, while a postposed genitive would express a semantically looser, or more articulated, content.[191] Seemingly, there would also be a general correlation between prenominal position of the attribute and a tighter syntactic bondedness between the two constituents.[192]

generic entity specifying the material, the nature, or the category of the head; e.g., 23,4: *resinam si indes, in culleum musti p. III bene comminuito* 'if you use resin, pulverize it thoroughly, three pounds to a sack of must'. It is noteworthy that, in the following paragraph, a similar coreferential noun phrase shows the other sequence: 24,1: *in eius musti culleum aquae marinae ueteris q. II* 'into the sack of must (add) two quarter units of old sea water'. Apparently, in this second passage the restrictive function of the genitive has weakened, as the nature of the *culleum* has become clear and *musti* has acquired an individuated and explicitly [+def] status, reflected by the presence of the determiner *is*.

190. Cf. also Plaut. *Amph.* 470–471: *erroris ambo ego illos et dementiae / complebo atque omnem Amphitruonis familiam* 'I will fool them both and fill all of Amphitryon's household with insanity'.

191. See Gildersleeve and Lodge (1895: 431): "The original force of a following adjective or Genitive was restrictive or appositive, while, when it preceded, it formed a close compound with its substantive; thus, *bonus homo*, 'a good man' (one idea); *homo bonus*, 'a man (one idea) who is good' (another idea). In Classical Latin this distinction is no longer inevitable, though it is often essential".

192. See Marouzeau (1922: 221); Lehmann (1991: 222–223).

Table 14. Constituent order in *eius* noun phrases

	eius–N	N–*eius*[a]
Plaut. *Amph.*	5	1
Caes. *Gall.* 1–30	13	2
Petron. 1–78	1	18

a The form *eius* does not occur in the first 10 chapters of the *Itin. Eger.* but attestations of the plural form *eorum* or of the genitive of other pronouns, like *ipse*, always show postposition.

These tendencies, however, appears to be laid on a general ground of relative freedom, and they are likely to reflect syntactic behaviors of a preceding phase of the language. In fact, two diachronic stages can be safely established. The scholarly *communis opinio* sees the G–N sequence as the Indo-European starting point. Indeed, early Latin attests G–N as the usual sequence, which can be seen in numerous archaic and legal expressions (*senatus consultum, iuris consultus, plebi scitum*; cf. *manus iniectio* in Lex XII *tab.* 3,2); in formulae (*pro deum atque hominum fidem*); in phrases where nouns that were grammaticalized into prepositions (requiring the genitive of the complement) usually show a preceding noun in the genitive in early and even classical texts (*honoris causa*); in archaic inscriptions and documents (*S.C. de Bacch.*: 12 cases of G–N vs. 2 of N–G). Patronymic genitive noun phrases are particularly stable in the earlier periods: G–N is the most recurring order, from the inscriptions of the Scipiones (cf. *S. C. de Bacch.*: *Q. Marcius L. f.*; the Scipiones' inscriptions to Caesar in *CIL* I,2.8: *L. Cornelio L. f. Scipio*).[193] The final stage of the language is unequivocally clear as well: N–G is the regular order, as is in Romance. In the first 10 chapters of the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, 114 occurrences of a genitive noun phrase show N–G order, while only 6 show the G–N sequence, most of which are instances of fixed expressions (2,7: *sine dei Gratia*) or of genitives of relative pronouns (2,2: *uallis … in cuius capite*). Vulgar Latin has generalized this situation; for example, Gregory of Tours almost invariably has the N–G sequence.[194]

193. See Adams (1976: 74–75).
194. Adams (1976: 73).

In strictly typological terms, Latin can be seen as a transition period from a G–N to an N–G sequence, but we have to stress that the relatively free word order of the Latin possessive noun phrase is an enduring state of affairs and the few clear-cut cases (e.g., with an individuated possessor) are simply the tip of the iceberg – the hypercharacterization, or hyperfunctionalization, of a syntactic type that appears rather loose in both the archaic and classical stages of the language.

Thus, the N–G sequence is at best defined as the *ongoing* unmarked order, which takes a long span of time to acquire a rigid status. The passage from loose G–N to rigid N–G entwines with the typological evolution of the basic, main, declarative unmarked sentence, loose SOV > rigid SVO, that affects the language only at a very late stage. Meanwhile, more archaic habits coexist with innovative tendencies from the time of Plautus on. This nonrigid state of affairs seems to be maintained throughout the history of Latin, at least in the normative variant reflected in the written language.

As we have seen, the predominance of the N–PossPr sequence becomes relevant only in authors from the Imperial age (Petronius, Egeria). Within the nominal sphere, genitive noun phrases are equally attested with both word orders in Archaic and Classical Latin, and the N–G sequence acquires a regular status only in a late text like the *Itinerarium Egeriae* which, in this respect, represents a *trait d'union* with the Romance languages. The particular case of *eius* noun phrases, though, displays a certain regularity from the beginning: the genitive of this very common determiner is normally preposed. It is not without significance, then, that in an author like Petronius, where the sequence of genitive noun phrases is still well balanced, the postposition of *eius* has already become the norm. Consequently, we may assume that the possessive pronoun has played a leading role in the general process of postposition of the Modifier constituent that began to infect pronominal genitives like *eius* (Petronius) because of its partial equivalence to a possessive pronoun, and then spread to the entire nominal sphere (Egeria).

4. Conclusions: Diachronic and typological implications

4.1 Predicative possession

All comparative evidence from the Indo-European languages suggests that Proto-Indo-European was a ‘be’ language of the locative type – that is, it was a language that expressed the possessive relationship between an old-information possessor in the locative case and a new information *possessum* in the nominative case, mediated by the existential verb ‘be’. This construction is known as the *dativus possessivus*; in Latin, *mihi est*.

While there is no evidence that in Proto-Indo-European the *possessum* and the possessor were marked as [−def; −anim] and [+def; +anim] respectively, patterns of evidence in the daughter languages suggest that the possessive construction with ‘be’ was oriented toward the *possessum* rather than toward the possessor. That is to say, the basic predication of possession was performed by an existential sentence, which typically marks the *possessum* as a [+new, −def] constituent, and the possessor was expressed by means of an adjunct (namely a locative/dative phrase). While the coding of the [+def] or [−def] status of the possessor apparently does not display any morphosyntactic restriction, a syntactic configuration formally oriented toward a [−def, +new] *possessum* is reflected in the existential character of the predication. This orientation reflects, of course, general features of the typical *possessum* and possessor on the informational level, and it explains why the preponderance of locative-*be* constructions in the early Indo-European languages have pronominal (and human) possessors, since pronouns represent by definition old information which is already known to the hearer. More detailed and refined hypotheses on the Indo-European possessive sentence, however, should take into consideration the form and, especially, the function of the ‘be’ form employed, a subject of investigation which is beyond our scope in this chapter.

Evidence of the daughter languages also strongly indicates that Proto-Indo-European had no fully functional transitive verb ‘to have’. Every example of a ‘have’ verb in the descendant languages has a clearly reconstructible meaning in Proto-Indo-European of “seize, take, snatch, conquer”. There are at least eight roots recoverable in Proto-Indo-European with this meaning, and each followed the same semantic itinerary on its way to becoming a ‘have’ verb in the various descendant languages.

At some point in the pre–Latin period, perhaps even in late Proto-Indo-European, there begins a shift from ‘be’ expressions of possession to ‘have’ expressions. As part of this process, Latin refunctionalizes the root *$g^h ab^h$- from its original active meaning of ‘seize, grasp’ to its eventual stative meaning ‘have’. This trend is evident in Latin already from the classical period, in which *habeo* is clearly the unmarked form of the predicative possessive type. The tendency toward *habeo* is apparent throughout the texts, so that by the time of the *Itinerarium Egeriae* there are practically no *mihi est* constructions remaining except in fixed expressions such as *mihi est iter*.

The process, in our view, is composed of interlocking steps which are conceptually though not necessarily chronologically ordered. To explain the shift, we begin by suggesting that ‘be’ and ‘have’ share a certain semantic space in which there is a functional syntactic overlap in many languages. This shared space allows for the fact that Latin and other Indo-European languages started out as ‘be’ languages and progressed to ‘have’ languages, often maintaining separate functions for the ‘be’ possessive and the ‘have’ possessive, as Latin did for centuries before ‘have’ eventually absorbed nearly all possessive predicative functions by the time of late Latin. To account for this progression from ‘be’ to ‘have’, we suggest that there is a development from location in general with ‘be’ to “bounded possession” (i.e., “physical possession”, which is linked to location; a prototypical case of bounded possession is ‘holding (something in the hand)’, which is of course the original meaning of *habeo* and its ancestors), to possession in general. The originally concrete meaning of *habeo* justifies occurrences in contexts expressing physical possession. The higher frequency of phrases such as *in manu* or *domi* within the occurrences of *mihi est x* in Archaic Latin texts (Plautus) suggests that this construction has by that time lost ground as far as the specific function of indicating physical possession is concerned. The assumption of such a value by *habeo* (and, in later, Imperial Latin, texts, an analogous assumption by *teneo*) is a symptom that either verbs meaning ‘hold, keep’ and existential predications share, at least potentially, a certain degree of reference to physical space.

The notion of shared semantic space between ‘be’ and ‘have’ provides a framework for at least a part of the replacement of the ‘be’ expression by the ‘have’ expression, in that it assigns a common semantic value to certain locative expressions and certain possessive expressions. This semantic paral-

lel provides a conceptual foundation for the shift of 'be' to 'have' in Latin and the other Indo-European languages. The relationship between the "existential" and the "possessive" function, however, should not be seen in terms of mere substitution but rather as a process of potential continuous overlapping. *Habeo* displays a fully possessive function throughout the history of Latin; however, an existential function creeps in sporadically, from *Cato* to *Itin. Eger.* (cf. Section 2.1.2), much earlier than general changes take place (e.g., Sp. *ayer* 'exist').

The second factor involved in this development is rooted in patterns of lexical semantic change. The evolution of 'have' from 'hold' is consistent with larger patterns of lexical change in which concrete notions become abstract (cf. *lego* 'I gather' > 'read'; *praehendo* 'I grasp' > 'understand'; *tango* 'I touch' > 'affect') and has parallels in many Indo-European languages, including modern ones, in which 'to hold' develops into 'to have' (cf. Sp. *tener* 'to have' from Lat. *tenere* 'to hold', also in southern Italian dialects, though this may be a Hispanism). Translating concrete notions to abstract ones is a universal tendency in semantic change, and one which accounts readily for the 'hold' to 'have' shift in *habeo*. 'To have' is a resultative of 'to grasp' in the sense that the result of seizing something is to have it in one's possession, a derivation which is not only plausible semantically, but is also confirmed morphologically by the presence of the stative suffix in *habeo* (and Russian *imet'*).

The third factor has to do with a change in expression type, from an object-prominent "impersonal" expression of the *mihi est* type to a "personal" agent-oriented expression of the *habeo* type. A person-prominent expression based on a transitive verbal form can equally emphasize both participants according to different contextual requirements, while the identification of the possessor does not rely only on the case form (dative) that encodes such a constituent. For this reason, it imposes fewer limitations on permissible textual links. The use of a specific verb also implies an idiosyncratic and lexically defined encoding of the predication of possession, which is thus clearly differentiated from other frequent and important kinds of existential predications.

The diachronic and typological trends in Latin predicative constructions reflect two sides of the same coin: as Latin changes over time, it moves toward a nominative-accusative type with increased agent-type subjectivity, which is

completely compatible with the stages just outlined. The development of a verb 'to have' is another critical part of this development, and its general spread throughout Latin from the time of Plautus and before represents a particularly stunning replacement of an intransitive impersonal construction by a personal construction with an accusative object. On the other side, the encoding of a nontypically transitive category such as possession (by itself, a stative notion, not an action) as a formally transitive verbal sentence is but an instance of a more general phenomenon that characterize the shift of Latin into Romance languages: that is, basic forms of predication (existential, copular, possessive, etc.), either formally intransitive as well as transitive (i.e., *sum, habeo*) progressively enlarge their semantic fields, on their way to acquiring purely relational and eventually grammatical meanings and functions.

Finally, the analysis of Latin predicative possessive structures can lead to a more refined framework in terms of general and diachronic typology. The position of "*have*-structures", which apparently stand in a structural disharmony with "*be*-structures", has led Stassen (2001) to characterize the former as a rather "diachronically heterogeneous type" whose development can depend on more than one kind of driving force:

> The forces behind this tendency are probably manifold. ... Furthermore, the drift towards a HAVE–Possessive may be fostered by the need to eliminate possible ambiguities. For example, in languages with an unmarked Topic Possessive possible ambiguities between "I have a dog" and "I am a dog" arise when the existential 'be'-verb and the copula are (or come to be) identical. In languages with a Locative Possessive [like Latin -P.B. & A.N.] the same type of ambiguity threatens when the language loses its case system (and the copula and the existential 'be'-verb are identical).[195]

Latin, indeed, shows that the set of constructions and functions displayed by *sum* naturally exerts a deep influence on the behavior (and, possibly, the development) of *habeo*-constructions. The structure of existential and copular predication thus represents a fundamental factor that has to be accounted for in the analysis of transitive possessive constructions, as regards their functions in a given language, as well as their very development.

195. Stassen (2001: 959).

As far as Latin is concerned, however, the role played by ambiguity (which is likely to be relevant in languages characterized by other structures of existential predicates) does not seem to be a striking constraint; rather, a consistent role as to the development of a possessive *habeo* is more likely to be played, simply, by the great number of constructions and different functions already assigned to the same multifunctional verbal form, *sum*. A different architecture of existential and copular structures might have led to a different story,[196] and, as we said, this appear to be a major conditioning factor, which, of course, in some languages can be flanked by consistent phenomena of ambiguity. Case loss, also, does not appear as a major stimulus to the birth of the transitive type, as the use of *habeo* is well spread in Archaic Latin, where the case system is still alive and kicking and, even in this instance, the functional overload of the dative case should be taken into consideration.

All in all, the structure of existential and copular predication and a complex series of other interfering factors (case system, case loss, ambiguities, textual valency of a given possessive structure, etc.) appear to be the most likely candidates that can differently shape a transitive possessive construction. As far as the traditional subdivision into *be*- versus *have*-languages is concerned, however, this appear to be over-strict, as Latin shows that both structures can interact and be consistently present at the same time in the same language, thus bringing into the picture the possibility of, so to speak, "mixed type" languages.

4.2 Attributive possession

There are three fundamental types of attributive possession structure in Latin. The first of these is the possessive pronoun construction, in which a Proto-

196. Old Irish, for example, features to some extent a possessive construction based on a transitive verb, *techtaid* 'have', that in the archaic stage represented by the language of the glosses occurs side by side with other types based on prepositions. Such a "new" type of transitive construction (vs. the hypothesized Indo-European starting point, the dative construction, only residual in Old Irish), however, is soon abandoned, as the prepositional type becomes generalized. This can be connected to the fact that Old Irish has two 'be' verbs, *attá* and *is*, that fulfill the two different functions of existential verb and of copula; see Nuti (2005b).

Indo-European pronominal stem furnishes the base for a set of pronominal possessives such as *meus, tuus, noster, uester*, and *suus.* As adjectives these agree with their head noun in person, number, and case, a feature which continues throughout the history of the language and into the modern Romance languages (except for case, of course).

The second type is for nominals other than the possessive adjectives, which are prototypically in the genitive case. While a remarkable feature of the Latin genitive noun phrase is a relative freedom as far as the sequence of the constituents is concerned, we can envision an original stage (perhaps Indo-European) in which the prototypical instance featured a G–N order that, all through the history of Latin, proceeds further on to both possible sequences and finally settles in a rather stable N–G sequence, which predominates in most of the Romance offshoots of possessive noun phrases.

The final type is the dative-marked possessor, not rare but certainly not on a par with the genitive construction. Since the dative possessive noun phrase was dependent at least in part on the *mihi est* construction as a syntactic model, it eventually disappeared as the general shift from *mihi est* to *habeo* took place in predicative constructions. Eventually, of course, the genitive type of possessive marking for attributive possession was displaced by the prepositional construction with *de*, a construction whose beginnings can be traced to the archaic period and whose foundation is to be found in the partitive. The replacement of the case-marked possessive by a prepositionally marked construction is clearly best understood in the context of the collapse of the case system generally, in which bare case functions such as direction, beneficiary, or stationary location all come to be indicated by prepositions.

While there is no consistent evidence of significance for the inherent versus established possessive relation, there is a tendency for possessive pronouns and other contextually understood possessors to be omitted with body parts and kin terms already in the early stages of the language. The phenomena of “external possession” and implicit possessor are thus well established in Latin and, seemingly, they are features inherited from Indo-European times that continue in the Romance languages, where they are frequently attested.

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Silvia Pieroni

Deixis and anaphora

1. Preliminaries*

The notion of deixis belongs to a time-honored tradition: the term δεικτικόν was used by Greek grammarians to refer to those ἄρθρα (*articuli*) which perform an indexical function;[1] *demonstrativum* is, originally, its Latin translation. Long-lasting terminology, however, is not always a guarantee of uncontroversial concepts and, in this particular case, the uncontroversial issues are few. Basically, there is agreement on the inherent correlation between the deictic reference that demonstratives establish and the speech-act situation. It is a crucial difference in comparison with common nouns, whose symbolic value is in principle established independently from contextual factors, though a context-free (i.e., notionally stable) component may be also singled out for deictic signs: for instance, *I* means the person uttering *I* (Bühler

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1. Ἄρθρα δεικτικά is the label used by the Stoics and Dionysius Thrax. Apollonius Dyscolus argues for the necessity of distinguishing between articles and demonstrative "pronouns" (ἀντωνυμίαι): Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἄρθρα καλοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας, διαφέροντα δὲ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρθρων, ᾗ ταῦτα μὲν ὡρισμένα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἀοριστώδη. [...] καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ὁ Θρᾷξ Διονύσιος καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικὰ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας ἐκάλεσαν (Apoll. Dysc. *Pron.* [Schneider 5,13–19]) 'The Stoics also label the pronouns as articles, but this notion of article is different from ours, since articles, as we mean them, are definite, whereas articles, as they mean them, are indefinite [...] Both Apollodorus the Athenian and Dionysius Thrax called articles the deictic pronouns themselves.'

1934; Jakobson 1957; Lyons 1977; cf. Fillmore 1982, 1997).[2] Leaving apart the distinction between deictic (or indexical) and symbolic reference,[3] the discussion in this chapter will be limited to the conceptual nucleus which is fundamental for the definition of deixis: the reference to the *personae* of the linguistic act, i.e. speaker and hearer in the ideal situation of dialogue, and the way in which the relationship among these functions processes linguistic reality.

Descriptions cannot be independent of viewpoints. For instance, the traditional descriptions by Brugmann and Wackernagel, like Bach's earlier description, in fact relied on the non-trivial assumption that the demonstrative system is (partially) symmetrical with the personal pronoun system (*Dér*-Deixis, *Ich*-Deixis, *Du*-Deixis, *Jener*-Deixis in Brugmann's terms; *to*-Deixis, *hic*-Deixis, *iste*-Deixis, *ille*-Deixis in Wackernagel's terms: see Brugmann 1904; Wackernagel 1928; cf. Bach 1891). Nonetheless, the assumptions on the ways this correlation functioned remained implicit: in fact, Lat. *is* (cf. Section 3.4) could be integrated into the system, yet without any explicit assumption on its correlation with person. A related idea, though intuitive as well, of a specific spatial determination also emerged from these first systematic classifications: the description of *hic*, *iste*, *ille* invoked a spatial meaning, in particular concerning the position of the *denotatum* in relationship with the participants in the speech act. Whether space was meant in a physical or metaphorical sense was of little importance, due to the purpose of classification rather than of theoretical analysis.

2. The term "deictic" will be used here to imply this general functional correlation, whereas the term "demonstrative", in line with a well-established tradition, will be used to refer to the specific category which includes *is*, *idem*, *ipse*, in addition to *hic*, *iste*, *ille*. Thus defined, the notion of deixis concerns all the domains which require consideration of the speech-act situation. Some of these areas, however, will be disregarded in this chapter, for instance temporal reference (cf. Haverling, this work, vol. 2) and specific issues such as "deictic verbs" (on which, cf. Ricca 1993).
3. The viewpoint on the nature of this distinction would, however, be essential in order to determine the opportunity of considering (deictic) demonstratives as "pro-nouns" and on the meaning itself of this term. Cf. Fugier (1974), Serbat (1984, 1986), De Carvalho (1991).

From the time of Bühler (1934), who explicitly raised the question,[4] the discussion of the last century has focused to a great extent on the meaning of demonstratives. As a consequence, such elements, which seemed to risk being devoid of meaning, were eventually filled with it. By now, the current viewpoint encapsulates a basic spatial semantics which depends on a distance parameter. The *communis opinio* has been consecrated by Anderson and Keenan (1985), who state that a deictic expression unmarked for distance "would be little different from a definite article" (Anderson and Keenan 1985: 280). Obviously, it has been repeatedly emphasized that space should not be meant in a rigid topological sense: it is easy to verify that a geometric view would be simply untenable. For instance, it has been maintained that space would be a psychological, rather than a physical dimension (Hottenroth 1982; Ricca 1989). However, the basic assumption has not been queried yet: rather, the interpretation of spatial semantics as a subjective choice of the speaker, since unfalsifiable, has rather strengthened its unquestionable status.

In fact, alternative views have been also developed. In particular, it has been suggested that the inherent relationship between deictic elements and context should be sought, each time, in the idiosyncratic interactional situation. This is to say that context is not an objective *prius*, but is established itself by interaction, depending on many factors (physical, psychological, sociological). Various descriptions of demonstratives in spontaneous interaction have called into question the distance-oriented theory (cf. Kirsner 1979 on Dutch and Strauss 1993 on English), rather hinting at a focalizing function of demonstratives in relationship with saliency: the spatial map would be, from this point of view, an occasional effect (cf. Mithun 1987; Sacks 1992; Hanks 1990, 1992; Laury 1997).[5] A major result of interactional approaches is the

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4. "Daß es in der Sprache nur ein einziges Zeigfeld gibt und wie die Bedeutungserfüllung der Zeigwörter an sinnliche Zeighilfen gebunden, auf sie und ihre Äquivalente angewiesen bleibt, ist die tragende Behauptung, die ausgelegt und begründet werden soll" (Bühler 1934: 80).
5. Adopting Himmelmann's idea that demonstratives have a minimum of semantics and are basically markers of saliency (Himmelmann 1996, 1997), Enfield (2003) suggests that context-dependent implications should be distinguished from conventional meaning. Analyzing the Lao two-term system, Enfield observes the inadequacy of the traditional hypothesis of a couple of terms which symmetrically expresses proximity and distance. Therefore, he suggests describing the Lao system as based on an opposition between an

emphasis on the creative power of linguistic acts, which are not viewed as a consequence of extralinguistic reality:

> And, importantly, while speakers make reference to objects, ideas and events with demonstratives, these uses also serve to define each speaker's area in social terms. I would like to stress that speakers do not observe the concrete or psychological location of referents and then use demonstratives actively to "put things in their place": demonstratives function to dynamically create or constitute place and perspective, rather than just refer to objects and spaces which might already "be there" in some objective or concrete sense. Demonstratives not only express context, they also build context. (Laury 1997: 58)

However, a difficulty remains in understanding how, given the always varying attitudes and contexts, the relevant traits, according to which systems do in fact function, could be singled out and abstracted.[6]

Two basic claims will underlie the discussion in this chapter and need therefore be explicit. First, the function of demonstratives, as well as of other elements, cannot be established independently from syntactic contexts. Context, however, is not an effect of the (addition of) lexical meanings which are previously determined, nor may it be considered as the reflex of extralinguistic situations, though it has obvious correlations with both: in other words, context, as a (strictly intralinguistic) correlation of combinatory functions, conceptually precedes the determination of the single functions. This is to say that functions themselves may be only defined relationally, one depending on the other. Therefore, the empirical analysis which lies behind this chapter, though starting from forms, does not aim at their ontological definition, but

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unmarked and a marked term, the one general, the other specific and informative (though the information supplied by the specific element is negative: "not here").

6. Kleiber (1986) observes that, in the discussion on deictic reference, two approaches may be distinguished: one which considers deictic elements as "des expressions qui réfèrent à une entité présente, directement ou indirectement, dans la situation d'énonciation" and another which "ne dit pas que le référent doit être trouvé *dans* l'environnement spatio-temporel. [...] La définition stipule seulement que l'identification passe obligatoirement par les relations spatio-temporelles de l'occurrence" (Kleiber 1986: 19; see also Kleiber 1992 and, in general, the discussion in Morel and Danon-Boileau 1992). Cf. Pieroni (2006).

rather attempts to grasp the functional values which forms perform in the contexts where they occur.

The second claim is that "function" is not a synonym of "use". In line with traditional analysis and with Bühler's observations,[7] a classification of demonstrative uses has been in fact developed (cf. Lyons 1977; Fillmore 1982, 1997; Levinson 1983; Webber 1991; Himmelmann 1996, 1997; Diessel 1999) and four use-types at least are currently distinguished: situational (also labelled "exophoric", in which a further subdivision is made between symbolic deixis and *Deixis am Phantasma*), tracking, discourse deictic, recognitional.[8] In particular, since the spatial semantics is considered as basic and since it manifests preferentially in the situational use, there is a syllogistic tendency to consider the situational use as primary (though not without exceptions: cf. Hanks 1992; Cornish 1996; Himmelmann 1997; Laury 1997).

7. "[...] die modi des Zeigens sind verschieden; ich kann *ad oculos* demonstrieren und in der situationsfernen Rede dieselben Zeigwörter *anaphorisch* gebrauchen. Es gibt noch einen dritten Modus, den wir als *Deixis am Phantasma* charakterisieren werden" (Bühler 1934: 80).

8. Here are some instances of each type, as described in the literature on the topic:
SITUATIONAL:
(i) This finger hurts. (gestural)
(ii) This city stinks. (symbolic)
(cf. Levinson 1983: 65–66; for gestural and symbolic, cf. Fillmore 1997: 63)
(iii) And he's ... you see a scene where he's ... coming on his bicycle this way
(Himmelmann 1996: 222; for "Deixis am Phantasma", see Bühler 1934: 121–140; for deictic projection, see Lyons 1977: 579; cf. Jakobson 1957)
(iv) I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. Could you repeat that?
(Webber 1991: 108; for pure text deixis, cf. Lyons 1977: 668)
TRACKING:
(v) Der Anwalt$_i$ sprach mit einem Klienten$_j$. Da er$_i$ / der$_j$ nicht viel Zeit hatte, vereinbarten sie ein weiteres Gespräch nächste Woche.
(Himmelmann 1996: 230; Diessel 1999: 96)
DISCOURSE DEICTIC:
(vi) A: Hey, management has reconsidered its position. They've promoted Fred to second vice president.
B: That's false. (reference to proposition) / That's a lie. (reference to illocution)
(Webber 1991: 111–112)
RECOGNITIONAL:
(vii)... it was filmed in California, those dusty kind of hills that they have out here in Stockon and all, ... so ...

Actually, given the absence of any evidence which shows that situational uses are unmarked or even prior in comparison, for instance, with tracking uses, it seems reasonable to avoid considering them as the only relevant uses for the definition of the deictic function, though they may certainly be distinguished and reveal preferential correlations with some demonstratives rather than with others (Section 4). It also follows that the definition of anaphora, traditional and time-honored itself,[9] is not necessarily in exclusive opposition with the notion of deixis: deictic demonstratives may in fact perform a tracking function, yet keeping their deictic value (de Jong 1996) and this kind of overlap is a normal condition among languages (Lyons 1977: 668; Ehlich 1982; Cornish 1996). Rather than entailing fuzzy borderlines between the notions of deixis and anaphora, it seems reasonable to take the perspective from which "deictic" and "anaphoric" are functions themselves and may therefore converge in one and the same context.

The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 2 we will discuss the category of person, both in its overt manifestations (personal pronouns and verbal inflection) and in its covert domains (deictic demonstratives). In Section 3 we will deal with anaphoric strategies including agreement, reflexives, and the triad *is*, *idem*, *ipse*; the issue of so-called "zero anaphora" will be also discussed. In Section 4 we will briefly focus on some correlations between the morphosyntactic properties of the elements treated in the preceding sections and their uses (e.g., discourse deixis, recognitional use), with some notes on their pragmatic value. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to few considerations, which simply follow from the analysis suggested in the previous sections, on the functional conditions for the emergence of articles and clitics.

9. Πᾶσα ἀντονυμία ἤ δεικτική ἐστιν ἤ αναφορική (AD *pron.* [Schneider 9,17]). Some authors, following Bühler (1934: 121), use to distinguish anaphora from cataphora, according to whether the pronoun traces back or forward to a referent in the discourse, and use "endophora" as a cover term to include both. In this chapter, the term "anaphora" will be used, according to the tradition, as the general cover term, unless its use in opposition with the term "cataphora" makes clear that it is to be meant *stricto sensu*.

2. Person

Person is a pervasive feature which concerns not only personal pronouns, but also verbal morphology, possessives, demonstratives (both pronouns and adverbs), and, possibly, other domains as well.

Whether we consider the value of person as deictic or as dectic and symbolic at the same time (for discussion, see Benveniste 1956; Jakobson 1957; Kleiber 1986), it is apparent that its definition in terms of "extralinguistic" reference is not satisfactory: it is a fundamental fact that the *ego* cannot even be defined except in relationship with a linguistic act, as well as it is a fact that an *ego* is necessarily implied in any linguistic act, as is obvious even in case it does not appear in the clause. In fact, the notion of an "*ego* locuteur", to be conceptually distinguished from the *ego* of the clause (in spite of the fact that they have the same referent), turns out to be functionally relevant even in third person clauses and possibly manifests its relevance, as shown by Fugier (1974), in determining some syntactic options.[10]

Limiting the discussion in this section to the expression of person in the clause, a first observation is that, at least for first and second person in finite clauses, the pronoun does not really substitute for any noun; rather, it repeats the content of the morphological information conveyed by the verbal ending, in terms which quite resemble other anaphoric strategies.[11] Actu-

10. For instance, Fugier (1974) shows how the difference between *Marcus dicitur uenisse quia lectica hic esset* and *Marcus dicitur uenisse quoniam lectica hic esset* is accounted for by postulating that, whereas *quia* refers to the explicit *Marcus uenit*, *quoniam* refers to some implicit sentence adjoined, such as *et ideo coniicio* (cf. Bertocchi 1994: 1–4). This is to say that *quoniam* manifests the function of the "*ego* locuteur" (the subject of the implicit *coniicio*). The relevance of this notion may be in fact hypothesized as relevant in many domains, most of which will be disregarded here, for instance those which concern the opposition subjunctive vs. indicative (cf. Bertocchi 1994; some further issues will be dealt in Section 3.3.2).
The necessity of distinguishing between different (hierarchically ordered) layers is made explicit in Functional Grammar, as developed by Hengeveld (1987, 1989) and Dik (1989). The basic distinction developed in this framework is between predication, proposition and utterance. For applications of the theory to Latin, see, for instance, Bolkestein (1989, 1990) and, for developments, Risselada (1993) and Kroon (1995).
11. From a theoretical point of view, though a mechanical correspondence cannot be maintained, it is a widely held assumption that full pronouns in languages with obligatory

ally, whereas the expression of person in finite clauses is primarily conveyed, synthetically, by verbal morphology, the encoding of person through explicit pronouns is found when the predicate is not a finite verb form (on subject ellipsis and case agreement, cf. Bertocchi 1985): for instance, *accusativus cum infinitivo* (henceforth, AcI) makes explicit the subject of the infinitive (in the accusative). This is also true in case of equi-subject structures, in which case a reflexive realization is obtained (Section 3.3.2). The explicit pronoun is also necessary in case of other non-finite predicative units, for instance in nominal clauses, which are attested throughout the whole history of Latin and in fact go back to a Proto-Indo-European pattern (Benveniste 1950). Consider also the following:

(1) Caes. *ciu.* 1,84,2: *ubi id a Caesare negatum*
'since it was denied by Caesar'

(2) Plaut. *Amph.* 607: *quis te uerberauit?* :: *egomet memet ...*
'Who beat you? :: I beat myself ...'

As a consequence of the fact that the person function is primarily conveyed by verbal morphology, explicit subject pronouns in finite clauses appear in contexts which are marked in terms of informational structure.

In fact, the textual function of pronouns cannot be singled out without making a distinction among text types, in particular without distinguishing between conversational and narrative texts (Pinkster 1986, 1987). In conversations *ego* and *tu* are either used to identify the speaker or addressee or, as well as *ille*, to carry focal information, as in (3); in narrative texts, however, the subject pronoun is used to indicate a change of topic, as in (4) (for examples of *ille* and of other demonstratives as subject pronouns, cf. the next section and Section 4):

(3) Cic. *de orat.* 2,77: *quantum <u>ego</u> iudicare possum*
'as far as I can judge'

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subject pronouns in independent clauses are grammatically equivalent to pronominal verb endings in languages which permit an independent clause to lack an explicit subject (Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990). Person inflection and personal pronouns may also be claimed to be connected from an etymological point of view, at least in some cases (cf., among others, Ambrosini 2001: 172).

(4) Cic. *Att.* 1,19,5–6: *haec sunt, ut opinor, in re publica. ego autem . . .*
‘that is all, I think, in the way of public affairs. As for me . . . ’

The pragmatic emphasis of the explicit subject pronoun may be strengthened by the presence of particles such as *profecto*, *uero*, *quidem*,[12] etc., as in (4) and in the following:

(5) Cic. *epist.* 4,6,1: *ego uero, Servi, uellem, ut scribis, in meo grauissimo casu adfuisses*
‘yes, Servius, I might still wish, as you say, that you had been by my side in my most grievous affliction’

Given the distinction between conversational and narrative units, a basic continuity may be recognized throughout the centuries, for instance comparing Cicero’s *de oratore* and Petronius (Pinkster 1987):

(6) Petron. 77,1–2: *tu dominam tuam de rebus illis fecisti. tu parum felix in amicos es.* [. . .]. *tu latifundia possides. tu uiperam sub ala nutricas*
‘you got your wife from you know where. You are not lucky with your friends. [. . .]. You are a man of property. You are nourishing a viper in your bosom’

The identifying or contrastive function may be also recognized in most cases of explicit subject pronouns in imperatives and questions, which are frequent from the time of Early Latin and, in some expressions, show a tendency to the postposition of the pronoun to the verb (Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 174):[13]

(7) Plaut. *Amph.* 1089: *ain tu, geminos?*
‘did you say, twins?’

This is still the case in Petronius, though sometimes it is difficult to ascertain whether the pronoun is a subject or not: for instance, in (8) “*tu* is accompanied

12. On *equidem* from *ego quidem* see Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 174) and Rosén (this work, vol. 1).
13. But “la place du pronom personnel accentué entraîne une différence de sens dans le type: *Ego scio* ‘moi, je sais’. Mais *scio ego* ‘oui, je sais; si, je sais’ ” (Juret 1926: 95).

by the vocative and may well be regarded as a vocative itself" (Pinkster 1987: 371):

(8) Petron. 48,4: *sed narra tu mihi, Agamemnon, quam controuersiam hodie declamasti?*
'but tell me, you, Agamemnon, which declamation did you deliver in school today?'

Accordingly, in narrative units subject pronouns are still used for topic change:

(9) Petron. 46,3–4: *ingeniosus est et bono filo, etiam si in aues morbosus est. Ego illi iam tres cardeles occidi . . .*
'he is clever and of a good stock, even though he is too fond of birds. I already killed three of his goldfinches . . . '

Therefore, cases such as (9) cannot be taken as instances of unemphatic uses, nor can they be considered as the basis for a future development of a weakened use of subject pronouns. Detailed analysis, as emphasized by Pinkster (1987), in fact, reveals the pragmatic motivation for explicit pronouns (both first and second person pronouns and third person pronouns) at different stages of Latin: it is therefore necessary to be cautious in trying to discover early instances of obligatory subject pronouns, a phenomenon which does not in fact concern Romance as a whole, though some very late texts may attest uses which do not seem pragmatically motivated any longer (cf. (10) below and Hofmann 1926 for more examples):

(10) Greg. Tur. *Franc*. 2,32: *cum ad eum accessero, ego faciam . . .*
'when I reach him, I will make . . . '

A diachronic issue which would be worth further consideration and research rather concerns the range of functional contexts for non-explicit subject pronouns, in particular third persons: example (11), where the implicit subject of the relative clauses is equi-referent with the genitives, shows the well-known fact that in Classical Latin "null subjects" may occur freely, though probably not without restrictions, in many syntactic contexts:

(11) Cic. *epist.* 1,9,12: *grauissime autem me in hanc mentem impulit et Pompei fides, quam de me Caesari dederat, et fratris mei, quam Pompeio*

‘but what drove me to this decision was Pompey’s pledge, that he had made for me to Caesar, and my brother’s pledge, that he had made to Pompey’

According to Herman (1991), a progressive decrease of such contexts may be observed in the last centuries of the Empire: namely, “autonomous” null subjects (i.e., those subjects which may be recovered only on the basis of the knowledge of the decoder and which are not constrained to a set of syntactic positions, according to Herman’s terminology) become limited to some fixed functions: for instance, in the shorthand protocols of Carthage (and evidence from *Itinerarium Egeriae* confirms this observation), “autonomous” third person plural verbs imply “the other side”, “our adversaries” as virtual subject, i.e., they imply generic subjects.

2.1 Paradigmatic oppositions

It is well known, that, in spite of the plain categorial distinctions (e.g., in Latin, six persons), the person function is a complex bundle of relationships. The speech act itself establishes the linguistic function of *ego* in necessary relationship with its paradigmatic alternant *tu* (Hjelmslev 1937; Jakobson 1957): unmarked in relationship with both, the so-called third person is thus negatively established (Forchheimer 1953; Benveniste 1956).[14] The crucial distinction between person and non-person is reflected in their various morphosyntactic properties: for instance, the (logical) impossibility of restrictive modifiers (adjectives, adpositions, relative clauses) with personal (i.e., first and second person) pronouns (cf. Fugier 1974). Furthermore, Latin personal

14. In crosslinguistic studies a hierarchy of persons has been suggested. This so-called “empathy hierarchy”, gradually departing from the point of view of the speech-act initiator (i.e., the speaker) is the mirror image of the markedness hierarchy (Greenberg 1966; Primus 1999: 210ff.): 3rd (least marked) < 2nd < 1st. Actually, the relative markedness of the second and first person is not unproblematic. Moreover, it is likely to vary according to sentence type (declarative vs. imperative and interrogative): see Loporcaro (2001). For this and other problematic issues concerning the markedness hierarchy, see Mühlhäusler (2001).

pronouns show paradigmatic properties which are crosslinguistically common and typical of Indo-European languages, such as absence of gender inflection (cf. Harley and Ritter 2002) and stem opposition between direct and indirect cases. Both the stem opposition between direct and indirect cases and the impossibility of restrictive modifiers only regard the first and second person in the singular, but not the so-called "plural" of these pronouns. This is a consequence of the fact that number is not an adequate category for person: as is evident, *nos* is not a plurality of *ego*, even when its reading is exclusive of the second person.[15]

Moreover, the plural forms of the personal pronouns may show distinctions which are not encoded in the other (pro)nominal domains: for instance, a double form of the genitive is available for the so-called first and second person plural. *Nostri*, *uestri* vs. *nostrum*, *uestrum* appear to be opposed in terms of the different consideration of plurality as, respectively, an undistinguished group or a composition of individuals (Ernout & Thomas 1964: 180–181). From a morphosyntactic point of view, the opposition is usually described in terms of objective vs. partitive genitive. Whereas the term "objective" is satisfactory for the description of most cases involved, the label "partitive" appears to be misleading and, at any rate, interpretative rather than syntactic. The functional opposition is better described in terms of argumental vs. non argumental relations: *nostri*, *uestri* fulfill the argumental function in relationship with predicative elements, both verbal and nominal:

(12) Sall. *Iug.* 14,17: *aut quisquam <u>nostri</u> misereri potest, qui aliquando uobis hostis fuit?*
'or may anybody, who ever was an enemy of yours, have pity on us?'

(13) Caes. *Gall.* 5,29,2: *tanta contemptione <u>nostri</u>*
'with such profound contempt for us'

15. On the fact that the so-called first person plural is not the plural of the first person singular, but a more complex entity, see Dressler and Merlini Barbaresi (1987), who explore some grammatical consequences of this asymmetry.

On the other hand, no argumental function may be ascribed to *nostrum* in relationship with *quisquam* in the following passage and a predicative function is rather to be the case:[16]

(14) Plaut. *Amph.* 1071: *neque nostrum quisquam sensimus, quom peperit, neque prouidimus*
'and not one of us noticed when she gave birth (to the twins), nor expected it'

A variety of morphosyntactic behaviors show that languages treat third person differently from first and second, thus indicating, as already noted, that third person is unmarked. Among these, a devoted third person pronoun may be missing and demonstrative pronouns used for this function. This is in fact the Latin case: all the demonstratives are available for the third person function, in the absence of a specific pronoun. The presence of an explicit pronoun is pragmatically motivated, just as with first and second person pronouns (Pinkster 1987; Rosén 1999: 163; cf. the preceding section): for instance in narratives, subject shifts, provided the new subject is not made explicit in a preceding sentence and no other strategy is at play, require the presence of a pronoun (deviations from this norm are mainly found in Archaic Latin; cf. B. Löfstedt 1965/66). In this particular case, *ille* in fact turns out to be the unmarked option (Pinkster 1987; Bolkestein and van de Grift 1994; Bolkestein 2000; see Section 4):

16. The value of the genitive of personal pronouns is also to be considered in opposition to the possessive form (Baldi & Nuti, this volume). The former is tendentially related to the object, the latter to the subject argument of a nominal: Cic. *Att.* 13,1,3: (*Nicias*) *uehementerque tua sui memoria delectatur*. It is nonetheless a fact that the two forms are far from being in complementary distribution. Compare Ter. *Phorm.* 1016: *neque neglegentia tua neque odio id fecit tuo* with Tac. *ann.* 4,24: *primo sui incessu* (Ernout & Thomas 1964: 180).

(15) Caes. *Gall.* 7,12,1–2: *Vercingetorix ubi de Caesaris aduentu cognouit, oppugnatione desistit atque obuiam Caesari proficiscitur. ille oppidum Biturigum positum in uia Nouiodunum oppugnare instituerat*
'when he heard of Caesar's arrival, Vercingetorix abandoned the siege and went towards Caesar. He (i.e., Caesar) had started to besiege a town of the Bituriges, Noviodunum, which was on the way'

In fact, *is* may also fulfill some of the functions which are fulfilled by a third person pronoun[17] in languages which have one, for instance:

(16) Plaut. *Amph.* 107–109: *is amare occepit Alcumenam clam uirum / usuram que eius corporis cepit sibi / et grauidam fecit is eam compressu suo*
'he fell in love with Alcumena, without her husband knowing it, and he enjoyed her body and got her pregnant with his embrace'

17. It is still to be ascertained whether *is* is found in those uses which are considered crucial for the definition of the category of the third person pronoun, namely the associative-anaphoric use and the bound variable reading, as in the following passages from German and English, respectively: *Vor meinem Büro stand ein Ehepaar. Er war groß...*; *John Doe bequeathed the first house he built to his wife, but Richard Roe deeded it* (**this* / **that*) *to his daughter.* In fact, I did not meet with such contexts. On the contrary, *id* is well attested in the discourse deictic use (Section 4), as in: Ter. *Haut.* 641: *credo, id cogitasti:* "*quiduis satis est dum uiuat modo*", Cic. *fin.* 2,6: *quid sonet haec uox uoluptatis, id est quae huic uoci subiciatur*. According to typological studies, third person pronouns are in fact more heavily constrained than demonstratives in the discourse deictic use: *This / *it is what I believe*; *She claimed this / *it* (English and German examples are taken from Himmelmann [1996: 212]). However, it could be worth wondering whether consideration of the relationship between categories and uses is a good experimental procedure or not: categories, in fact, are metalinguistic bundles of functional features and uses appear to be consequences of such abstract functions rather than directly dependent on categories. As concerns Lat. *is*, for instance, evidence simply suggests the observation that it may perform functions which are performed by the third person pronoun category in languages which have one, in addition to functions which are performed by different categories (when adnominal, for instance, it may function as an article). In other words, categories, among which personal pronouns and articles, should be probably decomposed in order to be functionally understood. This line of research, however, is often neglected in current studies and cannot be developed here: a hint in this direction will suffice to our purpose.

(17) Plaut. *Pseud.* 978–979: *tun'es Ballio?* :: *ego enimuero* *is* *sum.*
'so, are you Ballio? :: Exactly, it's me'

However, whereas the anaphoric function[18] may be fulfilled by *is*, *ea*, *id*, functions which are not purely anaphoric are fulfilled by deictics. For instance, in a passage such as (18), *ille* is used by the speaker, namely, Mercurius talking to the audience, to refer to Sosia, who is on the stage as well:

(18) Plaut. *Amph.* 185: *facit* *ille* *quod uolgo haud solent, ut quid se sit dignum sciat*
'he behaves in a way that is not normal for common people, he knows what he deserves'

The opposition between the typical tracking function of *is* and the deictic value of *ille* is in fact reflected in other superficial differences, such as the different "referential distance" (Givón 1983) from their antecedent: *is* is usually found when the antecedent is at a lower referential distance than *ille*. Consider the following passage:

(19) Plaut. *Amph.* 204–209: *continuo Amphitruo delegit uiros primorum principes. / Eos legat: Telobois iubet sententiam ut dicant suam: / si sine ui et sine bello uelint rapta et raptores tradere, / si quae asportassent redderent, se exercitum extemplo domum / reducturum, abituros agro Argiuos, pacem atque otium / dare illis . . .*
'straightaway Amphitryon selected the most illustrious of his captains. Then he sends them forth as legates and orders them to convey his terms to the Teloboians: should they wish, without contention

18. The distinction between cases such as (16), where the pronoun plays an argumental function, and equative structures such as (17), where the pronoun fulfills the function of the predicate is not relevant here, since third person pronouns may in fact appear, crosslinguistically, in both contexts. Moreover, both cases may be described in terms of anaphoric reference to a previous element. Differently from *hic/iste/ille*, *is* may be in fact defined as "anaphoric by design" (Fugier 1991: 387): though the anaphoric reference may be more or less faithful (cf. Fugier 1983: 253–255), it can be considered not "saturated", opaque, uninterpretable without the support of a co-present term (in fact, the relation between the root **i-* and the correlative root **k^w o-* cannot be neglected): cf. Kleiber (1985: 111) for the notion of "saturation". For further observations, see Section 3.4.

and without strife to turn over the spoils and the spoilers and if they were to restore whatever they had carried off, he himself would take his army home immediately and the Argives would leave their land and grant them peace and quiet ... '

This tendency is not a rule: compare (19) with (20), in which the referential distance between *illa*, *illum* and their antecedents is low and the choice of *ille* may be ascribed to its contrastive value (*illa* also marks the subject shift, as remarked above):

(20) Plaut. *Amph.* 133–135: *quae illi ad legionem facta sunt memorat pater / meus Alcumenae: illa illum censet uirum / suom esse* ...
'my father is telling Alcumena his war exploits: she thinks he is her man'

As noted, any of the other demonstratives may also be found as subject pronouns:

(21) Caes. *Gall.* 4,12,4–5: *in his uir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus amplissimo genere natus, cuius auus in ciuitate sua regnum obtinuerat, amicus a senatu nostro appellatus. hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit* ...
'among these Piso Aquitanus, a very brave man of noble birth, whose grandfather had come to the throne in his town and had received the title of friend of the Romans from our senate. This man, carrying help to his brother who was surrounded by enemies, rescued him from danger ... '

(22) Plaut. *Asin.* 603: *ne iste hercle ab ista pedem discedat* ...
'by Hercules, do not let him depart from that woman ... '

The choice is, of course, not random and depends on the functional features which characterize each pronoun, namely the relationship with the speech-act situation and with the *ego*, which are the relevant parameters for the demonstrative system, as will be described in the next section.

In fact, the coalescence of features, among them gender, which will result in the establishment of the third person category does not proceed in a random way itself: the fact that *ille* becomes a subject animate third person pronoun

is not a necessity (*ipse* may be also destined to that, as for instance in the plural forms of Italian *essi*); yet, it is consistent with its contrastive value, which correlates with the subject function (as is reasonable, in a pro-drop language) and with animate participants. This is not the unmarked use of all pronominal strategies: it is not the property of *is, ea, id*, for instance, which, from the time of Plautus, are chosen as subjects in less than the half of the cases in comparison with *ille* and, in addition, are more widely attested in the neuter than in the animate forms (for details, see Section 3.4): though the frequency of the use of *ille* as a subject pronoun is not the cause of its future development, it is certainly an indication of a functional distribution which is different from the very beginning.

2.2 The covert feature of person in the deictic system

It is difficult to reconstruct the Indo-European demonstrative system, since the individual languages differ greatly in this respect. The alternative is between reconstructing an unusually large number of stems or a limited number, from which the pronouns of the single languages would have developed with the adjunction of particles and adverbs (Kortlandt 1983; Beekes 1995: 201–202). Among Latin demonstratives, only three may certainly trace back to Proto-Indo-European stems: *is*, *sum* and (the inflectional part of) *iste*, the first from the stem **ej-/i-*, the second and the third from **so-/to-* (Szemerényi 1996: 204–207; Ambrosini 2001: 105–110). Tripartite deictic systems, which are clearly attested in some languages, for instance Armenian, Greek, and possibly Sanskrit, in addition to Latin, may themselves be considered as the result of independent developments or as indicative of an original structure (cf. Klein 1996, who claims that **to-* appears to be the etymological source of most forms for which so-called "second person deixis" is either manifest or has been maintained in the Indo-European deictic systems).

The Latin lexical forms – both adnominal and pronominal – of the deictic function, attested since the archaic period,[19] are three: *hic*, *iste*, *ille*. According to the traditional point of view, which fits the typological classification of

19. The discussion which follows disregards the issue of the possibility that the deictic value of *iste* might be secondary (Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 183).

deictic systems (cf. Pieroni 2006), deictic demonstratives would be symmetrically related to the grammatical persons (cf. Bach 1891; Brugmann 1904; Wackernagel 1928: 101–103; recently, the traditional view has been defended by de Jong 1998 and Klein 2000). In Anderson and Keenan's (1985) typological framework, the system could be therefore defined as "person-oriented":[20] a system for locating referents in relationship with extralinguistic entities, which the language projects as grammatical persons, according to distance or, from perspectives which take into account the pragmatic (psychological or sociological) dimension, according to saliency and accessibility. As concerns *Ich-Deixis*, for instance, Brugmann (1904: 10) affirmed: "Der Sprechende lenkt den Blick des Angeredeten geflissentlich auf sich selbst, den Sprechenden, und seine Sphäre oder darauf, dass er selbst den betreffenden Gegenstand vor Augen hat: sieh her auf mich oder auf das, was mein Wahrnehmungsobject ist."

However, it is evident that a purely spatial interpretation of deictic demonstratives is untenable (see already Frei 1944; cf. Keller 1946; Fontán 1965; Kurzová-Jedličková 1963; Orlandini 1989): consider (23) in which the same referent in the same context allows the free alternation of *hic* and *ille*, independently of any change concerning position or distance:

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20. As a matter of fact, alternative hypotheses, which deny the relationship of *iste* with the second person, have also been suggested: Keller (1946), for instance, claimed that the three terms imply different degrees of "deictic force" (*iste* > *hic* > *ille*); cf. already Marouzeau (1935: 148). De Carvalho (1991) explicitly suggests a model where *hic* and *iste* both depend on the *ego*, arguing for a refined system of oppositions in which *hic* is opposed to *ille*, on the one hand, and to *iste*, on the other. A "distance-oriented" egocentric system has been suggested in Benedetti and Ricca (2002: 22–24), a work which is nevertheless not directly concerned with Latin data. As noted, the traditional view has been recently defended by de Jong (1998), though in the minimalist perspective from which, in many context types, more than one deictic is appropriate, but in some contexts only one is found and these would tell us most about the true nature of the pronoun. The crucial term is obviously *iste*, which in fact de Jong correlates with the second person, mainly on the basis of the fact that the discourse deictic use (cf. Note 8 and Section 4) is at its functional core: the relevant point is not the frequency of this use (roughly, a half of the total occurrences of *iste*, according to de Jong's data), but the exclusion of other demonstratives from this context type.

(23) Plaut. *Amph.* 416–417: *egomet mihi non credo, quom illaec autumare illum audio: / hic quidem certe quae illic sunt res gestae memorat memoriter*
'I cannot believe my ears, when I hear what he claims: he certainly remembers exactly what happened there'

More than that, it would be impossible to define physical (or even metaphorical) borderlines in order to determine at what step (of the scale or of the *continuum*) one term is chosen instead of the other. Again, in the following example, the so-called "distal" demonstrative applies to a referent inside an area which has just been referred to by the "proximal" demonstrative:

(24) Plaut. *Amph.* 97–98: *haec urbs est Thebae: in illisce habitat aedibus / Amphitruo …*
'this is the city of Thebes: there, in that house, lives Amphitryon … '

This does not mean that the occurrence of deictic demonstratives and the location of referents must be kept separate from the interpretative point of view: an interpretation in terms of space or distance is available and appropriate in many contexts. Yet, an interpretation, however common it may be, is not sufficient in order to understand, or even describe, a linguistic process: it is its consequence rather than its reason (cf. Joffre 1998). The examples which follow further confirm that space and a referential notion of person are not the proper parameters to describe the Latin deictic system: pronominal *iste* and adnominal *ille* introduce a cataphoric relative clause, the former in a derogatory context, the latter in an emphatic context which resembles the recognitional uses (cf. Note 8):

(25) Plaut. *Men.* 766–767: *ita istaec solent, quae uiros subseruire / sibi postulant, dotae fretae, feroces*
'so behave these women who want to make men submit to them, availing themselves of their dowry and therefore arrogant'

(26) Plaut. *Amph.* 861: *ego sum ille Amphitruo, quoii est seruos Sosia*
'I am that Amphitryon, whose slave is Sosia'

Eventually, space and distance would not allow a unitary account for situational and tracking uses of demonstratives, nor, again, could a solution be

found invoking metaphorical values: in fact, for instance in the type "the one … the other", the order *hic* … *ille* and the order *ille* … *hic* may freely alternate and *hic* may therefore trace back either to the first or to the second element (Bulhart 1934: 169; De Carvalho 1991: 231; Bolkestein 2000: 109):

(27) Cic. *Mil.* 35: *haec non dico maiora fuerunt in Clodio quam in Milone, sed in illo maxima, nulla in hoc* …
'I do not mean that Milo had more of that than Clodius, rather, that character was at its highest degree in that man, on the contrary, this other man had it not at all'

(28) Liv. 30,30,19: *melior* … *est pax quam sperata uictoria: haec in tua, illa in deorum manu est*
'it is better … peace than victory, though you desire it: the first is in your hand, the second depends on the gods'

To sum up, to keep interpretations as *explicans*, we could only resort to the subjective and ever-changing choice of the speaker as to an unfalsifiable solution: the only proof, in fact, would be the text itself, which is the *explicandum*.

The minimal hypothesis to describe the Latin demonstrative system is based on a functional correlation, which is not actually (or, at least, it is not immediately) the referential relation between *origo* and *denotatum*, both meant as entities.[21] As Hjelmslev (1937) hypothesized, deictic demonstratives imply a feature, which we may label "person" as long as we specify that this is nothing more than an arbitrary terminological choice, which is not connected to an extralinguistic or linguistic ontology. Person, as such, is determined and established by the linguistic act and is therefore an *ego*; as

21. *Origo* is the term introduced by Bühler (1934); *ground* is preferred by Hanks (1990, 1992) and Laury (1997) who, following previous suggestion by Talmy (1978) and Fillmore (1982), consider the *ground/figure* contrast as a basic function of deixis. The following discussion will be centered on both adnominal and non-adnominal occurrences of demonstratives: adverbial demonstratives, since typically fulfilling a predicative function in the clause, imply in fact further semantic features which may not be reasonably ascribed to the deictic function. This is to say that, if a spatial semantics cannot be denied in most adverbial uses, this appears to be due to the predicative function rather than to the deictic one. On the asymmetries among deictic pronouns and adverbs, cf. Rauh (1983), Ricca (1989), Benedetti and Ricca (2002: 14–15).

a linguistic feature, the *ego* operates according to the opposition of marked and unmarked values. We can therefore hypothetically suggest that (the use of) *hic* be specified by the positive value [+*ego*], whereas (the use of) *ille* be specified by the negative value [−*ego*].

The ways in which *hic* shows its functional value are various on the interpretative plane (an exemplification may be found in Klein 2000): in many cases, a description of proximity is implied (and conforms to the traditional view of the spatial relationship between *origo* and *denotatum*), but this is nothing more than a possibility:

(29) Plaut. *Bacch.* 56: *nam huic aetati non conducit, mulier, latebrosus locus*
'woman, the brothel does not suit my age'

(30) Plaut. *Amph.* 752: *audiuistin' tu hodie me illi dicere ea quae illa autumat?*
'did you hear me, today, there, telling her what she claims?'

Instances such as (29) and (30) show other possible manifestations of the functional positive value [+*ego*]: it would not be reasonable to postulate, on the basis of their occurrence, a possessive semantics (which is the interpretative result of the context in (29)) or a rejection attitude (which is the interpretative result of the example in (30)), as well as occurrences which result into a localization should not induce the postulation of a spatial semantics. Deictic demonstratives have no specific meaning: they simply manifest a system of linguistic oppositions, resulting into various superficial interpretations.

2.2.1 Looking for the relevant feature of iste

This hypothesis could still appear as a variation of the traditional model of a "person-oriented" system: the analysis of *iste* will clarify that it is not, denying that (the use of) *iste* be simply specified by a feature [+*tu*]. Most contexts where *iste* appears imply in fact a relation with the second person: yet, these contexts cannot be reduced to a spatial semantics, unless a subjective notion of "reference area" is invoked in terms so generic as to be uninteresting from any experimental point of view. Consider example (31), which may be classified as an instance of discourse deixis (de Jong 1998):

(31) Plaut. *Amph.* 581–582: *pestis te tenet. :: nam qur <u>istuc</u> / dicis?*
‘You are tainted. :: Why do you say that?’

Moreover, the correlation of *iste* with the addressee of the speech act is common, but unnecessary (cf. De Carvalho 1991: 230–233; Joffre 1996: 150; 1998: 248–249). Cases in which a real addressee is undeterminable, if not excluded, are attested: to solve the problem, a “virtual” (yet, still ontological) *tu* has been sometimes hypothesized on the basis of the context (cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 183):

(32) Plaut. *Amph.* 287: *ubi sunt <u>isti</u> scortatores, qui soli inuiti cubant?*
‘where are these guys who consort with prostitutes, who sleep alone only unwillingly?’

(33) Plaut. *Amph.* 319–320: *mirum ni hic me quasi murenam exossare cogitat. / ultro <u>istu⟨n⟩c</u> qui exossat homines. Perii, si me aspexerit*
‘it would be surprising if he does not think about deboning me like a moray eel. Keep this butcher away from me. I am lost, if he has seen me’

(34) Plaut. *Amph.* 1039–1041: *perii miser. / quid ego – quem aduocati iam atque amici deserunt? / numquam edepol me inultus <u>istic</u> ludificabit quisquis est.*
‘poor me, I am lost. What should I do – supporters and friends leave me. By Pollux, this unpunished man, whoever he is, will never treat me as a plaything.’

As for (32), for instance, it might be suggested, on the basis of the occurrence of *isti*, that the passage is an allocution directed to somebody who is virtually present, though possibly hidden.[22] The idea is intriguing; yet, theatrical suggestion increases if we assume that the relationship implied by the allocution is implicit rather than explicit, i.e. founded on the negative rather than on the positive value of the relevant feature: it is a fact that the Latin text does not authorize the introduction of a second person in the interpretation. Exactly

22. This is the interpretation which emerges, for instance, from Faggi’s translation in Plautus, Titus Maccus, *Anfitrione. Bacchidi. Menecmi*, Garzanti, ([1993] 2000: 27): ‘Voi che non volete dormire da soli, razza di puttanieri, dove siete?’

for this reason, this feature cannot be [+*tu*]: provisionally, it can be stated that it is an *ego*, but a different *ego* from the one which has been proposed as the relevant one for *hic* (and *ille*). The assumption of the relevance of the *tu* in (33) would be even less reasonable: the context reveals clearly that Sosia is talking about Mercurius, without addressing him directly. As for (34), the utterance of which takes place without any addressee on the stage, we should invoke the reference area relative to the audience. The solution, however, would be trivial: whereas it is undeniable that dramas are directed to an audience, it cannot be neglected that they are in fact constituted by various speech acts and different discourse types (in a fictitious way, of course, but this is their essence) and not all monologues are crypto-dialogues whose addressee is the audience.

It is not worth dwelling on more examples: this kind of data is well known and the difficulty it raises for the idea of a strict correlation between *iste* and the second person has favored different proposals, in particular the hypothesis of a system articulated according to a gradation: a scale of "deictic force" was, for instance, Keller's (1946) proposal, who anticipates, for Latin, an idea which will be successful in pragmatic approaches (cf. Note 20). The hypothesis, however, is hardly falsifiable. Actually, if the relationship with *tu* is neglected and a gradation is invoked, it seems impossible to answer the following question: how the quantitative scheme results into the qualitative opposition? In other words, the point at which the relevant feature shows its relevance would be paradoxically undeterminable.

Moreover, neglecting the relationship with the *tu* would be neglecting a macroscopic piece of documentary evidence, which has not been properly emphasized in the literature on this issue (but cf. already Joffre 1996: 146, 1998: 246): an examination of a wide corpus of Latin texts[23] reveals that *iste* occurs in (units of) texts in the first person, i.e. dialogic texts which are correlatively and functionally determined by an inherent relationship with the second person (but the relationship is exquisitely linguistic and it is indepen-

23. Plautus: *Amphitruo*, *Bacchides*, *Menaechmi*, *Miles gloriosus*; Cicero: *de officiis*, *pro L. Murena oratio*, *de inventione*, Caesar: *de bello Gallico*, *de bello ciuili*; Sallust: *de coniuratione Catilinae*, *de bello Iugurthino*; Livy: *ab urbe condita*; Tacitus: *annales*, *dialogus de oratoribus*; Iuvenal: *saturae*; Petronius: *satyricon*; Apuleius: *metamorphoses*. Cf. Pieroni (2004).

dent from the real or virtual presence of an addressee).[24] In historical texts written in the third person, in fact, all occurrences of *iste* are within direct speech acts.[25]

Were emphasis and distance simply relative to an absolute notion of *ego*, how could we account for this textual distribution? And why would a textual restriction only apply to *iste* and not to *hic* ad and *ille*? The combination of our observations seems to produce a paradox: actually, the deep *ratio* of the use of *iste* emerges, if we only admit that the determination of the function which may be represented as second person is not obtained in a direct way and is not dependent on its textual actualization. Rather, the determination of the function which may be represented as second person is indirect: it is a consequence of the determination of a specific type of *ego*, which is the correlative and dialogic *ego*, which (the use of) *iste* manifests and on which (the use of) *iste* depends. To sum up: it is the *ego* which establishes *iste*, but not the same *ego* which establishes *hic* and *ille*. Saying *iste*, this *ego* qualifies himself in an oppositive way, both syntagmatically – it is in combination with *tu* – and paradigmatically – as it is not commutable with an *ego* which is not in correlation with *tu*.

The fact that the Latin system of personal pronouns does not distinguish, from the lexical point of view, among different types of *ego* is not obvious

24. For a linguistic partition of dialogic and narrative texts, cf. Ambrosini (1970). For a subtle articulation of discourse types, see Kroon (1995: 109–115), which refers to Roulet et al. (1985). In spite of the difference between Kroon's definition of "dialogue" and the definition given in this chapter (which is less subtle and simply includes monologues: more partitions could turn out to be relevant at further developments of this research), Kroon suggests, as well, keeping separate the notion "dialogic" (which, in her framework, refers to the status of a text segment in the wider discourse structure and is opposed to "monologic") from the consideration of the number of speech participants which are involved in the speech act ("monologal" / "dialogal" parameter, in Kroon's terms).

25. One occurrence in *de bello Gallico*, 3 in *de coniuratione Catilinae*, 110 in Livy, 16 in Tacitus' *annales*, but the manual count should only be considered an approximation. This result obviously refers to those texts in which a tripartite system may be claimed: cf. Section 2.2.2 – in particular, Note 31 – for textual units, such as the *mediocris figurae oratio* of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which attest bipartite stems. Cf. Fontán (1965) for the attestation of various bipartite stems in Latin, including the *hic* vs. *ille* type.

counterevidence:[26] it is a fact that different notions of *ego* (in particular, an "*ego* locuteur" to be kept distinct from the *ego* which may appear in the clause) should be postulated to account for grammatical options (cf. Fugier 1974; Bertocchi 1994; and Section 2). According to the hypothesis developed here, the distinction between two types of *ego* is manifest in the deictic demonstrative system: *hic* and *iste*, both related to *ego*, nevertheless manifest two different *ego*, a narrative *ego*, which is opposed to a narrative *non-ego* (the third person, *ille*) and a correlative *ego*, whose definition implies and subsumes the notion of *tu* (and the traditional correlation between *iste* and *tu* would be regained – as also suggested by de Jong 1998 – though from the different perspective from which *tu* is also a linguistic function and not an extralinguistic entity).[27]

Since the exemplification given above has been mainly based on the theatrical corpus, which is obviously the richest, it is worth emphasizing that the functional tripartition hypothesized here not only describes Plautus' system, but holds for different times and texts (cf. Note 23). Theater was certainly a favorite context for the use of *iste*, but monologic texts of various types, through the whole history of Latin, offer instances of *iste*, such as (35) and (36), which cannot be reduced to qualitative, namely derogatory, values (cf. Joffre 1996: 148–149), nor can they always be artificially explained by invoking the person to whom the work is destined as addressee, for instance Cicero's son in (36):

26. From the lexical point of view, for instance, Latin does not distinguish between "inclusive" and "exclusive" *nos*, but this does not imply that the distinction is not functionally relevant in the language (and phenomenologically signalled by the relative lexical forms in other languages).

27. It is difficult to know whether the intuition of different types of *ego* is shaded in the following passage from Benveniste (1956: 252): "Il faut donc souligner ce point : *je* ne peut être identifié que par l'instance de discours qui le contient et par là seulement. Il ne vaut que dans l'instance où il est produit. Mais, parallèlement, c'est aussi en tant qu'instance de forme *je* qu'il doit être pris ; la forme *je* n'a d'existence linguistique que dans l'acte de parole qui la profère. Il y a donc, dans ce procès, une double instance conjuguée : instance de *je* comme référent, et instance de discours contenant *je*, comme référé."

(35) Cic. *off.* 2,8: *tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore uersaris iis simillimo qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finituma uestris ignota esse nolui*
'actually, my Cicero, even though you are involved in a very ancient and noble philosophy with Cratippus as guide, who was very close to those who established this renowned school, I did not want you to be unaware of these ideas of ours, so close to yours'

(36) Cic. *off.* 3,111: *sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum quod captiuos retinendos censuit. nam quod rediit nobis nunc mirabile uidetur illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit. itaque ista laus non est hominis sed temporum.*
'but of Regulus' praiseworthy actions one thing is especially admirable: that he thought that the prisoners should not be set free. As for the fact that he went back, this now seems remarkable to us, but at that time he could not do otherwise. So, this praiseworthy action is not due to the man but rather to the circumstances.'

2.2.1.1 Iste *as a manifestation of the "emotive" function.* The hypothesis of the relevance of a "correlative" *ego* allows a unitary account for the occurrences of *iste*, rather than cutting a distinction between the deictic and the so-called "qualitative" values. Consider, for instance, examples (37) and (38), which are contexts where *iste* expresses derogation:

(37) Plaut. *Bacch.* 649–650: *non mihi isti placent Parmenones, Syri, / qui duas aut tris minas auferunt eris.*
'I don't like these slaves, Parmenones, Syrians, who rob their master of two or three minas.'

(38) Plaut. *Men.* 876–877: *iam ne isti abierunt quaeso ex conspectu meo, / qui me ui cogunt ut ualidus insaniam?*
'Are those people out of my sight, those who are forcing me – sane as I am – to go mad?'

It should also be remarked that, besides the well-known derogatory context, a sympathetic, "mock-conspiratory" value of *iste* may be also identified (see de Jong 1998), as in the following passage:

(39) Plaut. *Men.* 89–94: *apud mensam plenam homini rostrum deliges. / dum tu illi quod edit et quod potet praebeas / suo arbitratu ⟨usque⟩ ad fatim cottidie, / numquam hercle effugiet, tam etsi capital fecerit. / facile adseruabis, dum eo uinclo uincies. / ita* <u>*istaec*</u> *nimis lenta uincla sunt escaria*
'a full table – tie his snout to it! As long as you will provide him with food and drink to suit his pleasure and his appetite each day, he'll never run away, even if he has committed a capital crime. You will keep him easily so long as you bind him with these bonds. The bonds which are so extraordinarily tenacious are those on the belly'

Uses due to a sympathetic attitude are also frequent in expository texts from the time of Early Latin and are typical, for instance, of Seneca's works (de Jong 1998):

(40) Cato *agr.* 157,1–2: *nunc, uti cognoscas naturam earum, prima est 'leuis' quae nominatur … et item est tertia, quae 'lenis' uocatur, minutis caulibus, tenera, et acerrima omnium est* <u>*istarum,*</u> *tenui suco, uehementissima …*
'to give, then, the several varieties: the first is the so-called "smooth" … so is the third as well, the "mild", with small stalk, tender, and the most pungent of all, with a scanty juice which has the most powerful effect … '

(41) Sen. *nat.* 1,1,6: *tunc ignes tenuissimi iter exile designant et caelo producunt. ideo nulla sine eiusmodi spectaculis nox est; non enim opus est ad efficienda* <u>*ista*</u> *magno aeris motu. denique, ut breuiter dicam, eadem ratione fiunt* <u>*ista*</u> *qua fulmina, sed ui minore …*
'then the extenuated fires make a slender path and draw it out in the sky. So, no nights are without spectacles of this kind; for to produce them there is no need of great atmospheric movement. Finally, let me say it briefly, they are produced by the same cause as lightning bolts are but by less force … '

The derogatory and the mock-conspiratorial interpretations appear to be the polar values of the same function, rather than two different and independent values. In fact, they are a typical manifestation of the "emotive function" in Jakobson's (1960) terms and they can be considered as expression of a

correlative *ego*, which constitutes himself as such in relationship with the speech act.[28]

It is not worth dwelling on the other various interpretative effects of the value of *iste*, which have already been described in a wide literature: we limit ourselves to the frequent correspondence with possessive semantics, with or without the concomitant presence of a possessive pronoun (cf. (29) and see, in particular, Orlandini 1989):[29]

(42) Plaut. *Amph.* 556–557: *quid est? quo modo? iam quidem hercle ego tibi istam / scelestam, scelus, linguam apscidam.*
'what? how? I'll cut out that evil tongue of yours, you scoundrel.'

(43) Plaut. *Amph.* 285–286: *ego pol te istis tuis pro dictis et malefactis, furcifer, / accipiam …*
'I'll catch you, you rascal, for these oaths of yours and your misdeeds …'

A lesser known syntactic correspondence is the remarkable occurrence of *iste* in negative and interrogative sentences, and, in general, in sentences characterized by moods of unreality (Joffre 1998). A couple of further examples,

28. The manifestation of the "emotive function" might be also recognized in those contexts where *iste* is used to put participants (or things) aside, as in Plaut. *Asin.* 603: *ne iste, hercle, ab istam non pedem discedat*. On this use, see, in particular, Joffre (1998). It is worth stressing that both *ille* (cf. (18)) and *hic* (Plaut. *Amph.* 319) also occur in similar contexts. Yet, it could be argued that the three deictics do not have the same function: in particular, *ille* is used, in a narrative way, to describe (something about) someone who is characterized as other (and, therefore, aside) with respect to the *ego*, whereas *iste* is used when "celui qui prend la parole est devenu simple témoin, il a pris ses distances par rapport au déroulement dramatique, il livre ses commentaires et ses méditations en faisant du public son complice" (Joffre 1998: 250). In other words, the opposition is paradigmatic, in this case: a further invitation to keep the notion of function and the notion of use separate.

29. Once again, an absolute relationship of *iste* with the second person would be untenable. Consider the following examples: Plaut. *Poen.* 811: *ita sunt † isti nostri diuites*; Catull. 17,21: *iste meus stupor*. In Cicero both the occurrence with *meus* and with *noster* are attested (the second less marked, but *noster* is often used as *pluralis maiestatis*): Cic. *Vatin.* 6,2: *ac tamen hoc, Vatini, memento, paulo post istam defensionem meam quam tu bonis uiris displicuisse dicis…* From the point of view developed in the preceding section, these cases are neither exceptions nor the warning signs of a diachronic shift: in fact, they are easily accounted for by consideration of a correlative *ego*.

in addition to many of the cases we have already given (cf. (32), (33), (34), (37)), are the following:

(44) Cic. *off.* 3,82: *quid est quod afferre tantum utilitas ista quae dicitur possit quantum auferre si boni uiri nomen eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit?*
'how could you profit by this so-called expediency, or would you rather be damaged once it has stolen your good name and caused you to lose your sense of loyalty and justice?'


(45) Iuv. 2,135–136: *liceat modo uiuere; fient, / fient ista palam; cupient et in acta referri*
'if we only live long enough; things will be done, will be done openly; it might even be that they shall be published as news'

Although frequency is not decisive for our considerations, the correspondence with non-declarative modalities confirms the relevance of the "emotive function", as an expression of a dialogic and correlative *ego*.

2.2.2 Towards a paradigmatic description of the system: markedness and diachrony

The diagram below attempts a formalization of the functional traits suggested as relevant for the parametrization of the Latin demonstrative system:

(46)



It is worth emphasizing that the formalization suggested describes the Latin tripartite system, but it does not depend on it. The functional opposition between a correlative and a non-correlative *ego* is independent of the explicit lexical distinction of two elements: languages with bipartite systems, such as most Romance languages, are far from being indifferent to this functional

opposition. Rather, the transparency of the form-function relationship has become obscure. In fact, if one accepts the functional articulation hypothesized, the loss of the lexical distinction (which has been put into the historical framework of a complex – but not chaotic – reorganization, with interdependent traction chains, by Wartburg 1963) did not take place in a random way: the lexical form of the correlative term expands over the functional domain of the non-correlative egocentric term, dispersing the manifestation of its functional markedness. Nonetheless, the extension was possible because of the functional minimal trait which was shared by the two terms: the *ego*. As a consequence of this extension, *hic* was crushed, in spite of its frequency throughout the whole history of Latin, because it was the middle term between the most marked (*iste*) and the least marked term (*ille*).[30]

Therefore, although bipartite systems may in fact appear and reappear at different stages of Latin,[31] relevant texts for diachronic development appear those in which formal tripartition still holds, but starts to function in a

30. Tripartition may of course re-emerge via different strategies: one instance is the Tuscan type *questo*, *codesto*, *quello*, where *codesto* is re-determined by the insertion of the second person pronoun (*tibi*) between *eccum* (see below) and *istum*. Another type is found in Spanish and Portuguese, where the new term formally derives from *ipse*. For the analysis of a different system, i.e., the dialect of Torino, cf. Lombardi Vallauri (1995).

31. When considered from a functional perspective, the Latin system reveals a remarkable continuity: the relevance of the dialogic modality for the occurrence of *iste* certainly still holds in Petronius' text, where all the occurrences of *iste* are within direct speeches. It is not easy to identify a point at which the system turned: traces of *iste* used as a 'first person' demonstrative have been signalled in Fronto, Apuleius, Tertullian, Arnobius, Jerome, and in the *Historia Augusta* (*ThLL*, s.v.), but the lack of a direct relationship between *iste* and the second person is not the point at stake, as has been proven: this is in fact the case in many of Plautus' passages.
As for the set *iste* vs. *ille* used in opposition according to a bipartite stem, this may be found at different stages of Latin: Fontán (1965), for instance, recognizes the appearance of this type in the *mediocris figurae oratio* exemplified in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: *Rhet. Her.* 4,9,13: *eo quidem isti minus facile conarentur, quod illi quemadmodum discessent uidebant.* According to the data in the *ThLL* (s.v.), the main context in which the opposition becomes stable is that which opposes celestial and earthly phenomena (the second term may remain implicit): Cic. *Tim.* 18: *ille, qui ista iunxit et condidit.* Such contexts are obviously privileged in Christian authors: Tert. *resurr.* 5,2: *futtile et friuolum istud corpusculum*; Vet. Lat. Paul *II Cor.* 5,4: *in isto tabernaculo corporis* (but cf. also Pallad. 13,7: *ille augeatur, iste decrescat*).

different way in comparison with the above-described system[32] (for wide exemplification of *iste* in the domain of *hic* in later Latin, mainly in the *Afra*, cf. Abel [1971]; cf. also Fruyt [2003] for the use of *iste* in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*). From this point of view, the attestation of *iste* in third person narratives may be meaningful, for instance in the passages in (47), which is however an indirect speech act, and (48), from Suetonius and the *Historia Augusta*:

(47) Suet. *Aug*. 13: … *uni suppliciter sepulturam precanti respondisse dicitur iam istam uolucrum fore potestatem*
'… they say he answered to one man begging for burial that this matter would have been in the power of the birds'

(48) Spart. *Hadr*. 21,5: *fuerunt eius temporibus fames, pestilentia, terrae motus, quae omnia, quantum potuit, procurauit multisque ciuitatibus uastatis per ista subuenit*
'during his time there was starvation, pestilence, earthquake and, as far as he could, he tried to provide relief and to come to the support of many towns devastated by these misfortunes'

Within the functional reorganization of the system, the forms of demonstratives may eventually undergo a formal renewal by the adjunction of the reinforcing element *ecce*. As a matter of fact, the various categorizations of Latin *ecce* as an adverb, a conjunction or an interjection may be explained by the fact that it had "une valeur thétique, et possédait donc des fonctions liées à des contexts particuliers : une fonction presentative, une fonction interruptive, correptive, etc." (Cuzzolin 1998: 263). Prominently, it occurred in Classical Latin in displaying sentences, thus with first and second person verb forms, but also in some types of presentative sentences (Rosén 1998: 735):

32. In Apuleius' *metamorphoses*, for instance, most occurrences of *iste* are connected to emphatic dialogues (Callebat 1968), but in some occurrences (7 out of a total of 75) *iste* shows a narrative function similar to that of *hic*, i.e. it is a purely cohesive device in contexts such as the following: Apul. *met*. 1,2: *'parce' inquit 'in uerba ista haec tam absurda tamque immania mentiendo.' Isto accepto sititor alioquin nouitatis…* The text, however, is a first person narrative, so it is not easy to exclude that this is a further manifestation of the correlative *ego*.

(49) Plaut. *Trin.* 622: *sed generum nostrum ire ec⟨c⟩illum uideo cum adfini suo*
'actually I see that our son-in-law is coming with his relative'

As documented in Cuzzolin (1998), its "predicative" function lies behind the use of *ecce* as a reinforcing element for demonstratives (cf. Selig 1992: 182) and, in fact, the same phenomenon may be found across languages, for instance in Arabic and Czech and appears as a typical diachronic path of demonstratives (cf. Parenti 2001: 182–183, who also quotes similar reinforced forms from Albanian and Russian). The development which leads to the new forms of the demonstratives might be therefore described as the shift which leads *ecce* from a clause predicate to a reinforcing element of the nominal. The lexicalization of the group *ecce* + demonstrative is at least foreshadowed in Latin texts,[33] quite before the often quoted passages from the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (e.g., 14,2; 14,3, which in fact only attest the contiguity of *ecce* and *ista*, but do not really support the claim that the pertinent domain for the function of *ecce* is the nominal):

(50) *CIL I*^{2} 2520, 40–43: *seic ego Ploti(um) tibi trado ut tradas, mandes mensi Februario ecillunc*
'so I hand Plotium over to you, so that you hand him over, send him (i.e., that one) in the month of February'

(51) Apul. *apol.* 53: *libertus eccille, qui clauis eius loci in hodiernum habet . . .*
'that freedman, who still has the keys of that place today . . . '

(52) Apul. *apol.* 74: *sed socero eius eccilli Herennio . . .*
'but to his father-in-law, that Herennius . . . '

33. I wish to thank Alessandro Parenti for having pointed out these cases to me. Cf. Zamboni (2000: 116).

2.3 Beyond person

The non-flat branching of the personal tripartition has obvious reflexes in case of generic uses of person as well. Though we could wonder wether the availability for such uses is the same for all persons or not, in any case structures differ in relation to the choice of person, for instance the second person singular prefers the subjunctive mood in comparison with the first person plural:

(53) Tac. *Agr.* 3: *ingenia studiaque oppresseris facilius quam reuocaueris*
'you can more easily oppress the activities of understanding than awaken them'

(54) Cic. *Phil.* 7,19: *qua re si pace frui uolumus, bellum gerendum est*
'therefore, if we want to enjoy peace, we need make war'

This would seem to confirm the link between the second person singular and the function of a correlative *ego*, as singled out above concerning *iste*: namely the second person singular may have a generic value as long as it is the expression of a correlative *ego*, which creates a *tu* at the very moment when it establishes itself. The *tu* is not in opposition with the *ego*; rather, it includes it or even substitutes for it. Therefore, the second person singular includes the first person as well as the first person plural includes the second person: were it not so, they could not result in a generic reading.

From this point of view, both are different from the third person plural, which is mainly used with *verba dicendi*, such as *dicunt*, *ferunt*, *tradunt*. This is clearly exclusive of the first person, thus differing also from the impersonal passive, which may include (or even explicitly refer to) the speaker, as in the following passage:

(55) Cic. *Tusc.* 5,1: *quintus hic dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum disputationum, quo die est a nobis ea de re, quam tu ex omnibus maxime probas, disputatum*
'this fifth day will bring the Tusculan discussions to an end, Brutus. Today I discussed the subject which of all subjects meets your warmest approval'

As a matter of fact, whereas structures without argument subjects choose the non-person (e.g., *pluit*, *ninguit*, and other "meteorological predicates")[34], the generic use of the"third person" is restricted to a few cases, as *inquit* (cf. Lorenzetti forthcoming). Besides this, it could be worth considering cases such as (56), which appear in Late Latin in relation with the occurrence of a modal verb (but *potest*, i.e. *pote est*, is an ancient impersonal; cf. also the formulae *ut potest, potest ut* ...; see Ernout & Thomas 1964: 210):

(56) *Itin. Eger.* 2,7: *posteaquam ... descenderis inde, et de contra illum uides, quod antequam subeas, facere non potest*
'after ... you have come down from there, you can see it in front of you: before going under it, this was impossible to do'

Connected with the generic use at least for some pragmatic motivations, the so-called "illogical" plural *nos* is attested from the earliest times onwards (see, in particular, Haverling 1995; cf. also Haverling 2000 and, in addition to the studies mentioned by Hofmann & Szantyr 1963, Chatelain 1880, Slotty 1927, Pieri 1967, and Lilja 1971). Cicero quotes Ennius, though it could be questioned whether in this passage *intelligitur unum*:

(57) Enn. *frg. inc.* 377: *aut cum ex pluribus intellegitur unum: 'nos sumus Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini'*
'or when a singular is meant by a plural: we are Romans and we used to be Rudini'

This becomes a typical pattern of the epistolary style, but the pragmatic values of inclusion ("sympathetic plural") and modesty also favor its occurrence in oratory texts:

(58) Cic. *Tusc.* 4,67: *quoniam docendi causa a gaudio laetitiam distinguimus; illud iam supra diximus ...*
'because in order to teach it, we distinguish joy from gladness; we have already stated it above ...'

34. The attestation of cases such as *Ioue tonante*, *Ioue fulgente* (cf., e.g., Cic. *nat. deor.* 2,65) does not authorize the hypothesis that the divinity be the elliptical subject of *tonat*, *fulget* and similar. See Benveniste (1946). Cf. Rosén (1983: 195), Maraldi (1985).

The specific function of the *pluralis maiestatis* seems to belong to the official language of the imperial administration: certain occurrences of this kind are attested from the third century onwards, though the distribution as compared to the first singular is not clear until the fifth century, according to Haverling (1995: 340):[35]

(59) Leo M. *epist.* 23,1: *cum christianissimus et clementissimus imperator ... ad nos scripta transmiserit ...*
'when the extremely Christian and most merciful emperor sent us his writings'

The first clear examples of the "illogical *uos*" appear from the fifth century onwards, first in expressions such as *imperium uestrum* and *maiestas uestra* (Chatelain 1880; Mommsen 1882; Ehrismann 1901):

(60) Avell. 29,6: *unde ... excellentiae uestrae suggerere properaui, ut certum finem rebus, cognitis quae gesta sunt, magnitudo uestra decernat*
'therefore ... I hurried up and suggested to Your Excellency that Your Highness, knowing what has been done, decide to put an end to the situation'

According to Haverling (1995, see also 2000), this suggests that the development of the illogical *uos* should be sought in a more frequent use of the illogical *nos* in epistolography in general. In fact, whereas illogical *nos* was already very frequent in Cicero's letters, the systematic use of the second person plural as known in several modern European languages was not known in the Roman world.

3. Anaphora

As previously noted, the distinction between deictic and anaphoric uses cannot be taken as an absolute distinction of contexts. In particular, the three deictic demonstratives may be used as tracking strategies to refer to entities

35. Examples (59) and (60) are quoted from Haverling (1995).

already mentioned in the previous discourse, but this never implies that the deictic demonstratives are exactly equivalent to the non deictic demonstrative *is*, *ea*, *id*: the former always keep their deictic value and their peculiar function to make reference to the speech-act situation (de Jong 1998; cf. Note 18). From the perspective developed in Section 2.2, a solution could be also found to the contradictions of the traditional view as concerns the tracking value of deictic demonstratives, emphasized by Bolkestein (2000: 109):

> in the case of *ille*, 'remoteness' in space and time is extended to remoteness in thought ... However, this description is not satisfactory in view of the fact that explicit consideration of which parameters may be responsible for such metaphorical distance or nearness in 'thought' is generally lacking ...

Metaphorical "nearness" or "remoteness" is but one of the possible interpretations which correlate with the anaphoric value of the deictic pronouns, and these are by no means a consequence of the (textual) reality, just as purely deictic uses were proved not to be a consequence of the (extralinguistic) reality.

In what follows, we will concentrate on the anaphoric strategies which do not imply necessary consideration of the speech-act situation.[36]

3.1 Agreement

Agreement will only be mentioned in this chapter as a manifestation of the cohesive "tuning" within syntactic structures; thus, as an intratextual tracking device and a manifestation of the syntactic structuring itself (Ambrosini 2003). The main point developed in this section is that structures which are composed of the same elements but manifest different agreement relations need not be the same, because agreement has a role in expressing syntactic relations (cf. Lehmann 1988).

36. It should be emphasized that anaphoric reference may be helped by "esoteric means" such as, for instance, parenthetic *inquam*, which may co-occur with anaphorics and also with exactly repeated nominals (cf. Fugier 1991: 383–384, 387; Rosén 2002: 340).

Disregarding cases of syllepsis (for which, see Ernout & Thomas 1964: 138–152), there are two domains in which agreement is fundamentally stable and in which it applies consistently:

– between the subject and the predicate (agreement in person if the predicate is a finite verb and agreement in case if the predicate is a nominal – in case, number, and gender only with adjectives);
– between attributes or appositions and the noun to which they refer (full agreement in the case of attributes and declinable appositions, agreement only in case – for obvious reasons – for non-declinable appositions).

It follows from the first statement that subject-predicate agreement is a necessary (though perhaps not a sufficient) condition for a structure to be non-impersonal. It is also evident that the first type includes the second, if we only admit that attributes and appositions are predicates whose argument is the noun to which they refer.

From a functional perspective, deviations from this scheme elicit further investigation. As a case in point, the fact that full nominals, third person pronouns and proper names in the nominative may occur together with finite verbs marked by first or second person morphology demands an explanation. Traditionally, such cases are invoked as proof of the "appositional" nature of subject nominals in general, since morphology would be in any case self-sufficient (Ernout & Thomas 1964: 126–127):

(61) Nep. *Them.* 9,2: *Themistocles ueni ad te*
'I came to you myself, (as) Themistocles'

(62) Plaut. *Epid.* 398–399: *heus, foras / exite huc aliquis*
'yes indeed, come out here, somebody'

The term "apposition", however, may be ambiguous: the contexts in which the structure occurs suggest that the nominal is not the subject, but has a predicative function in the clause and forms a complex predication with the main verb.[37] In other words, admitting that the structure in (61) is the same as the one in (63) would seem the most economical assumption, which simply requires an antonomastic interpretation of the proper name:[38]

37. For the notion of "complex predicates", cf. Davies and Rosen (1988) and Rosen (1997).
38. According to this view, the observation by Priscian quoted below, rather than proving

(63) Cic. *epist.* 2,12,1: … *ne hospes plane ueniam*
‘… so that I won’t come as an obvious guest’

A further case in which agreement phenomena may give hints on the functional structuring is represented by (64):

(64) Verg. *ecl.* 3,80: *triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres*
‘it’s a sad thing the wolf for domestic animals, the rains for ripe crops’

Disregarding here the fact that (64) is likely to be an impersonal structure,[39] the relevant point seems to be that *lupus* does not trigger agreement. Both the lack of agreement and the interpretation suggest the idea that *lupus* is not the subject (or the pivot, if the structure is impersonal) of the predicative element *triste*. Rather, the subject (or pivot) of *triste* is the predicative complex [*lupus stabulis*], which in this sense is a syntagmatic unit (cf. Ernout & Thomas 1964: 127, who describe *triste* as a “neutre avec valeur généralisant” and Orlandini 1994: 173, who suggests the interpretation “c’est une chose […] triste”). The three elements would not be on the same plane: it is only as a syntagmatic group that *lupus* and *stabulis* would relate with *triste*. A consistent syntactic account could also be suggested for the less transparent case in (65):

(65) Cic. *Tusc.* 2,31: *turpitudo peius est quam dolor*
‘being shameful is worse than grief’

that the structure is no longer clear in later times (Ernout & Thomas 1964: 127), would signal the fact that such complex predications are not possible with all types of predicates, whereas the apposition of a proper noun to a personal pronoun is obviously always allowed: Prisc. *gramm.* VIII 101 [vol. II p. 448 lin.17–24 Keil]: *et prima quidem et secunda uerborum pronominibus iungi possunt solis, tertia uero etiam nominibus, quae per se tertiae sunt personae, absque uocatiuo casu, quod ante diximus, ut ‘lego ego’, ‘legis tu’, ‘legit ille’ uel ‘legit Cicero’. nam si dicam ‘lego Cicero’, soloecismus est, nisi addidero pronomen, dicens ‘lego ego Cicero’ uel ‘legis tu Cicero’, exceptis illis uerbis, quae sunt substantiae uel uocandi, ut ‘Priscianus sum, Priscianus uocor, Priscianus nuncupor’.*

39. Compare this with cases with a finite verb which does not show agreement with the nominal, such as the following: Cato *agr.* 144,5: *accedit oleae salsae modii V.*

"Le neutre résume un ensemble qui peut être représenté par une proposition entière [. . .] ou bien par un substantif [. . .] à valeur 'non-référentielle' (justement la même valeur que celle des sujets des énoncés génériques" (Orlandini 1994: 173). The lack of agreement suggests, again, that the nominative nominal is not simply the subject argument, and that we consider the possibility that clause syntax may be sensitive to the fact that a predication is contained within it. Morphology helps us in this case to grasp the predicative value, which is conveyed by the translation 'to be, being shameful'.

The list of cases which may show different agreement patterns is long. Among them, the so-called "attraction phenomena" are worth special attention. As a matter of fact, in some of these cases the structure with "attraction" is the rule: for instance, in cases of nominal predication such as (66), the demonstrative which performs the subject function systematically agrees with the nominal predicate (cf. Bortolussi forthcoming):

(66) Plaut. *Epid*. 431: *haec stultitiast*
'this is silliness'

The patterns without full agreement are attested only from the imperial age on (cf. Väänänen 1981: 149; Orlandini 1994: 175), in particular in interrogative and negative clauses, i.e.:

(67) Liv. 2,38,5: *si hoc profectio et non fuga est*
'if this is a departure and not a flight'

The option between two different agreement patterns is available in other contexts since the classical period. Compare:

(68) Cic. *Balb*. 29: *ciui Romano licet esse Gaditanum . . .*
'it is permitted to a Roman citizen to be a citizen of Gades . . . '

(69) Cic. *Tusc*. 1,33: *licuit esse otioso Themistocli*
'it was possible for Themistocles to live quietly'

From the point of view of syntactic functions, the reason could be the following: both are control structures in which the implicit subject of the infinitive is controlled by the indirect object governed by impersonal *licet*. However, whereas in *ciui Romano licet* [*esse Gaditanum*] it traces back to the dative and the predicate *Gaditanum* belongs to the infinitival clause, in *licuit esse* [*otioso*

Themistocli] the inmost predication (*otioso*) would have the noun (*Themistocli*) as its subject and the infinitival clause would imply a pro-predicate:[40] 'for Themistocles, who lived quietly, it was possible to do so'. As a matter of fact, rather than a speculative hypothesis, this would seem to be the formal description which follows the observation of agreement patterns.[41] This kind of analysis could apply to structures such as (70) as well, in which it could be hypothesized that the inmost predication, whose argument is *pago*, be *Troiano* rather than *nomen*; *nomen* would be therefore a support noun anaphorically tracing back to *Troiano*:

(70) Liv. 1,1,3: *et in quem primo egressi sunt locum Troia uocatur pagoque inde Troiano nomen est*
'and the place where they first landed is called Troia. And the name to the Troian village therefore follows'

If this is true, word order itself is possibly a consequence of syntactic structuring.

From a diachronic point of view, a few observations are worthy of note, as concerns the internal structure of complex nominals, in which agreement was in fact the main strategy to encode the relation between argument and predicate. Some predicative relations apparently became obscure and therefore demanded a new determination by more explicit means, which will prevail in Romance: this is the case of the *genitivus definitivus*, frequently attested in late authors (cf. Svennung 1935: 210; Bonnet [1890] 1968: 715), as, for instance, in Pallad. 4,10,28: *caprifici arborem*.[42]

40. The hypothesis of silent propredicates in Latin is, of course, easy to verify: Plaut. *Amph.* 937: *iam nunc irata non es?* :: *non sum.*

41. As already mentioned, the traditional term "attraction" has the drawback of implicitly hinting at a secondary structure: as a matter of fact, cases which show agreement between the predicate and the indirect object are attested (and frequent) from the time of Plautus (cf. Plaut. *Epid.* 338). Whether or not this could allow the reverse hypothesis of the chronological priority of the structure with "attraction", it must be emphasized that the functional opposition between the two structures in the Latin system cannot be understood in terms of (historical or conceptual) derivation.

42. The necessity of a specific means of coding for predicative relations sometimes also appears at the clause level. For instance, to encode non-finite predications after *sum*, in non-Classical Latin, adverbs may occur instead of adjectives (cf. E. Löfstedt 1911: 57;

A tendency towards the loss of full agreement within complex nominals is also evident from the analysis of the imperial inscriptions and of the African texts in *CIL* VIII made by Herman ([1966] 1990). Whereas the accusative appears as the unmarked case with respect to the encoding of grammatical relations in the clause (cf. La Fauci 1994, 1997; Zamboni 1998, 2000: 86–87, 102–103, 108–109), as concerns nominal groups its extension goes hand in hand with the extension of "abusive" nominatives: *CIL* VIII, 22570: *C. Aurelio Dioc(l)et(i)ano pio felix inuictus*; *CIL* VIII, 21559: *pro salute imp. M. (A)ntoni Gor(d)iani ... pater patriae*. In other words, "le nominatif, dans les textes tardifs envisagés, accuse une nette tendance à devenir une sorte de forme de base, une forme fonctionnellement 'non marquée' qui peut s'insérer comme membre dans des group dont la fonction syntaxique commune est exprimée par un autre membre" (Herman [1966] 1990: 324).[43]

Finally, from a functional point of view, we should stress the rise in Late Latin (and, afterwards, Romance) of other devices which were formerly associated with agreement and therefore optional (i.e., redundant). In particular, Herman (1985) hinted at juxtaposition as the strategy destined to prevail as the one for the denotation of membership in the same nominal complex. There is no point in emphasizing the frequency of scrambled constituents in Classical Latin (though not without constraints, as shown by Bolkestein 2001): scrambling in fact decreases with time. In Claudius Terentianus, out of a total of 73 noun phrases comprising a noun and one or more adjectives, only two contain disjoint noun phrases. In the classical period, on the contrary, case agreement was the basic strategy to encode the "cohesion" of various nominal elements and juxtaposition was but a concomitant and optional feature. Of course, this does not mean that juxtaposition is a consequence of the collapse of the nominal declension; neither could the cause-effect chain

Ricca, this work, vol. 2): consider, for instance: Petron. 61,1: '*solebas' inquit* '*suauius esse in conuictu*'. In fact, the use of an adverb with predicative function after *sum* is already known in Plautus (Lindsay 1936: 79).

43. Interestingly, this tendency especially emerges when human beings are involved (in particular, in case of proper nouns). The special link of the nominative case with human nouns has also been remarked as concerns those Romance forms which continue a nominative, in cases such as *latro* and similar. Cf. La Fauci (1994), Zamboni (2000: 93) for a morphosyntactic interpretation of this as a trace of an active-inactive or, possibly, ergative-absolutive system.

be reversed. In Herman's view, however, the fixing of contiguity strategies takes on one of the functions of declension. Interestingly, the apparent exceptions to juxtaposition all involve cases in which an anaphoric element is inserted in between: *Itin. Eger.* 37,3: *hic autem locus*; *Itin. Eger.* 39,22: *in eo id est loco*.

3.2 Zero anaphora?

As mentioned in Section 2, due to the morphosyntactic information contained in inflection, the expression (or lack) of explicit (pro)nouns in subject function depends on pragmatic factors. A question can be raised, however, concerning the minimal level of explicit marking of the other grammatical relations, in particular objects. From this point of view, a major difference between Latin and Romance languages has been repeatedly stressed (Dressler 1970; Mulder 1991; Luraghi 1997, 1998a, 1998b), namely that Latin so-called "zero anaphora" is not an exclusive property of subjects.[44]

Leaving aside cases which can possibly be considered as "absolute" (i.e., intransitive) uses, such as (71), and cases of anaphora in coordination, such as (72), which are permitted in the Romance languages as well (with the only difference that Romance deletion is mainly on the right),[45] it is easy to find examples in which the same propositional structure in Romance could only be expressed with an explicit pronoun, as in (73) and (74), which is favored by the predicative complement:

(71) Cic. *Att.* 2,8,1: *nunc, si quid in ea epistula … fuit historia dignum, scribe quam primum ne ignoremus …*
'now, if something in that letter … is worth chronicling, write as soon as you can so that we are not left in ignorance …'

44. For discussion and references on zero anaphora constructions in object position and on a possible syntactic account, cf. Cole (1987) and Huang (1994: 48–57, 2000).

45. In Romance languages such as Italian, object "deletion" is mandatory in contexts where a perfective periphrasis is coordinated with a participle, as in *L'ho visto e abbracciato* 'I saw and hugged him'. The agreement features of the participle could be a functional reason for this preference. Anyway, in case the auxiliary (which verifies the subject) is repeated, the clitic (which points at the object) must also be repeated.

(72) Caes. *Gall.* 3,29,3: *Caesar exercitum reduxit et ... in hibernis conlocauit*
'Caesar withdrew the army and ... settled it in the winter quarters'

(73) Tac. *ann.* 1,13: *L. Arruntius haud multum discrepans a Galli oratione perinde offendit*
'L. Arruntius offended him (*scil.* Tiberius) as well, not differing significantly in his speech from that of Gallus'

(74) Tac. *ann.* 3,43: *adduntur e seruitiis gladiaturae destinati ... : cruppellarios uocant ...*
'those who are destined to the gladiatorial profession are added from among the slaves ...: they call them *cruppellarii* ... '

In spite of the fact that the label "zero anaphora" is useful to identify this peculiarity of Latin syntax, it is worth emphasizing that it need not refer to any substantial missing element. Apart from preconceived ideas based on translations, there is no reason for claiming that something is missing in those languages which show a higher degree of implicitness: the fact that such structures may in fact be interpreted as having a specific object has certainly to do with the preceding discourse or with shared knowledge, but not necessarily with the morphosyntactic properties of verbs and structures.[46] Of course, all this does not mean that the fact that some languages (such as Latin) show this typical implicit processing, whereas others (such as the Romance languages) tendentially make the argumental frameworks fully explicit, is not relevant either as a typological[47] or as a diachronic issue (Section 5.2).

46. As a matter of fact, implicitness may concern predicates as well as arguments. Consider, for instance: Tac. *ann.* 1,1,1: *multa patrum et in Augustam adulatio*, where the postulation of the ellipsis of some form of the paradigm *sum* would be only a paraphrasis and by no means a theoretical explanation for the grammaticality of the structure.

47. Bickel (2003), for instance, on the basis of the investigation of some languages of the Himalayas, claims that the variation of "referential density", i.e., of the ratio of overt arguments (nouns or pronouns), also depends on the typological distinction among languages with case-sensitive Privileged Syntactic Arguments (PSAs) and languages with case-insensitive PSAs (namely, "referential density" increases when PSAs are case-sensitive). PSA is the cover term, first proposed by van Valin and LaPolla (1997), for controllers (such as the controller of verb-agreement or the antecedent of reflexives) and pivots (in their terms, the controllee of control constructions, the raised element in raising construc-

As a matter of fact, a progressive decrease in the incidence of structures such as (73) emerges in the history of Latin. Whereas examples of zero anaphora in coordination may be found at all stages of Latin, implicit arguments appear to become noticeably more restricted to contexts in which the object is generic or recoverable from verbal semantics. This is favored by certain text types, as Apicius' recipe book:

(75) Apic. 1,1: *rosatum sic facies: ... cum ad bibendum uoles uti ...*
'this is the way to make the rose wine ... when you want to use it for drinking ...'

As Luraghi (1998a) has already shown, in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* no "zero anaphoras" are found, even in contexts where the pronoun would be typically absent in Classical texts.

3.3 Reflexive structures

Whereas the first and second person pronoun do not appear in different forms in reflexive and non-reflexive structures, the third person has a specific pronoun to encode reflexivity (the implicational hierarchy for distinct reflexive forms in fact goes from first/second person to the third: if a language has distinct forms for the first two persons, it also has distinct forms for the third but not the other way around; cf. Comrie 1999: 337).

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tions, the target of relativization constructions). The distinction between case-sensitive and case-insensitive PSAs is meant to distinguish those processes which "make crucial reference to information contained in syntactic valency frames" from those processes "which refer directly to semantic argument structure and to prominence hierarchies defined there" (Bickel 2003: 711). From a different point of view, this might be described in syntactic terms as a different sensitivity to structural depth: controllers, for instance, may be sensitive to final (or superficial) relations as well as to non-final relations. The link with case is obvious: for instance, in Latin, final subjects are encoded by the nominative case. It is a fact that Latin controllers, at least in some domains such as reflexive structures (cf. Section 3.3), are sensitive to non-final relations (rather than to morphological case): in this sense, Latin evidence concerning the possibility of non-overt arguments would fit in Bickel's description.

The issue of reflexive structures will be dealt with here only as regards the determination of the controller and the domain in which this controller may be found. Both issues raise problems for morphosyntactic analysis: as a matter of fact, no specific requirement applies as to the superficial grammatical relations of the controller, nor do clause-binding restrictions.

3.3.1 The controller of the reflexive

What follows is a list exemplifying the range of possible controllers for the reflexive:

(76) Caes. *Gall.* 1,4,2: *(Orgetorix) ne causam diceret se eripuit*
‘(Orgetorix) got himself out of pleading his case’

(77) Caes. *Gall.* 5,38,4: *(Ambiorix) se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem*
‘for that purpose (Ambiorix) offered himself as a helper’

(78) Caes. *Gall.* 1,45,1: *multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset; … neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariouisti quam populi Romani*
‘many statements were made by Caesar in order to show why he could not give up the task at hand … and in his own evaluation Gaul did not belong to Ariovistus but rather to the Romans’

(79) Plaut. *Rud.* 49: *erat hospes par ⟨s⟩ui*
‘there was a man of his own kind’

(80) Cic. *Tusc.* 5,54: *neque eam (sapientiam) umquam sui paenitet*
‘and it (wisdom) never repents of itself’

As is evident, reflexives may or may not refer to the grammatical subject of the clause. They do in (76) and (77). They do not in cases such as (78), (79), and (80). Given this evidence, traditional grammars resorted to the intuitive notion of “logical” subject (for instance, Kühner & Stegmann 1955: 601ff.; Juret 1926: 96ff.). A clear definition of this intuitive notion has been sought from many perspectives and a pragmatic account in terms of topic has been sometimes suggested (Sznajder 1981; Bertocchi and Casadio 1983; Bertocchi 1989; Touratier 1994: 37–38; in a generative perspective, and as far as long distance reflexives are concerned, Benedicto [1991: 179–191]

has also claimed that the reflexive anaphors may be bound to the A′-position "topic").

The search for a specific semantic account has been developed over the last few decades and the relevance of the agent as controller has been invoked to account for instances such as (78). Actually, the occurrence of structures such as (81), in addition to the fact that long distance reflexives (see next section) mainly occur in indirect statements, has led scholars to enlarge the notion so as to include the speaker, i.e., the initiator of the action (Fruyt 1987: 209; 2002):

(81) Cic. *Mil.* 44: *uos ex M. Fauonio audistis Clodium sibi dixisse* … *periturum Milonem*
'you heard from M. Favonius that Clodius told him … that Milo was about to die'

However, this still cannot account for many structures (see (79) and (80) above) and the hierarchy of semantic roles should thus be resorted to. From a semantic point of view, the proposal that the relevant controlling function is the speaker/agent and, in the absence of it, the higher available role in the hierarchy, seems to be necessary. It is important to emphasize, for the sake of clarity, that the notion of "speaker" does not refer to the extratextual actual speaker (i.e., to the "*ego* locuteur" mentioned in Section 2; cf. Fugier 1974), but to the intratextual one: in (81), for instance, the "speaker" to which the reflexive traces back is Favonius, not Cicero (see the following section).

The variety of semantic roles which are available as controllers for the reflexive, as well as the intuitive notion of "logical" subject, may be captured in morphosyntactic terms, as long as we accept the descriptive tools of a multistratal approach to structures, thus recognizing that there are distinct notions of subjects which play a role in the grammars of languages and that the notion "subject" makes crucial reference to one syntactic level (Perlmutter 1982). Hence, for instance, the distinction between the "initial" and the "final" subject, stated respectively at the initial or the final level, is proven to be relevant across languages to account for different phenomena (among which are control, agreement, raising, reference tracking). As for Latin reflexives, the hypothesis seems to hold that the relevant grammatical relation for the controller

of reflexives is that of “first subject”,[48] meant as the subject notion which selects the set of all elements bearing the subject relation in the initial stratum (the grammatical subject of active clauses and the agentive complement of passive clauses), plus the set of all elements bearing the subject relation in a non-initial stratum of a clause whose previous strata do not contain any other element with one such relation (the subject of medial clauses as in (77), the dative of “inversion” structures as in (79) and the accusative of impersonals in cases such as (80)).[49] This hypothesis does not challenge the semantic accounts; rather, it invites consideration of their syntactic counterpart, with the advantage of unifying the controlling abilities shown by different semantic roles.[50]

Whether we prefer a syntactic or a semantic description, it is also worth noting that the relevant domain for reflexivization is either the clause (in a broad sense, not necessarily the simple clause; cf. (78) and the following section) or a nominal complex:

(82) Caes. *ciu.* 1,4,3: *Scipionem eadem spes prouinciae atque exercituum impellit . . . simul iudiciorum metus atque ostentatio* <u>*sui*</u> *et adulatio potentium . . .*
‘the same hope of a province and of armies . . . along with dread of the law courts, his self-display and the flattery of powerful men stimulate Scipio . . . ’

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48. The crosslinguistic relevance of this notion is demonstrated, for instance, in Harris (1978), Marlett (1984), Farrell *et al.* (1991).
49. According to this analysis, medial diathesis is considered as a manifestation of medial syntax (cf. La Fauci 1994). Anyway, the hypothesis of the first subject as controller would not be challenged even in the event that we would deny the unaccusativity of some deponent structures and claim that their final subject is also the initial one. Cf. Pieroni (2007b). On inversion, see Perlmutter (1984).
50. Nor is the syntactic account challenged by occurrences of reflexive possessives in structures such as Cic. *epist.* 15,14,1: *ille* (scil. *M. Fabius*) . . . *a me diligitur propter summam suam humanitatem* . . . , in which the controller is the final subject: possessives, as well as expressions such as *inter se* and *propter se*, show in fact a wider distribution in comparison with the other occurrences of the reflexive pronoun (cf. Fruyt 1987). See Bertocchi (1989) for discussion.

Such cases are not limited to *nomina actionis*, but, as a matter of fact, appear to be linked with predicative nouns (cf. Poirier 1989):

(83) Sen. *epist.* 90,40: *par erat alterius ac sui cura*
'each cared as much for his neighbor as for himself'

It is easy to observe that the functional mechanism for the control is the same as in clauses: namely, the agent may be the controller or, in the absence of the agent, the element fulfilling the first role available in the hierarchy of functional roles (in morphosyntactic terms, the first subject).

As a bit of negative evidence, it may be noted that the control of the reflexive cannot cross the boundary between coordinated noun phrases, because of opacity:

(84) Cic. *Caecin.* 27: *A. Atilius*$_i$ *et eius*$_i$ *filius L. Atilius dixerunt ...*
'A. Atilius and his son L. Atilius ... said ...'

Diachronically, the restriction of the range of possible controllers is attested by the Romance outputs.[51]

An interesting phenomenon regarding controllers is the occurrence of *se* as a reflexive marker unspecified for person (starting from the first person plural), attested in the second century CE, typically in formular expressions of legal style (cf. Cennamo 1991):

(85) Paul. *dig.* 46,2,20: *si sui iuris sumus*
'if we are within our own rights'

(86) ILCV 600: *ego L. Marius Ampliatus sibi et suis libertis libertabusque posterisque*
'I, L. Marius Ampliatus, to me, to my freedmen and freedwomen and descendants'

51. For a detailed comparison, a parametric description of the various Romance types would be needed: in fact, for instance in Italian, the range of controllers appears more restricted, yet not limited to final subjects: *Non le interessa che se stessa.*

3.3.2 Long distance reflexives

Even leaving aside complex clauses involving AcIs, possibly considered monopropositional, there are unambiguous cases in which reflexives are bound outside their minimal clause (cf. Poirier 1989). The occurrence of a complementizer lifts any doubt as to the bipropositional structure of complex clauses such as the following:

(87) Caes. *Gall.* 1,47,5: *his mandauit, ut, quae diceret Ariouistus, … ad* *se* *referrent*
'(Caesar) ordered them to refer Ariovistus' views to him'

(88) Caes. *Gall.* 1,47,6: *quos cum apud se in castris Ariouistus conspexisset … conclamauit: quid ad* *se* *uenirent?*
'when he saw them in front of him in the camp Ariovistus … shouted out: why were they coming towards him?'

Therefore, it is certain that Latin reflexives may cross the boundary between main and dependent clause, and, sometimes, even cross more than one boundary between dependent clauses: the question concerns the definition of the relevant domain for reflexives, which is in fact a variable across languages (cf. Comrie 1999; Cole et al. 2001).

Leaving apart for the moment relative, participial, and gerundial clauses, and limiting the analysis to the first degree of subordination, the generalization that the Latin data suggest is that embedded reflexive clauses may have their controller in the main clause as long as they are complement clauses of the main one (Benedicto 1991;[52] for final clauses, see below). The definition of complement clauses should be meant in this case in terms of government, therefore independent of whether or not the embedded clause is an obligatory constituent in the valency frame of the main predicate. In fact, in spite of the frequent overlap between the complement nature of the clause and its "obligatory" presence, the latter is not the relevant parameter, as emerges, for instance, in cases with a nominal or pronominal argument, whose complement

52. More technically, Benedicto (1991) claims that reflexives must be bound inside their "dynasty": a dynasty is a chain of governors whereby each governor governs the minimal domain that contains the next governor.

clause is an epexegesis (consider the function of *multa* in (78)). This constraint on complement clauses would seem to account for the non-occurrence of reflexives in causal, consecutive, comparative, and incidental clauses, as for instance in the following:

(89) Caes. *Gall.* 1,1,3: *horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae*$_i$*, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate prouinciae longissime absunt atque minimeque ad eos*$_i$ *mercatores saepe commeant*
'the Belgae are the most courageous of all these people, being the farthest removed from the culture and civilization of the province and given that merchants visit them very rarely'

(90) Cic. *Catil.* 2,22: *sunt ita multi*$_i$*, ut eos*$_i$ *carcer capere non possit*
'there are so many of them that a prison cannot keep them'

As a matter of fact, there is strong evidence that complement clauses may be governed by non-explicit predicates: this claim is also presupposed by the semantic approaches which invoke the (intratextual) speaker as the relevant notion for the control of long-distance reflexives (see (81) above). Consider the following examples:

(91) Caes. *ciu.* 3,49,1: *crebraeque uoces militum ... audiebantur prius se cortice ex arboribus uicturos quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros*
'and the remarks of the soldiers ... were frequently heard that they would rather have fed on bark from the trees than let Pompey slip from their hands'

(92) Caes. *ciu.* 3,80,3: [...] *ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio ueniant: se confidere munitionibus*
'... sends messengers to Scipio and Pompey asking them to come and help him: he had faith in the fortifications'

Examples such as (92) also show that most of the clauses which traditional grammars define as "final" should be considered as complement clauses: yet, final causes with long distance reflexives may possibly occur and require explanation:

(93) *Bell. Afr.* 79,1: [. . .] *oppidum que eo die circummunire coepit locaque idonea opportuna que complura praesidiis occupare hostes ne intrare ad se . . . possent*
'. . . that same day (Caesar) began to surround the town and garrison several suitable strategic points to prevent the enemy from infiltrating and approaching him'

To the best of my knowledge, an attempt at a unitary syntactic account of all the contexts in which long distance reflexives occur (including final clauses) is not to be found in grammars. A possible view could be based on the functional perspective (argued by La Fauci 1988 and partially summarized in Gross 2002; cf. Prandi 1996) that the presence in final clauses of a semantic counterpart expressing intention (with correlations such as the presupposition of a participant capable of volition) may be syntactically explained as involving a predicate (not necessarily a verb) of this type. As a matter of fact, crosslinguistically, a nominal expressing intentionality may be explicit in the "final" conjunction phrase (Eng. *for the purpose of*, Fr. *avec l'intention de*, It. *col disegno di*). In relation to this predicate (for instance the nominals *purpose*, *intention*, *disegno*), final clauses would be complements (i.e., a complex clause involving a final one would imply three predicative units: main clause, conjunction phrase, final clause).[53] Though all this is far beyond the purpose of this chapter, it is worth stressing that the hypothesis that long distance reflexives occur in complement clauses and the hypothesis that final clauses be complement clauses (of the nominal expressing intention implied in the conjunction phrase) strongly support each other. Moreover, in spite of its seeming abstractness, such an account makes explicit basic intuitions which underlie traditional semantic descriptions: "le réfléchi est dit indirect, lorsque dans une proposition subordonnée représentant la pensée ou l'*intention* [emphasis mine] du sujet du verbe principal, il renvoie à ce dernier" (Ernout & Thomas 1964: 182; cf. also Milner 1978: 81; Fruyt 1987).

53. Cf. Pieroni (2007b). An alternative hypothesis is argued by Ros (2001), who suggests, within Government and Binding Theory, that final clauses be in a structurally intermediate position between complement and adjunct clauses and side with complement clauses as regards reflexives.

This kind of perspective would also seem to give hints for the analysis of the structures which have been neglected so far: namely, relatives, participial and gerundial clauses. A unitary account of long-distance reflexives in finite subordinate clauses, including relatives, could in principle be attempted in relation to mood, i.e., to the opposition between subjunctive and indicative. The preferential association of long-distance reflexives with subjunctive contexts is in fact confirmed; however, this correlation is far from being one-to-one: subjunctive clauses do not require necessarily a long distance reflexive nor the other way around (cf. (94) and (95) below and Bertocchi 1994). Alternatively, the opposition restrictive vs. non-restrictive (which would parallel the opposition complement vs. non-complement clause) has been invoked for the distribution of the reflexive anaphora vs. non-reflexive pronouns in relative clauses (cf. Milner 1978; Benedicto 1991; Ros 2001). Consider the following:

(94) Cic. *inv.* 1,55: *Epaminondas … ei qui sibi ex lege praetor successerat exercitum non tradidit*
‘Epaminondas … did not hand over the army to the praetor who had succeeded him by law’

(95) Cic. *Verr.* II 1,86: *(Verres$_i$) Milesios nauem poposcit quae eum$_i$ … Myndum prosequeretur*
‘Verres asked the Milesians for a ship that would convey him to Myndum’

This distinction would possibly apply to the distribution of reflexives and non-reflexives in other non-finite clauses, such as gerundial and participial clauses:

(96) Liv. 22,59,18: *rediere cum legatis … ad redimendos sese missis*
‘they came back with the ambassadors … sent to procure their release’

(97) Cic. *Mil.* 39: *Cn. Pompeius$_i$ … cunctae Italiae cupienti et eius$_i$ fidem imploranti signum dedit*
‘Gn. Pompey … gave a sign to all of Italy, which desired and asked for his help’

Nevertheless, neither is the distinction always easy to make, nor can it account for all the cases. Consider, for instance:

(98) Caes. *Gall.* 6,9,1: *Caesar, postquam ex Menapiis in Treueros uenit, duabus de causis Rhenum transire constituit; quarum una erat quod auxilia contra se Treueris miserant*
'After he had moved from the land of the Menapii to that of the Treveri, Caesar decided to cross the Rhine for two reasons. One reason was that the German tribes had sent auxiliaries to the Treveri against him'

Therefore, these values and correlations appear, once again, to be concomitant (and statistically frequent) effects, but not the relevant functional traits. Therefore, it would rather seem reasonable to accept the idea (already suggested by Ernout & Thomas [1964: 184–185]) that the reflexive is used when the clause expresses the point of view of a participant in the discourse (could this be explained syntactically by the assumption of a non explicit predicate, as in final clauses?), whereas, negatively, a non-reflexive strategy is used when the clause expresses the point of view of the actual extratextual speaker, for instance of Cicero in (97). This idea has been developed in particular by Bertocchi (1986, 1994), who builds a general hypothesis, which comprises non-finite clauses: the reflexive would be used when the narrated event is described from the intratextual subject's (or topic's) "camera-angle"; in other words, reflexives may be considered as a "device for marking the speaker's attitude towards the participants in the event that he is describing" (Bertocchi 1989: 455). More precisely, following Bertocchi (1994), the relevant distinction for the alternation between long-distance reflexives and non-reflexives strategies would be related, on the one hand, to the distinction between clauses not implying and clauses implying the actual speaker's commitment, which Bertocchi respectively ascribes to the level of predication and to the level of proposition (cf. Note 10 and compare examples (99) and (100)). On the other hand, at the level of predication, the distribution of reflexive and non-reflexive strategies would also be related to sentence type, i.e., to the opposition imperative vs. declarative type (compare (101) and (102)).

(99) Caes. *Gall.* 1,41,2: *princepsque decima legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset*
'and the Tenth Legion was the first to thank him through its tribunes for the fact that he had expressed an excellent opinion on it'

(100) Cic. *div. in Caec.* 2: *me saepe esse pollicitum … dicebant … commodis eorum me non defuturum*
'they have been telling me … that I made many promises … not to fail to defend their interests'

(101) (= 87) Caes. *Gall.* 1,47,5: *his mandauit, ut, quae diceret Ariouistus, … ad se referrent*
'(Caesar) ordered them to refer Ariovistus' views to him'

(102) Cic. *Phil.* 6,6: *non is est Antonius: nam si esset, non commis*[*s*]*isset ut ei senatus … denuntiaret ne oppugnaret Saguntum*
'Antonius is not such a man; were he such a man, he would not have compelled the senate … to warn him not to siege Saguntum'

Thus, the choice of *is* instead of *se* would result related, at the level of the predication, with the declarative sentence type (independent from whether this is subjunctive or indicative) and, otherwise, with the point of view of the actual speaker (either, at the predicational level, of the extratextual speaker, or, at the propositional level, of a speaker different from the main participant).[54] The distinction could therefore be also connected to the opposition developed in classical logic between *de re* (transparent, implying actual speaker's commitment) interpretation and *de dicto* (opaque, implying an intratextual participant's commitment) interpretation.[55] Accurate detailed

54. Similar assumptions for the explanation of Japanese reflexives are found in Kuroda (1973). How these assumptions would relate with the issue of so-called "logophoric" pronouns (cf. Hagège 1974; Hyman and Comrie 1981) is an open question for future research.
55. The distinction between the speech-act level and the discourse level and, in particular, the *de re* vs. *de dicto* opposition has been especially developed in many works by Calboli (1989a, 1989b, 1995, 1997: 294ff., 2000, 2001), though with different – and sometimes reversed – conclusions. According to Calboli, reflexives are exactly a strategy to "place" participants (those referred to by means of the reflexive) in the actual speaker's thought and, thus, in the *de re* domain. According to Calboli (2001: 294; cf. Szemerényi 1996),

analysis is obviously needed, in particular when more than two levels are involved, as, for instance, in case of complex subordination where an indirect speech is recursively embedded within another (but see already Fruyt 2002).

Diachronically, the tendency towards a preference for explicit strategies of subordination (cf., in particular, Cuzzolin 1994) might have favored a decrease in the use of long-distance *se*, since AcIs were one of the privileged contexts for its occurrence (see Calboli 2001). However, in a case such as (101) (=87) (to be compared with Romance equivalents such as, e.g., It. *ordinò loro di riferirgli cosa dicesse Ariovisto*) the choice between reflexive and non-reflexive strategies apparently depends on the different segmentation of the relevant domain for the relation between reflexive and controller.[56] The new Romance segmentation in fact obscures a functional distinction which was explicitly conveyed by the Latin alternation between reflexive and non-reflexive strategies, i.e. – if the preceding analysis is correct – the distinction between actual speaker's and textual participants' commitment (or, to put it in other terms, the different value of a functional trait [± commitment of the participant in the discourse]), whose expression was eventually left to other strategies.

3.4 The determinative *is*, *ea*, *id*

Whereas the value of deictic demonstratives requires consideration of the speech-act situation and of the *personae* (meant as functional instances), the value of the remaining demonstratives (*is*, *idem*, *ipse*), sometimes labelled

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this hypothesis would allow, on the one hand, an etymological connection of the reflexive with the demonstrative stem *so/e-*; on the other, it would link the destiny of long distance reflexives to the destiny of AcI.

56. The lines of this different segmentation may be probably found in Latin: consider Petron. 38,4: *scripsit, ut illi ex India semen boletorum mitteretur*, and, especially, cases as *Itin. Eger*. 34: *legit illum locum, ubi Iudas Scariothes hiuit ad Iudeos, definiuit quid ei darent, ut traderet Dominum*, Aug. *serm.* 104,1: *quomodo putamus eam timuisse, ne diceret ei Dominus: "Surge, et adiuua sororem tuam"* (cf. Fruyt 2003: 115). Cf. also Curt. 7,6,18: *illi nec de fide nec de clementia regis ipsos dubitare respondent*.

"determinatives" (Fontán 1965), in principle does not.[57] Even if the absence of deictic value might represent a loss and *is* might have been originally a first person demonstrative (Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 185, who quote Skt. *iha* 'here', Gk. *ἰθα-*, Umbr. *esmei* 'huic'), as a matter of fact texts show from the very beginning an anaphoric use, which is likely to go back itself to Proto-Italic (Osc. *izic*, Umbr. *erec*) (cf. Wackernagel 1928: 85). In fact, *is* can be reasonably described as having the value "present in the discourse" (Serbat 1984: 558), since it is uninterpretable without the support of a co-present term (Note 18).[58]

57. We disregard here the old demonstratives from the stem *so-/sā* attested in Ennius (according to Festus), in a few other texts (cf. Calboli 2001: 292), and in the philological conjecture based on Plaut. *Truc*. 160: *sumpse enitere* (Fontán 1965).

58. Actually, Wistrand (1961) shows how late texts starting from Vitruvius attest uses of *is* which do not have any anchorage in the text, for instance Vitr. 10,16,8: *Diognetus eam helepolim reduxit in urbem et in publico conlocauit et inscripsit 'Diognetus e manubiis id populo dedit munus'*. However, the cases quoted by Wistrand, and which he labels "deictic", seem to occur in texts in the first person and, as Wistrand himself notes, are reminiscent of a "situationsanaphorisch" use, which is rather typical of articles. The whole issue deserves further attention and analysis.
It is also worth remarking that the fact that *is* does not depend on the speech-act instances (at least until the occurrences analyzed by Wistrand, and possibly also in them) eventually results in a "detached" value (Char. *gramm.* II 577, 19 [Keil]: '*eum*' *absentem refert*), which is possibly related to the fact that, in spite of its higher frequency as compared to other demonstratives in most text types, it is dispreferred in the poetic style (Meader 1901). In fact, when it occurs in poetry, as for instance in Verg. *Aen.* 4,478–479: *inueni, germana, uiam (gratare sorori) / quae mihi reddat eum uel eo me soluat amantem*, it could be argued that "le pronom banal est choisi [...] en raison de son *insignifiance* [italics mine] même. Il exprime une réticence, la pudeur d'un amour outragé. Didon ne peut pas nommer l'infidèle; le nom s'arrête dans sa gorge; mais il n'est pas nécessaire qu'elle le désigne expressément à sa sœur; il est 'il', 'lui', l'être dont elle a la pensée uniquement occupée" (Hélin 1927: 65, who notes how the use of *is* in this passage has intrigued annotators since Servius: 'eum = *Aeneam: quem ut notum nolui dicere*'). Similarly, Orlandini (1987: 9) semantically defines *is* as having a "metalinguistic" function, i.e., it depends on the utterance situation in the very generic sense that all linguistic acts imply a speaker: from this point of view, *is* would signal that an element est "tel que *je* vais le caractériser" (cf. Maurel 1983). De Carvalho (1991: 235) makes explicit the oppositive relationship between the demonstrative *is* and deictic demonstratives, describing the functional value of *is*, which he defines as "Deixis subjective" (in opposition to the "deixis objective" of *hic/iste/ille*) as follows: "En effet, de même qu'en posant, dans l'espace, un lieu détérminé comme 'mien', j'institue, du même coup, la représentation

The tracking use is in fact the function of *is* in Latin, from the time of Plautus onwards (cf. also the examples in Section 2.1):

(103) Plaut. *Amph.* 97–102: *in illisce habitat aedibus / Amphitruo, natus Argis ex Argo patre, / . . . / is nunc Amphitruo praefectust legionibus; / nam cum Telobois bellumst Thebano pop*[*u*]*lo./ is prius quam hinc abiit ipsemet in exercitum*
'in that house lives Amphitryon, born in Argos, of an Argive father . . . This Amphitryon is now the commander of the troops, now that the Theban people are in war with the Teloboians. Before he himself went into the army . . . '

The reference may be also cataphoric, as is well known, for instance when the pronoun introduces a relative clause:

(104) Plaut. *Amph.* 9–10: *ea adferam, ea ut*⟨*i*⟩ *nuntiem / quae maxume in rem uostram communem sient*
'I will bring those matters so that I can announce what is of your particular interest'

A tracking function is also to be recognized in cases such as (105)–(106), though they belong to a particular kind of "unfaithful" anaphora in which the antecedent cannot be found in the text, but is built from the context itself (for these and other cases of unfaithful reiteration, cf. Fugier 1991):[59]

d'un espace 'non mien', de la même façon, en définissant, à partir de moi, et hors-moi, un espace structuré, délimité en zones susceptibles de contenir, objectivement, comme il contient la mienne, la présence d'autres êtres que moi, je m'oblige, par contrecoup, à concevoir, à 'pré-voir' un espace laissé en dehors de cette 'objectivité'. Un espace que ne peut être, alors, que celui, que je porte, contenu en moi. Un espace, donc, *subjectif, abstrait*, et *inactuel*, parce que, coextensif à ma propre présence au monde, il ne se réduit pas à la vision que j'ai, présentement, de l'état actuel des choses". This would also be consistent with the considerations developed in the preceding section, mainly based on Bertocchi 1994, according to whom *is*, in contexts in which it is in opposition with *se*, is a manifestation of the actual speaker's committment. Put in other terms, its value could result exactly from its opposition with respect to the value of the reflexive, which would mark a participant's committment.

59. Consider also those cases where the tracking strategy applies because of the repetition of a root: Plaut. *Amph.* 994: *si quid patri uolupest, uoluptas ea mihi multo maxumast*.

(105) Plaut. *Amph.* 79–80: *sat habet fauitorum semper qui recte facit, / si illis fides est quibus est ea res in manu*
'one who behaves honestly always find supporters, as long as the people who judge it are reliable'

(106) Plaut. *Amph.* 476–478: *nam Amphitruo actutum uxori turbas conciet / atque insimulabit eam probri: ⟨t⟩um meus pater / eam seditionem illi in tranquillum conferet.*
'for Amphitryon will soon be raging at his wife and will charge her with adultery: then my father will turn that quarrel into peace.'

As an anaphor, *is* may in fact trace not only to nouns but also to the notional content of propositions or units of discourse (cf. Orlandini 1987 and Section 4).

As for the grammatical relations involved, it should be emphasized that *is* shows a preferential correlation with non-subject arguments and this is a main difference from *ille*. In comparison with *ille*, it also privileges inanimate referents.[60] It seems unnecessary to go into detailed statistics, since in any case no constraints are required.[61] As concerns the function of *is* in the clauses considered so far, with the exception of equative structures such as (17), repeated here as (107), where *is* is a pure morphosyntactic means of reference to the third person, the pronoun *is* fulfills an argumental function: this is also clear when the pronoun supports an attribute, separating it from the full nominal to which it refers, as in (108):

(107) (= 17) Plaut. *Pseud.* 978–979: *tun'es Ballio? / :: ego enimuero is sum*
'so, are you Ballio? :: exactly, it's me'

60. But the forms which are undifferentiated for gender, in particular the genitive and the dative, tend to be employed for animates and the reference to inanimates triggers the use of the "empty" substantive *res*: *eius rei*, for instance, is used for abstract nouns and sentence content. In any event, this holds for the deictic demonstratives as well. For this and other correlations with gender, see Rosén (2000); for the relationship between Latin neuter forms and *res*, see Orlandini (1994) and, for some prerequisites, Kleiber (1987a, 1987b).

61. Further research on the general frequency of *is* may nonetheless be worth doing: in Plautus, for instance, it is by far the most frequent element as compared both to deictic demonstratives and to the other determinatives. Cf. Section 3.5.3.

(108) Cic. *Tusc.* 1,57: *(animus hominis) habet … memoriam et eam infinitam …*
'the human mind … has a memory and an endless one…'

Actually, if all the cases described seem to suggest that *is* is a third person anaphor, a few cases show that the reference to the third person is not mandatory. As a non-person pronoun, *is* may be in fact related to a personal verbal morphology:

(109) Plaut. *Merc.* 631–632: *ego me*[*t*] *credidi / homini docto rem mandar⟨e⟩, is lapidi mando maximo*
'I thought I had entrusted my interest to an intelligent man, but I myself entrusted it to a real blockhead'

The structure is especially frequent when *is* is in correlation with a relative clause:

(110) Plaut. *Amph.* 176–178: *satiust me queri illo modo seruitutem: / hodie qui fuerim liber, / eum nunc potiuit pater seruitutis*
'I should rather complain that way: I was free this morning and now Iuppiter made a slave of me'

> Ces faits donnent à penser que *is* est un anaphorique plus général encore qu'un pronom de troisième personne … S'il en est ainsi, les examples où *is* reprend un morphème de première ou de deuxième personne montrent très bien que le constituant *is* a une signification nominale …, c'est-à-dire une signification que n'est pas concernée par la notion linguistique de personne … Le pronom anaphorique *is* est dans ces conditions purement et simplement un pronom anaphorique (Touratier 1994 : 30–31).

Eventually consider cases such as (111) (cf. [102]):

(111) Cic. *Catil.* 1,22: *neque enim is es, Catilina, ut te aut pudor a turpitudine aut metus a periculo aut ratio a furore reuocarit*
'in fact, Catiline, you are not such a man that decency could keep you … from depravity, nor fear from danger, nor reason from madness'

In such contexts, as in those exemplified by (107) (= 17), the function of *is* at the clause level is clearly predicative (though within the units constituted

by *is* + consecutive, as well as within the units constituted by *is* + relative, it is reasonable to assume an argumental function for *is*). It is peculiar that in all these contexts *is* traces back or forward to a definite (pro)noun or phrase (cf. Bortolussi forthcoming).[62] Accordingly, it may occur in identificational sentences such as (112), but it never functions as a pro-predicate of the type of Fr. *le*, It. *lo* in contexts such as Fr. *Jean est professeur et il l'est depuis longtemps* and It. *Giulia è bella e lo è sempre stata*:

(112) Plaut. *Asin.* 378–379: [...] *sed quis hic est ? is est, / illest ipsus.*
'[...] who is this? it's him himself.'

3.5 Identity: *idem*, *ipse*

The syntactic behavior of *idem* is similar to that of *is*, on the one hand; crucially different, on the other. As a pronoun, *idem* may also perform an argumental function in the clause:[63]

(113) Plaut. *Merc.* 855–856: *nam tu quemuis confidentem facile tuis factis facis, / eundem ex confidente actutum diffidentem denuo*
'by your deeds you so easily make whoever you like trust in you and then in the next moment you make the same person distrustful'

(114) Cic. *Q. Rosc.* 9: *nisi eundem et aduersarium et testem habuerit Roscius ...*
'unless Roscius had this same man both as an opponent and as a witness ...'

62. The function of *is* of signalling or subsuming a definite description is emphasized by Orlandini (1987) who therefore ascribes a predicative function to *is*. The terminological clash is an illusion, due to the different perspective: Orlandini in fact gives this definition from a semantic point of view, whereas in this chapter argumental and predicative function are meant to be syntactic relations.

63. It may of course also occur as a clause predicate, though the identification of unquestionable contexts of this type is not easy. For instance, in cases such as Plaut. *Amph.* 76–77: *qui minus / eadem histrioni sit lex quae summo uiro?* there are no syntactic proofs to decide whether *eadem* is a clause predicate or an attribute in relation to the nominal *lex*.

(115) Cic. *Sull.* 81: *at idem non adfuit alio in iudicio…*
'but he was not present in the other legal action…'

In these pronominal contexts, *idem* may in fact alternate with *is*:[64] from this point of view, it is interesting to note, that, whereas it can combine with all other pronouns, *idem* cannot combine with *is*.[65] Independently of the fact that the occurrences of *idem* in comparison with *is* may relatively increase in the long run, this suggests that, as concerns their pronominal function, *is* and *idem* functionally belong to the same paradigm from the very beginning (Touratier 1994: 44), as the internal inflection of *idem* would also suggest.

Nevertheless, when used adnominally, *idem* occurs in contexts in which *is* is not found, for instance in case it is in the scope of an adverb or is combined with other personal or deictic pronouns:

(116) Cic. *Tusc.* 3,31: *hic est enim uoltus semper idem, quem dicitur Xanthippe praedicare solita in uiro suo fuisse Socrate …*
'this explains the face, always the same, which Xanthippe, as it is said, used to claim her husband Socrates wore …'

(117) Cic. *Verr.* II 3,16: *easque res nouas abs te prolatas et inuentas magno tibi quaestui fuisse scio; eundemque te memini censorias quoque leges … tollere et commutare*
'I know that these novelties which have been revealed and discovered are to your great advantage; and I remember that you repealed and changed … the censorial laws as well'

(118) Caes. *Gall.* 4,11,4: *haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur, ut …*
'Caesar thought that all these things were aimed at the same object, namely …'

64. Or with *is etiam*. Consider: Cic. *off.* 2,10: *quicquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum*. Cf. Touratier (1994: 44).

65. Apart from three instances in Christian Latin and an uncertain passage in Gellius 6,1,11. As for the juncture *idem ipse*, it is never attested in Plautus, but is used by Cicero (*ThLL*, s.v. *is*; cf. Meader 1910: 42–44).

To maintain the unity of all these cases, we could perhaps claim that, when pronominal, *idem* is substantivized (cf. Touratier 1994: 45) and that its predicative value, which makes it an attribute when it is apposed to a noun, is therefore obscured at the clause level.

Just as with *idem*, *ipse* shows a variety of properties which neatly distinguish it from personal and deictic pronouns: it can freely combine with other pronouns, in particular with personal, demonstrative and reflexive pronouns (cf. Touratier 1994: 47–48):[66]

(119) Cic. *Verr.* II 5,9: *ego ipse haec quae ille quaerit … commemorabo*
'I myself will remember … these things which he looks for'

(120) Plaut. *Bacch.* 1206: *lepide ipsi hi sunt capti, suis qui filiis fecere insidias*
'good, these very same people were captured, who plotted against their own sons'

(121) Cic. *Tusc.* 5,36: *nam cui uiro … ex se ipso apta sunt omnia*
'the man for whom … everything depends on himself alone'

As a matter of fact, when *ipse* combines with an explicit nominal or pronominal, they may perform any function in the clause. But when no nominal or pronominal is specified, it turns out there are only two possibilities: either *ipse* refers to the subject (and person – any person – is manifested by verbal morphology, since Latin is a pro-drop language: cf. (122), (123), (124)) or, when *ipse* does not refer to the subject, it is third person (as in (125)).[67] This

66. As for the co-occurrence of personal pronouns and deictic demonstratives within a noun phrase, the parodic intent of seeming exceptions such as Plaut. *Amph.* 625: *Sosia, inquam, ego ille* in fact confirms the inherent opposition. Moreover, in such cases, it is not easy to decide whether the demonstrative is adjoined to the pronoun as a modifier or is itself a pronoun apposed to it.

67. At least according to the data in the grammars and in *ThLL* and as far as I could check in a corpus made up of all Plautus' comedies, Caesar's *de bello Gallico* and *de bello ciuili* and the following works by Cicero: *pro Quinctio*, *pro S. Roscio Amerino*, *pro Q. Roscio comoedo*, *in Q. Caecilium*, *in Verrem*, *pro Tullio*, *pro Fonteio*, *pro Caecina*, *pro lege Manilia*, *pro Cluentio*, *de lege agraria*, *in Catilinam* and all the *epistulae*. Very few "exceptions" are not really such: for instance, a relative pronoun in fact "supports" the occurrence of *ipse* in Val. Fl. 7,50-53: *uobis / … / quos, credamus ut ipsis, / rex suus inlisit pelago uetuitque reuerti* (cf. Pieroni 2007a: 155, in particular Note 4).

means that *ipse*, crucially differing from *idem* (cf. (113)–(115)), requires a minimal combination with another element (or function), which, when not explicit (i.e., manifested by a noun, a pronoun or verbal morphology), is virtual (cf. Touratier 1994: 47) and, in this case, third person:

(122) Plaut. *Amph.* 17–18: *nam quoius iussu uenio et quam ob rem uenerim / dicam simulque ipse eloquar nomen meum*
'I will say who told me to come and why I came and at the same time I myself will tell you my name'

(123) Cic. *epist.* 11,2,1: *cum ipsi in tua potestate fuerimus...*
'when we ourselves will be in your power ...'

(124) Caes. *Gall.* 1,10,3: *ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praefecit. Ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit ...*
'for these reasons he set Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general, in command of the fortification he had made. He himself hurried by forced marches into Italy ...'

(125) Plaut. *Asin.* 403: *atque hercle ipsum adeo contuor: quassanti capite incedit.*
'and, by Hercules, I see at last him himself: he comes along shaking his head.'

It is worth emphasizing that the "parasitic" behavior of *ipse* is not subject to categorial constraints: not only may *ipse* be combined with pronouns, nouns, verbs used as nouns, but also with adverbs, as in (126) and (127):

(126) Cic. *div.* 1,118: *et tum ipsum, cum immolare uelis*
'and exactly at the moment when you want to offer a sacrifice'

(127) Cic. *Att.* 12,40,2: *nunc ipsum ea lego*
'just now I read it'

From the point of view from which syntax is basically a combination of argumental and predicative functions, the distribution of *ipse*, and in particular its privileged relationship with the subject function in cases such as (122) and (123), suggests that it does not perform an argumental function in these contexts nor in cases as (124). Therefore, it would seem a reasonable hypothesis

to assume that it performs a predicative function: a hint at this is already in Pinkster (1990: 145) (cf. Pinkster 1983), who discusses the type *ego de me ipse profitebor* (Cic. *Phil.* 2,118), arguing that *ipse* specifically performs the function Predicativum (see also Bertocchi 2000: 546; cf. Joffre 2007). Furthermore, if *ipse* were not a predicate, it would also be difficult to understand how it could interact with negation in cases such as (128) and (129), where negation takes in only *ipse* in its scope (cf. Section 3.5.1 for further analysis):

(128) Plaut. *Merc.* 466–467: *non ipse emam, / sed Lysimacho amico mandabo*
'I will not buy it myself, but I will have my friend Lysimachus do it'

(129) Cic. *Att.* 10,14,1: *mihi quidem etiam lippitudo haec, propter quam non ipse ad te scribo, sine ulla lacrima est*
'even this inflammation of my eyes, because of which I cannot write you myself, is without tears'

3.5.1 Interpretative differences as effects of the syntactic context where ipse *occurs*

Given the hypothesis that *ipse* performs the function of a predicate, it is worth specifying that this does not entail that it behaves as an adjective: differently from *idem*, in fact, when not adnominal, it is never "substantivized" (cf. (122)–(124)). The question is then: what kind of predicate is it?

As a predicate[68] which semantically expresses identity (for a formal definition of "intensifiers" as semantic functions – not necessarily predicates – which take an individual term x as their argument and map them onto an output which is identical to the input, cf. Eckardt 2001; Hole 2002; König and Gast 2002; Gast 2006), it may in fact produce various interpretations, naturally connected with the intensifying effect: e.g., "just, exactly X", "even X", "as for X", "X by himself", as, respectively, in the following extracts:

68. The idea of an "identity" predicate is not new as concerns SELF-forms of the English type *himself*: in a generative framework, Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Browning (1993) developed the hypothesis that English *himself* be a complex NP headed by (the noun) *self* and with *him* in the Spec position. *SELF* is therefore analyzed as a two-place predicate denoting the relation of identity (for discussion, cf. Gast 2006: 30–32, 157 ff.).

(130) Plaut. *Men.* 898: *atque eccum ipsum hominem: opseruemus quam rem agat.*
'here he is himself: let's see what he does'

(131) Cic. *Att.* 9,15,5: *praeterea te ipsum quodam modo hic uiolauit cum in me tam improbus fuit*
'moreover, this man in a way offended you as well in treating me so badly'

(132) Caes. *Gall.* 7,49,1–3: *Caesar … ad Titum Sextium legatum … misit ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret … ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, euentum pugnae ex⟨s⟩pectabat.*
'Caesar … sent a message to Titus Sextius, the lieutenant-general … bidding him bring the cohorts speedily out of the camp and post them up at the foot of the hill at the right flank of the enemies … as for him, he advanced a little with the legion from the place where he had halted and awaited the issue of the battle.'

(133) Caes. *Gall.* 1,4,4: *neque abest suspicio, ut Heluetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciuerit*
'and not without suspicion, as the Helvetians think, that he killed himself'

It seems reasonable to argue that such differences are effects of syntactic combinations rather than semantic differences implied by a polysemous lexeme.

In principle, leaving aside the last case for the moment, the other three interpretations ("just X", "even X", "as for X") might be taken together as different manifestations of one single concept, which might be described as "X is the most remarkable element, the highest in rank, the climax" (this does not exclude, but rather invites us to consider the possibility that more subtle interpretative distinctions may be singled out). This "climax" contexts[69] does not show syntactic restrictions as far as categories or grammatical relations

69. This group only partially overlaps with the cases which are called "inclusive" in typological studies (cf. Edmondson and Plank 1978 for some prerequisites, and Bertocchi 1996 and 2000 for a discussion of the "inclusive" type in Latin).

are concerned. The predicate *ipse* has an element X as its argument: X may be a noun (as in (130)), a personal or demonstrative pronoun (as in (131) and (120)), an adverb (as in (126) and (127)). The combination [X *ipse*] may perform any function in the clause: subject (as in (120)), object (as in (125)), temporal determination (as in (126) and (127)) and so on. Clauses may belong to whatever diathetic type: active (as in (132)), deponent (as in (122)), passive (as in (120)).

On the other hand, example (133), as well as (128) and (129), belong to a subclass of cases whose interpretation is crucially restricted to a specific type of clause: this subclass might be labelled as the "alternative" type, since it corresponds to the interpretation "by himself, alone" and in fact entails a choice among alternatives, as can be seen from the disjunctive coordination in Plautus' passage in (134):

(134) Plaut. *Amph.* 69–71: *siue qui ambissent palmam histrionibus / seu quoiquam artifici- si per scriptas litteras / siue qui ipse ambissit seu per internuntium*
'or if there be those who have solicited the palm for actors or for any artist – whether by letter, or by personal solicitation, or through an intermediary'

From a syntactic point of view, such an interpretation of *ipse* is restricted to the subject function[70] and entails its possible breakdown: this property is highlighted by the semantic effect of negation, which, in cases such as (128) and (129), only applies to *ipse*.[71] It is worth noting that the animacy of the subject is not a relevant parameter for the definition of the "alterna-

70. In principle, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the relevant notion is not the "grammatical" but the "logical" subject, as, for instance, in the Italian type *E' stato ucciso dal re stesso, non da un sicario*. The issue is left for future research.

71. In other words, somebody can be writing, though he does not write himself. Obviously, the possibility of this structure depends on the type of predication: nobody could die or get old without dying or getting old himself.

tive" type:[72] on the one hand, as Bertocchi (1996: 543) observed, inanimate subjects are not excluded from the "alternative" type:[73]

(135) Cic. *div.* 1,74: *ualuae clausae repagulis subito se ipsae aperuerunt*
'the doors closed by the bars immediately opened by themselves'

On the other hand, it is not inanimacy that excludes the "alternative" interpretation in a case such as (136): little would change in the interpretation if Cicero himself were the subject.

(136) Cic. *ad Brut.* 8: *cumque ipsa oratio iam nostra canesceret* ...
'when our oratory itself has also reached a certain maturity ... '

The relevant parameter is exactly the possibility (or not) of the breakdown of the subject function.[74]

A further difference in comparison with the "climax" type is that the "alternative" structure can be active (as in (134)), reflexive (as in (133)), deponent (as in (137) below), but never passive:

(137) Cic. *ac.* 2,48: *cum mens moueatur ipsa per sese*
'since the mind itself moves by itself'

Passive clauses, such as (120), trigger the "climax" interpretation, at least insofar as *ipse* refers to the subject (cf. Note 70).

72. Once again, the group identified overlaps to a certain extent with the group which is labelled "exclusive" in typological studies, but the overlap cannot hide the fact that the relevant distinctions do not coincide (cf. Note 69). As found in the literature, the distinction between "exclusive" and "inclusive" is either considered as a lexical effect (as in Siemund 2000) or as a structural effect which follows from constituency and movement (as in Gast 2006, who states that the distinction between the two types of intensifiers, both generated in the Verb Phrase as sisters of their head Determiner Phrase, is due to the fact that exclusive intensifiers remain *in situ*, whereas inclusive intensifiers move along with their head Determiner Phrase to [Specifier, Tense Phrase]).

73. This is not to deny that a strong preference for the reference to animate entities is shown by *ipse* in general, independently from its interpretation. According to Rosén (2000), neuter forms are rare and mainly found when a nominal is made explicit: the few neuter forms without explicit nominal in Pliny could mark the beginning of the shift towards a demonstrative-anaphoric use (see Section 3.5.3).

74. Just to exemplify, we would not expect a predication which says that somebody is drinking, but it is not he himself who is doing the drinking.

Therefore, a hypothesis which would account for both paradigmatic and syntagmatic differences could attribute the semantic difference to the different interaction of *ipse* with the verbal predicate of the clause (*ipse* in fact never occurs as the only predicate). In the "climax" type, given a predication of any type, all its arguments may be further identified by *ipse* (i.e., constituted by a miniclause with *ipse* as predicate). In the "antithesis" type, *ipse* itself licenses a subject and bequeaths it to the verbal predicate (for details and developments, cf. Pieroni 2007a: 52–54).

3.5.2 The relationship of ipse *with the subject function*

The fact that *ipse* can never be described as the subject of a clause immediately hints at the point in common between *ipse* and the reflexive. However, the distribution of the two is crucially different, as is shown by the ungrammaticality of **Qui*$_i$ *cum ipsos*$_i$ *ad pedes proiecissent* in comparison with (138):

(138) Caes. *Gall.* 1,27,2: *qui cum … se… ad pedes proiecissent*
'when … they threw themselves … at his feet'

Since it is always combined with its subject, whether present or virtual, *ipse* is not controlled by the subject of the clause. The following contexts may be compared with those of long-distance *se*:

(139) Caes. *Gall.* 1,18,3: *(Caesar) reperit esse uera: ipsum esse Dumnorigem*
'(Caesar) finds out that such things are true: that he himself is Dumnorix'

(140) Caes. *Gall.* 1,40,9: *(Caesar dixit) ⟨h⟩ac ne ipsum quidem (scil. Ariouistum) sperare nostros exercitus capi posse*
'(Caesar said) that he himself (Ariovistus) had no hopes that our armies could be taken'

In the domain in which reflexives may be controlled by the subject of the main clause, *ipse* is not. This conclusion is not challenged by the occurrence of *ipse* in cases in which it does refer to the main subject/speaker, as the following:

(141) Caes. *Gall.* 1,13,5: *(Diuico ita cum Caesare egit) … ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere uirtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret*
'(Divico told Caesar) … not to exalt his own value too much, nor to despise them (i.e., the Helvetians)

(142) Caes. *Gall.* 1,44,8: *(Ariouistus praedicauit …) ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos …*
'(Ariovistus said that …) just as it was necessary not to let him attack our territories, at the same time we were in the wrong'

Such cases have been usually interpreted as proof of an alternation between *ipse* and reflexives in long-distance contexts, but, in fact, they offer no such proof.[75] First, in cases such as (141) the equi-reference is only partial: *ipsos* refers to all the Helvetians and not only to their messenger. But even cases such as (142), in which there is equi-reference, in fact only prove that *ipse*, as a predicate, may refer to a (virtual) element which is co-referential with the main subject.

As a matter of fact, evidence shows that *ipse*, as a predicate, has a privileged relationship with subjects:[76] the table in (143) shows the relationship between the semantic types described in Section 3.5.1 and grammatical relations:

(143)

	Subject	Non-subject
"Climax" type	yes	yes
"Alternative" type	yes	no

The unmarkedness of subjects also emerges from the intersection between the possibility of non-explicit nominals (or pronominals) and the possibility of *ipse* referring to any person, as summarized in the table in (144):

75. The hypothesis of *ipse* as a marker of reflexivity in long-distance contexts would also conflict with the crosslinguistic observation that, whereas the cut-off point of the relevant domain for reflexives varies from language to language, the correlation seems to hold that the most marked forms are used in the most local domains and the least marked in the most extended (Comrie 1999: 341).

76. Possibly, with "first subjects" (as well as reflexives; cf. Section 3.3.1 and Note 70).

(144)

	Subject	Non-subject
3rd person	yes	yes
1st/2nd person	yes	no

This unmarkedness of subjects could shed light on well-known pieces of evidence, which, however, have not been properly emphasized: in particular, most occurrences of *ipse* are related to the subject function. For instance, out of a total of 187 occurrences in Caesar's *de bello Gallico*,[77] more than 60 % are nominative subjects; if we add accusative subjects of AcI and subjective genitives we obtain more than 70 % of the total cases. If we limit the counting to cases in which no explicit nominal appears, the value reaches 80 % of the total. Though the quantitative evidence is not important in itself, it becomes meaningful when considered in a structured frame of marked and unmarked relationships.

The preference for the subject relation specifically emerges in the reflexive patterns: when both patterns are possible in principle, in fact, the one where *ipse* agrees with the subject, as in (145), is strongly preferred in comparison with the one where it agrees with the reflexive, as in (146):

(145) Caes. *Gall.* 7,73,4: *qui intrauerant se <u>ipsi</u> acutissimis uallis induebant*
'those who had entered got entangled in the sharp stakes by themselves'

(146) Tac. *ann.* 1,48: *<u>se ipsos</u> morti eximant hortatur*
'he exhorts them to deliver themselves from death'

Apart from the fact that the second pattern is mainly found in cases in which the syntactic structure makes it impossible to refer *ipse* to the subject, as in (146) (Touratier 1994: 48), according to the analysis developed in Section 3.5.1, it would follow that the two types, however synonymous they might seem in some contexts, are not necessarily equivalent and may rather

77. The sample has been collected manually. This naturally entails the risk of inaccuracies, which, nevertheless, may be easily tolerated thanks to the high figures and to the ease of verifying the basic claim of the privileged relation of *ipse* with subjects in a wider corpus.

differ according to the functional opposition between “alternative” and “climax”. This explains in fact the preference for the type *ipse sibi* (as in (133)) with respect to a hypothetical *sibi ipsi mortem consciuerit*, which would rather be related to a context of the type “even to himself, to himself as well as to others, exactly to himself, etc.”.

Eventually, it may be observed that, whereas the type in (146) is attested, though marginal in comparison with (145), a case such as (147) (=135) does not have the alternative option: **ualuae aperuerunt se ipsas*.

(147) Cic. *div*. 1,74: *ualuae clausae repagulis subito se ipsae aperuerunt*
‘the doors closed by the bars immediately opened by themselves’

This is obviously a consequence of the fact that *ipse* functions as a predicate in minimal combination with an argument and therefore simply follows from the analysis developed: *se* in (147) does not perform any argumental function, since it is a pure morphosyntactic marker for medial diathesis.

3.5.3 Developments

Both *is* and *idem* are destined to disappear in Romance, functionally replaced by the heirs of *ille* and *ipse* (for wide documentation of their Latin history, cf. Meader and Wölfflin 1900–1901 and Meader 1910). Though in terms of absolute frequency *is* is abundantly attested until late times,[78] a progressive restriction of its functional distribution – virtually to the genitive case – may be observed, for instance, in Petronius’ *Cena Trimalchionis* and a limited range of uses, among which fixed expressions, is found in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (cf. Ambrosini 1955: 101; Nocentini 1990). However, it appears difficult to single out a solution of continuity in chronological terms. Adams (1977) claims that the replacement of *is* by *ille* was full by the end of the first century, mainly on the basis of Claudius Terentianus, but the hypothesis of a plain substitution by *ille* is not uncontroversial: as a matter of fact, the point at stake would be to exclude the possibility that *ille* is motivated in such

78. However, the destiny of *is* is foreshadowed in quantitative terms as well, at least in some texts: for instance, in the Merovingian language of the *formulae Andecauenses*, the use of *ille* has certainly increased remarkably, extending over the domain of *is* and comprising a third of the total of all demonstratives, including determinatives (Calboli 1997: 113).

contexts: in Petronius, for instance, as Pinkster (1987) shows, *ille* is fully explainable according to its functional value without invoking any real innovation and the same can be affirmed for many occurrences in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (Fruyt 2003).

What can nevertheless be observed is the appearance of systems of oppositions different from the one which can be considered as classical. In the *Itinerarium*, for instance, a remarkable use of *ille* emerges in contexts which were in fact typical for *is*, mainly as a cataphoric correlative term (but cf. already Sen. *Helu.* 19,6; Ernout & Thomas 1964: 190) and thus opposed to *ipse*, which is typically anaphoric:

(148) *Itin. Eger.* 3,8: *ita infra nos uidebantur esse* <u>*illi*</u> *montes, quos primitus uix ascenderamus* ...
'those mountains, which we had climbed before, appeared so below us ...'

In this same text, *ipse* is found in contexts typical of *idem* (E. Löfstedt 1911: 65; Christol 1994), as well as in Velleius Paterculus, Tertullian, Palladius and possibly before (cf. Meader 1910: 39ff.):

(149) *Itin. Eger.* 48,1: *non* <u>*ipsa*</u> *parte exire habebamus qua intraueramus*
'we should not go out from the same side from where we got in'

The extension of the "identity" (non-adjectival) predicate to attributive contexts is not hard to understand (and, possibly, it is not a late phenomenon, though it becomes more frequent in later times; cf. Meader 1910: 196). Apart from the fact that this extension does not mechanically imply the disappearance of *idem*, the lack of the lexical distinction between the attributive and the non-attributive "identity" value would not entail that the functional difference is neutralized, as crosslinguistic comparison might easily show. Again, it is the system of oppositions which is new: *ipse* becomes the unmarked term with respect to *idem*. In Egeria's grammar, in fact, *ipse* may also be used as in classical times (cf. Trager 1932: 38, Väänänen 1987: 49, and Fruyt 2003 for wide exemplification both of "classical" and of "extended" uses; for the latter, see, in particular, Christol 1994) and (150) is crucially different from (149) both in syntactic and in semantic terms:

(150) *Itin. Eger.* 3,3: *in eo ergo loco est nunc aecclesia non grandis, quoniam et ipse locus … non satis grandis est*
'in that place now there is a church, not a big one, since the place itself … is not very big'

The lexical distinction may of course spring up again under new forms: consider, for instance, the Italian type *medesimo* from *-met ipsimum*.[79] As a matter of fact, *met ipsum* (from *egomet ipse* – censured by Donatus – with the particle suffixed to *ego* reinterpreted as a prefix of *ipse* [cf. Väänänen 1981: § 279; Renzi 2000: 184–185]) is already found in Latin without any correlation with the first person: the *Regula Magistri* attests *nosmetipsos*, *nobismetipsis*, *semetipsos*. The process repeats itself: whereas languages such as Italian recreate the Latin distinction thanks to a specific form *stesso* < *istum ipsum* (though the two terms *stesso* and *medesimo* are not in complementary distribution, as is well known), languages such as French show the collapse of the two functions into one form: *même* < *-met ipsimum*.

Possibly as a further step of the extension of *ipse* in the contexts of *idem*, a second-mention tracking function of *ipse* also arises (*ipse* is never cataphoric in texts such as the *Itinerarium Egeriae*), as, for instance, in the following:

(151) *Itin. Eger.* 1,2–2,1: … *per ualle illa, quam dixi ingens. uallis autem ipsa ingens est ualde*
'… through that valley, which is large, as I said. This valley is very large indeed'

Actually, once again, the change cannot be ascribed exactly to a specific point in time (cf., in particular, Joffre 2007). Consider the following structure in Caesar, and compare it with (151):

(152) Caes. *Gall.* 7,68,3–69,1: … *Alesiam circumuallare instituit. ipsum erat oppidum in colle summo …*
'… he decided to surround Alesia with siegeworks. This town was on the top of a hill'

79. The elative form could be considered a further hint of the predicative function which *ipse* shared with adjectives.

Whether or not the second-mention use is at the basis of a demonstrative-like function of *ipse*,[80] it certainly comes to perform one of the article functions (Renzi 1976; Nocentini 1990; Christol 1994; Vincent 1998), as well as the second-mention use in non-adnominal subject function foreshadows one of the functions of *ipse* as a pronoun (though in this case it is difficult to exclude an intensifying value) (cf. Section 5):

(153) *Itin. Eger.* 8,4–5: *hoc autem referente sancto episcopo de Arabia cognouimus; nam ipse nobis dixit nomen ipsius arboris, quemadmodum appellant eam Graece, id est dendros alethiae, quod nos dicimus arbor ueritatis. qui tamen sanctus episcopus nobis Ramessen occurrere dignatus est; nam est iam senior uir, uere satis religiosus ex monacho et affabilis, suscipiens peregrinos ualde bene; nam et in scripturis ualde eruditus est. ipse ergo cum se dignatus fuisset uexare …*
‘we heard this from the holy bishop of Arabia; in fact he told us the Greek name of the tree, which is *dendros alethiae*, that is the tree of truth. This holy bishop was so kind as to meet us at Ramessen; he is a rather old man, very pious, a former monk, he is affable and welcomes pilgrims; moreover, he is very learned as concerns the Holy Scriptures. So, after he had deigned to trouble himself … ’

4. Notes on the uses of *hic/iste/ille/is*, discourse organization and syntactic functions

Joint consideration of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships has revealed that demonstratives never appear to be in complementary distribution (they may occur as paradigmatic alternants in many contexts which are otherwise identical, from the syntagmatic point of view), nor are they in free variation (the paradigmatic alternation affects the context). This has allowed the hypothesis of a set of relevant traits, whose different combination would be the functional basis for the understanding of semantic effects (e.g., the

80. Demonstrative forms deriving from *ipse* are attested in Spanish and Portuguese, which thus recreate a tripartite deictic system symmetric to the personal pronoun system.

so-called "derogatory" value of *iste*, on which, see Section 2.2.1.1) and, reasonably, of their use and distribution in terms of discourse organization.

As a matter of fact, preferential tendencies may be singled out for the relationship among the various demonstrative elements and the information structure of the discourse, both as concerns the pragmatic status of the demonstrative itself and the pragmatic status of its antecedent. For instance, clear results concern the contrastive or otherwise emphatic value of *ille*, consistent with its double negative markedness in the deictic system ([−correlative] [−egocentric]),[81] and its use as a focal subject pronoun in conversations and as a marker of subject shifts in narratives (cf. Section 2). The fact that deictic pronouns are preferred to other pronouns as markers of subject or topic shift[82] is a tendency verified in other languages (cf. Comrie 2000 on Dutch): in fact, a large majority of instances of *ille* subjects do not continue a preceding subject, but refer to a participant in a different grammatical role (154) or occur after focus antecedents (155), at least in the narrative and expository texts – from Caesar, Cicero's letters, and Plinius – analyzed by Bolkestein and van de Grift (1994) and Bolkestein (2000) (cf. Pinkster 1987):

81. This obviously puts *ille* at the opposite side of strategies such as "zero anaphora". There is discussion whether this is also a distinctive feature with respect to the "connecting relative" (different texts in fact give different results; cf., in particular, Bolkestein 1996 and Rosén 1999: 172–173). This label refers to the anaphoric strategy obtained by means of a relative pronoun introducing a clause which does not answer the traditional criteria defining the syntactic dependence on a nominal: Caes. *Gall.* 3,28,1: *eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant qui in armis essent, neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse, eo exercitum duxit. qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere instituerunt* (for discussion cf. Blatt 1952: 19; Touratier 1980: 408–452; Kurzová 1981: 12, 47, 71; Lavency 1981; Lehmann 1984: 284–285; Longrée 2002; Álvarez Huerta 1996; Pennell Ross 1996; Rosén 1999: 165–173; Bolkestein 2001; see Pompei, this work, vol. 4). The thesis that the extension and frequency of the connecting relative is linked with the fact that Latin had no article is reasonable from a functional perspective (Calboli 1985): the connecting relative would in fact have covered the functional domain which in Romance languages it shares with articles. This does not imply, however, a direct relation between the decline of the connecting relative in Late Latin and the (future) emergence of the article (Rosén 1999: 173).

82. The terms are those of Dik's Functional Grammar, since data and considerations concerning such phenomena, to which we refer, are mainly developed in this framework.

(154) Cic. *Att.* 1,16,3: *pauci tamen boni inerant, quos reiectione fugare ille non potuerat*
‘still there were a few good people (on the jury), that he (the defendant) had not been able to get rid of by challenge’

(155) Caes. *Gall.* 5,45,3–4: *hic seruo spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat. has ille iaculo inligatas effert*
‘he persuades a slave to deliver a letter to Caesar, giving him hope of freedom and great rewards. The man carried out the letter attached to a javelin’

On the contrary, though *hic* and *is* as subjects may be also found in contrastive contexts,[83] their unmarked function is as resumptive pronouns after the introduction of entities by means of the pragmatically marked Theme constituents, in which case *ille* is dispreferred (cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 187):

(156) Cato *agr.* 157,3: *cancer ater, is olet*
‘a black tumor, that smells’

Is, in particular, being an anaphoric pronoun, typically has a Topic-continuing function.

The emphatic value of *ille* is not limited to the function of subject pronoun, but may also be found in adnominal use (157) and in complex noun phrases such as (158):

(157) Catull. 4,1: *phaselus ille, quem uidetis, hospites*
‘that light ship which you see, visitors’

(158) Ov. *trist.* 5,7,55–56: *ille ego Romanus uates – ignoscite, Musae! / Sarmatico cogor plurima more loqui*
‘I myself, the Roman poet – forgive me, Muses! have to tell most things in the Sarmatian language’

83. This nevertheless happens in more limited contexts and especially when they trace back to a “topic-to-be” antecedent (future topic), i.e., to an element which has been introduced into the discourse by a presentative strategy: Caes. *ciu.* 3,108: *erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius . . . is. . . indignari coepit . . .*

Fundamentally, the expressions where adnominal *ille* activates a referent on the basis of the shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, as in the recognitional use (Himmelmann 1996; for Latin, cf. Bolkestein 2001: 116; see Note 8), are founded on this same emphatic value:

(159) Plaut. *Men.* 57–58: *Epidamniensis ill', quem dudum dixeram, / geminum illum puerum qui surrupuit alterum*
'that man from Epidamnum, the one I mentioned some time ago, the one who carried off the other twin'

A subtype of this is the stereotyped use of *ille* in contexts where it means "the famous, well-known":[84]

(160) Cic. *Att.* 1,12,1: *Teucris illa lentum sane negotium*
'that Teucris is indeed a slow coach'

From the point of view of informational structure, the recognitional use, though presupposing some shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, is used for low topical (or even new) participants which need to be introduced or re-introduced into the discourse. This is the reason why it is often accompanied by a *you know?* or *remember?* type of tag question. Nevertheless, though this use is found in contexts which show "the tendency to incorporate additional anchoring or descriptive information" (Himmelmann 1996: 230), relative clauses and other modifiers are frequent but not diagnostic for the type. It is also worth noting that the association of the recognitional use with the demonstrative which is negatively marked in deictic terms is crosslinguistically common.

Whereas *ille* appears to be the devoted element for the recognitional function, the pronouns *is* and *hic* turn out to be much more frequent for discourse deixis (here meant *lato sensu*, as reference to events and propositions)

84. This type is sometimes recognized in some passages from Plautus, though the value of cases such as Plaut. *Amph.* 861: *ego sum ille Amphitruo, quoii est* ... could in fact be described as an ordinary instance of contrastive *ille*: this interpretation seems to be supported by the fact that the referent is not mentioned for the first time (cf. Fontán 1965: 88ff.). More generally, it is worth emphasizing that recognitional uses are likely to be only one of the manifestations of the emphatic value of *ille*.

than *ille*[85] (at least in narrative and expository texts, as shown, again, by Bolkestein and van de Grift 1994 and Bolkestein 2001).[86] As noted in Section 2.2.1, *iste* is also common in this use, mainly in dialogic texts, as can be seen in Plautus' comedies, which reveal that, whereas less frequent than *hic* in absolute terms, its use for discourse deixis is at the core of its functionality (in particular, *iste* appears as the only option available for discourse deixis *stricto sensu*, i.e., for reference to the addressee's text, whereas for entities mentioned by the addressee there is obviously more choice: cf. de Jong 1998 and example (31) in Section 2.2.1). Instances of *hoc* and *id* referring to propositions and events (within a discourse produced by the same speaker) here follow:

(161) Plaut. *Amph.* 256–261: *postridie in castra ex urbe ad nos ueniunt flentes principes, / uelatis manibus orant, ignoscamus peccatum suom: / deduntque se, diuina humanaque omnia, urbem et liberos / in dicionem atque in arbitratum cuncti Thebano poplo. / post ob uirtutem ero Amphitruoni patera donata aureast, / qui Pterela potitare rex est solitus. haec sic dicam erae*
'the following day their foremost men come crying from the city to our camp, they implore us, with their hands covered, to forgive their transgression: they all surrender themselves, their entire possessions

85. Leaving apart that the "discourse deictic" use of *is* and the rarity of *ille* in this context could invite a terminological revision (is discourse deixis deictic?), it is to be ascertained whether and how all this relates to the fact that *ille* and not *is* was going to develop as a third person pronoun. Crosslinguistic studies simply stress that the discourse deictic function and the third person pronoun show a strong tendency not to combine in the same element, probably as a consequence of the type of referents involved.

86. Interestingly enough, the markedness of *ille* for discourse deixis (here meant in the broad sense) is reduced, in absolute terms, if we isolate those cases in which the pronoun is coreferential with a complement clause. On the basis of the sample analyzed by Bodelot (1996), in such cases *ille* is the least marked pronoun after *hic*, in particular in didactic discourse (i.e., philosophic texts and Lucretius' *de rerum natura*). However, *ille* remains less versatile than *is* and *hic*: for instance, though all the pronouns are mainly cataphoric in this use, *ille* is almost excluded from anaphora. This seems again to be linked with its contrastive function, which also emerges from the frequent co-occurrence (three-fourths of the cases collected by Bodelot) with an adverb or particle which marks some kind of gradation or comparison: Sen. *epist.* 22,3: *censeo aut ex ista uita tibi aut e uita exeundum. sed item illud existimo, leni eundum via . . .*

sacred and profane, their city and their children to the Theban people to have and to hold as they deem fit. For his valor, my lord Amphitruo is presented with a golden bowl, from which king Pterelas used to drink. This is how I will tell these things to my mistress'

(162) Plaut. *Amph.* 46–48: *sed mos numquam illi fuit patri meo / ut exprobraret quod bonis faceret boni: / gratum arbitratur esse* <u>*id*</u> *a uobis sibi* . . .
'it never was a habit of my father to reproach good people by reminding them of the good he did for them; he thinks you are grateful to him for that . . . '

These examples also show that the difference between deictic demonstratives such as *hic* and *iste* and the demonstrative *is* may correlate with a contextual difference, which is verified at least as concerns Plautus' dramas, viz. the former may have a generic, vague reference to what has been said or to the topic which is talked about, whereas the latter tends to refer to precisely identifiable constituents (de Jong 1998: 29; cf. Fugier 1991).

The deictic feature is likely to be also responsible for the fact that *hic* (but fundamentally not *is*) may be used to summarize and close off a preceding segment: consider the next example, which follows a whole paragraph of news about legislation, Cicero's role in it, and the behavior of the consuls.

(163) (= 4) Cic. *Att.* 1,19,5: <u>*haec*</u> *sunt, ut opinor, in re publica*
'that is all, I think, in the way of public affairs'

To sum up, evidence shows that the reasons for the choice of one or the other strategy as regards discourse deixis do not basically differ from those singled out in case of reference to entities. The three demonstratives imply a deictic trait which allows, in principle, independence from intratextual coreferential elements (possibly in addition to a tracking value), whereas the use of *is*, as well as the connecting relative (cf. Note 81), appears as a tracking strategy which does not enjoy such independence. Consistently, the recognitional use appears to be related to the typical emphatic value of *ille*. More in general, Fugier (1974) shows that there is an inverse proportional relationship between the "effectiveness" of the anaphoric strategies (which increases throughout the series which goes from zero anaphora to *inquam* [cf. Note 36] to *is* to *hic/iste/ille*) and the "faithfulness" of anaphora, which is at its maximum

when a second nominal (possibly, but not necessarily, helped by anaphoric means) is the exact repetition of the first (cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 243–244: *equites* → *equites*), and at its minimum when the second nominal consists of a noun of quality tracing back to someone (cf. Cic. *Phil.* 13,11: *Antonius* → *ille helluo*). In this case, a demonstrative is necessarily required (cf. also Bolkestein 2002). All this would seem to support the idea that contextual uses are a consequence rather than an explanation of more subtle functional features.

Moreover, it is evident that the analysis of the pragmatic functions of both the tracking elements and their antecedents may also shed light on their preferential position in the clause. For instance, in the case of *ille*, a large majority of instances are sentence-internal, whereas *hic* definitely prefers sentence-initial position. Linear order is only a superficial manifestation of functions which are to be analyzed independently. For instance, sentence-initial position is favored by the resumptive function as well as by "discourse-deictic" uses, which are more frequent with *hic*, less so with *is*, and are scarcely attested with *ille*. In other words, as crosslinguistic comparison shows, a purely linear approach, though computing the frequency of mention and the distance between tracking elements and antecedent, is insufficient, and non-linear factors must necessarily be taken into account, for information-structure as well (Pennell Ross 1996; Bolkestein 2000).

Eventually, a remark is worth making on a common function of demonstratives (i.e., of the series *hic*, *iste*, *ille* and of *is*), which confirms their common paradigm, though obviously the choice of one or the other depends on the contextual factors described above. This consists in their being typical markers of nominals: in fact, when they are adjoined to elements different from nominals, they have a substantivizing effect. Such a function clearly emerges in those cases where a piece of text is used metalinguistically (cf. Rosén [1994: 132–133], in particular on the metalinguistic function of *hic* in Varro's grammar, for instance to explicit grammatical gender of invariable elements):

(164) Plaut. *Amph.* 371–372: *non edepol uolo profecto.* :: *At pol profecto ingrati⟨i⟩s. / Hoc quidem 'profecto' certumst, non est arbitrarium.*
'I object, naturally. :: Oh well, naturally that is immaterial. My "naturally" at least is a cold hard fact, no matter of opinion'

(165) Plaut. *Mil.* 819: *illud* ‘*stert*[*er*]*it’ uolui dicere*
‘I meant to say “snores”’

(166) Plaut. *Amph.* 529–530: *Tace, / ne corrumpe oculos, redibo:* ‘*actutum*’. :: *Id* ‘*actutum’ diu est*
‘Hush! Don’t spoil your eyes, I shall be back “soon”. :: That “soon” is a long, long time’

It goes without saying that, at least as concerns the classical use, this is a fundamental difference between the series *hic/iste/ille/is*, on the one hand, and *ipse*, on the other.

A use which is linked with the function of marking nominals is the occurrence in structures in which the demonstrative, as a *Gelenkpartikel* (cf. Gamillscheg 1937), supports an appositive to the noun, as in (167): this use, however, is in fact typical of *ille*.

(167) Cic. *de orat.* 3,194: *Antipater ille Sidonius quem tu probe, Catule, meministi, solitus est uersus hexametros aliosque uariis modis atque numeris fundere ex tempore*
‘Antipater of Sidon, whom you, Catulus, can remember well, had a habit of pouring out hexameters and other verses of various forms *impromptu*’

5. Notes on the emergence of new categories

A significant amount of literature has been devoted to the genesis of new categories in Romance, primarily the article and clitics. As far as Latin is concerned, most scholars have focused on the contexts which allow the individuation of an increasing use of the Latin precursors and on the comparability of these uses with their Romance counterparts. It would be impossible to go into the details of this extensive body of research and of its accurate documentation. The purpose of this final section is simply to hint at some questions which would be still worthy of consideration, taking the point of view which considers the genesis of categories not as a consequence of the frequency of structures, but as an effect of the emerging need for overt (and lexical) manifestation of specific syntactic functions.

5.1 On the emergence of articles

All Old Romance languages show a determinative article in normal use, though with slightly varying degrees of regularity. The sources for Romance articles are the least marked demonstrative and the identity predicate: though *ille* is the source which has been preferred in the long run, *ipse* is usually considered the older layer of the article category (cf. Aebischer 1948 for the distribution of the two in medieval times and Renzi 2000, in particular, on the history of *ipse* up to Romance).

In spite of many attempts to show that some of the conditions which define the article category are met in Latin, the questions whether and when a true category article is attested in Latin are still disputed,[87] as it is controversial whether talking about "articloïds" might help the discussion (cf., among the others, Aebischer 1948; Väänänen 1981; Orlandini 1981: 230, 1992: 197; Christol 1994). This section will therefore disregard the chronological issue concerning the first attestations of article or article-like forms (cf., among the others, Dauzat 1949; Abel 1971; L. Löfstedt 1981; Calboli 1990, 2000 – in particular as concerns the Merovingian texts – and the discussion in Schmitt 1987), and the following remarks are simply devoted to the analysis of the functional traits (of *ille* and *ipse*) which are related with the emergence of the new category.

In the long-lasting and still lively discussion, some specific contexts have been pointed out as meaningful for the shift which leads from *ille* to the article. In the preceding section, we have already hinted at the innovation constituted by the remarkable use of adnominal *ille* in cataphoric relation with a relative clause in texts such as the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (Renzi 1976; Nocentini 1990; Vincent 1998) and even before (for instance, in the *Itinerarium Burdigalense*; cf. Zamboni 2000: 116), though the bare noun as antecedent of a rel-

87. In particular, as concerns the attestation of *ille* (and *ipse*) in the larger situational use (i.e., in "the first mention of entities that are considered to be unique, and hence generally identifiable, in a given speech community" [Himmelmann 2001: 833]) and in the associative anaphoric use (i.e., in "the first mention of an entity which is not unique per se but with respect to a previously mentioned referent" [Himmelmann 2001: 833]). At least as concerns the "generic" use of articles, however, it might well be one of the latest stages in the development of the category (cf. Lerch 1940; Orlandini 1981).

ative clause remains the unmarked option (Väänänen 1987: 51; Fruyt 2003). In fact, most of these cataphoric structures may be considered instances of the typical emphatic value of *ille*, contextually definable as recognitional uses (*stricto* or *lato sensu*) (cf. Fruyt 2003: 109 in particular). Therefore, they do not prove that *ille* is an article nor an "articloïde" in the *Itinerarium Egeriae* (Väänänen 1987: 51; Christol 1994: 146) and rather attest a "high-frequency demonstrative" (for this notion, cf. Himmelmann 1997: 54, 100), favored by the text type:

(168) *Itin. Eger.* 49,3: *intra qua ecclesia est spelunca illa in qua docebat Dominus apostolos*
'and in this church there is the cavern where Our Lord taught to the apostles'

(169) *Itin. Eger.* 3,8: *ita infra nos uidebantur esse illi montes, quos primitus uix ascenderamus*
'those mountains, which we had climbed before, appeared so below us ...'

Though this use is not innovative at all in itself, the generalization of *ille* for it nevertheless appears as an effect of its extension as a marker of emphasis (on the relevance of emphatic context for the spreading of *ille*, cf. Trager 1932; Kurzová-Jedličková 1963): as happens, the generalization of a structure implies, together with frequency, its bleaching. This is likely to be the reason why this context has been considered as one of those revealing the path which would have led to the article.[88]

It is worth noting that contexts such as (168), which involve a restrictive relative clause, may be well analyzed as composed of a noun plus a predicative unit (i.e., the relative clause), within which the demonstrative pronoun performs the function of argument. This structure does not differ substantially from the corresponding restrictive relative clause not headed by the demonstrative: simply, it makes the argumental function explicit, possibly because of emphasis. From this point of view, the demonstrative in (168) shares a

88. From a typological perspective, Himmelmann (1997) argues that articles come from recognitional rather than from tracking uses. In fact, this context is a privileged one for the observation of one of the functions which are typical of articles.

functional trait with the so-called *Gelenkpartikel*, which is the element with the function of linking a nominal with an apposed (adjectival, nominal, introduced by a preposition, etc.) predicate, i.e., with the function of an ἄρθρον in the original sense of the word (Gamillscheg 1937; cf. Lerch 1940; Rosén 1994; Nocentini 1996). This is a classical use as well (cf. (167)), where *ille* may be considered as a pronoun which supports the following predicative unit: in functional terms, its argument (i.e., the subject) (on the possible definition of *Gelenkpartikeln* as pronouns, cf. Parenti 2004).

This is also the conceptual link with other contexts which are traditionally invoked in relation with the emergence of the article category: *ille* + participles, *ille* + *talis, alter* and the like, *ille* + numerals (cf. Wolterstorff 1917, 1920; Ernout & Thomas 1964; Orlandini 1981, 1992, 1995), as, for instance, in:

(170) Petron. 115: *illum bellantem arma decipiunt*
'arms betray the man who fights'[89]

(171) Plaut. *Mil.* 168: *nihili facio quid illis faciat ceteris*
'I do not care what he does to the rest of them'

(172) Sall. *Iug.* 16,5: *illam alteram... Adherbal possedit*
'Adherbal was given the other (part)'

None of these contexts is a late innovation. In fact, they simply reveal a common function between the (unmarked) demonstrative and the article. Probably for this reason, they are liable to be taken as the place where the phenomenon takes place, whereas they are likely to be simply the contexts which enlighten a common functional trait. Following suggestions by Rosén (1994) and Giusti (2001; cf. Giusti 1993: 45–48; Renzi 1987, 1992, 1997; Orlandini 1995) and, specifically, the functional analysis suggested by La Fauci and Mirto (2003: in particular, 80–84) and La Fauci (2003),[90] it would seem rea-

89. The wider context interestingly shows how the presence of *ille* in this context use is not mandatory: *Illum bellantem arma decipiunt, illum diis uota reddentem penatium suorum ruina sepelit. Ille vehiculo lapsus properantem spiritum excussit, cibus auidum strangulauit, abstinentem frugalitas.*

90. Giusti (2001) precisely argues for an "argumentizing" function of the article, whereas it could also be suggested that the article simply makes explicit a functional relation

sonable to accept the hypothesis that the article makes the argumental function of the nominal explicit, exactly as it evidently does when it combines with a non-nominal category. The so-called "substantivizing" function is in fact typical of articles in languages which have them (as it was of demonstratives in Latin) and it would seem an economical assumption that the function of articles does not differ substantially in case it combines with a non-nominal element and with a nominal element.

In principle, the hypothesis could be developed further: according to Meyer-Lübke (1899: 173ff., 1920: 212; cf. Orlandini 1992, 1995: 119;[91] Rosén 1994; Vincent 1998), articles first emerge in relationship with the subject function (both for developments and critiques, cf. Renzi 1976: 19–20; Rosén 1994: 140; Vincent 1998: 431–432). It could therefore be worth verifying whether adnominal *ille* also shows a preferential relationship with subject arguments and, more specifically, whether this marking concerns a specific subset of subjects. According to Rosén (1994), for instance, on the basis of Augustine's *Confessiones*, a relation may be established between the occurrence of *ille* and postverbal subjects. Though highly speculative at this stage of the research, the hypothesis could be also made that the preferential occurrence in such contexts is related to the emphatic (focalized, rhematic) value of these nominals in the clause (cf., in particular, Selig [1990: 225–234], who illustrates the use of *ille* with first mentioned entities in the sixth to eighth century *Vitae*). In the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, this preferential relation seems to emerge in existential and presentative structures. Consider (168), (169), and the following:

(173) *Itin. Eger.* 5,3: *monstrauerunt etiam locum ubi factus est* <u>*uitulus ille*</u>
'they showed us the place where the calf was built'

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inherent in the nominal category, which, as such, consists of both a predicative and an argumental function; cf. Note 92 below.

91. According to Orlandini (1992), the preference for subjects is linked with the fact that nominative is the most accessible function for relativization. More in general, Orlandini suggests a correlation among the various contexts described (antecedent of a relative, *Gelenkpartikel*, occurrences with participles and numerals, etc.) in semantic terms, arguing that *ille* functions as a strategy of relativization and restriction of the discourse universe. Though from a different perspective, this idea and the hypothesis of an argumental function would seem to support each other.

In spite of the fact that these contexts are only preferential for the occurrence of nominals marked by *ille* (and the evidence should be confirmed by detailed analysis of a wider corpus), they suggest the hypothesis that the occurrence of *ille* is first favored in cases in which a marked correlation between functions and categories is met. The unmarked association is in fact the one between noun, theme, and argument. In other words, the hypothesis could be made that these nominals, which combine both an argumental and a predicative function,[92] could be marked for both: in particular, the predicative function could be marked, for instance, by linear order and the argumental function by the presence of the demonstrative. Therefore, without denying the logical aptness of the subject being topic and *notum* (Orlandini 1981: 242–243) and the relationship between the establishment of the category article and the

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92. As argued by La Fauci (2000a), [± argument] and [± predicate] should be considered as functional traits which, as such, may either correlate with different elements in the clause or even combine in one and the same element. On the basis of the considerations developed by Rosen (1987), who suggests that nominals consist inherently of both an argumental and a predicative relation, La Fauci and Loporcaro (1997) and La Fauci (2000b: 21–39) suggested that existential structures are the projection of the internal structure of a nominal into clause morphosyntax: the argumental and the predicative function, at least at the initial level of clause syntax, converge into the nominal, since the auxiliary, if any, is the predicate at the final level only. This explains the crucial difference from copular structures, where the argumental and the predicative function are fulfilled by two different nominals. Consider:

Erant omnino	*itinera duo* ...	(Caes. *Gall.* 1,6,1)	
	[+argumental]		
	[+predicative]		
Vita autem haec rustica ...	*iustitiae magistra*	*est* (Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 75)	
[+argumental]	[+predicative]		

As concerns "thetic" structures such as (173), the point in common with existential structures is evident in pragmatic terms. From a morphosyntactic point of view, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that the rhematic elements, in structures such as (173), could be considered as predicates at some level, exactly as in existentials (cf. Moro [1997: 232], who suggests, from a different perspective, that Romance VS unaccusatives contain a small clause, i.e., they are "the result of an incorporation of a lower predicate into a higher verb"). In other words, they would be a specific type of multi-predicate clauses (or "nominal unions"), according to the framework developed by Davies and Rosen (1988) and Rosen (1997).

function of making the theme-rheme structure explicit (a function which is mainly fulfilled in Latin by word order [cf. Nocentini 1990; Vincent 1998; Zamboni 2000: 116]),

> between the stage of Classical Latin, at which word-order coupled with the other tools [. . .] suffices to express definiteness, and the stage, at which there is a regular pronominal article, one expects an intermediary phase in which *ille* and sim. are required precisely when word-order and syntactic position do not suffice to render a noun definite or where position per se marks indefiniteness. This, logically, would be the correct point of departure of the definite article, at which *ille* functions as a device accessory to word-order, if not in complementary distribution with it. (Rosén 1994: 140)

The path of *ipse* towards the article starts from a very different point: however, its development as article is likely not to be directly connected with the function of identity predicate described in Section 3.5 and rather connected with its value as a synonym of *idem* and(/or) with its second-mention anaphoric function (or, in the terms of Vincent [1998], to its shift from a focus to a topic marker). Whether or not these second-mention anaphoric contexts, such as attested in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, might be considered as already attesting an article function (as suggested by Christol [1994]) or a demonstrative-like function which could be seen as an intermediate step between "intensifiers" and articles (cf. König 2001: 757), they certainly attest one of the functions which articles will perform and which was not performed by the intensifying identity predicate.[93] As a matter of fact, the function of *ipse* as a marker of the nominal category, with the consequent substantivizing effect, in fact also emerges:

93. Some quantitative evidence may be meaningful (Väänänen 1987; cf. Christol 1994): out of 240 occurrences of *ipse* in the *Itinerarium*, 34 are pronouns, 11 are "traditional" uses (cf. Trager 1932: 38), and the remaining attest various subtypes of anaphoric functions. Both the new function of *ipse*, which appears not far from an article, and its predominance in comparison with *ille* also emerge from the *mulomedicina Chironis* (cf. Durante [1981: 42–44], who, following a traditional line of research which has been attempted also as concerns the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, draws from this predominance some conclusions about the geographic origin of the text; but cf. the discussion in E. Löfstedt 1959: Ch. 3).

(174) Vet. Lat. *Ioh.* 20,4: *currebant* ... <u>*ipsi*</u> *duo simul*
'the two ran ... at the same time'

5.2 On the emergence of clitics

Just as with the emergence of the determinative article, the issue of the emergence of clitics presents a documentary difficulty: the effective Old Romance pronominal syntax cannot be traced back to Latin and the transition appears as a large qualitative jump between occurrences which foreshadow only to a certain extent the future developments and the first clearly Romance examples. The hypothesis that the Latin pronouns became proto-clitics at a given point in Late Latin has been argued by Wanner (1987) on the basis of quantified investigations of a wide Late Latin corpus which is supposed to show Proto-Romance features.[94] Wanner shows that, from the second century onwards, texts closer to spontaneous speech attest a constant increase in cases that are ambiguous between a second position pronoun placement and another, probably new pronoun placement principle which is verb-based.[95] However, this fact appears as an effect of some deep functional change rather than as an explanation or as an intermediary step in the path which will lead "systematic association of cl[itic] and V[erb] from latency to the status of a syntactic principle" (Wanner 1987: 237). In general, the logic that the fre-

94. Ramsden (1963) advanced the first pioneering hypothesis on this issue. This hypothesis can be summarized as the chronological sequence of three stages, whose main reflex in Latin is an increasing juxtaposition of the pronoun and the verb:
   (i) change in word order from SXOV to SVOX (subordinate clauses preserve final V position longer than main clauses);
   (ii) independently, the accent changes from musical to expiratory;
   (iii) analogical extensions.
   See Wanner (1987: 123ff.) for a critique.
95. It has also been claimed that, from the time of Classical Latin, the position after the first constituent was a "weak" (though not clitic) position, to be kept distinct from the position of "strong" pronouns, which could float in the Latin clause as well as nouns: the difference in positional restrictions could be in fact related to pragmatic factors, such as the opposition between thematic elements (weak pronouns) and focalized elements (strong pronouns) (cf. Salvi 2001). The starting point for the whole discussion is obviously Wackernagel (1892).

quency of a specific structure plays a role in language change may be queried, and frequency can be plausibly viewed as an effect rather than a cause for the emergence of structure types.

Though the causation is in fact difficult to find from the point of view of Latin, the way in which the new system works may at least be observed from the point of view of Romance, at which we can only hint here, limiting the discussion to one single theoric issue. Romance clitics occur in contexts in which Latin could have no pronoun at all and make explicit the nuclear relations of the predicate[96] (with the exception of the subject: Romance languages with subject clitics do not attest them in their ancient stages [cf. Vincent 1998; Salvi 2001]). This strongly suggests the idea that Romance clitics functionally make explicit, on verbs, the core argumental functions: as such, they are in a strict functional correlation with case. This does not mean that they follow the loss of case marking (a mechanical substitution in fact tallies with the evidence from many points of view), but they are in fact a strategy for encoding grammatical relations. Though clitics cannot be considered as verbal affixes (their relationship with the verb is considered as an "appui implanté", according to Bossong's [1998] typology [cf. also Nocentini 2003]), this would allow the consideration that the functional shift is from a system which primarily marks case relations on nouns to a system which primarily marks case relations on verbs. This is also observed in other domains, for instance in the case of nominal predicates, which in Latin could verify the subject by means of case agreement; in Romance, subjects are mainly verified by the finite verb morphology of auxiliaries. In other words, the category which retains nominal case inflection, i.e. clitics, survives and acquires a new function in verbal inflection (see, in particular, La Fauci 1997: 47). As a matter of fact, a progressive decrease of the strategy labelled "zero anaphora" may be observed in the history of Latin (cf. Section 3.2). Though we have no answer to the question why the need for this change became pressing, this view would also allow a parallel with the emergence of the article. On this view, both articles and clitics would emerge as

96. Obviously, we are concerned with clitics which fulfill a pro-argumental function and not with those which fulfill a pro-predicative function such as It. *lo è (bella)*. This latter issue will be disregarded here.

manifestations of the argumental function, though in different syntactic domains.

Actually, whereas the parallel between subject pronouns and articles also holds from the etymological point of view (both derive from *ille* and *ipse*), clitics have *ille* as their only source. The contrastive, therefore stressed, status of *ipse* is the reason suggested by Vincent (1998: 415). Perhaps, the observation could be added that *ipse* shows from the very beginning a strict relation with the subject function (Section 3.5.2), though the fact that it never extended to other pronominal functions remains a simple empirical observation.[97] As for *ille*, as we have repeatedly noted, Latin documents attest its extension in the domain of *is* (Section 3.5.3), but, even apart from this, its destiny as a third person pronoun was favored from the very beginning: in fact, it was in general the unmarked member (i.e., allowed in most context types) of the demonstrative category[98] and, in particular, it could fulfill the pronominal function independently of any explicit anchorage in the text (cf. (18)).

6. Summary and concluding remarks

In Latin, as in other languages, deictic and anaphoric strategies are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, *hic*, *iste*, *ille* keep their deictic value when used to refer to entities which are found in the text; on the other, none of them shows a limitation to the situational function. As a matter of fact, whereas deictic elements (i.e., elements which imply a relationship with the speech-act situation and, in particular, with those linguistic functions which the tradition uses to label "persons") are all available for anaphora, the reverse is not true. At least from this point of view, the common claim that deixis is (conceptually or chronologically) prior to anaphora (see already Hanks 1992; Cornish

97. The question whether the limitation to subjects directly depends from the syntactic context where *ipse* was in fact constrained to subjects (which we have labelled "alternative" in Section 3.5.1) could be worth considering.

98. With the exception of the discourse deictic use, but this would seem to be consistent with its use as a personal pronoun; cf. Note 85.

1996; Himmelmann 1997; Laury 1997) would appear to be groundless. Taking a functional perspective requires to leave aside the contextual distinction between reference to extralinguistic and to intralinguistic entities, however relevant it be for other types of descriptions, and to look for more subtle features: eventually, the crucial distinction turns out to be the distinction between the level of the speech act or utterance and the level of discourse. On the basis of the interaction between these two levels (and possibly more, for instance in indirect speeches), person and non-person need to be understood as linguistic functions rather than being trivially identified with physical persons (though they may, of course, be instantiated as such).

A functional point of view on grammatical person is favored in Latin by the fact that the third, i.e., non-person function may be fulfilled by various morphosyntactic strategies (which are nevertheless never synonymous) in the absence of a specific category. More than that, it is necessary to decompose the person function itself: in the system of deictic demonstratives, for instance, two elements may be proven to refer to the *ego*, i.e., *hic* and *iste*, but whereas *iste* correlates with the *tu*, *hic* does not. It follows that a distinction should be drawn between two manifestations of the *ego*, one referring to the speech-act level (and thus correlative with the *tu*), the other referring to the discourse level (non-correlative). Both the reference of *iste* to the *ego* and its inherent correlative value, which are proven on the basis of syntagmatic and paradigmatic combinations, are also confirmed by its association with the "emotive function" (as defined by Jakobson 1960), which is manifested, for instance, in derogatory contexts.

The tripartition of the deictic domain may be thus formalized according to a non-flat branching constituted by a hierarchical double bipartition ([±correlative] [±egocentric]) which describes marked and unmarked relations. *Iste* turns out to be the most marked member, the opposite of *ille*. These two terms in fact survive in Romance bipartite systems, which lose the lexeme manifesting the intermediate element from the point of view of markedness. If the characterization suggested is correct, it follows that the spatio-temporal orientation of entities is not the necessary ontological presupposition for the description of deictic systems. Obviously, as shown in a wide literature, spatio-temporal description is one of the privileged fields to which the relation between the *ego* and the *tu* applies: nevertheless, it is not necessarily a prime cause for such relations.

The necessity of decomposing categories also becomes evident when considering the pronominal category as a whole. Given the basic functional articulation of linguistic entities into predicative and argumental functions, the syntactic behavior of an element such as *ipse*, traditionally considered in the class of demonstratives together with the deictics, shows some crucial differences, namely, it shows a predicative function which is not limited to its adnominal use. The typological observation that "intensifiers", while behaving as focus particles in many respects, also "exhibit the morphological behavior of adjectives in a wide variety of languages" (König 2001: 747) could perhaps gain from a clearer assessment of the predicative value they show in the contexts where they occur. The fact that *ipse* requires a minimal combination with another element (which should be postulated virtually, when not explicit) also makes clear the relationship of *ipse* with reflexives, from which it crucially differs as concerns distribution. It is well-known that in languages which use the same expression for "intensifiers" and reflexive anaphors (for instance, English, Finno-Ugric, Turkic, Semitic, Indic, Persian, Mandarin Chinese), the two functions are distinguished distributionally and "reflexive anaphors occur in argument position other than the (matrix) subject position, whereas intensifiers occur in adjunct positions" (König 2001: 751).

Moreover, the relationship between lexical forms, meanings and functions is clearly not one-to-one. Therefore, different meanings should not lead to the multiplication of lexical items. In the case of *ipse*, its different meanings appear as an effect of the functional combinations (i.e., of syntax) and not as their componential basis. The direction from syntax to (morphology and) the lexicon would seem to be not only a diachronic path, as suggested by Givón (1971: 413) and as can be easily verified (for instance as concerns the new forms of the deictic demonstratives reinforced by *ecce*), but a theoretically comprehensive view. It seems clear, the loss of lexical distinctions has nothing to do with the relevance of functions, which may be kept distinct (and verified as distinctive) in spite of the lexical fusion.

The idea that functions and structures are not related in a mechanical way is also proven in the domain of other anaphoric strategies, such as agreement and reflexives. As for agreement, a normative perspective would lead to wonder why different structures may alternate and eventually to postulate basic and derived (or "exceptional") structures. Actually, if we adopt a functional perspective, different answers follow. The so-called "attraction" phenomena,

for instance, might be considered as manifestations of the cohesion among certain elements rather than among others. As concerns “long-distance” reflexives (and their opposition to non-reflexive pronouns), a clearly definable subset of cases appears related to the dependency relation between the main and the subordinate clause, which in fact turns out to be a complement clause, fulfilling an argumental function in relationship with the main predication. More generally, it can at least be hypothesized that the long-distance reflexive is a strategy to put clauses in the scope of one participant’s commitment, thus to ascribe them to (one of the levels of) discourse. Accordingly, a typology of reflexives cannot avoid the attempt to define the relevant syntactic domain in functional terms rather than in terms of constituency.

A point of view which puts the relation between function and form before both also favors consideration of “zero anaphora” as a peculiar implicit procedure, not to be misinterpreted as a substantial deficiency and rather to be seen as a luxury which Latin syntax could afford.

In spite of the fact that a basic continuity may be recognized until the Late texts for most domains which have been analyzed, the lines of fracture which run across the system – and may, in principle, foreshadow a new functional distribution – may be singled out. Given the marked and unmarked relationships in the demonstrative system, for instance, the bipartition based on the most marked and the least marked term, with two different functions combined in the first form, is a logical possibility. As regards *iste*, its occurrence in narrative contexts as a purely cohesive device in free alternation with *hic* appears to be a sign of a different organization, in which *iste* seems to have extended over the first person non-correlative deictic term, as will be attested in the Romance languages. This shift may, then, either imply a bipartite system, which neutralizes – at the lexical level – the distinction between the correlative and the non-correlative *ego*, or the re-determination of an element. It does this for instance by re-emphasizing the second function of the correlative *ego* (as in Tuscan *codesto < eccum tibi istum*); a new tripartion may be also created by means of *ipsum*, which in Late Latin fulfilled the function of an unspecified deictic (as in Sp. *ese*, Port. *esse < ipsum*). *Ipse* is in fact attested both in uses which extend over the domain of *idem* (and, therefore, of *is*) and in uses which finally absorb the expression of identity, resulting in a simple second-mention tracking function, which might be seen as the functional basis for the future developments of *ipse* as an article. The

functional regression of *is* may be observed, at least to a certain extent, also with respect to *ille*, which spreads over its functional domain, for instance, as antecedent of a relative clause.

On the other hand, it can be affirmed that none of the outputs is inconsistent with its origin. *Iste* had always been centered on the *ego* (the *tu*, which is relevant for its definition, is simply its paradigmatic alternant); *ille* had always been an emphatic tool and is nonetheless the unmarked form for the third person function (it could combine the anaphoric and the deictic trait); *ipse*, which loses its predicative value in those contexts which foreshadow its use as a pronoun, had nevertheless always had a privileged relationship with subjects, which is preserved in its Romance output as a subject pronoun (never as a non-subject clitic). This functional consistency (which, while neutralizing some features, keeps the distinctive value of some others) could in fact be one of the reasons of the "persistence" effect which has been observed in many of these changes (Vincent 1998: 433–434; cf. Hopper 1991: 22). However, it may be worth emphasizing that this functional persistence need not be meant as a semantic phenomenon and the various outputs, for instance, of demonstratives (articles, pronouns, new demonstratives, and possibly meaningful in several different ways: cf., on this last point, Klein-Andreau 1996) need not imply that the original semantics was as much complex: they simply manifest different systems of linguistic oppositions, which may then result into various superficial interpretations.

The specific paths and reasons for the emergence of the new Romance categories have been disregarded in this chapter and only a few questions have been raised from a perspective which looks at the functional correlations between systems without interpreting them as cause-effect relationships. Both articles and clitics appear as functionally-related with case: from the point of view of Romance, clitics may be reasonably claimed to be explicit markers of the core arguments. Consistently, the hypothesis could at least be advanced that the article fulfills the argument function within the internal structure of nominals. The hypothesis should nonetheless not be misunderstood as a mechanical substitution of articles and clitics for case. Rather, different forms appear available for one function (and the forms could in principle have coexisted, as they do, in fact, in many languages), as well as other functions of case may be performed by other formal devices (for instance, the obligatory finite auxiliary in unmarked declarative clauses with compound tenses).

Different forms for the same functions, more functions under the same forms, explicit emergence of functions which were covert, and obscuration of functions which were explicit: a never-ending realignment, under which and thanks to which language survives, disguising itself rather than changing.

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Subject index

Index of classical references

The index of classical references contains textual information on classical works cited in the text. Latin authors and their works are abbreviated according to the conventions of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (*ThLL*). Citations of early authors, especially those preserved in fragments, may vary. Since there is no standardized set of abbreviations for Greek, we have listed classical Greek authors by their full Latin name, preceded by a fully recognizable abbreviation (e.g. Xen. = Xenophon). Greek works are abbreviated so as to be maximally transparent to non-specialists. Biblical authors and works are included in the index, though other non-classical texts such as *El Cid* or *Don Quixote* are omitted. Index items from the Bible which are not marked as specifically from either the *Vulgate* or the *Vetus Latina* are listed by author or title, e.g. *Matth.*, or *iud.*